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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION. 

THE QUALITIES OF MEN. 

THE SUBCONSCIOUS. 

FACT AND FABLE IN PSYCHOLOGY. 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

Boston and New York 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 



THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF CONVICTION 



A STUDY 
OF BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES 

BY 
JOSEPH JASTROW 

PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

MDCCCCXVIII 



^:5 



COPYRIGHT, 1918, BY JOSEPH JASTROW 



ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



Published May iqiB 



MAY 29 1918 

©CI.A497539 



X7I 



IN MEMORIAM 
CHARLES SIMPSON PEIRCE 

MASTER LOGICIAN 

WILLIAM JAMES 

MASTER PSYCHOLOGIST 



PREFACE 

Thinking is an art, the art of logic; and thinking is an 
expression of our total mental nature, which brings 
it under the domain of psychology. Psychology is con- 
cerned with explaining how we incline to think; logic 
undertakes to lay down the law of how we must think 
if we would think correctly. The actual thinking that 
we do, whether true or false, strong or weak, original 
or commonplace, consistent or capricious, direct or 
rambling, is none the less thinking. The results are 
psychological specimens, however well or ill they stand 
the test of logic; they are all plants, whether weeds or 
flowers. In the standard patterns of thought, the proc- 
ess begins with premises and ends with conclusions, 
and requires some sort of bond to hold the two to- 
gether in an argument. Formally that is the whole pro- 
cedure; actually it is little more than a bare skeleton, 
lacking all the features of the flesh-and-blood reality. 

What makes it so is the distribution of our interests 
and the limitations of our mental nature. Primarily 
we are interested in conclusions; for they bear upon 
our conduct, our comfort, our emotional security. 
Thinking encounters — as it is stimulated by — the 
reaHty of facts and events, the complexity of experi- 
ence. We Uve under a practical stress; thinking must 
satisfy needs. We are ever thrown back upon our 
composite psychology. The tangible outcome of our 
taking thought is the reservoir of our convictions, that 
supplies the stream of action. The relation between 



viii PREFACE 

thinking and doing is elastic as well as complex. Think- 
ing may not decide, but merely incHne; it gives rise to 
beliefs and attitudes, tendencies toward conclusions, 
more or less tempered, beset by reservations, qualifi- 
cations, doubts, and counter-inclinations. Particularly 
are we moved by our emotions, our hopes and desires, 
more practically by our interests, always by our varied 
relations to the content of our thought. 

As a consequence, though we share a common order 
of reasoning and a common human nature, we reach 
very different conclusions, approach the same prob- 
lems in different attitudes, with different incUnations. 
Yet equally are we affected by the beliefs of others. 
Conviction is a social process, follows the herd instincts. 
Tradition and convention bear heavily upon us, and 
determine what we beUeve almost as rigidly as what 
we eat or what we wear. We are in the stream and are 
borne along by the general current, and caught in the 
eddies and tossed by the waves of our immediate sur- 
rounding. Still we must each sink or swim by our indi- 
vidual strokes of effort and give them the direction of 
our purpose. We cannot escape the obHgation of set- 
ting a course, and in following it we show the impress 
of our psychology, the loyalty of our minds. 

The subject of this volume is concerned with the 
interaction of our logical and our psychological nature. 
It attempts to deal with the psychology of our most 
complex logical products. It follows the "case " method 
as the only pragmatic procedure, the only one that does 
justice to the rich content of a concrete issue. In the 
course of the analysis principles emerge and are em- 
phasized; as in a trial at court, the judge and jury. 



PREFACE ix 

though concerned with evidence and argument, are 
guided by principles. The sweep is a wide one and in- 
cludes "cases" from the past, survivals into the pres- 
ent, of outgrown beliefs which still linger in strange 
persistence, popular beliefs in conflict with expert con- 
clusion, and the varied range of controversy in which 
protagonists contend for opposite verdicts upon much 
the same though differently selected evidence. Since 
many of the beliefs thus creditably sponsored must in 
the nature of things be more wrong than right, the 
analysis has to consider closely the psychology of fal- 
lacy and prejudice, the tendencies to wrong belief that 
make a strong appeal to our nature. ^ For like reason 
a comparative survey of the several belief processes in 
terms of their logical structure, introduces the study 
of the series of "cases." 

A supporting motive in the enterprise is to impress 
upon a generation over-impressed with the practical 
side of material achievement and the stern logic of 
events (so many of them plainly the complex issues of 
convictions that have become institutionally strong), 
the fundamental obligation of clear thinking, the 
moral obligation to be reasonable. Reasonableness is 
many-sided. It means a competent training in the 
process of evidence and argument; it implies a fair 
immunity from prepossession as well as from fallacy; 
it supposes a fair-mindedness, as much in the sporting 

* In an earlier volume. Fact and Fable in Psychology, I have con- 
sidered in more concrete manner a range of problems of more direct 
interest to psychology. Yet in some measure the present volume 
supplements the former one, and carries the same intention to dis- 
tinguish between the fact and the fable that are so complexly inter- 
woven in the fabric of our thought. 



X PREFACE 

as in the judicial sense; and a tempered and well-poised 
sense of proportion, which is the essence of sanity. At 
no time are these qualities so supremely necessary as 
in the critical times through which the convictions as 
well as the emotions of men are now passing. The 
world war has shaken convictions and made necessary 
an examination of foundations, and a fundamental in- 
quiry into the basis of those values that keep endeavor 
keen and civilization ahve. In such times we learn to 
cherish with an increasing fervor the convictions that 
sustain our national and our individual being. The 
shock to men's minds has been as serious as to their 
senses. That German minds could think as they do 
seems even more amazing than that German hands 
should be so infamously polluted with crime. The as- 
sault upon reason has been as savage and as deadly as 
the violation of law, of morahty, of decency, of honor, 
of humanity. The intellectual violation is the more 
responsible, since by its nature it emanates from the 
trained leaders, those by calling competent and vowed 
to the defense of the values of right thinking. The 
supreme importance of conviction is thus revealed in 
MacchiaveUian motive and pan-Germanic perspec- 
tive. But equally are the responsible nations of a mor- 
alized world determined to defend to the uttermost of 
their resources of mind and hand, of wealth and blood, 
the convictions that they are assured by all the evi- 
dence of time and faith, stand at the root of sane and 
humane living. 

No phase of the quickening of convictions that comes 
in war time can compare in significance with this source 
of our determination. But it is chastening to consider 



PREFACE xi 

also the lesser menace and the slighter lessons, inherent 
in the altered psychological attitude that war brings. 
They may all be regarded as temptations toward in- 
tolerance under emotional stress; and they find their 
correction in the conviction that sanity and keeping 
one's head are indispensable supports of an enduring 
patriotism. As an instance of one type of unreason I 
have considered in the concluding chapter the wide- 
spread distortion of the position of pacifists, which has 
swept over the country in a wave of inconsistency, mis- 
understanding, and maHce. That any word or deed, 
however slight or indirect, which in any measure inter- 
feres with the war efficiency of the nation, is to be unre- 
servedly condemned; that those who persist in it must 
be restrained by force if need be, — all this and more 
is admitted by practical-minded, loyal citizens. But to 
direct this animus blindly against those who repudiate 
with vehemence and indignation the attitudes ascribed 
to them, is peculiarly intolerant in a democratic com- 
munity. The most lenient explanation of the matter is 
that those guilty of the sin fail to distinguish between 
a principle and the mode of its application, and again 
that they fail to distinguish between patriotism and 
the approved manner of its expression. In a country 
that safeguards the right of opinion, men inevitably 
differ in their views of attitudes and policies that will 
best maintain the nation in its determination to win 
the war and win it rightly. When one body of loyal 
patriots attempts to impose its views upon another 
body of loyal patriots, the path of intolerance is ap- 
proached. Fortunately the wise authorities of the cen- 
tral government are alert to the menace and are taking 



xii PREFACE 

steps to check its spread. Fortunately, also, the good 
sense of the American people may be trusted to aid 
the recovery from a temporary lapse, under an intelli- 
gible provocation. 

War time demands that minor differences of opinion 
be set aside in favor of an indispensable unity of action; 
and by the same token it demands that no portion of 
the community be estranged from the common cause 
by a hostile attitude toward tenets and principles 
which in times of peace have contributed to the moral 
capitalization of the nation. Still more bindingly the 
same obligation rests upon advocates of views (in what- 
ever field of opinion) which the majority regard as 
false and dangerous, but which under ordinary condi- 
tions are accorded a tolerant hearing, though equally 
a vigorous protest under approved principles of con- 
troversy. A flagrant violation of this tolerance appears 
in the suit instigated by the anti-vivisectionists against 
the Red Cross organization to prevent the use of funds 
in the interests of medical research; and that means, 
to mitigate the sufferings and save the Uves of the vic- 
tims of war. To push a private prejudice against a 
public interest at this time and in this manner is an 
ignorant, obstinate, and malicious attack, inhumane 
and unpatriotic even though sincere; it is a tragic dem- 
onstration of the menace that lies in unreason. Though 
exceptional, the instance should be used to strengthen 
the forces of reason and loyalty. Convictions have too 
momentous a part to play in the winning of the cause 
of the pledged allies to permit any encroachment upon 
their sacred principles. It is this conviction that gives 
pertinence to the general consideration of our logical 



PREFACE xiii 

and psychological resources — the perfection of our 
intellectual munitions — at this critical period when 
right thinking must prove the powerful ally of right 
action. 

Most of the chapters have appeared in periodical 
form; all have been thoroughly revised, and some re- 
written in the interests of a more uniform presentation, 
and an adjustment to timely interests. Acknowledg- 
ments are made for permission to reprint as follows: 
To the Popular Science Monthly (now the Scientific 
Monthly) for the "Psychology of Conviction"; "The 
Antecedents of the Study of Character and Tem- 
perament "; "Fact and Fable in Animal Psychology "; 
to the Educational Review for "Belief and Credulity" 
and "The Democratic Suspicion of Education "; to the 
Review of Reviews for "The Case of Paladino"; to 
Hampton* s Magazine for "Malicious Animal Magne- 
tism"; to the Nineteenth Century for "The Will to Be- 
lieve in the Supernatural." The remaining essays have 
not appeared before, the printing of one of them having 
been delayed by the exigencies of the war. The obli- 
gation which I owe in the election of the theme and 
in the continued pursuit of the central problem that 
gives unity to the volume, is acknowledged upon the 
dedicatory page. The preparation of the manuscript 
for the press has had the critical care of my wife. 

Joseph Jastrow 

Madison, Wisconsin 
March 1918 



CONTENTS 

I. The Psychology of Conviction .... 1 

The forces playing upon conviction; imitation, conserva- 
tive tendencies, taboo, conformity, tradition; why men 
beUeve and what they believe. Emotion and convention; 
the f miction of conviction; logic, ethical, aesthetic regulation; 
relation to conduct. The "case" method; "cases" of inade- 
quate evidence; credulity and weak hypothesis. Theories 
of human nature; the temperaments; knowledge and wis- 
dom; "cases" of survival of cruder notions; belief in rare 
and occult power; middle ground between old-time credul- 
ity and present-day controversies. The psychology of con- 
troversial issues; the "case" of indulgence; the "case" of 
feminism; the "case" of pacifism. The personal aspects 
of conviction; social bearings of personal conviction; the 
Freudian interpretation of sources of conviction; Freudian 
mechanisms; compensation and the will to believe; ration- 
alization of motives; consistency and the pride in rational- 
ity; reserved areas of belief; attraction of irregular beliefs; 
the abnormal field. Logic and psychology in control of con- 
viction; the scientific realm. 

II. Belief and Credulity 37 

Logical evolution of belief; the fixation of opinion; mo- 
tives of tenacity, of authority, of inclination, of verifiability; 
their history, mode of their operation, and survival. Limi- 
tations of scientific application ; the sources of credulity. 
Types of credulity; prepossession and weak sense of proof. 
Credulity and deception; uncritical acceptance of fact; 
ready susceptibility to fallacy. The "case" of Taxil; the 
"case" of Kaspar Hauser; the "case" of Christian Science. 
The theoretical and the practical mind; theory and practice; 
their mutual dependence; the worth of theory; the limita- 
tions of practice; belief-standards; credulity as to fact re- 
sults from ignorance of principle. 



xvi CONTENTS 

III. The Will to BeLieve in the Supernat- 
ural 75 

Introductory; the satisfactions of belief; unrest of doubt; 
older belief -habits; survivals; the behef-attraction of phre- 
nology; the growth of inclination to beheve. The composite 
character of an individual's belief; critical and uncritical 
attitudes; tolerance and lax standards; reserved areas of 
belief. Personally centered and objective behefs; their in- 
compatibility; their mutual insulation. Beliefs entertained 
for motives of satisfaction; beliefs defended as verifiable; 
hypothesis of reconciliation. More delicate invasions of the 
will to believe; the value of acknowledging the inclination. 

rV. The Case of Paladino 101 

The history of Paladino; contradictory testimony; the 
logical principles of the "case." The exposure in New York, 
1910; the detailed modus operandi; positive detection and 
negative prevention. Previous exposures; various interpre- 
tations. The "medium" imposes the conditions; offering 
of prize transfers authority over conditions to rightful place; 
loyalty to logic would make investigation needless. The 
temper of acceptance; the national temperaments; most 
testimony valueless; the attitude required for detection. 
The tendency to credit such performances responsible for 
much of their ready acceptance; the influence of favoring 
hypotheses. The public interest; prestige; objective stand- 
ards of beUef; social value of dramatic exposure. 

V. The Antecedents of the Study of Charac- 
ter AND Temperament 128 

A type of belief with ancient past and slow evolution, 
alike in knowledge and in logic; the persistent interest in 
hmnan nature; Greek origins. The doctrine of the tempera- 
ments. Hippocrates ; "spirit" theory of disease; astrology, 
folk-lore, and the humoral doctrine; Hterary and popular 
expressions of "humors." Physiognomy; extravagant no- 
tions of Cardan and Porta. The system of Lavater; limita- 
tions of impressionism; degradation of physiognomy. Gall 
and Spurzheim, founders of phrenology; the assumptions of 
phrenology; Gall as a physiologist; Braid and phreno-hyp- 



CONTENTS xvii 

notism. The career of phrenology; practical applications; 
extravagant absurdities. The sources of psychology; rigid 
standards of evidence; knowledge of nervous function; the 
scientific era. The anthropological interest; the interest of 
comparative psychology; the study of character; fusion of 
these interests. 

VI. Fact and Fable in Animal Psychology . 173 

Sentimental and logical attitude toward intelligence of 
animals. Psychological criteria; analysis of growth of mind 
in the child; decisive contrast to animal limitations. The 
performing horse; extravagant pretensions and simple 
tricks; inconsistency of belief in marvelous powers of 
trained animals; the evidence from errors. The tendency to 
credit marvels; the uncritical attitude; self-deception. 

VII. "Malicious Animal Magnetism" . . . 191 

"M. A. M." as Mrs. Eddy's personal delusion; the sources 
of the belief; ancient superstition and folk-lore survival; 
mesmerism and "animal magnetism." Mrs. Eddy's indebt- 
edness to Quimby; mesmeric manipulations; the incorpo- 
ration of the notion in "Christian vScience"; the victims of 
the beliefs of "M. A. M." Diagnosis of Mrs. Eddy; para- 
noiac sentiments. Revival of the belief in the Christian 
Science Church; its relations to Mrs. Stetson. Benevolent 
"absent treatment" finds its counterpart in "M. A. M."; 
the pernicious belief resisted; the reserved acceptance by 
Mrs. Eddy's followers, of the principles of Christian Science 
and of her personal vagaries; the true psychology and false 
philosophy of mental healing. 

Vni. The Democratic Suspicion of Education 218 

Introduction to the psychology of controversial issues. 
The older suspicion of learning; the shifting relations of 
theory and practice. The democratic control; the role of the 
universities; in Europe and America. Democratic provi- 
sions for education; the retention of university control by 
an external body; political influence. The democratic em- 
phasis of practical knowledge; insistence upon results; em- 
ployment of learning in subordinate capacity. The conflict 



xviii CONTENTS 

of public service and private control; the political suspicion 
of education; internal control the solution. 

IX. The Psychology of Indulgence: Alcohol 

AND Tobacco 246 

The special psychology of a practical controversy. Phys- 
iological side of the "cases" of alcohol and tobacco; food- 
value and zest- value; discriminating appreciation and indul- 
gence; undiscriminating antipathy and prohibitory meas- 
ures; parallel "cases" of anti- vaccination and anti-vivi- 
section; technical interests and sane regulation. Judicial 
type of opposition; moral denunciation and aesthetic objec- 
tion; the legitimacy of sentiment; Puritanism and tolerance; 
the sympathetic court of indulgence. The need-and-satis- 
f action motives of indulgence; the attitude and environ- 
ment of indulgence; the temperamental factor; the holiday 
mood; conflict of morahty and indulgence. The psychology 
of suppression; the Freudian view; the release of tensions; 
tolerance and abuse, their regulation; the redemption by the 
setting. 

X. The Feminine Mind 280 

The several phases of the "woman question." The nature 
of the feminine endowment; the biological, the academic, and 
the worldly interpretations. Natural and nurtural common 
sex traits; derivative traits; heredity and original sources of 
power; food, sex, and play; natural and acquired values. 
Early setting of mascuhne and feminine qualities; the sex 
ardor and mental aggressiveness of the male; nurture reen- 
forces nature; the infusion of transferred pursuits by original 
zest. The feminine psychology; larger affectability; qualities 
of courtship and mothering; their transfer and the feminine 
technique. The intellectual sphere; the central logical 
powers and the supporting psychological traits. The evi- 
dence of tests; special and general tests; their interpretation; 
tests of achievement; vocation selection and fitness; the 
composite sources of achievement; disqualification by con- 
vention; quahties and their expression. Feminism and au- 
thentic sex differences; the protest against disqualification; 
civilization and transformed masculine and feminine traits; 
the division of labor; the masculinization of industry; mis- 



CONTENTS 

leading assumptions; educational, social, and political re- 
strictions; women's rights; the cultural services of men and 
women; feminism and pacifism. 

XI. Militarism and Pacifism 

The issue as a conflict of interests, of political rule, and 
of ideas; the right of psychology to a voice. The values at 
stake; the uncertainty of the terms; injustice of extreme 
positions; war disturbs the judicial attitude; the need of 
preserving other values; the limitations imposed by war; 
the conflict of ends and means; the sanction of the Allied 
cause. The distorted view of pacifism; the logical paradox; 
pacifistic reservations; analogous interactions of principle 
and practice; the several objections to the world war; the 
proportion of pacifist objection; the perversion of prejudice. 
The principles of militarism; the German upholders: Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Treitschke, Bernhardi ; their disciples. The tem- 
pered case for militarism; political service and the " great illu- 
sion " ; economic forces and internationalism ; the philosophy 
of force ; elimination of war and the impairment of the po- 
litical structure ; substitutes for war and their limitations ; 
the spirit of their administration. The moral benefits of 
war; the losses; retention of benefits in other service; the 
moralization of war derived from the gains of peace; the ter- 
rible moral degradation proves extreme menace of militarism. 
The pacifist movement; anti-militarism; constructive poli- 
cies; the diflBculty of establishment or refutation of claims; 
the uncertain bearing of precedents; significant lesson from 
the outgrown causes of war; summary of pacifist arguments; 
the appeal to conviction. The institutional tendencies of 
pacifism and militarism; the congeniality of mihtarism and 
absolutism, of pacifism and democracy; judicious interpre- 
tation; diflSculty of distinguishing between defense and of- 
fense; the limitations of force; the German assault on mili- 
tarism; the international spirit and the claims of reason. 

Index 



XIX 



I 

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 



A NOTABLE contribution of the world convulsion of 1914 
and thereafter is to the psychology of conviction. It 
has been made plain as never before that the strength 
and directions of men's convictions — authoritatively 
formulated in loyalties — furnish the decisive motive 
power of the world's energies. Under this stimulus the 
need of inquiry into the mental processes that generate 
and direct convictions becomes increasingly imperative. 
There can be no question where beginnings lie. The 
original source of conviction is emotion. In terms of the 
world's crisis, the modus vivendi of nations is still expres- 
sible in Mr. Wells's phrase: a "convention between 
jealousies," and jealousy is an intense and disturbing 
emotion. The initial factor in the genesis of conviction 
is the rivalry between reason and emotion. Convictions 
are commonly and rightly considered as products of 
rational consideration; they testify to the distinctive 
quality of the human mind — conceived and glorified 
as the instrument of thought, the creator of civilization. 
In this view the progress of science unfolds as the tri- 
umph of reason. Fundamentally it is true that the pat- 
tern of conviction is designed and wrought of reason's 
thread, but not simply so. The design deviates, the 
workmanship is irregular, as thinking is emotionalized 
and favors the desired conclusion. 



8 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

The psychology of conviction surveys the play of 
forces that shape the aims of men, however fine-spun 
or rough-hewn. The spirit of the survey is analytic; its 
method utilizes the historic retrospect, studying beliefs 
that once have lived and flourished, but interprets them 
by insight into the motives of convictions warmly vital, 
pragmatically alive, dispensing mingled profit and loss. 
Living beHefs, cherished and effective, alone supply 
adequate specimens for study. Their analysis is vivi- 
sectional, yet proceeds upon a competent control of 
established anatomical and physiological relations. 

To reach convictions implies an impulse toward 
thinking; it implies the elementary data of experience, 
and the standard social environment in which beHefs 
operate and determine conduct. With these assumed, 
attention may be focused at once upon a constant, 
world-old and ever active factor, which may be called 
docility, contagion, complacency, imitation, convention 
— one and all of a nature compact. In this broader 
view, men's convictions, generation by generation, have 
been accepted traditionally, as they still are. In every 
direction of inquiry, beliefs have been embraced, and 
have kept thinking ahve, that to later, more enlightened 
views appear strange, fanciful, and irrational. Most 
generally, people have believed and continue to believe 
what they are told and taught to believe. In terms of 
efl&ciency this factor in the psychology of conviction 
dwarfs all others, and may throw them out of perspec- 
tive. Men of affairs as well as psychologists must con- 
tinue to reckon with this comprehensive and insist- 
ent — whether wise or unwise — imitative-conservative 
tendency. Its field of operation is wide. In the inter- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 3 

pretation of nature and man's place in it; in the inti- 
mate contact with animals as quarry, as beasts of bur- 
den, and as companions; in the regulation of human 
intercourse — of family and tribe, of industry and con- 
quest; in the formulation of myth and the constructions 
of religion; in the establishment of the social order, the 
dominant procedure by which uniformity is obtained 
is that of unquestioning acceptance; as in the practical 
domain of customs and morals, it is a like-minded ten- 
dency to conformity. In regard to these the ordinary 
man follows responsively, though with growing educa- 
tion more and more responsibly. Penalties are attached 
to violations, and the taboo rules with universal tyranny. 
Laws grow in strength and sanction with usage; no 
phase of thought or action, momentous or trivial, is 
exempt from the rigidity of the established. The dead 
hand of the past lays its heavy burden upon man's 
thinking, permeates the psychology of enlightened as 
of primitive belief. From a kindred source, in other 
temper, are derived the lessons of history, the conti- 
nuity of science, the increasing purposes of men and 
nations. 

By virtue of its comprehensive scope, the factor of 
conventional conformity may be assumed to be familiar. 
It occupies the background, constant in its presence, 
shifting in its setting, against which all other forces, 
jointly operative, are projected. Similarly important 
is the fact that in any liberal and modern environment, 
conformity escapes from a narrow and stereotyped pre- 
scription and proscription, and encounters the rivalry 
of conventions, the contests of opinions, the competi- 
tive selection among the loyalties. Congenial beliefs 



4 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

are absorbed, uncongenial ones shunned, or, more truly, 
fail to enter the orbit of consideration. The conventional 
combines with and may prevail above the emotional 
factor in the issue. The gregarious, the social, the coop- 
erative forces draw upon the supporting emotions, and 
merge the two. Convictions are formed and sustained 
that are emotionally acceptable and traditionally ac- 
cepted by a considerable group of one's tribes-folk, 
neighbors, fellow-citizens; these are institutionally rein- 
forced by the sanction of tradition and authority. But 
with the systematization of knowledge and the expand- 
ing tutelage of science, the play of logical thinking 
increases notably. In any modem approach the psy- 
chology of conviction presents its problems as those of 
rival reasoning and logical selection; it requires the in- 
vestigation of the complex processes of inclination (or 
plausibility) , by which the few are chosen among the 
many called or caUing. It asks why the corner-stone 
of one man's mental edifice is rejected by the build- 
ers of others. 

To consider the processes of conviction in any mea- 
sure of detachment from its content is a sterile proce- 
dure. The life that is in them, however spiritually or for- 
mally sustained, flows in a definitely conditioned body. 
Lip-service in belief and hollow observance of custom 
are common incidents. The recital of creeds and rituals 
with a feeble sense of meaning finds its parallel in the 
allegiance to institutions, cults, laws, systems, parties, 
tenets, and practical attitudes with slight and vague 
appreciation of their basis, either by way of import or 
justification; for convention and the congeniality of 
adjustment rule. The part of reason, as likewise of a 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 5 

less explicit intelligence, in the maintenance of convic- 
tions that are none the less warmly cherished and em- 
braced, is limited; these limitations form the clues to 
the imderstanding of the forces by which beliefs live and 
move and have their being. The recognizable features 
through which that being is made manifest appear as 
the points of attachment of belief; they determine what 
men believe as well as in another phase of their complex 
psychology they determine why men believe. 

II 

If this approach is rightly set, the chief determinants 
of the psychology of conviction, with bearing alike upon 
process and content, are emotion and convention. 
Fundamentally beliefs are formed and held because 
they satisfy, because they minister to some deep psy- 
chological craving, or some simpler need or indulgence; 
equally significant is the sharing of such beUefs with 
others, which is their indispensable social reinforcement 
and gives the added value of a conscious adjustment 
and an acknowledged approval. 

Before considering at closer range the nature of the 
satisfactions that sustain convictions, their psychology 
should be brought into relation with yet more compre- 
hensive, allied processes. The general formula is sup- 
phed by sensibility, which stands as the parent type of 
the instrument of distinction. As ever, the feeling fac- 
tor is basic; the elemental distinction is that between 
pleasure and pain. Recognition promptly enters, and 
fuses as it extends the lessons of comfort and discom- 
fort, of profit and loss. It widens rapidly to increasing 
circles of distinctive mental situations, inherent in the 



6 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

indirect responses required of complexly intelligent 
agents. Eventually distinction becomes an explicit and 
a logical process — a delineation between truth and 
error. In simpler situations men feel their way by sup- 
port of sensibiUties; gradually they come to reason their 
way through the problems that confront them. In any 
practical modern situation the rational factor is so per- 
vasive, so intricate, aUke by nature and tradition, that 
a prolonged and complex process of education is neces- 
sary to fit the individual to cope with it. The place of 
the keystone in the educative process is held by the 
structure of science, composed of highly specialized 
systems of relations, orderly analyses of causes and 
effects, rigid establishment of principles. These guide 
and support the most directive convictions of the 
human mind. In them appear the most adequate prod- 
ucts of the logical mind, not detached from psychology, 
but surmoimting it. Yet the earher modes of reaching 
convictions, and the satisfactions attending them, per- 
sist; they yield, but never with complete surrender, to 
the later discipline. 

The varieties of distinctions in the higher reaches of 
the mind, where lies the psychology of mature and 
complex convictions, comprise more than the logical 
ones. The regulations of attitude and action which 
they serve are commonly distinguished as of three 
orders : the logical, the moral, the aesthetic. In all there 
is a rightness and a wrongness, a principle of selection 
which distinguishes alike the decisions and the natures 
of men. The logically right, the morally right, the 
sesthetically right is set apart — sharply it may be, 
with delicacy and uncertainty of distinction more com- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 7 

monly — from the wrong. More specific terms are 
available. Logically there is the correct and the false, 
truth and error; morally there is good and bad in con- 
duct and intention; sesthetically the standards are more 
variable, more responsive to condition, but the distinc- 
tion between good taste and bad taste and their prod- 
ucts is no less real. Convictions reflect these several 
phases of a common human nature. Conduct is deter- 
mined by logical, moral, and aesthetic convictions. The 
factors cumulate and interact. The conviction is formu- 
lated as one, but embodies logical, moral, and aesthetic 
considerations. Now one and now another phase 
dominates; but the selecting mind is at once and com- 
positely logical, moral, and aesthetic in its temper, 
expresses loyalty to each and all. Hence the com- 
plexity of the psychology of conviction. The same 
conclusion — which practically is a regulation of con- 
duct through attitude and belief — is reinforced by 
logical, moral, and aesthetic supports. Men share a 
common allegiance in belief or action upon a somewhat 
different grouping of motives and reasons. 

The practical criterion throughout is conduct. What 
men do depends upon what they believe, and how they 
feel; their thoughts and feelings are important because 
these affect their actions. The common utility is in 
the regulation of behavior. We thus return to the r6le 
of conviction as a determiner of conduct. Schooling 
and experience, book-learning and practical occu- 
pations, dealings with men and all manners of social 
observances and institutions — all of which are regu- 
lated by beliefs in the form of traditional explanations 
— leave as their deposit a logical sense, which acts 



8 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

after the manner of sensibility of the sensory type but 
with a more complex psychology. The logical sense 
also follows its type, reflects the stage of culture of the 
times, the social station, the mental development. It 
functions by accepting congenial orders of belief and 
rejecting others, while the very conditions of its accept- 
ances preclude from its horizon orders of conviction 
beyond its ken. All this is familiar because the like 
holds of every evolutionary product. The logical sense 
is the slowest, most laborious, as well as the most pre- 
cious of psychological growths. As commonly exercised 
by the average man, it keeps him fairly safe from crude 
error so long as he remains on familiar ground. Within 
these limitations it distinguishes between the true and 
the false, much as his senses — in turn not so well pro- 
tected as those of animals — distinguish (though not 
infallibly) between wholesome and unwholesome food. 
But to follow the lead of one's mind is a far more intri- 
cate matter than to follow one's eyes or one's nose. 
And similarly of one's moral sense and one's aesthetic 
sense: these select among the alternatives of conduct 
and preferences of attitude, make their way through 
situations, and in their exercise according to one's 
schooling and tradition confer ahke logical, moral, and 
sesthetic sensibilities and their satisfactions — all of 
them capable of indefinite expansion. The record of 
that expansion is in a profound sense the story of 
civilization. 

The moral sense and the aesthetic sense are truer to 
the parent type in that their affective ingredient is 
strong, and their social dependence marked. Moral 
convictions and the satisfactions which they bring — 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 9 

and with a different bearing the same is true of aesthetic 
ones — affect the entire psychology of conviction. To 
neglect in any measure the moral and aesthetic mo- 
ments in the genesis and operation of convictions is to 
miss the genius of their nature, the source of their 
strength. Logical convictions and the satisfactions at- 
taching to them are in all respects more derivative 
and more artificial, belong characteristically to later 
educational stages. Yet our chief concern is with them, 
because the latter-day issues, which alone adequately 
illustrate the psychology of conviction as it affects our 
behefs and attitudes, are so largely intellectual mat- 
ters. Our approach to them and our faith in them is in 
the main a logical one. The disturbances of the even 
tenor of our logical ways by the strong currents of 
moral and aesthetic emotions and sentiments form a 
vital part of our problems. They shape daily preju- 
dices no less than the jealousies and unreasoning loyal- 
ties that precipitate world's crises. 

Ill 

The profitable pursuit of the psychology of convic- 
tion proceeds by the "case" method. Outgrown and 
discarded beliefs and attitudes, no less than those 
within our living experience, furnish the data for in- 
structive analysis and suggestive diagnosis. Types of 
belief demonstrably false, yet once prevalent and com- 
manding the allegiance of a considerable portion of men 
of fair or superior intelligence, still bring a valuable 
lesson in the analysis of the appeal which they once 
made, in the dissection of the motives and arguments 
which led to their acceptance. As such types of befief 



10 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

are selected from among modern, even contemporary 
movements, the use of latter-day enlightened criteria 
is the more justifiable; less allowance need be made for 
an imperfect logic and for the as yet unexplored regions 
of the continent of science. In point of fact the illus- 
trations are continuous, with no breach of analogy 
between ancient credulity and its modern representa- 
tives, no abrupt change in the motives or the mechan- 
isms of appeal. With due allowance for the change of 
outlook and attitude of other days and other ways, 
there must be considered the parallel changes in the 
grouping of forces at the focus of each problem con- 
sidered. This gives the set to the psychology of the 
several "cases" of conviction; the cases fall into types, 
and the differentiation of types becomes the psycholo- 
gist's task. 

In clinical metaphor, each "case" requires the study 
of its antecedents, of the mode of life, and the in- 
dividuality of the patient and of the nature of the 
disease from which he suffers. Patient and disease 
are at once one and distinct. The study of a "case" 
of conviction requires knowledge of the antecedents of 
the problems and its bearings upon human interests, 
along with a study of the appeal which it makes and the 
psychology of its adherents. There is the psychology 
of the conviction as an objective belief, and the psy- 
chology of the convinced as a subjective issue. If one 
assumed a detached point of view, one might separate 
the strictly logical cases and recognize beliefs accepted 
upon evidence and applied coldly and consistently. 
In this view the logical plant — which is the human 
mind — would accept the crude material in the form 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 11 

of data and turn out the finished product as conclu- 
sions. If the result proves to be false, the fault lies in 
a too ready acceptance of premises or their imperfect 
manipulation. Such an analysis is bare and formal, 
literally true but psychologically barren. Yet, as will 
presently appear, a fair approximation to the type may 
be selected. The inclination to accept the premises 
upon the (inadequate) evidence, and the tendency to 
point the data to the ends reached (prepossession) are 
as real as the formal logical processes. These tenden- 
cies make the psychology of the problem, constitute 
its character. 

"Cases" of this order may readily be summoned 
from the annals of science. Consider the explanation 
of fossils. Under a scholastic type of word-learning 
they were ascribed to a "stone-making force," a "lapi- 
dific juice," "seminal air," "tumultuous movement 
of terrestrial exhalations." To our type of science- 
drilled mind, all this is the mere husk and shell of ex- 
planation, empty verbiage, stale and unprofitable. Yet 
it is a factor in the psychology of conviction. Dogma 
and formulae, formidable words, like popular slogans, 
help to carry conviction. They are more apt to con- 
tribute to obvious fallacy and pretense than to subtle 
error; but they play their part variably. On the other 
hand, when the upholders of scriptural literalism ac- 
counted for fossils as "sports of nature," as models 
made by the Creator before he had decided upon the 
most suitable forms for animals, or as snares hidden 
by the Almighty to tempt the unorthodox, we are 
plunged at once into definite prepossessions and al- 
legiances to accepted doctrines which have powerfully 



12 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

affected not only the beliefs but the actions of men. 
Charges of heresy lurk in the background, and we 
enter upon the warfare of science ^ with dogmatically 
established conviction, however fortified. When Vol- 
taire argued (one does know how seriously) that "fos- 
sil fishes were the remains of fishes intended for food, 
but spoiled and thrown away by travelers; that the 
fossil shells were accidently dropped by Crusaders 
and pilgrims returning from the Holy Land," we read 
the explanation with a strange sense of incongruity 
between data and conclusion. The true explanation 
might have appeared strained to Voltaire, because the 
facts underlying it were so completely out of his ken. 
Everywhere facts and theories cooperate and deter- 
mine plausibility. We reach an undisputed "case" of 
credulity, not merely of weak hypothesis, when we 
learn of one Beringer who presented long arguments 
to prove that fossils were "stones of a peculiar sort, 
hidden by the Author of nature for his own pleasure." 
It is related that Beringer's students prepared baked- 
clay fossils of fish, flesh, and fowl — and even speci- 
mens with Hebrew and Syriac inscriptions upon them 
— and buried them in the Herr Professor's favorite 
digging places. Illustrations of these miraculous fossils 
were published, with the subsequent attempt of the 
author to suppress the work when the deception be- 

1 It is in such service that Andrew D. White's A History of the War- 
fare of Science with Theology (1896), has become a classic. Science is 
neutral in its campaign. It necessarily regards dogma as its enemy; 
it respects the province of religion when the latter refrains from an 
invasion of occupied territory. The tremendous struggle of the evo- 
lutionary position to gain a foothold in the nineteenth century is an 
adequate example of the varied prejudices which scientific argument 
may encounter, in enlightened times. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 13 

came known. As an individual "case" of credulity 
the incident would be amusing only; its significance 
lies in this: that not the inherent improbability of the 
conclusion by our standards, but the standard of judg- 
ment of the convinced scholar is the essential consid- 
eration. The tendency to accept the explanation of the 
origin of fossils (the theory) is congenial to the accept- 
ance of the "finds" as corroborative (the facts). But 
in the "case" of fossils, however explained, an objec- 
tive attitude is readily taken. The conviction carries 
no social or emotional consequences; one's views of 
fossils have no bearing upon conduct, or at best a 
most remote one. It sets up no allegiances of a prac- 
tical order, creates no causes or loyalties, except as the 
convictions one espouses become extensions of one's 
personality, defended with the warmth of a cause 
embraced. 

IV 

It is the peculiar merit of beliefs concerning our psy- 
chological nature in contrast to the constitution of 
natural objects like fossils, that they carry such a wide 
appeal, play so largely among the motives that sup- 
port vital convictions, while yet patterned after the 
manner of scientific conclusions. An interesting group 
of beliefs relates to the interpretation of human types 
and differences. The ancient doctrine of temperaments, 
explaining the psychological types of men by the domi- 
nance of blood (sanguine), black bile (melancholic), yel- 
low bile (choleric), and phlegm (phlegmatic), is as purely 
fictitious and as baseless as the cited views of the origin 
of fossils; but it persisted with remarkable tenacity and 



14 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

gave rise to a varied progeny of speculations that in 
turn dominated the convictions and the practices of 
men. The doctrine of the four temperaments was in- 
corporated in the "humoral" system of medicine. 
From Hippocrates to Harvey, diseases were diagnosed 
and patients treated in terms of the "hot" and the 
"dry," the "cold" and the "moist," with most fan- 
tastic elaborations. Chills and fevers, parchings and 
perspirations, flushing and pallor, confirmed the find- 
ings; and the recovery of the patient — by the assist- 
ance of nature or in spite of the resistance to nature — 
proved the value of the system and established the 
prestige of the practitioner. The explanation of disease 
(theory) and the cure of ills (practice) form such a 
powerful motive to thought and action that the entire 
armament of the mind's powers — scientific and im- 
aginative — was brought to bear upon the problem. 
The most ambitious of such constructions was the 
medical appHcation of astrology, seeking the fate of 
men in the positions of the heavenly bodies. Medicines 
were concocted and administered with reference to 
the position of sun, moon, and stars; elaborate corre- 
spondences were set up connecting the mineral, the 
vegetable, the animal kingdoms and the cosmic sys- 
tems with the fates of men and the cure of ills that 
flesh is heir to. Disease is but part of man's fate. The 
prediction of the future, the control of fortune, the 
detection of talents — all combine and proceed upon 
the same flimsy logic and consoling psychology. The 
horoscope summarizes the issue astrologically as al- 
chemy, physiognomy, palmistry, phrenology, and their 
like illustrate the persistence of the notions and the im- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 15 

aginative constructions by which they were satisfied. 
These vagaries of the human mind in the realm 
of conviction — vagaries to us, but serious behefs to 
former generations — embody a common psychological 
factor, that of finding what one seeks, which is vital to 
the understanding of each and all. Also central to their 
psychology is the tendency of the thought to shape the 
issue — the peculiar and elusive sense in which think- 
ing aids and induces the result. In the treatment of 
disease this becomes "mind-cure" — the faith that 
facilitates as well as the prejudice that blinds. The pos- 
session of this key to the situation — like the knowl- 
edge of the true nature of fossils — exposes the irrele- 
vance and falsity of the several wild if shrewd guesses 
and proofs; but unhke the "case" of fossils, the mo- 
tives contributory to convictions in regard to human 
nature and the control of human fate continue in subtle 
and complex form to shape current views, orthodox 
and unorthodox alike. We are still subject to disturb- 
ing influences in the psychology of our convictions, in 
the interpretation of our own psychology. The estab- 
lishment of the logic of science in these realms is still 
imperfect by virtue of the same tendencies — admit- 
tedly far better disciplined — that gave currency to 
beliefs that seem to us preposterous in temper, absurd 
in evidence. Thus in retrospect the dual lesson bear- 
ing upon the psychology of conviction appears: first, 
that every advance in understanding is a step forward 
in logic, in the standards of evidence and the rigidity 
of conclusions, in the conceptions of plausibility and 
the discipline of the mind; second, that the forces 
inclining to belief persist, however altered their per- 



16 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

spective, and continue to make the attainment of 
reasonable convictions and the consistent direction of 
conduct through them, a difficult and deHcate task — 
the art of intellectual living. Wisdom is the name for 
the exercise of the logical function, with due recogni- 
tion of the assets and liabilities of an ancient and fal- 
lible human psychology. 

Such considerations make it pertinent to look upon 
persistences or revivals of beliefs continuing the older 
patterns of conviction, as survivals — never simple, 
often intricately disguised. Along with the older loy- 
alties they incorporate the newer ones; particularly, 
they profess and in a measure maintain an adherence 
to high-grade logical standards. Their defection, how- 
ever, is as commonly and as essentially a reversion to 
older psychological habits of belief as to a weakness 
in logical manipulation. Such "cases" of survival are 
most varied, indeed individual in composition. Inter- 
esting examples may be found in that wide domain 
already surveyed, belonging to psychology in a double 
sense: the one, that the content of the belief relates 
to the conceptions of thinking and the views of our 
psychic nature; the other, that the tendencies shaping 
belief in this realm are so characteristic of the "con- 
viction " phase of our psychology. One of these " cases " 
and the most typical is the survival and revival of the 
belief in the possession of powers by some individuals 
in defiance or transcendence of the estabhshed laws 
and limitations of human endowment. So character- 
istically psychological is this conviction that the phe- 
nomena associated with it have received the name of 
"psychical research" — a term irrelevant or mislead- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 17 

ing, but harmless if accepted as a convenient phrase. 
As here considered there I's no choice but to regard 
the beHef-tendency thus displayed as an inclination to- 
ward the supernatural. This trait merits detailed analy- 
sis; its "cases" are difficult, sometimes baffling. For 
the belief persists in minds thoroughly loyal to scien- 
tific ideals in other realms. The "cases" contribute a 
further factor to the psychology of conviction, and 
raise the interesting question of consistency. They 
suggest the existence of reserved areas of belief, more 
or less exempt from the limitations of logic, where the 
satisfactions of belief may be more freely sought and 
accepted without logical compunctions. Such indul- 
gences are more appropriately considered under the 
personal phases of belief; but they contribute essen- 
tially to the convictions that keep alive the "proofs" 
of telepathy as of other modes of mental communica- 
tion unrecognized by psychology, and the evidence of 
survival after death at the hands or mouths of me- 
diums. The logical interest lies in the elaborate tech- 
nique which such convictions have developed in sup- 
port of the hypothesis, and the continued vitality of 
the belief, despite repeated exposures of fraud in the 
accumulation of evidence and woeful defects in logic 
in the arguments. Much of the belief in the super- 
natural is based upon the conviction that the facts 
cannot be otherwise explained, that deception is im- 
possible. Such assumption in turn has its reasons; they 
lie in the will to believe and the gross underestimation 
of what can be done by deliberate or subconscious de- 
ception. 

It is fortunate that "cases" of belief in the super- 



18 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

natural occasionally venture into the domain of the 
physical where their pretenses invite disclosure. Such 
detective service is in no way obligatory upon physi- 
cists and psychologists, even though their domain is 
intruded upon and their title challenged; it may be 
accepted as an obligation in the interests of social san- 
ity, which any competent protagonist of science may 
properly imdertake. Such is the "case" of Paladino. 
Reduced to barest outline, in the presence of Eusapia 
Paladino — a Neapolitan woman of peasant status — 
tables moved, curtains blew to and fro, tambourines 
rattled, while seemingly her hands and feet were 
controlled. Incidentally the large compensations for 
witnessing the performance filled her purse. AU this 
exploitation is commonplace and sordid. Upon the in- 
abihty of men prominent in one or another scientific 
field to detect how it was done, is reared the hypoth- 
esis that these occurrences demonstrate supernatural 
powers. When it is shown by counter-plotting that 
the "medium" disengages one foot and lifts the table 
on her toes, the entire logical construction tumbles 
ignominiously; but the "psychology of conviction" 
of the case, hke the moral, remains. The relation be- 
tween premises and conclusion before the convincing 
disclosure, and the tendency to build upon them the 
belief in the supernatural, are just the same as before. 
The factors in the case are the enormous influence of 
the prestige of the sponsors for a performance that 
without it would attract slight attention; the weak 
logical sense that interprets the inability to detect how 
a thing is done as strengthening an otherwise unsup- 
ported hypothesis; but last as first, the tendency be- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 19 

low the surface to accept the supernatural hypothesis 
is responsible for the "case." 

This group of survivals, occupying the middle 
ground between old-time credulity and present-day 
controversies, is a fairly extensive one. It may be ex- 
tended to include instances in which older conceptions 
are applied to newer problems with a weak sense of 
their incongruity. Such is the problem of animal in- 
telligence. The inclination to ascribe to animals re- 
markable powers of mind is more creditable to human 
charity than to human logic; it is more a matter of 
sentiment than of logic. The science that speaks with 
authority on this issue is psychology. In view of the 
difficult steps by which man has slowly gained a criti- 
cal knowledge of his own endowment and its work- 
ings, it is not strange that the like is true of his 
knowledge of the animal mind. Psychology has es- 
tablished how slow and laborious are the steps by 
which a decent logical control of data has been secured. 
The process is illustrated in the education of every 
child. Yet animal prodigies are placed on exhibition, 
and admiring audiences accept simple trick-perform- 
ances as evidences of calculating horses, talking dogs, 
and educated animal geniuses. Learned books are writ- 
ten to prove that neither fraud nor self-deception has 
entered; the interest in the matter is so disturbing that 
commissions, on which professors of psychology serve, 
must be appointed to allay the mental unrest. Once 
more the discrepancy between performance and con- 
viction is flagrant. A horse paws with his right fore- 
foot (as horses do), and is taught to continue to do 
so until he perceives a signal to stop. The performer 



20 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

advertises that the horse adds, subtracts, divides, ex- 
tracts square roots, counts, tells people's ages, knows 
grammatical construction, and what not. (It should be 
added that a bright horse or dog is so keenly observant 
that owners of such animals may beheve in the powers 
with the sincerity of self-deception.) The entire "case" 
would be ludicrous did it not furnish so neat an ex- 
ample of how conviction creates miracles, how readily 
prepossessions engender credulity, how inadequate is 
the popular notion of the f oimdation of the mental pro- 
cesses used by all, and how weak may be the logical 
sense that alone can protect against the acceptance of 
such performances at their alleged value. Even in the 
twentieth century the case of "mathematical horses" 
makes a distinct contribution to the psychology of 
conviction. 



By this devious route we come to the present-day 
arena of contention in which opposing convictions, all 
professing a common loyalty to logical (or it may be 
to moral or aesthetic) principles, defend opposite con- 
clusions, favor antagonistic policies, bid for support as 
rivals, and array men in parties and factions, in schools 
and sects, as well as in hostile camps and campaigns. 
The controversial area of the psychology of conviction 
is a close neighbor to those considered; their boun- 
daries touch and overlap. The older motives reappear 
with chastened mien; the analysis proceeds more con- 
siderately of subtle error and deUcate bias. The se- 
lection of "cases" is difficult by embarrassment of 
riches; for here lies the source of the saying: many men. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 21 

many minds. The desire is to tap the controversial 
cmrent at its richest flow, to illustrate the variety of 
its contributory streams, the many sources of its hid- 
den springs. As a triad of such issues, suflSciently typi- 
cal and distinct, may be selected the "case" of indul- 
gence, the "case" of the feminine mind, the "case" of 
miHtarism and pacifism. In the one issue there stand 
embattled the prohibitionists and those who favor a 
sane, even an indulgent regulation of such practices 
(admittedly a serious evil in excess) as the use of to- 
bacco and alcohol; in the next, the feminists contend- 
ing for a nullification of the restrictions in the move- 
ments and careers of women, minimizing the differences 
of the sexes and their inherent consequences, as op- 
posed to those who believe these differences to be 
vital, comprehensive, and established; in the last the 
most intensely partisan arraignment by believers in 
peace, of the horror, waste, and unreason of war, by 
believers in war of the blindness, sentimentalism, and 
visionary impracticaUty of pacifists. The fact which 
the psychology of "controversial" convictions faces is 
that in the presence of the same data and compar- 
able schooling and environments, men reach deviating 
and opposite conclusions. Each party believes strongly 
that he has definitely proved his case. Yet it cannot be 
doubted that in the main the minds thus in disagree- 
ment are fairly similar problem-solving instruments. 
They are not identical in nature nor mechanical in 
procedure, i The human mind is by no means a loom 
receiving raw material, and with the pattern once set 
turning out a uniform product. For simple mathemati- 
cal processes the formula holds; it makes no difference 



22 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

what mind performs the calculation. In controversial 
issues and practical policies it makes the greatest 
difference what manner of mind receives, elaborates, 
considers, and concludes. The individual factor domi- 
nates and yet holds true to type. Differences of opin- 
ion as of policy and taste are not chaotic or capricious 
or arbitrary. Despite all fluctuations, reason in well- 
poised minds is an orderly procedure, and principles 
endure. The temptations to depart from such order 
are precisely the points of interest in the controversial 
phases of the psychology of conviction. 

In explanation it is famihar that data known to one 
mind may be unknown to another, and that the impor- 
tance attached to one group of data may differ in one 
mind and another. But behind all this and determin- 
ing it is the predilection that selects and gives weight 
to groups of data of favorable bearing, inclines the 
interpretation to a predetermined bent, and reaches a 
conclusion more by reinforcement of an anticipation 
than by any progressive step; which means that it is 
not the force of evidence but the magnetism of con- 
clusions that attracts. And this in tium is true because 
such specific predilections in regard to one issue or an- 
other are themselves the issue of a general perspective 

— compositely logical, moral, aesthetic, and practical 

— which determines the values of experience and ar- 
guments, that determine the set of one's convictions. 
We may call this character, we may call it a point of 
view or Weltanschauung , and bear in mind that this 
exists as really, though in less finished and articulate 
form, for the unsophisticated as for the learned mind. 
Indeed, one of the marked differences between them 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 23 

is the relative immunity of the disciphned mind to 
the disturbances of emotional predilection and subcon- 
scious prejudice. Yet the best-schooled minds take 
their stand determinedly, with stanch convictions, 
claiming no exemption from human bias, but mak- 
ing allowance in their well-balanced judgments for the 
psychology of conviction as operative in themselves 
and in the world in which their influence makes itself 
felt. Any more intimate analysis requires the con- 
creteness of a specific argument with all its ramifica- 
tions and bearings, its traditional relations to custom 
and opinion. By considering the series of steps by 
which one arrays one's self on one side or the other of 
such controversies as those concerning prohibition, 
feminism, and militarism, one will realize the manner 
in which facts, arguments, experience, predilection, and 
one's general outlook upon the values and precepts of 
life, cooperate in the formation of positions, attitudes, 
loyalties — all of a practical order. In this estimate 
one must make large allowance for the persistent forces 
of convention, tradition, and imitation as individually 
operative; for these spread and fix conviction quite 
as they disseminate other habits of reaction. Parallel 
in importance remains the factor of a personal, emo- 
tional, temperamental congruity. Furthermore, in con- 
troversial questions where so commonly the data are 
imperfectly known and the arguments inadequately 
understood, convictions none the less proceed as con- 
fidently — possibly more confidently — under these 
limitations as in their absence. For doubt is an un- 
pleasant state of mind, and the reaching of a decision 
and the taking of sides constitutes an indispensable 
type of satisfaction. 



9^ THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

The incompleteness of this analysis of the psychology 
of controversy is obvious. It is intended only to pre- 
pare for the analysis of concrete cases; for the "case" 
method is the most instructive in this domain. Two 
possible factors are ignored: the one the element of 
intentional deception or the distortion of a biased in- 
terest; and the other the allied element of hypocrisy 
and inconsistency. These receive some attention under 
the consideration of the personal phases of behef ; yet 
they play a specific part in controversial issues. In il- 
lustration the attitude toward education as a means of 
fitting the mind to play its proper part in life offers a 
pertinent example. The ordinary democratic view pro- 
fesses a cordial support of education and an admiration 
of the products of the trained mind. But actually it 
distrusts scholarship and deprives it of a reasonable 
share in social control. Such an attitude is one of 
suspicion masked by avowed confidence. It is an 
excellent and by no means ^ isolated instance of the 
inconsistency between theory and practice, between 
profession and performance. Since most controversies 
have practical issues, this phase of the matter is often 
of decided consequence. 

VI 

We turn to the personal aspect of conviction, not as 
a novel factor (for everything is personal in the sense 
that there are no beliefs, only believers), but as a spe- 
cial emphasis. What men beheve and why men beheve 
converge in the satisfaction of behef — which is a per- 
sonal reaction. The conviction once attained in con- 
formity with one's psychology yields its satisfaction 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 25 

in the removal of doubt, the support of conduct, the 
consolation of faith, the guidance by principles, the 
consistency of a system or point of view, and adds to 
these the contented feeling of adjustment. Such are the 
common functions of creed, sect, party, principle, code, 
custom, loyalties. The act of subscription, allegiance, 
enlistment, settles matters. Patriotism may be cited 
as a comprehensive expression of the issue, and raises 
the question in how far one's patriotism is a sentiment 
or a conviction. An American can with difliculty con- 
ceive his allegiance of country as otherwise disposed. 
Yet he knows that millions of his fellow-citizens of 
like nature with himself profess an adopted allegiance, 
while a divided one (neglecting the complexities of 
the great war) is wholly compatible with a proper con- 
sistency of purpose and attitude. All this is fairly 
well understood, for it operates close to the surface of 
our deliberations and our articulate sentiments. Fol- 
lowing this trend, one might conclude that the desir- 
able order of satisfaction is as obtainable from one type 
of belief as from another. Loyalty is everywhere simi- 
larly conditioned; the sense of attachment is the main 
thing and may be inculcated as readily upon the plat- 
form of absolute autocracy in government as of the 
freest democracy. It is not in such types of conviction 
that the distinctively personal factor is conspicuous; 
quite the contrary, it is in such larger loyalties — all 
supported by convictions — that the individual merges 
with the crowd, with the collective mass, and even sur- 
renders to it. This, however, does not detract from the 
personal intensity of the convictions thus formed, nor 
from their efficiency. Upon the sentiment of patriot- 



26 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ism, and the conviction that one's country is in the 
right, is based the integrity of nations, even to the 
supreme sacrifice of the soldier. Defection in this atti- 
tude may mean mutiny and treason. It is a sobering 
reflection that the ultimate bond of nations, as every- 
where the unity of a collective purpose, rests upon the 
integrity of the personal convictions of those enlisted. 
This is the fundamental reahty and gives to the study 
of conviction its unique importance. That such per- 
sonal intensity of conviction may come from any or 
many sources, must ever be borne in mind. 

It is in the more individual affiHations and in the 
narrower circle of one's loyalties that the personal 
element appears in stronger relief. There is one sys- 
tem of psychology, with bearings upon the genesis and 
nature of conviction, that is entitled to precedence in 
our considerations. The psychology of Freud is reared 
upon the relation between motive and belief, upon 
the wish as father to the thought. In broader outline 
the Freudian system explores among the subterranean 
roots of motives to discover the promptings of thought 
and action. It emphasizes the subconscious; and it 
builds upon a group of mechanisms, by which the appar- 
ent, superficial stream of thinking is brought in rela- 
tion with the deeper, hidden sources of its flow. To no 
mental product does the system apply more intimately 
than to convictions.^ For the first and last things in 

1 The parallel applications of equal importance are to the free 
material of dreams, reveries, imaginative excm-sions (also to seem- 
ingly accidental lapses, like forgetting and mislaying) and to impul- 
sive, aberrant conduct. All these orders of expression lose their de- 
tached character when supplied with the clue of motive. It is not 
necessary to accept the extreme Freudian interpretation, particu- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 27 

the Freudian psychology are motives; and the clue to 
conviction (beyond the realm of undisputed reason) is 
motive. In the view of Freud the mental life is a strug- 
gle — a conflict between what is, what we are, what 
we must do, what we should like to be and do, and 
how we should like to have things. So imagination 
enters to bridge the gap, and the fictitious pleasures of 
day-dreaming and of conclusions not untouched by 
delusion yield their satisfactions. Truly rationaliza- 
tion enters, and we justify our beliefs and acts by rea- 
sonings to conceal their real motives in emotion and 
desire. The mechanisms of thought are mechanisms 
of concealment — a psychological camouflage; reason 
masks emotion, in that the acknowledgment of the 
emotion is unpleasant or otherwise tabooed, while 
the appeal to reason is accredited and creditable. The 
masking devices are varied, some dramatic, others 
shrewd, others subtle. The most typical is the device 
of compensation. Lacking one satisfaction we minimize 
its loss by setting up another in its place. A salient 
example is that of a man of checkered and uncertain 
career, in all essential respects a failure in life despite 
conspicuous talents, who in announcing the subject of 
his personal reminiscences as a platform topic chose 
the title: "How I Achieved Success." That title is a 
Freudian confession of failure, disguised to the self that 
makes it. Similarly, if the German mind is prepared 
to stand by its Austrian (Freudian) ally in the psy- 
chological field, the Teutonic insistence upon the supe- 

larly the reference of all these mental products to the motives of sex. 
The Freudian view is entitled to respectful consideration; it has 
proved suggestive in many directions. 



28 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

riority of German "Kultur" may be interpreted as a 
Freudian confession of a sense of lack, the inability to 
achieve that dehcate appreciation of the values of life 
that is characteristic of the French, or the well-poised 
directive capacity and clean-cut analysis of the Eng- 
lish mind. The compensation is the gigantic and im- 
modest delusion of superiority. Suspicion or accusa- 
tion is often of the same natiu-e, imputing to others 
motives present in one's self, but disowned. The same 
applies to apology in that it implies a self -accusation: 
qui s* excuse s* accuse. The conception of convictions 
as formed or supported by this mechanism of emo- 
tional transfer — in consolation or compensation — 
yields a restricted but authentic application of the 
Freudian principles. The Freudian mechanisms apply 
more fully to expressions of stronger, more original 
emotional tone — like the instinct of motherhood lack- 
ing its authentic outlet and seeking substitutes in the 
mothering of pets or causes; yet like these, convic- 
tions serve as a temperamental satisfaction by em- 
ployment of similar devices. Other common Freudian 
factors may be noted. There is over-determination, 
overdoing — in excess of recoil (through some inter- 
nal resistance or scruple) swinging far to the opposite 
extreme. The characteristically Freudian aspect of 
the issue is that the impulse to the extreme is felt, but 
the motive source remains subconscious; yet it oper- 
ates and projects from its depths a sense of trouble and 
difficulty. Conviction may be held waveringly though 
longingly, shifting in successive devotion to fads and 
"isms." 
The "conviction" aspect of the conflict is a struggle 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 29 

for consistency as well as for contentment, which in 
its ripeness aims at the harmony of one's beliefs and 
conduct. Such a consistent whole is a personality, 
many-sided but single-minded. Thus in tracing the 
orbit of conviction, we constantly return to the emo- 
tional motive — an emotion close to will. The com- 
mon name for this is desire, the Freudian wish. In so 
far as the Freudian diagnosis applies, it is the unful- 
filled wish, the thwarted desire that shapes the true 
motive of conviction. It operates in so far as the belief 
is by nature or adoption warmly cherished, with a deep 
personal absorption; it is peculiarly applicable to ex- 
treme semi-pathological temperaments, in which the 
processes are emotionally intensified. But a more com- 
mon Freudian mechanism peculiarly applicable to the 
genesis and support of convictions is rationalization, 
which is the justification of belief to reason. We actu- 
ally believe by virtue of a trend anchored in personal 
desire, and have recourse to reason to mask this source 
— to clothe a personal conviction in more presentable 
garb. Accepting the motive as a "reason," we believe 
for one reason and defend conviction for another; such 
is the Freudian defensive and self-deceptive mechan- 
ism. In some measure the conviction may be unrea- 
sonable, yet it secures and maintains its hold by con- 
formity to authentic psychological processes. 

The mechanisms thus described in Freudian man- 
ner have been otherwise and previously recognized; 
the Freudian setting adds to their illumination and to 
their relation to our general psychology. In applica- 
tion to conviction, we must proceed more delicately, 
with discerning allowance for the type of conviction 



30 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

involved. We recognize that we are committed to a cer- 
tain pride in our rationality; we make claim to be rea- 
sonable beings; and for this end our dress-parade selves 
argue and defend as well as ignore and conceal. By 
quite the same route in practical matters, we admit 
that our interests come to determine our positions, 
though we know that scientific judgments must be dis- 
interested and unprejudiced. 

Intense conviction obscures vision; yet enthusiastic 
interest opens our eyes. We must accept the HabiHties 
along with the assets of our own psychology. In Freu- 
dian aspect beliefs avoid contact with reaUty by sur- 
rounding themselves with a defensive smoke-cloud of 
security; in scientific employment, hypothesis and spec- 
ulations extend the study of reality, alike in detail and 
in scope. Neither the one nor the other issue is neces- 
sarily involved nor readily avoided. In consequence 
the consistency of the varied convictions of all sorts 
and conditions of men on all sorts and conditions of 
questions is a partial one. An equal consistency in all 
one's varied interests is an attainable but rare ideal, 
possibly not even a desirable one. A common form of 
inconsistency suggests the hypotheses of reserved areas 
of conviction in which predilection may disport itself 
in freedom from the restraints of too rigid a logic. It is 
possible that a man of science may be cautious and 
logical in his special domain, but in matters outside of 
it, in which a personal bias enters, he may be uncritical, 
even credulous, and accept or propose arguments falla- 
cious or weak. Such defection constitutes the personal 
factor in the prevalence of the "survival'* types of 
conviction already reviewed. The hypotheses of '*re- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 31 

served areas of belief" applies characteristically to the 
spiritualistic phase of "psychical research" — that is 
the acceptance of evidence of the communication by 
the departed through mediums; it applies particu- 
larly to the "case" of Paladino, while yet this "case" 
is made by the prestige attaching to the scientific 
reputation of her sponsors. The hypothesis applies 
sporadically through the several incidents that have 
attended the renaissance of spiritualism since 1850. In- 
clination to accept the spiritualistic belief is the main 
factor; the evidence plays a secondary part. Those 
responsible for such evidence contribute to the psy- 
chology of deception/ as the deceived contribute to 
the psychology of credulity. This holds for the vast 
majority of believers; but for the few and the leaders 
of the movement, the conviction suggests the oper- 
ation of a reserved area of belief. Whether the res- 
ervation is due to a Freudian complex is an individual 
question. 

There is a further aspect of such allegiances: namely, 
the attraction which a behef excites by its very depar- 
ture from rationality; the tendency is due to the lure 
of the obscure. Its most philosophic expression is mys- 
ticism. But the cooperation of other factors is appar- 
ent. Such occult and irregular beliefs grow by conta- 
gion; they grow by prestige; they grow by a congenial 

^ 1 have considered these problems in an earlier volume. Fact 
and Fable in Psychology (1900), particularly in the earlier chapters. 
Accordingly the types of belief in which credulity, intentional 
deception, and weakness of logical sense play the leading parts in 
the dissemination of false beliefs, are not emphasized in the pres- 
ent consideration. The portions of the volume just referred to may 
be accepted as an amplification of this position, in terms of analysis 
and illustration. 



32 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

selection of adherents; and a factor in the last contri- 
bution is the satisfaction of clinging to the esoteric, of 
belonging to a different order, a less conventional cult 
than that which secures the adherence of the ordinary 
man. Even radicalism makes its converts by some 
measure of such appeal. But simple credulity, or logi- 
cal weakness is never absent, and constitutes a per- 
sonal factor in the issue. Consider such a behef as 
that in phrenology, which is fairly modern and persists 
with revivals to recent times. What the attraction of 
such a beUef may once have been or how it continues 
to exist, albeit with lowered caste, is not easy to de- 
termine. Lack of scientific training may be the chief 
factor in its spread; but each such behef offers the 
problem of how this particular belief selects its re- 
cruits. The same is true of homoeopathy. In both 
cases those who follow the system may have difficulty 
in describing either the basis of the principles, or their 
own adherence to them. Such excursions into the 
history of personal attachments might add to the 
psychology of conviction; but their pursuit leaves the 
central problem of the present study. Obviously such 
beliefs linger with a low vitality, and the change of 
their clientele suggests the degeneration of a city neigh- 
borhood when a residential district loses its prestige. 

Continuing in the direction of the irregular, we come 
to behefs that may properly be called pathological. 
Such behefs are so strikingly individual that they are 
ordinarily not shared by others. They are called delu- 
sions and are characteristic of insanity in its various 
forms. Here the personal factor reaches its maximum 
scope. Such delusions may likewise appear as Freu- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 33 

dian compensations; their modes of rationalization are 
so irregular that therein is recognized the mental aber- 
ration which represents the extreme issue of personal 
conviction in its deviation from logical standards. The 
manner of reaching one's convictions as well as the 
convictions reached thus become a criterion of one's 
sanity. Such (delusional) beliefs do not affect others; 
nor are they taken seriously. The rare "case" in which 
an individual belief of this type plays a part in a sys- 
tem of wide acceptance in modern times is supplied by 
the case of Mrs. Eddy. Her personal delusion of a 
"malicious animal magnetism " runs through "Christian 
Science" so far as that system reflects her life-history. 
She accused disciples who had escaped from her influ- 
ence, of this peculiar form of sorcery (mental poisoning, 
she called it), and took all sorts of precautions to 
avoid its dire effect. Naturally the great mass of her 
followers ignore this strange belief; yet their attitude 
to the tenets promulgated by Mother Eddy, if con- 
sistent, implies a subscription to this belief also. The 
inclusion of Mrs. Eddy's belief in malicious animal 
magnetism is accordingly pertinent to the personal 
and pathological aspects of conviction. 

VII 

The practical issue of the operation of these sev- 
eral cooperating and conflicting factors is the toler- 
ance of all planners of convictions and compromises 
and makeshifts in the mental household. No one is 
completely logical, and no one is devoid of the logical 
impulse and a certain logical consistency. But the 
psychological trend runs more deeply, more perva- 



34 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

sively. Conviction appears as a compromise of logic 
with psychology. The solution of om* problems de- 
pends not alone on the discovery of truth, but on the 
control of the means of securing its acceptance. To 
gain for beliefs their proper recognition amid the riv- 
alry of convictions and of the forces sustaining them, 
is an art. The slowness and laboriousness of human 
progress is a direct consequence of these conditions 
and limitations of the human mind. The acceptance 
of new truth meets with all sorts of oppositions and 
resistances, which though collectively expressed are 
! individually experienced. The conflicts of men, as of 
/ nations, take place in the arena of personal conviction. 
: Purposes, policies, jealousies, ambitions, sentiments, 
converge in the formulation of a conviction, which 
may be as simple as a slogan and as complex as a 
destiny. 

Viewed retrospectively, the greatest triumph of the 
human mind was the gradual removal of large areas 
of behef from the influence of the personal psychology 
of conviction. Scientifically established truth came to 
proceed objectively, undisturbed by interest in the 
outcome of inquiry and determined by the sanction 
of verification. The gradual disestablishment of the 
anthropocentric view of the universe culminated in 
the removal of human desire from its place of domin- 
ion in the formation of behef. The process is but par- 
tially accomplished even in disciplined minds, and for 
the great masses of men plays a subordinate part in 
the scheme of their lives. Moreover, the existence of 
so many controversial issues, in which conclusions are 
far from clear and yet action is demanded by condi- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 35 

tlon, imposes the exercise of judgment upon mixed 
motives of logical loyalty and psychological appeal. 
For all these reasons the understanding of the stream 
of influences that play upon the genesis and shift of 
conviction is a permanent occupation of the psycholo- 
gist. The obligation to seek control of human convic- 
tions through a study of their nature applies with pecu- 
liar force to twentieth-centm-y conditions in which a 
sentiment of democracy prevails; for democracy im- 
poses or encourages the consideration of convictions 
by inviting adherence to parties and confirming the 
verdict of the ballot. Democratic forces operate far 
beyond the political realm; (there is hardly a page of 
the daily press that does not make an appeal to men's 
actions by prevailing upon their convictions. \ Rival 
newspapers bring to their selected clientele the rein- 
forcement of convictions already espoused. Towering 
above all other issues are the set of convictions that 
have arrayed the dominant nations of the world in a 
colossal life-and-death struggle. The world-war is a 
war of convictions, tragically consigned to the ordeal 
of a scientific armament of destruction; and the deci- 
sion, however reached, will establish one set of convic- 
tions in the minds of men, and depose its rivals. Once 
the normal relations of men and nations again prevail, 
we shall be able to look back upon the struggle with 
the saner logic of a scientific judgment. While the 
awful struggle continues and in "its progressive steps, 
we become the passionately interested witnesses of the 
play of psychological forces on the largest scale that 
has ever been enacted. Parallel with the clash of arma- 
ment is the conflict of conviction; both will participate. 



36 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and presumably the latter with greater influence, in 
the negotiations of peace — in the restoration of a 
normal outlook upon the values of life and their con- 
trol by sane convictions. 



II 

BELIEF AND CREDULITY 

The introductory essay has set forth that the approach 
to the psychology of conviction is through the portals 
of logic. The individual faces the problem in the ques- 
tion: What beliefs shall I accept and what reject? The 
principles determining selection and rejection at once 
engage the student; for their function is not only to 
determine the critical standards, but to defend them. 
The fixation of belief as a practical process, which each 
shares as well as witnesses, must be studied not only 
as a process, but in terms of its foundations. The pres- 
ent study undertakes a critical survey of these foun- 
dations. In its course it uses the method of contrast 
to illustrate the consequences of defection in the logi- 
cal standards of evidence. While the central issue is 
the logical principle of fixation, the determination of 
the logically acceptable is the natural completion of the 
problem. Right belief and creduKty refer to habits of 
mind as well as to standards of evidence. Their joint 
consideration determines the course of argument. 



The vital history of human development is to be 
sought in the history of beliefs. The inscriptions of 
Egypt or of Babylon, though rendered in modern 
tongues, speak an imperfect message until illuminated 
by some insight into the beliefs which these cultures 



38 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

cherished. The amazing ruins of Copan, the serpent 
mound of Ohio, remain mute and inglorious until we 
solve the riddle of the beliefs of their builders. Dead 
Pompeii becomes a Hving city when we people its 
streets with the hopes and fears, the beUefs and opin- 
ions of its last inhabitants. The history of the arts and 
the sciences, of society and of religion, specifically in- 
volves an account of the succession of beHefs and of the 
growth of behef-habits. The story of men's doings is 
likewise, in large measure, a reflection of their beliefs; 
<ionduct, whether of individuals or of masses of men, 
remains an undeciphered record until interpreted as 
the concrete expression of definite behefs. The spring 
of action is motive, and the intellectual impetus to mo- 
tive is belief. 

Of the outward and of the inward marks of the stages 
of learning none are more notable than the beliefs 
which as the result of such learning come to be accepted 
and promulgated. With these is associated an attitude 
of inclination or disinclination in regard to the various 
and ever-enlarging problems that engage the interests 
of men. The possession of certain behefs and a defi- 
nite belief -attitude differentiates the educated from the 
uneducated, the scholar from the dilettante, the ex- 
pert from the layman, the modern spirit from the medi- 
aeval, the traits of this generation from those of its 
immediate predecessors. For those who would search 
out the motives and the justifications of their behefs, 
it is of constant importance to realize the more potent 
and the more patent tendencies and influences by 
which are shaped the opinions ahke of the many and 
of the few; to consider the characteristics which give 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 89 

to certain beliefs and belief-attitudes their logical co- 
gency, their ethical worth, and their social power, and 
deprive other classes of beliefs from any possible par- 
ticipation in these values. Such an inquiry naturally 
includes an outlook upon the regions of unwarranted 
belief, of error and prejudice and credulity. 

An attractive approach to the problem thus sug- 
gested may be found in a remarkable essay by C. S. 
Peirce.^ Belief is presented as a mental trait possessing 
and developed by plain advantages of an evolutionary 
or adaptively useful kind. Such at least would be the 
case for all simple and practical matters upon which 
the incipient rationality of primitive man cut its teeth. 
Logicality, Peirce tells us — and by that is meant a 
habit of mind that leads to the detection of truth, to 
thinking about things as they are, to bringing our 
thoughts into agreement with reality — "logicaHty in 
regard to practical matters is the most useful quality 
an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result 
from the action of natural selection; but outside of 
these it is probably of more advantage to the animal 
to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging 
visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon 
unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion 
a fallacious tendency of thought." Natural selection 
certainly has not interfered with the persistence of 
untrue and illogical beliefs. While some truth ward 
tendency is clearly a part of the natural endowment 
of homo sapiens, such tendency by no means dominates 
his mental habits. Indeed, it is brought to its fruitage 

* " The Fixation of Belief," Popular Science Monthly, November, 
1877. 



40 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

only after so much struggle and the learning of so many 
hard lessons of experience and of such slow accumula- 
tions of ages of thinking, that it may be appropriately 
described as an artificial, weakly possessed, and imper- 
fectly disseminated acquisition. Furthermore, practi- 
cahty, Hke much else, is a matter of degree; groups of 
ideas and ways of thinking are more or less practical, 
and influence action more or less indirectly and by 
variously roundabout paths; as the range of human 
thought widens and diversifies, deepens and becomes 
more complex, an ever-enlarging circle of human in- 
terests and concerns comes to be of this indirectly prac- 
tical kind. Precept and practice, instead of being con- 
nected by a short and straight, stout cord, are no le^s 
effectively bound by a comphcated network of strands, 
many of them dehcate in texture, elaborate in weave, 
and difficult to trace. For present-day purposes we 
may consider belief as characteristically of this type 

— complex in structure, subject to endlessly varying 
influences, modifiable by diverse factors and circum- 
stances, responsive to social, hereditary, educational, 
and transitory as well as to more permanent, natural, 
and artificial influences. 

A prominent result and indeed a purpose of behef 
is the concordant settlement of opinion. Yet this result 
may be brought about — has often been brought about 

— by other than logical processes; or, speaking with 
reference to the experience of history, it may be said 
that it proceeds by methods which are conderoned by 
the most approved logical (and ethical) sanctions of 
more advanced stages of knowledge, though it receives 
the endorsement of the cruder and less enlightened at- 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 41 

titude of the period. For every work of science — and 
something analogous is true of other progressive move- 
ments — "great enough to be remembered for a few 
generations, affords some exempHfication of the defec- 
tive state of the art of reasoning of the time when it 
was written; and each chief step in science has been a 
lesson in logic" (Peirce). Of distinctive methods of 
fixing belief Peirce describes four: the method of te- 
nacity, of authority, of inclination, of scientific veri- 
fiability. The first, when stated baldly, seems devoid 
of all merit; yet it expresses in extreme form a tendency 
which the student of belief is certain to encounter. The 
man of tenacity proceeds upon a faith that the opinion 
which he holds is the truth, that it is his duty to affirm 
this conviction, to reiterate it and to cherish it, to re- 
frain from entertaining any considerations which may 
tend to shake the belief, and to seek all the influences 
that may strengthen it. Naturally this does not re- 
main a coldly intellectual process, but becomes suffused 
with an emotional intensity which leads the devotee 
to look with pity or contempt or horror upon any con- 
trary opinion; even to scorn "weak and illusive rea- 
son," and to take refuge in the calm satisfaction of a 
firm and immutable faith. "When an ostrich buries its 
head in the sand as danger approaches, it very likely 
takes the happiest course. It hides the danger and then 
calmly says there is no danger; and if it feels perfectly 
sure there is none, why should it raise its head to see?" 
(Peirce.) 

Such an attitude is possible only to an intellec- 
tual recluse and, to be consistently maintained, must 
be kept remote from earthly realities. Even when re- 



/ 



42 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

served for non-practical considerations, it breaks down 
under the social impulse; man was not meant to live 
alone and neither feels, acts, nor thinks alone. A com- 
mon influence is necessary to fix men's beliefs ahke, 
and the most expeditious method of producing a con- 
sensus of opinion has proved to be that of imposed 
authority. History is too full of the triumphs and the 
failures of this method — both equally sad to contem- 
plate — to make it necessary to bring forward illus- 
trations of its procedure. Dogma and manifesto, the 
trial for heresy and the Index Expurgatorius, the In- 
quisition and the stake, scholasticism and pedantry, 
the HteraHsm of the expounders of the Scriptures or of 
the commentators of Aristotle, the refusal of the ortho- 
dox to look through the telescope to see what they had 
no authority for observing, or the E pur si muove of 
Galileo — bring to mmd realistically the heroic scenes 
of the dramas for which the method of authority fur- 
nishes the common plot. The limitations of this method 
are certain to be irritatingly felt by the few, however 
lightly tolerated by the many. The saving remnant 
that enjoys a wider outlook, and penetrates the mist 
with which dogma has enveloped the atmosphere, real- 
izes that infallibility is theoretically an idle dream, and 
practically an artificial fiction: and in so far as others 
use their eyes and look in forbidden places, they ob- 
serve that many of the beliefs of men do not fall under 
the shadow of the prommciamento, but thrive in the 
sunshine of common sense. And if this be true of some 
opinions, why not of others? Unless doubt and ques- 
tioning and inquiry on all subjects be utterly suppressed, 
the error of imposed authority will be suspected, the 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 43 

means whereby a sounder belief may be discovered will 
be at least dimly realized, and some resort to other 
methods of shaping belief be attempted. 

But even when freed from the fetters imposed by 
authority, the minds of the leaders of men have not 
always followed in the footsteps of wisdom. They have 
been prone to overlook the tyranny of their own or- 
ganization and inheritance, and have come to accept 
a more liberal and humane dictator and one of their 
own seeking — but a dictator none the less. They be- 
lieved what was agreeable to reason; they accepted that 
to which they naturally inclined; and the philosophers 
of cultivation inclined to beliefs that were plausible, 
or comforting, or stimulating, or upUfting, or liberaliz- 
ing. Congenial spirits found one another or a com- 
mon leader, and schools of opinion came and went. 
The pendulum swung now this way and now that; here 
a dominant leader impressed his personality strongly 
upon his contemporaries; there a reaction from an ex- 
treme doctrine induced attention to new lines of thought; 
everywhere opinion came to be more responsive to 
influences from without, from practice and experience, 
from custom and institution. But whatever progress 
results under this regime is fitful, and hazardous, and 
ill-defined; it is only when the causes of our inclina- 
tion are scrutinized and the objective worth, not the 
agreeableness, of our reasoning comes to be regarded 
as of primary import, that the pursuit of knowledge, 
and the fixation of belief in which it results, realize 
their allegiance to a higher power. Strange gods have 
been worshiped in strange ways by the followers of 
their inclinations; the intuitionalists and the mystics 



4A THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and those who believed themselves inspu-ed — though 
the inspiration of one was folly and anathema to an- 
other — have therein found exercise for their inahen- 
able right to hberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
"Truth," Lowell explains, "is said to lie at the bottom 
of a well for the very reason, perhaps, that whoever 
looks down in search of her sees his own image at the 
bottom, and is persuaded not only that he has seen the 
goddess, but that she is far better-looking than he had 
imagined." 

The method of scientific verification has been so 
wrought into the fiber of our thinking that we find it 
diflScult to realize the power and dominion of other 
sovereigns; we the scientifically minded are the Hel- 
lenes, and the others are the barbaroi. And rightly so; 
for the credentials of our sovereignty are the rewards 
of generations of patient study of the ways of nature, 
sanctioned by the logical anticipation of natural events, 
by the practical utilization of natural principles, by a 
conscientious, impartial, and objective analysis of our 
own mental processes. For the scepter in the hands of 
science is neither a symbol of wanton authority, nor a 
badge of unearned privilege, nor a license for extrava- 
gance and caprice, but an emblem of law and order — 
safeguarding to aU the most cherished opportunities 
for right knowledge, right beliefs, and right actions, in 
what measure each is wise enough to consent to be thus 
governed. It is the prerogative of the scientific method 
that it enthrones the logical right — the true — as the 
moral law within enthrones the ethical right — the 
good. The crowning virtue becomes not conviction, 
nor the approval of authority, nor acceptability, nor 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 45 

general credence, but provability. The adoption of 
this as our sovereign method alters our ideals, even 
where it modifies but little our practices; it radically 
transforms our belief-attitude and oiu* outlook, even 
though we cannot as yet apply the one nor enter into 
possession of the other. 

Yet we must not complacently assume that the ad- 
vantages are exclusively incorporated with the one 
method, or that its adoption is unencumbered with 
conflict and sacrifice. We shall continue to feel the 
natural proneness to shape our beliefs by other and 
less strenuous standards; we are unwilling to, and we 
need not, abate our appreciation of what the other 
methods have accomplished in the trials and tribula- 
tions of the past. We cannot lightly shake off the te- 
nacity of our convictions, however obtained, nor the 
inertia that easily, and the incapacity that necessa- 
rily, appeals to authority; we shall continue to yearn 
to believe what is agreeable and to resist unpleasant 
truths; we may still reserve some corner of our belief- 
chamber which shall be exempt from the intrusion of 
inquiry; but, on the whole, however we may defend 
these tendencies, or apologize for them, or struggle 
against them, we make some decent attempt to clothe 
them with the semblance of plausibility and to present 
them garbed in fashion scientific. "Yes," Peirce ad- 
mits, "the other methods do have their merits: a clear 
logical conscience costs something — just as any vir- 
tue, just as all that we cherish, costs us dear. But we 
should not desire it to be otherwise. The genius of a 
man's logical method should be loved and reverenced 
as his bride, whom he has chosen from all the world. 



46 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

He need not condemn the others; on the contrary he 
may honor them deeply, and m so doing he only honors 
her the more. But she is the one that he has chosen, 
and he knows that he was right in making that choice. 
And having made it, he will work and fight for her, and 
will not complain that there are blows to take, hoping 
that there may be as many and as hard to give, and 
will strive to be the worthy knight and champion of 
her from the blaze of whose splendors he draws his in- 
spiration and his corn-age." 

From this survey of the methods by which opinion 
comes to be established and disseminated, we emerge 
with an appreciation of how it arises that the history 
of behef — not imhke history in general — is an affair 
of war and peace; that it deals, on the one hand, with 
the accounts of the warfare of the scientific method 
with its rivals, and, on the other, with the internal 
development, the institutional absorption, and the col- 
onization of its own spirit among outlying cultures. 
"Logic," Mr. White reminds us, "is not history. His- 
tory is full of interferences which have cost the earth 
dear. Strangest of all, some of the direst of them have 
been made by the best of men, actuated by the purest 
of motives, and seeking the noblest results." And in 
the same strain Morley: "It is surely the midsummer 
madness of philosophic complacency to think that we 
have come by the shortest and easiest of all imagi- 
nable routes to our present point in the march; to sup- 
pose that we have wasted nothing, lost nothing, cruelly 
destroyed nothing on the road." 

From a consideration of the principles by which be- 
lief may be rightly and rationally fixed, we proceed 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 47 

to a contemplation of these principles in action. Coun- 
sel may be wise, but not practical. We know that the 
actual formation of true belief is beset with serious 
diflficulties; that the process is likely to be a response 
to a condition of affairs rather than to a statement of 
theory. Yet, though it be a condition and not a theory 
that confronts us, a knowledge of the theory may be 
the most effective armament for meeting the condi- 
tion. If knowledge is power, it is as much because 
method is better than shift as that acquaintance with 
fact is better than ignorance. Now that science has 
entered into her kingdom and the vastness of her do- 
main is willingly recognized, — for in a vital sense all 
that may be known by human ken, supported by evi- 
dence, presented in orderly arrangement, related to 
other knowledge, and developed by further study may 
be called science, — the busy problem is the infusion 
of the scientific method into all our ways of thinking, 
its application to all the various kinds of beliefs that 
affect our ideals, oiu* working conceptions, and our 
actions. In so far as this is accomplished there is de- 
veloped a scientific-mindedness, a rationality and sym- 
metry of judgment, which shall give to the conception 
of what is possible and what impossible, what prob- 
able and what improbable, what established and what 
disproved, a maximum of clearness, soundness, accu- 
racy, and practicality. It is this habit of mind that 
makes one keen-scented for right beliefs and secure, 
not from error indeed, but from rash credulity. 

It would be most unscientific to overlook the fact 
that many departments of human interest are not ready 
for — and in their nature may not be readily subject 



48 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

to — the concrete and exact application of the scien- 
tific method. But this recognition offers no excuse for 
removing such classes of beliefs from the influence of 
the rationalizing spirit and of the same scientific habits 
of mind that have created such a beneficent and stim- 
ulating atmosphere in more exact realms of thought. 
Such an influence results in what may be termed a 
belief -attitude; and this in turn is reflected in one's 
standards of evidence, contributes to one's expertness 
of judgment, determines one's inchnation or the will to 
believe. Yet this consummation is compatible with 
diversity among the opinions of the wisest as well as 
to the more glaring disagreements of all sorts and con- 
ditions of minds. But where there is accord in regard 
to a general fundamental method, such diversities are 
not to be feared. What Lord Morley aptly notes of 
personal companionship — that its painful element is 
not difference of opinion, but discord of temperament 
— is equally true of intellectual pursuits in generaL 
"Harmony of aim, not identity of conclusion, is the 
secret of the sympathetic life." Such differences of 
opinion fall within the range of valid beliefs. Those 
that do not — and many of them fall beyond the pale 
because of their discord of temperament, their alliance 
with other methods of fixing behef — may be variously 
characterized as prepossession, error, fallacy, supersti- 
tion, extravagance; and for the habits of mind that 
tend to the acceptance of false beliefs the terms il- 
logicality and creduUty are apposite. The former is 
commonly understood as referring to the proneness 
when confronted with the premises to draw false con- 
clusions therefrom; the latter as a too great readiness 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 49 

to accept the premises on insuflficient evidence. Yet in 
practice they are often found as close companions and 
appear at the summons of prejudice, ignorance, inertia, 
and of that weakness of judgment and vacillation of 
standards of belief that flourish, weed-like, when the 
scientific habit of mind is not assiduously cultivated. 

It is important to demonstrate that the forces that 
have been most productive of error in the past are not 
wholly shorn of their strength in the present; that the 
tendencies to act upon data credulously, with perverted 
logic and distorted evidence, however different the 
fashion of the garments in which they are paraded, are 
still recognizably the same persistent human frailties 
that detract from the complete appropriateness of the 
definition of man as a rational animal. It is further to 
be noted that quite too many of these misdemeanors 
are laid to the charge of ignorance; in truth ignorance 
cannot usually prove an alibi, but what remains to be 
discovered are the influences that prevented the dispel- 
ling of the ignorance, and therein will be found the vera 
causa of the credulity. Lecky reminds those who would 
investigate the causes of existing beliefs that a change 
of opinion is apt to imply, more than anything else, a 
change in the habits of thinking. "Definite arguments 
are the symptoms and pretexts, but seldom the causes 
of the change." "Reasoning which in one age would 
make no impression whatever, in the next age is re- 
ceived with enthusiastic applause." As we travel in 
retrospect along the stepping-stones from myth to 
science, from credulity to logicality, we find rather Httle 
disproof and very much outgrowth.^ It is because we 

^ What Dr. Holmes observes of the homoeopathic extravagances is 
characteristically true of many another error. "Were all the hospi- 



50 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

have a more appropriate, that is, a truer way of re- 
garding a certain cluster of phenomena, that we dis- 
card the old way; and this truer conception, reached 
partly by new fact, partly by new argument, partly 
by new insight, partly by new appHcations of method, 
is the logical legacy which the successive "heirs of all 
the ages" — each in turn "in the foremost ranks of 
time" — bequeath to their descendants. 

It is not easy to reach a decision in regard to the 
erroneous views of the past, as to how far preposses- 
sion blinded men to actual evidence, how far decisive 
facts were not available, how far logical methods were 
weakly handled; each of these was frequently present 
and acted both as cause and effect. This, however, 
is deserving of emphasis: that when the method of 
science is put in the first place, significant facts will be 
observed and looked for, argimients pro and con will 
be weighed, the dangers of prepossession will be real- 
ized. Not that this will always be done wisely and well, 
nor that error will necessarily be avoided; but that the 
steps that are taken, even though they be small and 
tentative and meandering, are more likely than by any 

tal physicians of Europe and America to devote themselves, for the 
requisite period, to this sole pursuit, and were their results to be 
unanimous as to the total worthlessness of the whole system in prac- 
tice, this slippery delusion would slide through their fingers without 
the slightest discomposure, when, as they supposed, they had crushed 
every joint in its tortuous and trailing body." "Many an error of 
thought and learning has fallen before such a gradual growth of 
thoughtful and learned opposition. But such things as the quadra- 
ture of the circle, etc., are never put down. And why.'' Because 
thought can influence thought, but thought cannot influence self- 
conceit; learning can annihilate learning, but learning cannot anni- 
hilate ignorance. A sword may cut through an iron bar, and the sev- 
ered ends will not unite; let it go through the air, and the yielding 
substance is whole again in a moment." (De Morgan.) 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 51 

other method to be in the right direction. Our scales 
may be crude, our weights only approximate; but even 
so, the result is more likely to be trustworthy than if 
we abandon them and resort to guesswork, or, retain- 
ing them, put down a fist on one end of the beam. 

It thus seems proper to speak of the combined logi- 
cal and psychological weaknesses that tend to the ac- 
ceptance of unreal evidence and of irrelevant explana- 
tion as credulity; and the problem of problems, alike 
in the voyages of discovery and in everyday cruising 
on waters great and small, is to equip the pilot to steer 
his course by right belief and not by credulity. The 
intellectual mariner's compass, for all purposes alike, 
is the method of science; none the less pilotage is an 
art. Many shores are imperfectly charted; there are 
reefs and shoals, storms and fogs, breakages in the 
machinery and lack of training in the crew. These are 
the dangers of the seas — and shipwrecks are not un- 
common; but how much more imminent the dangers, 
and how almost impossible the traffic, without any 
compass or with a less reliable one! It is the worthy 
ambition that brightens the hopes of many a scholar 
to contribute some aid to the extension, the greater 
availability, the greater convenience and safety of the 
highways or of the equipment of intellectual naviga- 
tion. 

II 

The central purpose of this study is to indicate the 
foundations of scientific belief. These, like piles driven 
deep down below the surface, are often unconsidered 
by those who use the structure which they support. 



52 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Equally is it the purpose to consider the habits of mind 
that lead to the guidance of conduct by scientifically 
minded conviction. A notable defect in this respect is 
credulity — a common quality, but cogently or dramat- 
ically illustrated only in terms of somewhat elaborate 
pretenses accompanied by some measure of successful 
currency. When thus presented, credulity is paralleled 
by deception; there must be deceiver as well as de- 
ceived. This complicates the issue without adding no- 
tably to the psychological interest. In addition, the 
two roles may be united^ and there results seK-decep- 
tion, which in turn may vary from a fairly plain to a 
decidedly obscure diagnosis. 

Retrospectively creduhty attaches to the formation 
of beliefs under outgrown standards. A weak logical 
sense inheres in them; but more positively they result 
from prepossessions, which means a willingness to dis- 
pense with logical requirements in the interests of a 
cherished conviction. Examples of the one type are 
easily found by going back to older systems of think- 
ing.^ The more dramatic types of credulity are to be 

1 A credulous age or a credulous standard of belief finds expression 
in the acceptance as true of reports or statements contrary to fact, 
and again of interpretations of facts or evidence contrary to sound 
reason or plausibility. In the former case the lack is the criterion 
of evidence, in the latter in the criterion of proof. The former is 
more closely related to ignorance, the latter to prepossession; the com- 
bination of the two is common. The belief in unicorns, mermaids, 
sea-serpents and aU manner of travelers' tales represents the one 
type; beliefs in fossils as shells carried and dropped by Crusaders, 
in horoscopes, palmistry, the elixir of life, the conversion of baser 
metals into gold, as well as such projects as rain-making, perpetual- 
motion schemes, or again calculating horses, and clairvoyant mediums. 
Such examples of psychological fables or myths and again of psycho- 
logical fallacies or delusions are touched upon in various studies in 
this volume. 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 53 

found in cases of deliberate deception. Though often 
sordid in motive and ingenious in execution, they de- 
serve attention. A few instances are as instructive as 
many, and may be presented as standard examples. 
In approaching them, we may stop to consider the 
sources of credulity, in so far as it inclines to error 
or weakens the inclination to rationality. Credulity is 
shown in an uncritical acceptance of statements. There 
is no simple rule for its avoidance, no automatic switch 
that makes connection when truth presses the button, 
but refuses to work for the touch of error. There is the 
possibility of reaching principles that guide judgment. 
One must consider both the statements and the source. 
A man may deliberately lie; he may belong to the class 
to which Huxley refers when he speaks of "the down- 
right lying of people whose word it is impossible to 
doubt"; he may be more or less consciously or subcon- 
sciously misled by his imagination; he may be hope- 
lessly deficient in his powers of observation, or in his 
knowledge of fact, or in his capacity to handle evidence 
and argument; and none of these ethical or logical 
shortcomings seems to interfere at all in certain persons 
with their powers of holding and publishing opinions 
on all manners of subjects — even on those on which 
no human soul has the possibility of possessing knowl- 
edge. It is also important to note how far the issue in- 
volved is a matter of fact or of the interpretation of 
fact. Both fact and its interpretation, or arguments, 
appear as prominently on the side of error as of truth; 
yet, though not reducible to anthropometric measure- 
ments, the physiognomies of the two are recognizably 
different to the trained observer. 



54 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

It seems ludicrously easy to collect facts of any de- 
sired quality and to point them in any desired direc- 
tion. Dr. Holmes effectively describes these abuses: 
"Foremost of all, emblazoned at the head of every 
column, loudest shouted by every triumphant dispu- 
tant, held up as paramount to all other considerations, 
stretched like an impenetrable shield to protect the 
weakest advocate of the great cause against the weap- 
ons of the adversary, was that omnipotent monosyllable 
which has been the patrimony of cheats and the cur- 
rency of dupes from time immemorial, — Facts! Facts! 
Facts!" Yet in the crucible of logic it is possible to 
separate the dross from the gold. The arguments em- 
ployed have a like suspicious appearance: they "have 
been so long bruised and battered roimd in the cause 
of every doctrine and pretension, new, monstrous, or 
deliriously impossible, that each of them is as odiously 
f amiUar to the scientific scholar as the faces of so many 
old acquaintances, among the less reputable classes, 
to the oflScers of police." The former type of credulity 
— the rash acceptance of facts — is the more simple 
and the more usually considered; the latter type — the 
rash acceptance of explanations or interpretations of 
facts — is frequently the more vital and instructive. 
Ingenious and successful lying is doubtless a fine art; 
yet the more difficult part of it is the gaining of cre- 
dence for one's inventions. That depends largely upon 
the behef-attitude of the public and upon the psycho- 
logical climate in which they live. \ It is quite obvious 
that the conscienceless prevaricator or charlatan must 
play upon the prejudices and vanities and ignorance 
and cupidities of his clientele. \He presents what they 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 55 

wish to believe, appeals to their passions and emotional 
weaknesses, and when necessary berates his opponents 
with no gentle hand, and indulges in what Huxley- 
speaks of as "varnishing the fair face of truth with that 
pestilent cosmetic, rhetoric." But the psychologist's 
interest is predominantly on the other side, with the 
duped rather than with the knave, especially when con- 
tagion has a fair field and judgment is lost in a psychic 
epidemic of credulity. Such we are apt to associate 
with dark ages and ignorant communities, with isolated 
cultures and inhospitable mental climates. A few in- 
stances from the days of the telegraph and the omni- 
present daily paper may accordingly be the more in- 
structive.^ 

^ Dr. Holmes's Homoeopathy and its Kindred Delusions, first pub- 
lished about sixty years ago, was substantially a study of credulity 
as applied to medical matters. Readers of this will recall that besides 
the minute exposure of the baselessness of the Hahnemannian cult, 
there are there considered (1) the royal cure of the King's Evil; (2) 
the Weapon Ointment and the Sympathetic Powder, the first rather 
lukewarmly considered by Bacon, the latter brought into notoriety 
by Sir Kenelm Digby; (3) the Tar- Water mania of Bishop Berkeley; 
(4) the history of the Metallic Tractors, or Perkinsism. These are 
thus summarized: "Theirs* two illustrate the ease with which nu- 
merous facts are accumulated to prove the most fanciful and senseless 
extravagances. The third exhibits the entire insuflSciency of exalted 
wisdom, immaculate honesty, and vast general acquirements to make 
a good physician of a great bishop. The fourth shows us the intimate 
machinery of an extinct delusion, which flourished only forty years 
ago; drawn in all its details, as being a rich and comparatively recent 
illustration of the pretensions, the arguments, the patronage, by 
means of which windy errors have long been, and will continue to 
be, swollen into transient consequence. All display in superfluous 
abundance the boundless credulity and excitability of mankind upon 
subjects connected with medicine." The account of Perkins and his 
Metallic Tractors falls in well with the instances here considered. 



56 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

III 

The name of Leo Taxil — a pseudonym for Gabriel 
Jogand-Paves — may be unknown to many readers; it 
should not remain so, for the judgment which has been 
pronounced upon Mme. Blavatsky — also a modern 
of the moderns — may with modifications be applied 
to Taxil; that he "has achieved a title to permanent 
remembrance as one of the most accomplished, in- 
genious, and interesting impostors in history." Only 
Taxil's accomplishments were of a rather gross order; 
his boldness surpassed his ingenuity; and the interest 
is centered in his deeds rather than in his personaHty. 
Like most disciples of Cagliostro, his career was a 
checkered one.- In 1885, at the age of thirty-one, he 
was engaged upon his magnum opus, having already 
appeared as a violent radical in politics, — he is a 
product of France, — a rabid anti-clerical, and the 
author of a Hbelous pamphlet on the "Secret Amours 
of Pius IX." The suggestion for his chef d'oeuvre was 
the encyclical of Leo XIII (1884) directed against the 
Freemasons, who with others were placed imder the 
ban as subjects of the realms of Satan. After a full con- 
fession of the errors of his former ways, Taxil was re- 
ceived back with rejoicing into the bosom of the Church, 
and thereupon published four volumes of wholly imag- 
inary revelations, revealing the sacrilegious orgies and 
devil-worship of the Masonic mysteries. For this he 
received in person the solemn benediction of the Vati- 
can, as well as the material rewards of the sale of one 
hundred thousand copies of his work and the honor 
of its translation into EngHsh, German, Italian, and 
Spanish. If it be stated that the German version 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 57 

omitted the volume on the "Masonic sisters," for the 
reason that it was not thought proper to outrage the 
moral sense of the community by recounting "the filthi- 
ness of the hellish crew," the character of the work may 
be surmised. Taxil extended the sphere of influence 
of his imaginary devil-worshipers to all parts of the 
world — even from Singapore to Charleston, at which 
latter point the Masonic Grand Master figures as a 
Satanic Pope, who has at his disposal a telephone, in- 
vented and operated by devils, whereby he puts a gir- 
dle round about the earth in forty seconds, and a magic 
bracelet by which he summons Lucifer at his pleasure. 
Intoxicated by his success and the credulity of his ad- 
herents, Taxil's invention runs riot; and he tells the 
story of a serpent inditing prophecies on the back of a 
demon who, "in order to marry a Freemason, trans- 
formed himseK into a young lady, and played the piano, 
evenings, in the form of a crocodile." Taxil gained con- 
federates in other countries, who contributed to the 
movement according to their several needs and talents. 
One of the most interesting figures in the story is the 
fictitious personage, Diana Vaughan — the pucelle of 
the drama and of its denouement. She was given out to 
be the descendant of Thomas Vaughan, the seventeenth- 
century mystic, and the goddess Astarte; her Luci- 
ferian origin and principles were shown by her horror 
of all religious observances, by the devils who attended 
her, and through whose aid she made excursions to 
Mars, where she "rode on Schiaparelli's canals, sailed 
on the Sea of the Sirens, and strolled among the gigan- 
tic inhabitants of the planet." Many remarkable inci- 
dents of her curious personality are retailed for the 



58 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

benefit of the believers; while poetic justice is appeased 
by her final conversion to the Church through the in- 
strumentality of the spirit of Jeanne d'Arc. 

When it became necessary to materialize Diana 
Vaughan for the benefit of the privileged few and to 
satisfy the skepticism of others, she was cleverly im- 
personated by "a bright American girl, employed as 
a copyist in a Parisian typewriter establishment, who 
wrote all the letters at Taxil's dictation and received a 
monthly salary of one hundred and fifty francs for her 
services." This was hardly a fair appreciation of Ameri- 
can talent, considering that the money remitted to 
Diana Vaughan in ten years amounted to more than 
half a million francs. In 1896 Taxil was a prominent 
figure in a great anti-Masonic congress held at Trent, 
where indeed he was treated as a hero and a saint. On 
April 19, 1897, in Paris, there was held by invita- 
tion of Diana Vaughan a highly sensational function, 
at which it had been announced that the miraculous 
lady would appear. When the moment arrived, Taxil 
stepped forward and said: "Reverend Sirs, ladies and 
gentlemen! you wish to see Diana Vaughan. Look at 
me! I myself am that lady." Then followed an explicit 
account of the twelve years of imposture and an impu- 
dent expression of thanks to the clergy for the unwit- 
ting aid in his deviltries; a forced retreat to a neigh- 
boring caf6 to escape the vengeance of the crowd; a 
momentary furore, some discussion pro and con; and 
then, so far as can be learned, the world wagged on and 
the story ends.^ Sm*ely this is a remarkable instance of 

* The account of Taxil is derived from E. P. Evans, "Survival of 
Mediaeval Credulity," Popular Science Monthly, March and April, 1900. 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 59 

fin-de-siecle credulity, and one that will hardly suffer 
by comparison with mediseval superstition. Its impor- 
tance in the present connection lies in the illustration 
which it furnishes of what may happen in extreme 
cases when verifiability and scientific-mindedness are 
wholly ignored, and the methods that appeal to au- 
thority and to prepossessions are allowed to rim riot. 
Then standards of probability, as well as the critical at- 
titude, are wholly absent or hopelessly distorted, and 
credulity has the open door. 

Prepossessions are not always so prominent in the 
evolution of myths that gain acceptance by preying 
upon credulity. The presence of an indolent atmos- 
phere and of a sympathetic milieu is all that is neces- 
sary. Of this the story of Kaspar Hauser, the "wild boy 
of Nuremberg," furnishes a fairly modern instance; for 
the Nestors of our generation may easily remember 
the interest which his case aroused throughout Eu- 
rope. The commonly accepted tale made him out as 
an abandoned child, cruelly confined in a dark cell, cut 
off from all association except with the monster who 
gave him his daily bread. He became the classic ex- 
ample of the condition of a human being in the absence 
of all education; he was heralded as a child of nature, 
as an example of the innocence of man before the fall, 
as a realization in the flesh of Rousseau's Emile. It 
was proposed to adopt him as the child of Europe, and 
he was actually adopted as a son by the Earl of Stan- 
hope. The interest in his case was maintained by the 
accounts of his marvelous psychic powers, as also by 
the speculations as to his origin, which brought slander 
upon more than one noble house. He could see a gnat 



60 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

in a spider's web a long distance off, and after twi- 
light; he could distinguish between a pear and an apple 
and a plum tree by their odor at a distance at which 
others could barely see the tree; he was overcome by 
the exhalations of a graveyard several streets off; he 
could distinguish metals by their different attractions 
for his fingers, while the vicinity of a hardware shop 
brought on convulsions; when examined by a homceop- 
athist, he proved in his own person the truth of homoe- 
opathy. His origin was a matter of eager speculation. 
Gossips and scholars were equally busy; and, with 
characteristic Teuton thoroughness, a bibliography of 
nearly three hundred numbers was accumulated, re- 
counting the various versions of the story of Kaspar 
Hauser. 

The sifted facts out of which, or in spite of which, 
the various myths sprouted and flourished, are few and 
luminous. The boy appeared on the streets of Nurem- 
berg with a letter in his hand, which he had doubtless 
written, and was put in prison as a helpless wayfarer. 
The original protocol shows that he walked a mile on 
that day, recited the Lord's prayer, spoke with dialec- 
tical peculiarities, said that he had gone to school, 
showed his fondness for horses, and admitted that the 
object of the letter, addressed to a captain of cavalry, 
was to secure him a post in the service. He seemed to 
feign simple-mindedness and to avoid answering ques- 
tions. In the one letter was another purporting to have 
been written sixteen years previously by the mother 
of the boy, but obviously a forgery. This started the 
story to which the Burgomaster gave wings by a proc- 
lamation elaborating the "wild boy of nature" theory. 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 61 

and embellishing it with fantastic "details calculated 
to give verisimilitude to an otherwise improbable tale.'* 
Learned ignorance in the person of a Professor Dau- 
mer — to whom Kaspar was entrusted for his educa- 
tion — still further distorted the simple facts. Though 
at first the boy could not speak (this is Daumer's story) 
and could only understand those who treated him as 
an infant, this helpless and untutored babe, after three 
days, played on the piano, soon after knitted a stock- 
ing, and in four weeks was able to entertain the Burgo- 
master with an account of his years of solitary confine- 
ment. Within a month this worthy, but mentally blind, 
professor had transformed the wild boy into a model 
of social elegance, who carried on witty conversations, 
made graceful allusions to the ancient Romans, and 
played checkers and chess. The story is too full of de- 
tail to be further considered; but enough has been given 
to show the glaring inconsistency of the theory of ex- 
planation either with the real facts, which almost no 
one knew, or even with the alleged facts, which were 
widely circulated. Kaspar's lot simply chanced to fall 
in pleasant places; by accepting the part which the 
creduHty of his surroimdings thrust upon him, he was 
buoyed into fame and made the subject of a neuge- 
schichtliche Legende.^ It is proper to add that the back- 
ward stage of a practical psychology seventy years ago 
made possible the acceptance of such a caricature of 
an untutored child of nature. Doubtless many gave 
no credence to the tale; but its ready acceptance in 
almost all circles gives it a permanent place in the 

* The true Kaspar Hauser is disclosed in Antonius von der Linde*s 
Kaspar Hauser (2 vols., 1887). 



62 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

history of credulity. In contrast with the affaire Taxil, 
the Kaspar incident appeals more to the intellectual 
than to the emotional weaknesses, and involves a larger 
share of misinterpretation of fact; while the lack of 
proper standards to estimate the improbabihty of what 
is given out for fact is glaringly obvious in both cases. 
This personal characteristic of the duped may be more 
forcibly described as guUibihty. 

To complete the collection of types of credulity, we 
should have an instance in which a system of interpre- 
tation of facts — not a mere narrative — in itself star- 
tling and contradictory to ordinary experience, gains 
widespread credence, and that in spite of pronoimced 
inconsistency with verifiable observation and common 
sense. These conditions are remarkably well satisfied 
by the recent promulgation of the doctrines of Chris- 
tian Science. Even in this field of intellectual effort, 
the land of the free and the home of the brave has con- 
tributed an article worthy to compete with the foreign 
product. Eagle-like, this system spreads its wings and 
soars free from the bonds of sense or earth-bound reali- 
ties, free from human logic and the errors of mortal 
mind, free from the material impediments which nature 
has inconsiderately set in our paths, free to make things 
so by thinking them so, free to set method and learn- 
ing and experience at naught. And surely it calls for 
courage of no common order to resist the seductive 
appeals of eye and ear, to sail steadily on heedless of 
the calls of the sirens of rationality, convinced at the 
outset that things cannot be as they are, and refusing 
the nod of recognition to the plebeian idols of the ills 
of flesh. It is not necessary in this connection to re- 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 63 

count the beliefs of this system; it is sufficient to point 
out that when thousands of inteUigent persons give 
practical adherence to, and enroll themselves under the 
banner of one who teaches that a bunion would be an 
adequate cause of insanity, if only we held the same 
behef about the bunion as we do about congestion of 
the brain; that smallpox is contagious by reason of 
the same agencies as make weeping or yawning con- 
tagious; that fear may be reflected in the body as frac- 
tured bones, just as shame is seen rising to the cheek; 
that anatomy and physiology and hygiene are the 
husbandmen of sickness and disease, while the reading 
of a textbook of Christian Science is equally effective 
in producing health; that when a healthy horse takes 
cold without his blanket, it is on account of the poor 
creature's knowledge of physiology — then such per- 
sons can hardly complain if they are cited as instances 
of modern credulity. 

IV 

Such, then, is the backgroimd against which logical 
belief shines forth with contrasted splendor; such are, 
admittedly in their extreme form, the results of follow- 
ing after strange gods and deserting the narrow path 
of strenuous rationality, of critically trained judgment, 
of adherence to verifiable standards of belief. The tale 
needs no adornment, and the moral is sufficiently 
pointed to require no hard blows to drive it home. It 
will be profitable in continuation to survey, though 
perforce briefly, the middle distance, the practical field 
of compromise and of the necessity for action, in which 
we needs must travel up hill and down dale and cannot 



64 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

take the level road which we wish were possible; in 
which we must risk error constantly if we would move 
at all. 

In entering the practical arena that philosopher is 
indeed insensitive or unobservant who does not be- 
come conscious of a decided climatic change. He is 
presumably familiar with various uncomphmentary 
remarks concerning his unfitness to assmne a due share 
of the responsibilities of life, from the tribute of Fred- 
erick the Great ("If/* he said, "I wanted to ruin one 
of my provinces, I would make over its government 
to the philosophers ") to the fashionable gibes against 
the scholar in politics for the professor in practical 
affairs. There is certainly much exaggeration in the 
current notions of the incompatibility of the reflective 
and the directive (perhaps it would be unwise to say 
the active) temperament; and there is much reason 
for the claim that the science-moulded philosopher 
may say, "Nous avons changes tout cela" Indeed, a 
recent writer has forcibly maintained that the nearest 
analogue of the man of science is the "so-called man 
of business, and the chief distinction between the two 
is that the one deals with the unf amihar, the other with 
famihar things." ^ This significant difference was long 
ago presented by De Morgan as one of the advantages 
that a logical training secures. "I maintain that logic 
tends to make the power of reason over the imusual 
and the unfamiliar more nearly equal to the power over 
the usual and familiar than it would otherwise be. The 
second is increased; but the first is almost created." 
This is but one of the differences in training, interest, 
^ * F. W. Clarke, Popular Science Monthly, February, 1900. 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 65 

thought-habit, and temperament that estrange the 
scholar from the man of affairs. Yet much of this un- 
famiharity is a matter of technique, and as such be- 
longs equally to the arts of life and to the sciences; the 
ignorance of one another's techniques is no cause for 
lack of sympathy and comprehension of the aims and 
efforts of practical and scientific specialists. A further 
contrast is emphasized by philosophical historians. 
"In practical life the wisest and soundest men avoid 
speculation and insure success because, by limiting 
their range, they increase the tenacity by which they 
grasp events; while in speculative life the course is ex- 
actly the reverse, since in that department the greater 
the range, the greater the command, and the object 
of the philosopher is to have as large a generalization 
as possible" — this is Buckle's formulation. "Noth- 
ing can be more fatal in politics than a preponderance 
of the philosophical, or in philosophy than a prepon- 
derance of the political, spirit," says Lecky. Fiske, in 
commenting upon the relations of Huxley and Glad- 
stone (whom Huxley himself spoke of as a "copious 
shuflBier"), says: "One could no more expect a prime 
minister, as such, to understand Huxley's attitude in 
presence of a scientific problem, than a deaf-mute to 
comprehend a symphony of Beethoven." 

And yet these occupations are not mutually exclu- 
sive; philosophy and politics are not December and 
May, and the temperate zone, in which (in theory, at 
least) we pass our existence, is a composite of the two. 
Indeed, a divorce of theory and practice is disastrous 
to both parties of the alliance; theory is the more real 
and vital for its consideration of and adaptation to 



66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tangible conditions; and practice is more rational and 
more liberal, embraces a larger expediency than if re- 
sponsive only to the status quo. Learning dissociated 
from doing is threatened with the decadence of mere 
erudition, pedantry, and disputation. Exercise is 
equally good for mind and body; but there is danger 
of falling in love with the mere mechanism of thought 
— the absorption in the feeling of one's mental muscles 
contracting and of plodding in treadmill routine, ever 
moving, but never advancing. The danger of practice 
dissociated from principle is that of becoming time- 
serving, narrow, partisan, short-sighted; it tacks for 
every wind, loses its bearings, and sacrifices larger for 
smaller gains. Emerson said of the English some fifty 
years ago, "They are impious in their skepticism of a 
theory, but kiss the dust before a fact"; and Emer- 
son's own countrymen are curiously like and curiously 
unlike the people whose traits he characterizes. Lord 
Morley deplores the same tendency from a more mod- 
ern point of view. He notes the inclination to reply 
to an advocate of improvement by "some sagacious 
silliness about recognizing the limits of the practical 
in politics, and seeing the necessity of adapting theories 
to facts. As if the fact of taking a broader and wiser 
view than the common crowd disqualifies a man from 
knowing what the view of the common crowd happens 
to be, and from estimating it at the proper value for 
practical purposes." These various opinions, when 
judiciously strained, leave a weighty deposit of truth; 
and they have a direct bearing upon the issues of right 
and wrong belief. They make it abundantly clear that 
the relations of right knowing to right doing as ur- 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 67 

gently demand illumination to-day as when Socrates 
perplexed the Athenian youth by maintaining that no 
man would willingly do wrong or wittingly hold to 
error. On the one hand, we are told that for wild specu- 
lation and rash credulity, the practical man takes the 
lead, whether it be by subscribing in coin to schemes 
for extracting gold from sea-water, or "backing" the 
rain-makers, or the "Keeley motor"; or in subscrib- 
ing in faith to the reality of cm-ative mental vibrations, 
the accounts of signaling with the inhabitants of Mars, 
the evolution of gray matter in Helen Keller's finger- 
tips, or any other of the items of the progress of 
science with which newspaper paragraphers regale 
their readers when copy is scarce. On the other hand, 
the men of books and apparatus are charged with the 
pursuit of fads, of a contempt for journals and ledgers, 
of an ignorance of business ways, and an incapacity 
to deal executively with men and things. The truth is 
that there are all shades and grades of men in both 
careers. The important things to be observed are 
tendencies and their causes, not individuals and their 
peculiarities. It is these tendencies that are reflected 
in opinion and conduct indirectly, and directly in the 
relations of theory to practice, as acted upon or con- 
sidered. 

This relation — between the theoretical and the 
practical factors in the progress of knowledge — may 
be pictured as similar to that pertaining between mas- 
ter and dog. The dog runs ahead of the master, takes 
short excursions on his own account, comes to a turn 
of the road and wanders hesitatingly about until he 
detects the direction in which his master turns; then 



68 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

dashes confidently onward with an air of having in- 
tended to go that way all along, and probably imagines 
— and the appearances are in his favor — that he is 
leading the man. Yet the wise dog does not wander far 
out of scenting distance, is on the alert for the call of 
the master, and quickly retraces his steps when he 
finds that his master has turned the other way. It is 
doubtless true that the dog may hght upon valuable 
discoveries; and the master will do well to heed any 
unusual signs of alarm or excitement on the part of his 
keen-scented companion; and if it happens that the 
shades of night close in upon him or that his own sight 
grows dim, he that walks in darkness is fortunate in 
having so trustworthy a guide. From which we may 
learn that the formation of belief in practical affairs, 
while seemingly independent of theory and indeed 
rimning ahead of theory for short stretches in a restless 
striving to enrich experience, is none the less directed 
by theory, and prospers best when following, though 
with judgment and self-rehance, the indications of 
principles and formulae. 

The mutual recognition of the functions of theorist 
and practitioner is one of the desired and not improb- 
able consummations of modern civilization, and upon 
it depends in considerable measure the practical fate 
of right and wrong behefs. It is still pertinent to re- 
peat Buckle's complaint that "a theorist is actually 
a term of reproach instead of being, as it ought to be, 
a term of honor; for to theorize is the highest function 
of genius, and the greatest philosophers must always 
be the greatest theorists"; yet, in so doing, we may 
add the condition that the philosophers shall theorize 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 69 

wisely and with appreciation of the actuahties of exist- 
ence, not dogmatically or capriciously. In brief, there 
is scientific theorizing, as there is scientific practice; 
belief and credulity, truth and error, economy and 
waste, profit and loss, are possible in each. Yet in the 
end, rational progress in belief and practice, though 
truly a question of proportion, must take its illumi- 
nation not diffusely from countless scattered sources, 
but directly from a central luminous principle. "The 
devotion to the practical aspect of truth" — to cite 
again from Lord Morley — "is in such excess as to 
make people habitually deny that it can be worth 
while to formulate an opinion, when it happens at the 
moment to be incapable of realization for the reason 
that there is no direct prospect of inducing a sujQScient 
number of persons to share it." "As if the mere possi- 
bility of the view being a right one did not obviously 
entitle it to a discussion." "The evil . . . comes of not 
seeing the great truth that it is worth while to take 
pains to find out the best way of doing a given task, 
even if you have strong grounds for suspecting that it 
will ultimately be done in a worse way." "It makes 
all the difference in the world," says Whately, "whether 
we put Truth in the first place or in the second place." 
Lord Morley thus protests against what he calls the 
House of Commons view of life, which subordinates 
principle to expediency, — which may be unfortunate, 
but necessary, — but in so doing sacrifices the para- 
mount significance of principle, — which is both un- 
necessary and pernicious. 

The practical arena wherein truth and error, right 
and wrong, the better and the worse cause, principle 



70 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and expediency, are engaged in combat is obviously 
too complex to admit of ready description or analysis; 
the few groups of combating influences that have been 
brought within the field of view occupy but a modest 
corner of the arena. Other equally important contests 
are going on at the same time; the ethical aspects of 
belief are nearly as complex as the intellectual, and as 
worthy of consideration; and people still find an in- 
terest in discussing how far truth should be dissemi- 
nated when it undermines traditional convictions seem- 
ingly essential to happiness or even to virtue; how 
far, in Clifford's words, "Truth is a thing to be shouted 
from the housetops, not to be whispered over rose- 
water after dinner, when the ladies are gone away,"\ 
and how far the dissemination of right belief is itself 
controlled by considerations of practical as well as 
of theoretical morahty. Philosophers of so opposite a 
calling as a Harvard psychologist and a Parliamentary 
leader ^ unite in telling us that, in the last analysis, 
with regard to disputed questions of a not too practical 
sort, men do and have a right to beheve, at their own 
risk, that which seems to them most elevating, fitting, 
satisfying, and rational; that in this process we aU 
follow custom and temperamental impulse, though we 
cover our retreat with arguments. These enticing rami- 
fications of the central problem of right and wrong 
behef , however germane to the comprehension of the 
forces that make for truth and error, require indepen- 
dent consideration. The issues in which these various 
factors — and especially the aspects just presented of 
the relations of theory to practice — culminate is that 
1 James, The Will to Believe; Balfour, The Foundations of Belief. 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 71 

of the formation of belief -standards. It is in the com- 
mon possession of these that the logical man of theory 
and the logical man of practice should find their sym- 
pathetic companionship; and to the appreciation of 
this underlying requisite for harmonious and profitable 
intercourse, nothing will contribute more directly and 
effectively than a comprehension of the relations that 
do and should exist between the guiding principles of 
belief and their wise embodiment in conduct. If the 
leaders of men, leaders of small companies and of large 
ones, those who are Hstened to and likewise listen to 
others, can be induced to absorb somewhat of the spirit 
and the sensitiveness to real distinctions that result 
from the successful devotion to the aims of science, the 
danger of the ready acceptance of false beliefs, the fos- 
tering of credulity, would be materially lessened. 

In an age when many marvelous things have been 
accomplished, some of them on the surface as unex- 
pected and as unconnected with other knowledge, in- 
deed as seemingly contradictory of such knowledge, 
as the ostensible miracles and startling paradoxes that 
are paraded as demonstrable truth, it is natural enough 
that the man in the street should be bewildered and 
not know what to believe nor whom to believe. Be- 
tween the Scylla of ignorant and obstinate skepticism 
and the Charybdis of ignorant and rash credulity, the 
channel seems perplexingly narrow; nor is it always 
possible to assume the expertness and disinterestedness 
of those who offer themselves as pilots. The possibility 
of seeing one's bones through the skin seems as remote 
as the possibility of perpetual motion; telepathy no 
more wonderful than wireless telegraphy; the predic- 



72 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tions of the astrological almanac as credible as the 
determination by the spectroscope of the physical con- 
ditions of other planets; the phrenological faculties 
as satisfying as the results of the physiological study 
of brain-localizations; the mental vibrations of the 
"absent treatment" healer as fairly supported by the 
results as the therapeutic action of drugs; the pres- 
entation of the mathematical triturations and the ho- 
moeopathic potencies as learned and convincing as the 
enigmatic formulae and manipulations of the chemist. 
And yet these resemblances are quite superficial, the 
analogies of their likeness quite misleading. On the 
one shore lies the orderly kingdom of rational belief; 
across the border the chaotic realm of credulity. 

Any one who cares to take the trouble of examining 
the literature of the propaganda of logical imortho- 
doxy can readily satisfy himself of the reality and the 
character of the realm over which credulity holds sway. 
He will observe the truly unbalanced, the "cranks," 
those possessed with what has been described as the 
"unconquerable determination of the human race to 
believe what it knows is not so," the innocently and 
naively deluded, the faddists and extremists, the seem- 
ingly normal and wholly intelligent. The shades and 
grades of believers are as pronounced as on the other 
shore. And yet to the man of sturdy intellectual vir- 
tue these distorted though not wholly valueless beUefs 
offer no temptation. And equally true is it that the 
logically moulded thinker knows that it is useless to 
demand any ready-made prescription which shall save 
all men from credulity, not only in extreme cases — 
which most people do not really fear — but in the 



BELIEF AND CREDULITY 73 

intermediate and more frequent and actual perplexi- 
ties of the practical life. 

The nature of the antidote which is most worth the 
seeking it has been the purpose of this study to set 
forth. And last as first should it be emphasized that 
there is in many of the vital and typical problems of 
knowing and doing, an objectively best method of 
fixing belief to which we may reasonably approximate 
in practice. Neither the logical requirements of philo- 
sophical thought nor the actualities of the practical 
life, when rightly interpreted, appear to be seriously 
antagonistic to — indeed are wholly compatible with 
— the absorption of the principles rooted in the scien- 
tific analysis of belief. This infusion of the blood of 
science permeates the organic structure of the belief- 
attitude, and creates a sturdy afi&nity for right belief 
and a deep-seated aversion for the intellectual man- 
ners that error, attractive to credulity, is apt to bear. 
In truth this protecting aegis is in some measure an 
aesthetic trait — a certain intellectual fastidiousness 
which, as is also true of the ethical life, becomes a po- 
tent ally of virtue. And this logical virtue becomes 
recognizable in the ability to guide action and belief 
by reference to fundamental principles; it requires the 
quality of mind that easily holds the impress of an 
argument, whose beliefs are deep-rooted in the soil of 
human experience critically interpreted. 

When confronted with the noisy demonstrations of 
some new revolutionary claimant for public favor, the 
well-bred mind, though plastic to worthily formative 
influences, is not easily distxu'bed in its convictions, nor 
readily affected by the contagion of popular approval. 



74 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Even though unable to explam fully the status of the 
ambitious aspirant, it does not become panic-stricken 
and lightly transfer its allegiance, nor madly follow 
a fashionable prestige, however brilliantly heralded. 
Rather is comfort sought in the reflection that often 
before have meteors flashed across the sky and dis- 
appeared, and still the stars shine fixedly. Across a 
gap of twenty centuries it finds the touch of natiu-e 
that renders the whole world kin, and repeats approv- 
ingly the sentiment of Lucian: "To defend one's mind 
against these follies a man must have an adamantine 
faith, so that, even if he is not able to detect the pre- 
cise trick by which the illusion is produced, he at any 
rate retains his conviction that the whole thing is a lie 
and an impossibility." Such a man knows full well that 
the baser metals cannot be converted into gold; and 
though at credulity's 

"booth are all things sold. 
Each ounce of dross costs its ounce of gold," — 

he realizes, too, the potent reality of truth: that truth 
is neither a metaphysical abstraction nor a matter of 
taste, and least of all a matter of expediency. While 
judiciously responsive to the practical demands of the 
conditions under which belief must be wrought out and 
expressed, he is assured with Lowell that "compromise 
makes a good umbrella, but a poor roof"; while sym- 
pathetic with the more intimate discussion of the 
belief process, he holds clearly in mind the functional 
utility and categorical imperative of right belief. 



Ill 

THE WILL TO BELIEVE IN THE 
SUPERNATURAL 

The present study aims to illustrate, in terms of a 
widely disseminated belief, the manner in which the 
incUnation toward a conclusion affects the process of 
argument and the perspective of evidence. The influ- 
ence may be coarse and obvious; it may be subtle and 
indirect. On the part of those subject to its sway, the 
influence is disavowed, often indignantly repudiated; 
for the analysis thus becomes vivisectional in its attack. 
An objective psychology must perforce overrule while 
yet it considers such protests. 

The topic may be introduced by a personal remi- 
niscence. Among the indiscreet memories of an im- 
eventful curriculum of many college generations ago, 
one survives in fair relief — the study of Bishop But- 
ler's "Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to 
the Constitution and Course of Natiu-e" (a.d. 1736). 
So much of this non-elective study as reached my un- 
derstanding aroused an aversion to the type of argu- 
ment primarily, to the matter incidentally. Yet by the 
light of that benign essay I have again and again ap- 
preciated the comfort of sighting the terminus from 
the starting-point of a logical journey. It seems to be 
simpler and safer to reason or to travel when the des- 
tination is greeted, not with the uncertain scrutiny of 



76 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

a stranger, but with the welcome famiKarity of a 
friend. 

I do not confuse this experience with the earHer 
school-boy discovery of the disappearance of mathe- 
matical entanglements by the simple device of looking 
up the answers in the book. The procedures that were re- 
sorted to, to bridge the gap of non-comprehension were 
ingenious, but not convincing. The irrelevant Q.E.D. 
served only to call attention to the absence of any 
visible harness to join horse and cart in proper rela- 
tion. The adept argument, whether proceeding by 
analogy or otherwise, is more circumspect. It knows 
full well that conclusions do not travel on logical cre- 
dentials alone; nor is their circulation determined by 
the quaUty of their construction. The successful argu- 
ment presents the manners likely to impress the minds 
to which it addresses itself; it finds a sympathetic au- 
dience and displays its wares with an easy confidence 
in their acceptability; or if it meets with indifference 
or doubt, it proceeds to create an atmosphere con- 
genial to its purposes. It uses aU the arts of influence, 
from social prestige and aesthetic charm to flattery, 
and the backing of influential patrons. It distracts 
attention from the logical procedure, and until brought 
to bay never discloses its methods, never openly seeks 
a conversion, but insinuates its persuasions so unob- 
trusively that the mtad addressed moves as with its 
own initiative, and participates in the conclusion as 
in an original discovery, reflecting an exceptional in- 
sight. It is into the mental reactions of the cUentele, 
when thus addressed, that I propose to inquire; and 
my interest in the theme has been continuous from 



THE SUPERNATURAL Tt 

the days when the drastic encounter with Butler's 
"Analogy" first revealed the commanding supremacy 
of conclusions, and the subsidiary function of prem- 
ises. 

I 

For many of the issues which impart to the intellec- 
tual Hfe some of the complex and perplexing aspects of 
a problem-play, the function of reason, like that of the 
play, is not primarily to convince, but to corroborate 
and to console. SeK-esteem and the logical proprieties 
require that the beliefs which have been admitted to 
the privileges of hearth and home shall be presented 
in the prevalent garb of reason. It certainly is pru- 
dent to hide their nakedness, if not their actual deformi- 
ties; and well-behaved visitors are not usually unduly 
inquisitive. It will readily be conceded that our seK- 
esteem, our social and personal reputation, require 
that we be rated as logical beings, that our views and 
conduct ahke shall be accepted as substantially the 
result of pure reason. This rationality is among our 
choicest assets in every public declaration of our men- 
tal possessions. We confess quite as freely to a bad 
memory as to an illegible handwriting; but we would 
as soon own to being bad reasoners as to having bad 
taste. The actual possessor of bad taste enjoys his 
taste because the taste is his; he is not even ready to 
admit that "it is a poor thing," though he is aware 
that "it is his very own," and many of the ranges 
of belief bear a suspicious resemblance to matters of 
taste. What has been said of butter and boys may, 
with about the same wisdom, be said of arguments or 



78 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

systems of beliefs: there is none so bad but that it is 
somebody's darling. And if William James proposes 
to increase the happiness of Bostonians, as well as of 
other equally human "men and women," by persuad- 
ing them once for all to "abandon the notion of 
keeping up a musical self, and without shame let peo- 
ple hear them call a symphony a nuisance," "and 
thereby reap the same reward that comes with the 
day when we give up striving to be yoimg or slender," 
is not the recipe as applicable to arguments as to sym- 
phonies? Are there not as many and equally desirable 
citizens vainly seeking inspiration and meaning in 
reasoning and evidence, when their heart's desire is 
an sesthetic or a dramatic satisfaction, and one that is 
genuine and effective? And would it not be conducive 
to happiness for the one to find it in "rag-time" or 
opera bouffe, and the other in spirit-seances and other 
encouragers of mysticism? 

But this consummation is not to be looked for. 
Homo sapiens is too tenacious of his wisdom as em- 
bodied in behefs, and of none more so than of the behef 
that his own beliefs are rationally reached and logi- 
cally defensible. Doubt is an unpleasant, unstable, 
and irritating condition, akin to the hesitation that is 
fatal. It is a transitory status that must be absorbed 
and find relief in action or conviction. We need behefs 
to guide conduct, to sustain thinking, and to restrain 
impulses; and we acquire them as best we may, and 
make them as serviceable as we can.^ Primitive man 
was and is as adept in the art as ourselves; his world 
is decidedly different from ours, his needs less so. 
It is ever matters of deep and iatimate human welfare 



THE SUPERNATURAL 79 

that attract the belief -habits of mankind; and to primi- 
tive man almost all phenomena were eloquent with a 
personal message. He sought the aid of kindly forces 
and appeased hostile ones; and his beliefs, like his at- 
titudes, were direct and genuine. Plagues and storms, 
comets and eclipses, were the heralds of warning or of 
punishment. But beliefs are yet more illuminating as 
forestalling the future than as reflecting the past; the 
prophet and the seer speak, and prove their calling by 
the exercise of transcendent powers. 

Slowly, irregularly, and laboriously there encroaches 
upon this primitive, emotionally sustained system of 
causality a drastic, objective type of explanation, 
inconsiderate of the individual. Medicine comes to 
account for the plague, meteorology for the storms; 
while the very ability of the astronomer to predict the 
time of the eclipse and to trace the path of the comet,, 
robs them of portentous meaning^ The history of 
opinion teaches that before beliefs acquire citizenship 
in a scientific commonwealth, they develop under the 
protectorate of an anthropocentric regime, in which 
hope and- fear, desire and consolation are the reigning 
powers; though the citadel which they occupy comes 
to be more and more commonly represented as forti- 
fied by the armor of logic and by its natural impreg- 
nable advantages. ^Before astronomy came to its own, 
astrology, shaping celestial "oppositions" to human 
ends, flourished as a living belief; until the chemist 
established his elements and his formulae, the alchemist 
found an occupation in ministering to human ambi- 
tion. So long as the laws of living matter were but 
vaguely surmised, it was possible for men to believe in 



80 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and seek the elixir of life and the fountain of eternal 
youths These beliefs are now dead; the habit of mind 
that favored them is for the most part outgrown. To 
such extent have medicine and chemistry, astronomy 
and physics, physiology, and hygiene come to regulate 
the order of our thinking, that any relation claimed 
by these sciences is at once relegated to their xmdis- 
puted sway. We accept the astronomer's predictions, 
the chemist's analysis, the physicist's experiment, the 
physician's diagnosis. As laymen we comprehend 
them so far as we may; yet our attitude is inspired by 
a like allegiance to the same logic that guides the ex- 
pert. To such extent, at all events, has the natural 
trend of oiu- beliefs been scientifically disciplined, and 
in such measure are our emotional leanings, so far as 
we still feel them, silenced by an acquired logical out- 
look. 

Yet, for the majority of men, it remains natural that 
the belief-habits of an older nature, when thus sup- 
pressed or expelled, should seek refuge elsewhere — 
partly in unexplored frontiers and partly by setting 
up reservations within the ceded territory. The out- 
grown beliefs which, like the fancies of childhood, have 
been wholly laid aside, we are willing to call supersti- 
tions; but for the behefs of no very different status 
that yet glow like fading embers or occasionally burst 
into flame when a new fagot is placed upon the ashes, 
we have some lingering fondness. It is difficult to select 
a beUef of intermediate position, that is not in rigor 
mortis, but still shows a flickering vitality ;*'^f or any 
selected behef offers but an individual range of ap- 
peal, circumstance, and composition. Phrenology, as a 



THE SUPERNATURAL 81 

fairly modern instance, may serve. There is distinct 
truth in the differentiation of fimctions in the brain 
and of their relation to specific areas, some general 
conformity of brain development to cranial contours; 
but the anatomy is warped, the physiology crude, and 
the psychology arbitrary. A re-survey of the field with 
finer instruments of research under a profoundly altered 
attitude led the way to a physiological psychology and 
to cautious but useful application of its teachings. This 
system secured a following and still survives, not by 
virtue of the strength of its evidence, nor by the appeal 
of its principles, but by the underlying interest which 
it furthers in the ready determination of human traits 
and as a means of prospecting among human careers. 
If, then, we ask why any one is still loyal to phrenology, 
we may satisfy our curiosity by assmning that some 
are misled by a faulty estimation of the evidence and 
in so far display the weakness of their logical powers; 
yet the majority of its adherents are plainly biased in 
its favor by the consolation or insight which an accep- 
tance of its tenets promises. Since the advantages it 
extends are rather vague and affect only the more se- 
date, unemotional aspects of human fate, and since its 
disregard of established knowledge is rather barefaced, 
and since in competition with other and more striking 
beliefs it lacks the attractions of excitement and charm, 
its vitality is rather low. Yet the question, which might 
well serve to fill a gap in a lagging conversation, "Do 
you believe in phrenology?'* has the precise signifi- 
cance which is germane to the present discussion. Logi- 
cally, the question should mean, **Have you examined 
the data upon which the correlation of mental traits 



82 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and cranial contours is founded, and do you appreciate 
the measure of consistency of the phrenological hypoth- 
esis with the established findings of science?" Actu- 
ally it means, "Do you find the conclusions of phre- 
nology interesting and satisfying, and does it appeal to 
your quasi-dramatic notions of how things should be, 
und, incidentally, have you happened to meet with any 
confirmations of its principles?" Plainly, it is not the 
force of evidence, but the magnetism of conclusions, 
that attracts; and intense conviction, far from making 
keen-sighted, obsciu-es the vision. Milder inclinations 
mildly distort the view, yet bring it about that some 
sort of view is attainable. The lukewarm leaning to- 
ward phrenology is illuminating both in resemblance 
and in contrast to the status of other beUef s that form 
the background of this survey. J 

There is no occasion to emphasize unduly the emo- 
tional or aesthetic factor in the determination of beliefs. 
No one supposes that for the larger, and indeed the 
lesser, concerns of the intellectual life people affect 
beUefs as they do fashions. No, they proceed ration- 
ally; and, according to disposition and training, they 
infuse into their attitudes and actions the spirit of 
rationahty. Yet this admission, obvious and compre- 
hensive, does not lessen the potency of the will to be- 
Heve. Beliefs, not unlike fashions, are followed mildly 
or violently; and the lighter leanings which many con- 
fess for palmistry or telepathy are endured, possibly 
cherished, not embraced. Beliefs of feeble vitahty sur- 
vive so far as they avoid a direct clash with conduct, 
so far as they do not obscure the mental outlook. In 
gauging the intellectual caliber of our fellow-men we 



THE SUPERNATURAL 83 

• 

lay as much stress upon why and how deeply they 

believe as upon what they believe. Yet we do not 
hesitate to attach a certain qualified rating to the ad- 
herents of this or that "ology" or "opathy," in so far 
as we regard such adherence to indicate obtuse logical 
sensibilities. We apply such judgments gingerly, and 
seek not to offend. No one, however astute or expert, 
can determine just how homoeopathists are made, 
unless it be that, like poets, they are born. He com- 
pares A with B and with C and with D — all homoe- 
opathists through diverse combinations of evidence, 
argument, and circumstance — and looks for some 
common streak in their mentality. He may or may not 
find it. He supposes an underlying will to believe, re- 
sponsive to some such appeal, which by some play of 
fortune has tipped the scale in favor of homoeopathy. 
He does not assume a predilection to believe in homoe- 
opathy. With but sHght change in the psychological 
formula of A, B, C, and D, and with moderately differ- 
ent environments and careers, A might have been an 
ardent adherent of regular medicine, B a passionate 
devotee of psychotherapy, C might have gone over 
wholly to "absent" treatment, while D alone would 
continue to feel the call of homoeopathy. The most 
common bias seems to be a tendency to cherish per- 
sonally consoling and irregular beliefs. Were this not 
a fairly widespread and, for a considerable group of 
humanity, a very deep-seated mental trait, it is diffi- 
cult to imderstand how the great numbers of these 
systems thrive and leave a progeny. 



84 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

n 

Such is the potency of the will to believe. Unac- 
knowledged, though operative, it gives direction and 
furnishes motive power to conscious behefs; it gathers 
argument and evidence, seeks aflinities, and makes 
or mars careers. In the extreme it develops a fanatic 
or a propagandist; ordinarily it makes alliances with 
common sense and some measure of scientific training, 
with the wholesome benefit of experience and with a 
reasonable regard for evidence and authority. And if 
this analysis assumes that the spirit of scientific veri- 
fication is not developed to a commanding dominance, 
is there any good reason why for the majority of man- 
kind it should be so? Lacking much incentive from 
within or without to wander from the beaten track, 
the ordinary devotee of common sense proceeds com- 
fortably, even complacently. He trips occasionally and 
stubs his toe; but in the give and take of a practical 
world this is at once part of the discipline and part of 
the game. Any tendency that he may feel towards 
financial credulity or an uncritical confidence in human 
virtue is likely to be checked by costly experience. But 
there is no recognized clearing-house for his intellec- 
tual speculations. His investments, whether moder- 
ate or extensive, in the beliefs quoted on the belief- 
exchange, yield their interest in the satisfaction which 
they bring. He avoids, for the most part, depressed 
and imdesirable views, and affects those which the mar- 
ket of the day records as steady and incUned to rise; 
and the demands of decent consistency are thus met. 
Even the academic mind, though withholding its sanc- 
tion from any such logical compromise, in its confes- 



THE SUPERNATURAL 85 

sional moods acknowledges the logical imperative of 
the status quo. And to this add another consideration: 
every mind is composite, even a mind that has achieved 
a well-knit unity of personality. There are all sorts and 
conditions of beHef-attitudes within the same mind, 
as inevitably as there are many minds where there are 
many men. We admit compatibilities and incompati- 
bilities, sympathies and antagonisms; but these are 
limited alike in scope and degree. It takes a serious 
incompatibility of temper or a flagrant violation of 
logical propriety to cause a family rupture in the men- 
tal household ; and concessions and makeshifts are 
freely advanced to maintain a conventional peace. 

Many minds are broadly and others but narrowly 
streaked with rationality, but none are of wholly uni- 
form texture; and the varieties of patterns and their 
combination which thus result add to the interest of 
human ideals and management, and on the whole 
prove adequate to current standards. There is, accord- 
ingly, hardly any combination of adherences which 
cannot find coherence in some minds. K we conduct 
our search diligently and discreetly we shall somewhere 
find a John Doe who is at once a Republican, a "votes- 
for-men" man, a Presbyterian, a vegetarian, with a 
leaning toward osteopathy and palmistry; while his 
'friend, Richard Roe, proves to be a Democrat, an equal 
suffragist, an ex-Episcopalian become a Christian 
Scientist who still clings to the material reality of roast 
beef, and is more than half convinced of the genuine- 
ness of telepathy and spirit materializations, though 
he pooh-poohs the notion of "malicious animal mag- 
netism" which forms a tenet of his sect. And the two 



86 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

may have a mutual friend with whom they hold ami- 
cable intercourse, despite the fact that he is a Socialist, 
an ethical culturist, a Fletcherite, and a very stolid 
individual generally, who yet feels uneasy when seated 
as one of thirteen at table or when asked to float a ven- 
ture on Friday, the thirteenth of the month. All these 
individuals and their near and remote kin are more or 
less logical, and in plain and familiar situations unaf- 
fected by prejudice are likely to reach reasonable posi- 
tions. They may not always reason correctly or accu- 
rately, but they exercise a respectable logical attitude 
and intent. They may not be expertly critical, may 
indeed jump at conclusions, or hurdle to them; but 
these forms of mental agility in no way stamp them as 
exceptional or condemnable. In the summer of 1909 
it would have been natm-al to find one of the above 
triumvirate an advocate of Cook, the other of Peary, 
as the true discoverer of the Pole; while by rare chance 
the third, through lack of interest or excessive ration- 
ality, might have had no opinion at all. The will to 
beHeve is aroused by the malaise of imcertainty; and 
it acquires a positive force and direction by sympathy 
of temperament, and thus makes converts through a 
composite rational and emotional appeal. 

And for the rest, let us assume that the subjects 
of our logical sm-vey are high-grade thinkers, loyal to* 
the principles of a consistent interpretation of things 
as they are; let us assume that from such downward 
to the common-schooled, bourgeois layman, tempera- 
mentally hard-headed or the reverse, there will be 
found in a natural series diverse shades and grades 
of rationality and consistency. Within the series, the 



THE SUPERNATURAL 87 

most significant variable is the whole-mindedness of 
loyalty to the scientific attitude. This quality testi- 
fies to the profound and comprehensive encroachment 
of a scientific surveillance over the entire range of 
human activities and belief. Clearly, every thoughtful 
man of to-day regards a vast range of opinion as wholly 
withdrawn from the exercise of personal preference 
and as ruled by formulae and demonstrations, by sta- 
tistics and the laboratory. But the circle of human 
interests is larger than the syllogism, and cannot be 
described by the compass of the induction. The com- 
plexity and incalculability of our psychology, the 
breadth and depth of the intellectual and the emo- 
tional life, defies the most comprehensive formulae. 
Yet nowhere does rationality find its occupation gone. 
The habit of mind which we bring to our most personal 
and insoluble problems is profoundly influenced by 
the trend and the discipline of the same principles, the 
same conceptions of cause and effect and of the uni- 
formities of nature, which have inspired the contribu- 
tions of pure and applied science. 

To repeat: a sincere logical loyalty and a discern- 
ment subject only to the inevitable limitations of 
endowment and experience may be conceded. If rep- 
resentatives of this type of mind subscribe to a belief 
that heavy pieces of furniture, while ordinarily subject 
to commonplace laws of matter, may occasionally be 
moved by an occult force emanating from a spiritually 
empowered medium, or if they believe that premoni- 
tions and coincidences are vitally and personally sig- 
nificant, it seems but fair to regard such beliefs as set- 
tled upon a reservation set apart from the ordinary 



88 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

habitations of their intellectual world. Possibly such 
openness of mind may be no more than an evidence of 
the estimable virtue of tolerance. The open mind is 
as desirable in science as the open door in commerce. 
But when examined closely, the mode of reception of 
these reserved issues suggests a backdoor traffic, which 
does not mingle with the stream that animates the 
public highways. It remains significant that the tem- 
per of the attitude and the trend of the conclusions 
which pervade these reserved areas will not square 
with the everyday regulation of affairs, nor with the 
imderlying conceptions which make possible our theo- 
retical and our practical outlook. It is also significant 
that these irregular attitudes and conclusions are ap- 
plied to a limited range of phenomena, which are held 
together largely by their persistent appeal to the in- 
terpretation of laws and events as personally signifi- 
cant. 

The tendency to be affected by such aspects of phe- 
nomena, the tendency to permit the growth of, or to 
cultivate, reserved areas in the logical garden remains 
a temperamental matter; and since professional men 
of science, in spite of well-earned reputations and not- 
able achievements, in spite of proved abihty to handle 
the logical tools of their science effectively, are yet not, 
exempt from the influences of their personal composi- 
tion, there need be no surprise to find men of this 
stamp among the adherents of the beliefs in question. 
It must be very definitely understood that men of sci- 
ence (in fair number) may be professionally critical 
and temperamentally credulous. What most needs em- 
phasis is that the bias which they express grows out 



THE SUPERNATURAL 89 

of personal traits, not out of the qualities that support 
their technical acquisitions. The physicist who sub- 
scribes to the genuineness of " spirit-levitation," and 
the biologist who records the appearance of "super- 
numerary spectral limbs," are convinced of such phe- 
nomena, not because the one is technically conversant 
with the uniform behavior of inanimate matter, and 
the other with the limitations of organic structure, but 
by virtue of quite other and ordinarily suppressed fac- 
tors of their psychological composition, which find no 
exercise in the procedures of the laboratory. The spe- 
cial knowledge of the physicist is hardly necessary to 
the discovery that auto-motor wardrobes and self- 
elevating parlor-tables are outlaws in the realm of 
gravitation; the technique of the biologist is unneces- 
sary to the recognition that the spontaneous genera- 
tion of hands and arms and their speedy absorption in 
the natural members is a violation of the laws of organic 
genesis of the most stupendously amazing proportions. 
The layman's appreciation of these contradictions is 
quite as definite as that of the professional scientist; 
and the predilections of the two for similar views are 
of a nature all compact. The common-sense specialist 
and the common-sense layman are in this aspect quite 
on a par, and stand and fall equally by a like logical 
virtue and like logical or psychological failings. Nine 
times out of ten, and oftener, it is not the physicist, 
but the temperamental man in the investigator, that 
is responsible for the extra-scientific conclusion; and 
hardly less often does the manner and measure of his 
conversion reflect far more correctly and intimately 
his personal psychology than his professional physics. 



90 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

It is, indeed, most natural, if we concede the wide dis- 
tribution of the "mental reservation" habit of mind 
amongst high-grade and loyal thinkers, that such pheno- 
mena should be endorsed, such hypotheses favored, 
by a small number of men who happen to be physi- 
cists, or chemists, or astronomers, or physiologists, or 
anthropologists. Parenthetically it is worth nothing 
that the chemist does not subscribe to a belief in al- 
chemy, nor does the astronomer go* over to astrology, 
nor does the physiologist guide his estimate of men 
by phrenological precepts, nor does the anthropologist 
resort in perplexing situations to charms and amulets 
and incantations. Let there be no confusion as to the 
legitimate and illegitimate bearing of professional pres- 
tige upon the status of a behef of this extra-scientific 
tenor. If John Doe and Richard Roe are inclined to 
believe in *' materializations" or "telekinesis" because 
they learn that this and that scientific man has ex- 
amined and been convinced, their inclination is war- 
ranted only in so far as it bases itseK upon an ascrip- 
tion to the men of science of a superior equipment to 
decide this issue, and upon an equal assurance that the 
same qualities of mind are used in their professional 
as in their non-professional research. 

in 

This view is brusquely stated. Without withdrawing 
from any of its consequences, it should be tempered 
to fit more elasticadly the varying conditions. In spite 
of reserved areas of divergent befiefs, a man's mind 
remains a unit, though a complex one; and the facul- 
ties which he employs in his scientific work do not for- 



THE SUPERNATURAL 91 

sake him when he becomes involved in these personally 
centered systems. By the same token, does not an 
adherence to the law-defying theories of the seance- 
room reflect upon the soundness of his logic in his rigid 
specialty? The reply cannot be precise or decided, 
though it must not be equivocal. Consider a practical 
situation : an inhabitant of Wall Street keenly real- 
izes the complexity and precariousness of his predic- 
tions, and the investments based upon them. He forms 
conclusions by considering as best he can the state of 
the market, the condition of the crops, the truth of 
certain rumors, the remote political situation, and the 
like; thus he reasons and estimates and carries on his 
business. But in exceptional cases, when his confidence 
forsakes him, he consults a fortune-teller to decide 
whether to throw his fate with the bulls or the bears. 
The factors in his nature that take him to the "me- 
dium" are precisely similar to those that bring to the 
same high priestess the most innocent lamb that ever 
nibbled at coupons. What the stock-broker discovers, 
or supposes, concerning the soothsayer's real methods 
will depend upon various circumstances, of which the 
chief is the shrewdness of the common-sense individual 
that keeps house in the same tenement of clay with the 
stock-broker. And whether his associates on the ex- 
change shake their heads, and whether his clients trans- 
fer their business to other brokers, when they learn of 
his visits to the fortune-teller, will depend likewise upon 
his good luck and upon the character of the associates 
and the clients. And just as these situations vary, so 
likewise is there a difference between the stock-brok- 
er's reliance upon the clairvoyant and the physi- 



92 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

cist's allegiance to materializations. All analogies are 
weak and partial; but the most conspicuous difference 
of the two cases is the least important, namely, that 
the man of Wall Street tries to apply his belief to actual 
concerns, while the physicist's belief remains theoreti- 
cal. In both cases we have the employment in one field 
of attitudes and conceptions which have a very dis- 
tinct status from those that obtain in the other. In 
the main, no reconcihation is possible; yet the two 
manage to make terms by adroitly and tactfully avoid- 
ing one another's sensibilities. But all this within limits; 
if the stock-broker begius to be imduly reckless, and 
transacts all his affairs by telepathy or premonitions, 
there is likely to be trouble even before his sanity is 
questioned. If the physicist contributes to his "Physi- 
cal Journal" experiments iu which his observations of 
Hertzian waves or radio-activity are altered to make 
room in his equations for spirit influence or disturbance, 
there can be httle doubt as to his fate at the hands 
of his fellow-physicists. Likewise, iu making allowance 
for the common temper of the two activities; if a 
physicist or a biologist or a stock-broker or a layman 
of any calling were to exhibit in his iuvestigations of 
spirit manifestations a marked credulity, a clear de- 
tachment from the obligations of a critical logic and a 
prudent common sense, we could not but look askance 
at this exhibition, and could not but discount the rat- 
ing of his ability in his special field. We should then 
decide that these divergent streaks were not superficial 
and isolated, but ran deep and broad through his men- 
tal tissue. Such judgments we cannot avoid; such con- 
siderations constantly and legitimately circulate in the 



THE SUPERNATURAL 93 

arena of opinion, and by them reputations stand and 
faU. 

It has been impHed that the investigator of the su- 
pernatural does and must keep apart his law-defying 
conclusions in the "spirit" realm and his law-abiding 
conclusions in the material realm. It has been indicated 
how far the usage of logical society tolerates such in- 
tellectual division, and how far such conduct may ren- 
der him subject to suspicion; also the disaster that 
awaits him who attempts to put wholly asunder what 
is yet joined in natural unity. Yet justice has been 
done to neither aspect, neither to judicial tolerance 
nor to judicial rigor. Doubtless the largest tolerance 
would go out toward personal and private beliefs for 
which faith and a religious earnestness stand sponsor. 
If in private life a distinguished physicist were a 
known believer in the inspired character of Sweden- 
borg's revelations, or if a distinguished astronomer 
announced himseK a literal believer in the views ex- 
pressed by Brigham Young, we might make what com- 
ments we chose upon this combination, but we should 
in no measure be called upon to examine the value of 
such beliefs by the same attitude and standards by 
which we examine the legitimacy of his physical or 
astronomical contributions. It is also our privilege to 
consider the connection between undogmatic and lib- 
eral religious views and the advances of science. We 
should indeed be utterly blind to the lessons of the 
past were we not impressed with the direct power of 
the larger belief-attitudes to make or mar the fortunes 
of science. We may, if we choose, express surprise that 
out of this or that intellectual environment so worthy 



9i THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

a scientific contribution should come; but it seems 
obvious that we must hold distinct the beUef of Pro- 
fessor A in the necessity of total immersion as a pro- 
cedure in baptism and his behef in the correctness of 
a theory of radio-activity. Neither we nor the profes- 
sor cite his authority as a physicist in favor of the 
religious ceremony. We feel no tendency to join the 
Swedenborgians because this or that man of science 
has joined them, and we observe that the latter does 
not apply his physics to the questions of his faith. It 
is hardly necessary to add that these h5T)othetical cases 
are recorded wholly objectively and without particular 
reference; that very objectivity is as indispensable to 
the student of behef as it is to the achievement of 
scientific results in any field. 

IV 

This illustration has been added mainly to indicate 
that if the advocates of spontaneous "elevation" and 
spirit-made plaster casts and supernumerary spectral 
limbs were only such as assembled for the good of their 
souls, and invited to their meetings those to whom 
such beliefs brought real and reasonable consolation, 
and held seances to foster and give tangible reenf orce- 
ment to such beliefs, they would doubtless receive 
such tolerant appreciation as their behavior incites. 
But such is exactly the reverse of the actual situation. 
They desire nothing more earnestly than the scientific 
warrant; they desire no other consideration for the 
reality of spectral limbs than for the verification of 
six toes on the human foot; they put X-rays and tele- 
kinetic, spirit-guided powers of mediums in the same 



THE SUPERNATURAL 95 

class; they hold that the communications of spirits 
shall be received no differently than messages by wire- 
less telegraphy. There is no asking for quarter here, 
but a direct challenge, or rather a challenge modified 
by an appeal. The most convinced devotees of the 
modern supernatural do not maintain that the struc- 
ture of science is all askew and its foundations totter- 
ing. They do not ask that our physical laboratories 
be dismantled and rearranged in accordance with the 
extra-physical or super-physical systems which their 
hypotheses involve. They are not militant, and they 
sincerely respect the methods and results of scientific 
research. They wear the same uniform, display the 
same equipment as do the regulars in the army of sci- 
ence; but the motives that arouse their patriotism and 
the foe which they wish to scatter give to their war- 
fare a wholly different, a truly foreign, and often a 
confusing complexion. They ask: Are the boundaries 
of science so securely marked that there is no break 
or irregularity in its contours? May there not be con- 
ditions of a rare and exceptional nature that do not 
conflict with the solidarity of the universe for the rea- 
son that their primary allegiance is to another order 
of events? May it not be that interpenetrated with 
this world, which we know only so far as we have 
senses responsive to the vibrations of its contained 
energies, there is yet another to which we are ordi- 
narily insensitive, but which now and then by a happy 
conflux of conditions suddenly rings out with a con- 
vincing resonance by virtue of a higher sympathetic 
vibration? Concede this to even a slight degree of 
possibility, and why may not the whole range of 



96 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

mediumistic phenomena, to say nothing of telepathy 
and premonitions and apparitions and veridical coinci- 
dences, all shoot together into a sort of interstitial sys- 
tem that leaves the world of daily contact quite inte- 
gral and consistent and yet itseK holds together? 

Now the point of view that entertains this compre- 
hensive query may be squarely met; but this issue 
involves a very different tale, little of which is relevant 
here. The query is relevant, because it illustrates an 
important phase of the will to believe in the supernat- 
ural — the desire to bring belief iuto daily harmony, 
if that may be, to bring to occasional speaking terms, 
if that alone is possible, the extra-scientific realm with 
the accepted scientific regime, even though the latter 
must give way to receive the rapprochement. Let it be 
clearly understood that the point is not the strength 
of this and the other hypothesis or the value of the 
evidence in terms of demonstrable facts, but only the 
source of the tendencies to believe. Evidence is rele- 
vant only so far as it is the primary and actually effec- 
tive source of the belief. In these issues it is maintained 
that evidence plays a wholly subsidiary r6le. The plot 
for the middle-class and the upper-class minds — fun- 
damentally or incidentally dramatic in their require- 
ments — proceeds upon the basis of quite a different 
range of motives; and the similarity of the denouement 
must not mislead. What is true of the super-physical 
feats of the mediums may be accepted as sufficiently 
typical of the whole range of evidence. In regard to this, 
it seems no unpardonable inaccuracy to say that the 
evidence reduced to a single sentence is this: That upon 
such and such occasions the performances have been 



THE SUPERNATURAL 97 

satisfactorily accounted for as more or less clever utili- 
zations of plain everyday physical forces (involving 
fraud on the part of the medium); and that on such 
and such other occasions, the particular observers have 
been imable to discover how what seemed to them to 
occur was really accomplished. In one case the de- 
tectives find a clue and disclose the modus operandi, 
let us say, of the murder or the robbery; in another 
case they fail. Detectives happen to be most wary 
of concluding that the crime could not have been com- 
mitted in this way or in that, and they seem curiously 
disinclined to consider spirit interference and super- 
nmnerary spectral limbs; they have a prepossession in 
favor of theories that involve skeleton-keys and "jim- 
mies" and accomplices. On the other hand, the sitters 
at a seance are quite sure that "it" could not have 
been fraud, that the medium could not know their 
private affairs, that such and such a maneuver was out 
of the question; hence " it " must be the work of spirits 
or super-physical agencies. Obviously this is, and must 
be, an inaccurate, shorthand transcript of the evidence; 
yet the evidence is referred to only to indicate in what 
way evidence does actually affect the belief-attitudes. 
It is contended that the step from fact to explanation 
is taken, not as a logical inference, but as a psycho- 
logical inclination; and that, for purposes of such illus- 
tration, this summary of the type of reasoning is fair 
and typical. 

V 

All this is added to make room for the admission that 
for a very small and select group of adherents of super- 



9S THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

physical beliefs, who, indeed, have carefully examined 
the whole range of phenomena, who have cm-bed what 
prepossessions they may have, for whom the belief in 
the reahty of the phenomena brings Httle consolation, 
even some distress — for these, the insistence of the 
"facts" does seriously affect and determine their con- 
clusions. The group is small, possibly larger than one 
supposes; but as the terminal group in a series thus 
hypothetically constructed, it finds a natiu-al place. 
Such men are not credulous; they are critical. They 
reject a large part of the evidence; but they find a ker- 
nel, which they say is wholly different in significance 
from the shell. Some make this nucleus a center of a 
system; others refrain from speculation, but insist that 
a common physics and a common psychology do not 
render a satisfactory account. Here the doctors plainly 
disagree; and when doctors disagree, it is not surpris- 
ing to leam that they, too, express their temperamental 
as well as their professional inclinations. Such men 
must be less sensitive to the deterrent force of violent 
logical incompatibilities than are their stubborn col-^ 
leagues who will not concede that the heavens may 
occasionally faU. They must be more sensitive to the 
conviction that grows out of personal experience, to the 
unpleasant bewildennent of a baffled understanding; 
they may be a little over-impatient of doubt and the 
restraint of judgment, a Httle more likely to give large 
values to the subjective, and small ones to the objec- 
tive factors in the formulae of conviction. And, by such 
tokens, do they not give evidence to a refined suscep- 
tibility to the will to believe? 
i The pubHc is intolerant of fine distinctions; and this 



THE SUPERNATURAL 99 

attempt to be appreciative of all sorts and conditions 
of belief-attitudes may prove wearisome. Yet because 
these beliefs are alive they must be handled with the 
caution of the vivisector. The psychologist must not 
shrink from the operation, though the nerves which 
he exposes are those of self-esteem.^ Ideals determine 
standards, and standards determine actions.. The 
pride of rationality need suffer no rebuff; but a ra- 
tional view of our own rationality is itself a worthy 
ideal. Men need find no more fault with themselves 
for failing to disclose the procedures of mediums than 
for a like failure in unraveling the mysteries of the 
disappearing lady on the conjurer's platform. There 
is no element of intellectual feebleness involved in 
guessing how either effect is produced — and in guess- 
ing wrongly. The most expert political writers gauge 
the situation the day before the election and make 
the most confident predictions; and twenty -four hours 
later the prophecy proves wholly wrong, but the pro- 
phet does not remain without honor in the land. He 
continues as the accredited correspondent on politi- 
cal events. It is a consummation devoutly to be wished 
that any remote stigma of logical incapacity that by 
implication seems to be attached to the inability to 
divine how such and such phenomena are to be ac- 
counted for shall be speedily removed. We live very 
comfortably and with no loss of poise under the most 
imperfect explanations of many of the things of which 
the world is so puzzlingly full. But last as first, it is 
not the phenomena, but the personal hold of the the- 
ories advanced to account for them, that arouses a 
misproportioned and a misguided interest; and these 



100 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

same theories achieve their commanding place in con- 
temporary interest because of the miacknowledged but 
recognizable vitality of the will to believe in the 
supernatural. 

A modern psychological theory restates the Aris- 
totelian view of the value of the mental, or, more cor- 
rectly, the emotional cathartic. It tells sufferers from 
ingrown psychic trouble, that if only they will dig deep 
down and bring to the surface the suppressed and ostra- 
cized parasite that is preying upon their psychic tissue, 
the very act of explicit confession will bring peace 
to their souls. May not the general recognition of the 
will to believe as a legitimate factor in the tenacity of 
beliefs bring about a more wholesome attitude toward 
the phenomena that keep alive the conception of the 
supernatural? 



IV 

THE CASE OF PALADINO 

A PERSISTENT problem in the regulation of conduct by 
belief is the maintenance of right relations between 
theory and practice, between principles and their ap- 
plication, conclusions and their evidence, facts and the 
interpretation of facts. At times the distinction is clear 
or becomes so in a nearer approach; at times it is un- 
certain, and resists analysis. A prevalent logical fault 
is a certain impatience with principles and a corre- 
spondingly eager reliance upon facts. Such attitudes 
reflect a temperamental contrast. Those fond of handi- 
craft have been divided temperamentally according 
as they find pleasure in large constructions, bold mas- 
sive work, or in delicate operations and finished detail. 
The intellectual counterpart of this contrast is some- 
what differently disposed. The hard-headed, matter- 
of-fact reasoner finds his convictions set by facts and 
is somewhat suspicious of principles, which exist for 
him mainly as summaries of facts. The convictions of 
the theoretical temperament respond sensitively to 
the illumination conferred by orderly principles, and 
accepts the fact or the "case" as a welcome but not 
indispensable confirmation. To minister to both in- 
terests, but particularly to the former, the following 
circumstantial narrative is set forth. While yet the 
tale, adorned or unadorned, points its moral, its main 



102 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

service is to reinforce in terms of "fact" the emphasis 
of logical principles in reaching theories or accepting 
statements. 

I 

The case of Paladino finds its origin in interests as 
old and as widespread as humanity; its closest affiHa- 
tion is with the time-worn, crude practices and beliefs 
of primitive peoples. Its survival into these science- 
saturated days makes it notable; and the attempt to 
parade in academic dress and to take a place among 
the accredited representatives of latter-day research 
is astounding, whether regarded as shrewd bravado 
or as a sincere propaganda, and remains so in what- 
ever temper we review the successes and reverses of 
its checkered career. The woman in the case attracts 
attention. Though in the main a willing instrument of 
a movement that gets its headway from motives and 
interests that far transcend her personahty, she can- 
not be dismissed as a lay figure upon which the prod- 
ucts of an eager imagination have been skiUfuUy draped. 
The affaire Paladino might have been the affaire Smith 
or Jones; but the combination of circiunstances that 
gave it name and more than a local habitation is un- 
usual in complexion, and has become international in 
its setting. 

The notorious Eusapia of New York in the year 
1910 is a surprisingly unprogressive replica of the 
obscure Eusapia of Naples of the period of 1890. Un- 
der the encouragement of convinced votaries, one and 
another phenomenon has been added to her repertoire; 
yet her stock in trade has undergone little alteration 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 103 

beyond the artful cutting of the garment to suit the 
cloth — the requirements of her clientele being suffi- 
ciently met by the standard patterns of her produc- 
tions. It must be definitely and clearly grasped at the 
outset that what Eusapia does affords but the slightest 
clue to her fame or to the attitude of her sponsors, lay 
or scientific. The story will be blind and its meaning 
lost if thus read. The case of Eusapia, like a divorce 
suit or an embezzlement, gets its prestige from the 
standing of the parties concerned. The incidents are 
about as sordid, about as commonplace, and carry about 
the same lesson in one set of circumstances as in an- 
other. But when the proceedings move in intellectual 
high life, Mother Grundy, enterprising editors, and all 
sorts and conditions of men and women take notice. 
This heightened interest in the personnel of defendant, 
prosecution, and witnesses must not be permitted to 
obscure or distort in any measure the simple findings 
of the case, which alone form the subject-matter for the 
jiu-y's consideration. 

A sifting of the personal evidence in the case of 
Paladino discloses that Eusapia was born in 1854, of 
lowly origin, and was early left an orphan without rel- 
atives or resources; that her girlhood was uneventful 
save for the chance discovery, in a spiritualistic circle, 
of her powers as a medium. It appears that her debut 
was in the form of a letter in 1888 from Professor 
Chiaia, of Naples, to Professor Lombroso. The latter 
was firmly convinced of her supernormal powers as 
early as 1891. In 1892 a group of men of science in- 
vestigated her case in Milan, among them Professor 
Richet, of Paris, who, at first skeptical, later be- 



104 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

came an enthusiastic convert to the "genuineness" 
of the manifestations. The years 1893, 1894, and 1895 
brought forward new and distinguished converts, in 
Italy, in Russia, in France. Two EngKsh observers, 
Sir OHver Lodge and F. W. H. Myers, took part in the 
seances held at Professor Richet's house on the lie 
Roubaud in 1894; through their interest Eusapia visited 
England in 1895, and there met her first serious re- 
verses. Those who have subscribed to the occurrence 
of supernormal phenomena in her presence, through 
agencies inexplicable by fraud or by known physical 
forces, form a distinguished group; many of them 
have written learned articles framing elaborate theo- 
ries to account for the motive forces responsible for 
the phenomena. Mr. Hereward Carrington has de- 
voted a volume to her case. It is his opinion "that 
Eusapia is genuine; but she is, so far as I know, almost 
unique. That in her may now be said to culminate and 
focus the whole evidential case for the physical phe- 
nomena of spiritualism." If it could be shown that 
"nothing but fraud entered into the production of 
these phenomena, then the whole case for the physi- 
cal phenomena would be ruined — utterly, irretrievably 
ruined." 

It thus appears that, if we are to decide the case of 
Paladino according to the extent of the evidence,^ the 

* The roll of Eusapia's sponsors includes many men of scientific 
professions; of these the more enthusiastic show unmistakable ten- 
dencies to accept supernormal explanations. The Italians, Professors 
Lombroso and Morselli, and the French writers. Professor Flam- 
marion. Colonel de Rochas, Dr. J. Maxwell, and M. de Fontenay 
have contributed the most elaborate and extravagant accounts. The 
two most important reports are those of the Institut General Psy- 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 105 

scientific as well as personal reputation of the wit- 
nesses, there can be no doubt of a verdict in her favor: 
that phenomena occur in her presence independently 
of her initiative, and indicate some unrecognized 
agency, presumably that of spirits. But the case does 
not stand alone; it is part of an historical development; 
it is full of psychological complications; the step from 
the data to the verdict is beset with subtle difficulties. 
The circumstances of the settings are of command- 
ing importance in all such issues; indeed, they make 
the case of Paladino, make it or mar it. From Eusapia 
herseK we obtain no aid. She permits the Eusapian 
facts and the Eusapian legends to take their course; 
she confesses to a faith in the spiritualistic interpre- 
tation, and calls upon her trance-control (one "John 
King" of spiritualistic origin) to stand by her. In brief 
she adopts the lingo of her cult and adapts her atti- 
tude to the atmosphere of her sitters. In addition she 
commands larger and larger compensation for her serv- 
ices with the extension of her fame, and yields to the 
importunity of interviewers to provide the reputation 

chologique (Paris, 1908) and of the Society for Psychical Research 
(1909), The standard phenomena are signals and raps at command; 
table levitations; movement of objects in and from the cabinet; 
touches by invisible hands; the apparition of a hand above the me- 
dium's head; and a cold breeze issuing from the medium's forehead. 
The more unusual phenomena include the change in weight of the 
medium's person, and her levitation to the table; the moving of 
heavy bodies, and the approach of light ones in distant parts of the 
room; the appearance of arms, heads, and faces, often recognized; 
the mysterious impression of hands and faces on plaster or putty; 
the creation of an additional arm; the disappearance of the medium's 
legs, and other details too remarkable to mention. While these sev- 
eral documents are different in reliability, it is unnecessary to dis- 
tinguish between them. An admirable brief review appeared in PuU 
navis Magazine of January, 1910, by Professor Leuba. 



106 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

favorable for a remunerative specialty. Besides, she 
admits that she tricks if she gets a chance, and suggests 
that all mediums do; hence the need of control. The 
clue to the case lies in the close logical analysis of the 
situation, in the intimate study not so much of the 
evidence as of the conditions of men and events out of 
which the evidence grows. The case of Eusapia is a 
case for the logician, for the sturdy reasoner with com- 
mon sense, fortified as well with some special knowl- 
edge of the psychology of the atmosphere in which the 
case moves and has its being. 

It is fortunate that legal procedure has familiarized 
the public with the emergence of truth — that is, of 
substantial truth for practical purposes — from a glar- 
ing contradiction of testimony. Juries promptly learn 
that evidence must be weighed and not measured by 
its superficial area; that it may be necessary to decide 
upon complex probabilities which party is lying or 
finessing or is hopelessly incompetent, or pitiably self- 
deceived. Whether Eusapia is a monster or a martyr, 
a marvel or a mountebank, a medium of the unknown 
or a manipulator of the undetected, is just the kind 
of a verdict that our common sense is quite capable 
of reaching, if only we hold fast to the inalienable right 
to light, logic, and the pursuit of deception. 

n 

. A helpful procedure in the case will be to call atten- 
tion to Exhibit A as reported by eye-witnesses. At a 
seance held at a residence in New York City on April 
17, 1910, there were, so far as Eusapia was concerned, 
the usual arrangements: the chairs of sitters about the 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 107 

table, the curtained corner called the cabinet, contam- 
ing the paraphernalia affected by spirits (tambourine, 
tabouret). The unusual arrangement was the conceal- 
ment of observers beneath the chairs of the sitters 
within closest range of the medium's person. The de- 
tectives were smuggled to their positions under cover 
of a screen of the bystanders, while Eusapia's atten- 
tion was engaged in the attempt to influence by her 
supposed supernormal power an electroscope brought 
to the seance to serve as a psychological decoy. They 
escaped under cover of the darkness at a later stage of 
the proceedings, wriggling their way along the floor 
and carrying with them a knowledge of the motive 
power of table levitations that should make others 
wiser if not happier men. To understand their testi- 
mony, the ceremonies of the table must be famihar. 
The decisive evidence of the belief that the medium 
does not move the table is that her hands and feet are 
controlled by the two sitters on her right and left re- 
spectively. She gives the control of her right hand to 
the left hand of her right sitter, and the control of her 
left hand to the right hand of her left sitter; the latter 
is the post of honor, since Eusapia is left-handed. 
Similarly her left foot (at the outset) is secured (?) by 
contact with the right foot of her left "control," and 
the like for the other foot. 

To prove an unknown force, all that is necessary is 
to sUp away the left foot, make the right foot serve to 
keep contact with one foot of each "control," and to 
apply said agile and versatile left member to the leg 
of the table. The unobserved but observing observer 
under the table reports that 



108 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

a foot came from underneath the dress of the medium and 
placed the toe underneath the leg of the table of the left side 
of the medium, and pressing upward, gave it a little chuck 
into the air. Then the foot withdrew, and the leg of the table 
dropped suddenly to the floor. More wobbling of the table 
occiuTed. [This is done by pressure of the medium's hands.] 
Again the foot came from underneath the dress of the medium 
and placed itself underneath the leg of the table, forced the 
table upward from the floor about half a foot, held it there 
for a moment and repeated the "phenomenon." Each time 
after a levitation, the medium would appear to rest her left 
foot upon the top of the right, which remained constantly 
in an oblique position upon the feet of the left and right *' con- 
trols." At no time did she have her left foot hampered in 
any way. It was constantly moving in the space about her 
chair; and I was lying with my face on the floor within eight 
inches of the left leg of the table; and each time that the table 
was lifted, whether in a partial or a complete levitation, the 
medium's foot was used as a propelling force upward. 

Next, let it be noted that the "controls" on this oc- 
casion were well versed in the tricks of mediums and 
in the observation of significant details in this elusive 
sleight-of-hand and foot. Knowing when to expect 
action on the part of the released foot, the "control" 
cautiously probed the space with his own foot and "was 
unable to touch her left leg from the knee dovm, at 
the place where it should have been." The phenom- 
ena of the cabinet were similarly disclosed. The mo- 
tive power proved to be partly the released foot and 
partly the released hand. The substitution of the right 
hand to do duty for both hands is effected under cover 
of the curtain, which is first flung over the table by 
the left hand: this, too, was perfectly apparent to the 
skilled "controls," to whom such tricks were stale and 
improfitable. Her right "control" was in the favored 
position to detect the movements of her released left 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 109 

hand during the later cabinet feats that require des- 
perate darkness. He says: — 

She took my left hand and placed it over her right shoulder, 
far enough to let me feel her left shoulder-blade, where I 
exerted some pressure with the finger-tips. With my hand 
in this position it was almost impossible to know whether she 
were moving her left arm or not; hence I took the liberty of 
placing the ball of my left wrist where the tips of my fingers 
had been [in other words a substitution-trick of his own]; and 
this gave me ample opportunity to feel with my fingers thus 
freed, the movements of the sleeve of her left arm without 
her knowing it. Then it was plain that whenever the curtain 
was sharply "blown" forward, it was done by her throwing 
it forward with her left hand in a quick impulsive jerk. It 
was also plain that the hand we saw at the parting of the cur- 
tains was none other than hers. 

These details indicate how circumstantial was the 
detection of the simple and tricky fraud that under- 
lies the standard performances of Paladino; and they 
indicate the training and insight which the detection 
requires. Had this type of cross-examination been 
drastically administered early and often, it seems un- 
likely that there would have been a case of Paladino. 
Having thrown upon the situation these illuminating 
side-lights, it will hardly be necessary to rehearse the 
further corroboratory testimony. The performance sug- 
gested throughout that the medium worked for con- 
ditions favorable to the evasion of the control. 

To fortify the conclusion, a second seance was ar- 
ranged (Eusapia being ignorant of the outcome of the 
first) at which there were no concealed observers, and 
at which the usual phenomena took place so long as 
the "controls" exercised such lax guardianship as the 
amateur commands. But upon signal the control was 



110 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

made real and effective; and the result was decisive. 
From that moment on, nothing happened. The medium 
grew excited and irritable, complained of the holding 
which was in reality gentle but properly directed, tried 
again and again to throw the observers off their guard, 
but all to no avail. Expert control stopped the phe- 
nomena under the precise conditions under which a 
half-hour before, with complacent and ordinary con- 
trol, they had occurred in profusion. The "forces" re- 
quired the use of Eusapia's hands and feet. 

ni 

The case of Eusapia puzzles many a candid inquirer. 
If this crude deception Kes at the basis of a career that 
had acquired a literature of its own, why had it not 
been discovered before? The answer is that it had, and 
repeatedly; the strange fact remains that those who de- 
tected Eusapia in fraud continued to believe in her gen- 
uine powers. 

As early as 1893 Professor Richet, of Paris, com- 
mented on the general suspiciousness of the whole pro- 
ceeding, and said, "To the extent to which the condi- 
tions were made rigid, the phenomena decreased"; and 
yet the same distinguished scientist attests physiolog- 
ical miracles in the presence of Eusapia that require 
larger credulity than many a sympathetic layman can 
command. Both Dr. Moll and Dr. Dessoir, of Berlin, 
detected the precise substitution-tricks that were used 
in New York. 

The main point is cleverly to distract attention and to re- 
lease one or both hands or one or both feet. This is Pala- 
dino's chief trick. 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 111 

Dr. Moll records the throwing out of the curtain to 
cover the hand substitution; and notes that, by watch- 
ing for it, he could detect the exact moment when the 
hand or foot was freed. 

She boldly raises her left hand above her head, and this is 
accepted as a spirit hand. In spite of the nine-tenths dark- 
ness, I distinctly saw the movements, as she raised her arm. 

In the stances in 1895 in England, Dr. Richard 
Hodgson repeatedly detected Eusapia in fraud, and 
the verdict of his committee was "systematic fraud 
from first to last." The temper of that day is worth 
recalling. Myers, though a thorough believer in super- 
normal phenomena, was unwilling to connect his con- 
victions with the Eusapian phenomena. Eusapia was 
for seven weeks a guest in his house and gave twenty 
seances. 

During all that time Eusapia persistently threw obstacles 
in the way of proper holding of the hands. She only allowed 
for a part of the time on each occasion the only holding of the 
feet which we regarded as secure, i.e., the holding by the 
hands of a person under the table. Moreover, she repeatedly 
refused any satisfactory test other than holding. Generally 
we endeavored to make the holding as good as she would 
allow us to make it; although toward the end we occasionally 
left her quite free to be held or to hold as she pleased; on 
which occasions she continued the same frauds, in a more 
obvious manner. The frauds were practiced both in and out 
of the real or alleged trance, and were so skillfully executed 
that the "poor woman" must have practiced them long and 
carefully. 

Professor Sedgwick likewise discredited Eusapia. 
The investigations 

placed beyond reasonable doubt the facts that the frauds dis- 
covered by Dr. Hodgson at Cambridge had been systemat- 



112 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ically practiced by Eusapia Paladino for years. In accord- 
ance, therefore, with our estabHshed custom, I propose to 
ignore her performances for the future, as I ignore those of 
other persons engaged in the same mischievous trade. 

Professor Le Bon has presented an admirable survey 
of the significance of this "Renaissance of Magic" ^ 
in the course of which he records: — 

We saw on several occasions in quite good light a hand 
appear above her head; but when I had my assistant observe 
her shoulders illuminated from behind without her knowledge 
one could follow ail her movements, and readily secure proof 
that the materializations were simply the natural hands of 
the medium freed from the control of her observers. As soon 
as Eusapia began to be suspicious, the apparitions of the 
hand ceased altogether and did not reappear until, yielding 
to the desire of some credulous friends, I consented to help 
them by withdrawing. 

To return to the earlier attitudes (again 1895), Sir 
Oliver Lodge's conclusion is curious: — 

I am therefore in hopes that the present decadent state of 
the Neapolitan woman may be only temporary and that 
hereafter some competent and thoroughly prepared witness 
may yet bring testimony to the continued existence of a genu- 
ine abnormal power existent in her organism. 

Since this decadent state persisted for another fif- 
teen years it is idle to consider it temporary; and it 
seems unfortunate for the case of Paladino that the 
presence of competent and thoroughly prepared wit- 
nesses so regularly induces attacks of decadience. 

IV 

The case of Eusapia Paladino is peculiarly a case for 
the logician, for the incorruptible advocate of a sturdy 
* Revue Sdentijique, March 26 and April 2, 1910. 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 113 

common sense. Thinking straight is essential to seeing 
straight. The evidence grows out of the attitude far 
more than the attitude results from the evidence; and 
this tenet forms the cardinal principle of any judi- 
cial review. The conditions attaching to the inquiry 
present our first concern. Mediums form a privileged 
class; they place themselves beyond the range of sci- 
entific procedure, and challenge the contempt of court. 
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that if those who 
profess to influence physical objects without contact 
were willing to submit to the experimental rules of 
the laboratory, the investigation would be a matter 
of minutes and not of years. The reply to impatient 
critics, private and editorial, who ask why the inves- 
tigators do not bring the matter to an issue by intro- 
ducing obviously decisive tests, is uniformly simple: 
They are not permitted to. 

However shrewdly it is made to appear to be the 
contrary, the fact is that the medium imposes the condi- 
tions and the conduct of the performance. Like the 
performing conjurer, the medium yields to inquiry 
graciously and eagerly within the limits of the trick, 
but is most adroit in gliding over the critical moments 
at which examination would be inopportune. But the 
incomparably great advantage of the medium ^ is that 
he is posing as the minister of the unknown, not as an 
illusionist, and must be accorded the privileges of his 

^ A medium, recording his confessions, says: "A medium of ex- 
perience can always outwit a looker-on even more than a conjurer, 
because a conjurer would not be allowed to play the antics which we 
can." A French conjurer corroborates from his side: "Mediums use 
tricks so coarse that no prestidigitator would dare to show them in 
public; so they are reserved for the scientists." 



114 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

cult. Likewise he has ready excuses, which, like good 
intentions, are as common as paving-stones, and serve 
their purpose more generally in unsanctioned than in 
holy causes. Light diminishes the force; passing the 
hand between the medimn and the leg of the table at 
the critical time breaks the circuit; skeptical and inquis- 
itive observers interfere with the conditions; and as 
much more such explanations as the accepted cant or 
the clientele will tolerate. 

It is waste of time to point out the glaring incon- 
sistency of mediums who profess and print the proofs 
of their performance of the most marvelous prodigies 
in complete light, and yet object to light as interfering 
with their power. These apologies are distracting; the 
essential fact is that the medium sets the conditions 
and refuses decisive tests. Mr. Carrington, — for whom 
Eusapia is the black swan of spiritualism, — in an ear- 
lier volume bears evidence: — 

In the first place, it must be stated that the medium never 
allows himself to be placed absolutely under control, i.e., held 
in various places by several sitters, at the same time, as an 
escape from such control would be an obvious impossibility. 

And this is Mr. Carrington's advice to investigators 
of mediums in general: — 

Instead of binding the medium with ropes, tapes, etc., and 
sealing them so profusely, suggest that the medium employ, 
instead, a simple piece of white thread, and see how quickly 
your offer is rejected. 

The most practical method of bringing the matter 
to a test seems to be to transform the issue from an 
investigation to a contest; for then he who offers the 
prize natm-ally determines the conditions of the award. 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 115 

Sport commands greater loyalty than science. So Pro- 
fessor Le Bon, with the assistance of Dr. Darieux and 
of Prince Roland Bonaparte, arranged a prize of two 
thousand francs for any one who would make an object 
move without contact (say a light block of wood lying 
upon a table), but imder conditions determined by a 
scientific commission — surely the merest child's play 
for Eusapia and the other "physical" mediums, in 
whose presence these phenomena occur so regularly 
that their learned sponsors have invented a term for 
the effect and call it "telekinesis." Professor Le Bon 
received several thousand letters from persons ready 
to admit that they exercised this power ; but less than 
half a dozen came to learn the conditions; they all 
promised to compete for the prize, but none appeared. 
In New York an offer of one thousand or even two 
thousand dollars for a like proof of Eusapia*s powers 
under simple but rigid conditions was evaded, and 
then declined upon the usual irrelevant grounds. It 
would, indeed, be tantamount to a conviction of im- 
becility for a physicist not to be able to determine 
whether an object can be moved without contact, pro- 
vided he determines the conditions of the experiment; but 
between this and the issue of a challenge on the part of 
the medium to discover how the said medium accom- 
plishes his alleged "telekinesis" imder conditions arbi- 
trarily set by him, there is more difference than between 
the equator and the pole. It is because the medium 
will not consent to play the game according to the rules 
of science that the scientist is forced — in the interests 
of maintaining the sanity of the community — to 
demean himself by meeting the medium on the latter's 



116 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ground, and outwit him or expose him as best he can. 
For this travesty public sentiment is responsible. 

It thus appears that the reputation of Eusapia and 
the voluminous documents in the case, and the wide- 
spread tendency to credit her with rare powers un- 
recognized by contemporary science, all find their 
support in a single momentous circumstance: that this 
and that group of observers witnessing effects arranged 
by Eusapia were unable to account for what they 
saw, or that Eusapia, under these conditions, was able 
to bring about the phenomena without revealing her 
methods, whatever they might be. The evidence is 
essentially negative up to a certain point, which is the 
critical one of direct exposure; and beyond that pK)int, 
the flimsy support of the supernormal hypothesis is at 
once laid bare. 

The lesson thus enforced is a very simple one in ele- 
mentary logic, within easy grasp of every one who exer- 
cises and cherishes his common sense: that the flim- 
siness of the support of the hypothesis should have been 
perfectly apparent quite independently of the covering 
under which it took refuge. It reaUy should not have 
required an exposure to lay bare what should have been 
recognizable by the general suspiciousness of its appear- 
ance. It was public sentiment, not the needs of science, 
that required the exposure. 



Since what Eusapia does affords but partial enUght- 
enment, the further clue must be sought in the attitude 
of the witnesses in whose behalf the effects are pro- 
duced. Professor Le Bon considers the national tern- 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 117 

perament a fair index of the degree of marvel with 
which the Eiisapian performance is reported. In Eng- 
land (and let us add in our own Anglo-Saxon land) 
there was no mystery, but plain fraud; "in France the 
success varied according to the milieu and the intel- 
lectual status of the sitters — it was considerable in 
polite circles and in general very limited in a scientific 
atmosphere"; "in Italy, the land of poets . . . effects 
appeared more marvelous than the magicians of legend 
ever achieved." It is the personal qualification of the 
observer that determines the quality of the perform- 
ance; it is reported as marvelous or as moderately puz- 
zling or commonplace or transparent, according to the 
temperament of the spectator and his susceptibility 
to "take stock in" strange powers that he knows not 
of. This is a familiar psychological principle, but one 
by no means obsolete. Eusapia's tricks are corre- 
spondingly time-worn, but served so long as eager or 
complacent witnesses were inclined to interpret their 
inability to discover how the effects are produced as a 
presumption in favor of unknown forces. 

Everything depends upon the degree of caution with 
which the first step is taken; it is the first few hair- 
breadths that irrevocably determine the direction of a 
straight line. If you pause at the threshold long and 
resolutely, and refuse to be impressed with any effects, 
however apparently marvelous, imtil the fact that they 
are produced independently of the medium's initiative 
has been definitely established, your report will be 
brief, and, if we may judge by the past, stupid and de- 
pressing. If you are decidedly critical you may record 
(as some of the French observers have done) that the 



118 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

phenomena are in part suggestive of fraud, in part 
inexplicable, but that it would be premature to regard 
them as supporting any super-scientific hypothesis; if 
you assume the typical amateur attitude, and have 
the usual high confidence in your powers of observa- 
tion, a successful seance will leave in you a vague and 
mixed impression of bewilderment and paradox; if you 
treat the control yet more charitably and are half con- 
vinced that the effects support beliefs already cherished, 
distinct marvels will occur, and as your conviction 
grows, the medium grows in boldness, your critical 
faculties are dulled, and mysteries multiply. The last 
stage of all is that of perfect conviction due to repeated 
indulgence in uncritical seances, to the full-fledged 
devotion to irregular theories, to the abandonment of 
all caution, and the eager awaiting of novel miracles, 
determined by the ingenuity of the medium and the 
depth of your logical intoxication: sans sense, sans 
eyes, sans reason, sans everything. It is at this stage 
that a considerable portion of the literature of the case 
of Eusapia has been composed. The secret of it all is 
not in the performance, not in the miracle, but, as the 
French neatly say, in the miracule, in the mental sus- 
ceptibility of the subject to the marvelous. 

The great bulk of such testimony is accordingly quite 
valueless except in illustration of the workings of the 
prepossessed mind. Yet it is not prejudice alone that 
is responsible for the fertility of the evidence. A fallacy 
of observation is operative. It is almost impossible 
to make the uninitiated realize how difficult it is to 
demonstrate fraud when decisive tests are barred, and 
how deceptive is the evasion of what appears to be a 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 119 

rigid control. The average sitter, ignorant of the inade- 
quacy of the uneducated sense of touch, repHes: "I 
know that her hand was on mine all the time; I am sure 
that she could not have released her foot without my 
feeling it or have brought out that tabouret without 
my seeing it; my senses are not so easily duped." This 
overweening confidence is responsible for many a 
ruined mind. Professor Miller asks us to look upon 
Eusapia and her tribe 

as the incarnation of specious evidence, a symbol of sophis- 
try. When you go to see her, she really sees you to better 
purpose. When you want to "control" her — that is, make 
sure where her hands and feet are, — she controls you. That 
is, she gets you to sit in the circle at the table, touching your 
neighbor's hands, and thus forming what she calls "the 
chain." It is well called the chain, for by it the sitter is bound. 
By dint of "substitution" her own hand is soon free and you 
do not know where it is, but she knows very well that your 
hands are in full view on the table. You cannot be exploring 
in awkward places. The reason she gives for the chain is, of 
course, that it enables the current to flow round the circle. 

Her greatest accomplishment of all is this, that she knows 
where every one is putting his attention. If you should look 
at the critical place, nothing would happen there. But she 
is a consummate mistress of all arts to direct your attention 
away from the critical place. If she wants to do something 
with the hands, she bids you be careful that you have good 
control of the feet. If she wants to slip her foot on yours so 
as to get the heel where the toe has been and put the toe on 
another foot, she will make mystic passes in the air in front 
of your eyes, and at each stroke of her hand, slip goes the 
foot — a slight motion which it is virtually certain that you 
will not notice. A jerk in one place covers a lesser jerk in an- 
other. She is a supreme eluder. 

And the medium's table adds insult to injury. The 
very instrument that serves to prove the existence of 



120 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

the unknown serves as a screen to render the move- 
ments of the medium secure from observation. 

There is no need to draw any invidious distinction 
between those who are able to detect Eusapia's tricks 
and those who are not. It is still a cause for gratitude 
that the world is not so degenerate as to make a course 
in detective work an essential of a liberal education. 
What education should bring about is a saner attitude 
of mind that is satisfied with the disclosures rendered 
by the competent; and yet more, the attitude that is 
sufficiently impressed with the general suspiciousness of 
the whole affair to require but a few ounces of expo- 
sure to add to the pounds of damning circumstance. 
Dramatically the exposure has value in compelling 
attention, and this because ears have become deaf to 
the still, small voice of reason. 

^ VI 

There is another and larger significance of the case 
of Paladino. There must be some deep reason for the 
weak logical response to this type of issue; some real 
force to throw the observation out of function so seri- 
ously, and produce such widespread mental disaster. 
The distorting influence lies in the psychology of be- 
lief. Were there not some strong pull urging one on 
to the acceptance of the effects as transcending known 
experience, we should not be so ready to overlook or 
scantily attend to the requirements of the premises. 
It is the attraction of conclusions, often subconscious 
and subtle, as well as slight and seemingly feeble, that 
throws reasoning out of its orbit and dulls the vision. 
Small forces, if applied at the critical point, produce 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 121 

notable disturbances, and particularly in the case of 
delicate instruments like the average human thinking 
machine. For that instrument has a most complex 
psychology. It is logical in part only, and often in 
small part, and by virtue of severe and protracted 
training. Men are interested in conclusions and un- 
wittingly select and shape the evidence to support cher- 
ished beliefs; that is why, in the case of Paladino, the 
evidence is far more the result of the attitude, than the 
attitude of the evidence. The psychological is pitted 
against the logical make-up; and the issue is uncertain. 

Belief is not a coldly objective attitude. Beliefs are 
cherished; they sustain life and make life worth living. 
Yet one cherishes also his rationality and the honor of 
the definition of a man as a rational animal. The edu- 
cated man remains decently rational so long as there 
is not too strong temptation to depart from the con- 
clusions which logic indicates. It becomes clear, when 
one thinks below the surface of the Paladino situation, 
that perhaps the largest single fact contributing to her 
reputation and to the excitement which her very simple 
and vulgar performances aroused, has been the strong 
inherent tendency to believe the hypothesis which she 
enpouraged in regard to her "manifestations." It is not 
the plausibility of that hypothesis, but the tendency 
to credit it, that is the really efficient motive in Eu- 
sapia's favor. Hypotheses attract belief according to 
their power to console, to satisfy, to remove uncer- 
tainty; hypotheses are plausible according to their 
conformity with the established system of consistent 
truth, called science. 

The hypothesis that some rare and unrecognized 



122 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

force is responsible for the Eusapian phenomena need 
not be ruled out of court arbitrarily. We are far from 
having boxed the compass of knowledge. But when 
any such evidence of a new force appears, we may be 
certain that it will invite and meet the criteria of logic 
and the conditions of a fair and unreserved examina- 
tion. It will not appear as a new game or as a challenge 
or emerge shrouded in the darkness of a curtained cor- 
ner with "hands off" displayed on it in large letters. 
It will appear as an effect, obscure and vague possibly, 
but seeking definition and illumination in the same 
clear Hght of observation and experiment, avoiding 
arbitrary or suspicious precautions, as now pervades 
every laboratory experiment and conditions the success 
of every inquiry. By all means let us cultivate an 
open mind, but not one so perforated with loopholes 
that much that should remain out drifts in, and much 
that should be rigidly retained drops out. There is 
sanity in the perspective of exclusion and retention 
here as elsewhere. 

If it be urged that the conditions imposed on the 
manifestations may be the means of their prevention, 
that darkness is not intended to conceal the medium's 
movements, but happens to be inimical to the display 
of his "force," the issue is again one of logical con- 
sistency. Not alone would the interference by this ca- 
pricious "force," as set forth by its discoverers, make 
nonsense of many chapters of science, and require the 
abandonment of laboratory equipments as so much 
misguidedly accumulated junk, but the behavior of 
this "force" is completely consistent with the psycho- 
logical interests of the medium in outwitting his vie- 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 193 

tims. It is just such issues that expert and lay juries 
must decide. Nor may refuge be taken in the plea that 
one cannot disprove the existence of the rare powers. 
The logic of evidence places the burden of proof on 
those who maintain the hypothesis. One imaginative 
mind can propose more hypotheses than ninety-nine 
men can disprove. Similarly, in regard to the argu- 
ment that Eusapia's recourse to cheating does not dis- 
prove the possession by her of genuine powers: were 
the existence of such powers made probable by other 
evidence, Eusapia might be dismissed. But since all 
the evidence is aiffected with the same suspicion as sur- 
rounds this case, it is flagrantly illogical, not to say 
foolish, to build a house on the sand in the hopes that 
if it stands, it will prove the sand to have been rock. 
To attempt to shift the burden of proof to the other 
side is mere jugglery and evasion. To accept it places 
the law-defying claimant face to face with his law- 
abiding rival. Does it not seem more rational and 
illuminating to agree with Professor Le Bon: "I be- 
lieve with the mediums, that darkness is more favor- 
able to the development of — credulity? " 

VII 

The concluding considerations belong to the larger 
interests of the public. Juries must on many issues 
decide by general appearances. They know that many 
scientific wonders have been produced in this day and 
generation; they know that men of science indulge in 
a good deal of remote speculation. They are also aware 
that in the history of science some fruitful trees have 
sprung from rejected seeds. It is natural that these 



124 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

analogies of truth and error should mislead. Why 
should not the age that has brought forward wireless 
messages and X-rays have discovered as well telepathy 
and "telekinesis"? The one sounds as learned, and to 
the uninitiated is just as mysterious, as the other. 
Most of us must be content to go through the world 
pressing buttons and reasonably ignorant of the force 
that does the rest. But it is a logical duty, and one 
within reach of all, to hold rational notions of the na- 
ture of these unseen forces. Eusapia at her cabinet 
calling upon the dematerialized "John King" to help 
her lift a tabouret to the table, and the "wireless" 
operator on a distressed vessel signaling for aid may 
appear to present analogous and equally dramatic 
situations. The incidents may have occurred on the 
same night; but in units of culture they are centuries 
apart. And similarly of the arguments: the entire logi- 
cal trend, the intellectual temper in which the man 
of science speculates is indefinitely removed from the 
mode of approach of those who fly to capricious sys- 
tems based on the undetected movements of tables, or 
the acrobatics of cabinet properties, or the insipid 
drivel of materialized spirits. It is the most flagrant 
abuse of intellectual charity to ask, under the guise 
of the tolerance which science approves, that the like 
consideration be extended to candidates that present 
such different credentials, such unlike qualities in their 
appeal. 

Public opinion is tremendously influenced by pres- 
tige. Great names properly carry great weight; but 
glitter also blinds. The problem is ever the same, that 
of drawing distinctions rightly. The argument from 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 125 

prestige is within its field wholly legitimate, but is like- 
wise subject to abuse. The pursuit of science vouches 
for honesty (except in rare instances); and that itself 
disposes to faith. But the largest factor of the sugges- 
tion of prestige is the assumption that the same quali- 
ties which have been exercised in the labors which 
have brought men their scientific standing, have fitted 
them for this particular problem and have been used 
in trying to trace it to its source. Now, the latter sup- 
position is very far from true. How one will acquit 
himself in such an inquiry depends far more on one's 
personal temperament and general logical attitude in 
the smaller affairs of life, than on the value of one's 
scientific memoirs. Some scientific men happen to be 
peculiarly well suited for such inquiry; and many are 
doubtless peculiarly unsuited. Their fitness is more 
likely to be the outcome of other qualities than those 
which have contributed to their scientific expertness; 
and possibly those who hold back may be better suited 
to the task than those who seek it. Yet this consid- 
eration, important as it is, is not quite as important 
as the converse, which is that even the testimony of a 
small group of perfectly sincere, able, and well-trained 
observers, despite their reputation, cannot be of such 
supreme weight as to overturn well-established prin- 
ciples and particularly to overturn them on the basis of 
a mere negative inability on the part of these men to 
detect the particular modus operandi of some especially 
shrewd individual. 

The objectivity of science determines that facts are 
true and important independently of the personality 
of their advocates. Science demands proof and sin- 



126 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

cerity — just the same sanctions that the law or soci- 
ety cherishes. The scientific man gets his reputation 
from the confirmation of his discoveries, not the 
discovery from the man. It is not in the main that 
Eusapia is so superior in attainments to many another 
of her guild or is so pecuHarly original; she is excep- 
tionally fortunate. Instead of living and dying ob- 
scurely with a local reputation in her Neapolitan home, 
she has become an international figure through the 
advertisement of men of distinction, who have failed 
to detect her deceptions. The significant lesson of the 
story is the necessity of examining data objectively, 
of freeing them at once from the suggestion of pres- 
tige and from the prejudices of individual observers, 
and of realizing that scientific principles and common 
sense alike are more enduring and more important than 
the apparent exceptions thereto. 

The social and moral aspects of the case of Pala- 
dino fall outside the scope of this review. The spirit 
of the laws and the rigor of their enforcement, the social 
condemnation of dubious practices, sufficiently illus- 
trate the familiar inconsistency with which we look 
upon the piu-suit of wealth by false pretences and 
shrewd deception. As a logical product, fraud is usu- 
ally so sordid and so stupid that we are inclined to look 
upon it leniently when it is interesting; and we must 
remember that those who paid large sums to see Eu- 
sapia' s table move, paid it by reason of their suscep- 
tibility to the psychology of the situation as above 
duly set forth. They could have attended quite as 
good a "show" for a much smaller admission fee. Pub- 
lic interest has put money in her purse, as it brought 



THE CASE OF PALADINO 127 

reputation to her name. There may even be some com- 
pensating service performed by distinguished "fakirs" 
in that they stimulate dormant critical faculties. Too 
much intellectual security makes for a complacent and 
lazy confidence. The well-to-do are apt to bestow their 
beUefs, like their alms, indiscriminately. Even though 
science serves as a faithful watch-dog of om* logical in- 
terests, we should be equal to a little watchfulness on 
our own account. Business relations and political strife 
keep men wide awake and bring them in direct con- 
tact and conflict with others whose motives and moves 
they are quite prepared to suspect; but the traffic in 
beliefs seems a safe speculation. The mental organ- 
ism, like the bodily, seems to require occasional sources 
of irritation to keep it in normal condition. It may be 
a good thing from time to time for large groups of 
people to be shaken out of their lethargy and realize 
that their rationality is still exposed to attacks of this 
kind. This may be a very costly way of gaining expe- 
rience, and of regulating public mental health, but 
when it is done on so conspicuous a scale, it is likely 
to be effective. Large bodies require strong doses dras- 
tically administered. 



THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE STUDY OF 
CHAKACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 

To illustrate adequately the formation of conviction, 
it is desirable to include a long-range survey in which 
the successive phases of belief in regard to one and the 
same problem shall stand forth as a progression, reflect- 
ing stages of logical skill and psychological insight. To 
present the play of factors in their abundant fruition, 
the problem must concern large and deep human in- 
terests, and consequently venerable ones. These con- 
ditions are admirably met by the group of beliefs con- 
cerning human differences in terms of the relation of 
mental traits to their conditions in bodily structure 
and function. The term "character and temperament" 
may serve to indicate the theme; it is the antece- 
dents of modern conceptions regarding the nature of 
oin* inherited temperamental traits and our acquired 
characteristics, that supply an interesting series of 
beliefs. These spread in time from Hippocrates to 
Darwin, and in scope from the diagnosis of disease 
through forecast of fate, to the reading of character, 
and detection of talents, by outward signs, up to a 
scientific physiological psychology. Extravagant no- 
tions, ancient superstition, fanciful mediaeval systems, 
modern survivals and elaborations, along with the 
slow advances of psychology, that had to wait the 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 129 

proper development of supporting sciences, all appear 
in the unfoldment. 

Parallel with it run the successive steps in the stand- 
ards of conviction. The largest contrast is that of the 
play of tiie subjective as opposed to the objective 
method. (Notions attract by reason of their plausi- 
bility, and once adopted find ready confirmation in 
observations, and in turn lead to practices. ) Such no- 
tions and practices must not be considered too exclu- 
sively in the light of our rigid logical standards and 
our modern knowledge. In their day they were really 
plausible. True, they often wandered in a circle, touch- 
ing a truth here and there, and again straying off to 
barren deserts of speculation : — 

"Wie von ein bosen Geist im Kreis henimgefulirt 
Und ringsherum liegt schone griine Weide." 

Confidence in a subjective plausibility characterizes 
the antecedents of the conceptions of human natm-e. 
The most explicit example is not ancient but modern; 
it is furnished by Lavater, who raised this subjective 
impression which countenances make upon us to the 
dignity of a "physiognomical sense." All this illustrates 
pointedly how well we may use our mental powers 
and remain ignorant of the true processes upon which 
they proceed. This circumstance establishes the need 
of a science of psychology as well as accounts for its 
difficulties. It calls attention to the fact, readily over- 
looked, that psychology, like all sciences, has a long 
history; its stages are not so distinct as those of more 
objective sciences, such as astronomy or physics or 
chemistry; they must be sought in the antecedents, 
the by-ways as well as highways, of ancient thought. 



L^' 



130 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

The stages of progression are not quite serial or regu- 
lar. For the most part the notions and systems that 
come and go are not disproved, but outgrown. The 
reign of one is followed by the reign of another, some- 
times of the same dynasty, sometimes of quite differ- 
ent ancestry. None the less they form an historical 
series, an evolutionary development. 

Throughout the course the imperfect logic that holds 
the notions "or the system together is quite as impor- 
tant as the imperfect insight into the facts and their 
meaning, to which it is applied. This remains the 
central consideration — the lesson of the story — and 
constitutes the value of its contribution to the history 
of conviction. 



The strong practical interest in the sources and va- 
rieties of human powers, and their proper direction and 
training, may be utilized in behalf of the retrospec- 
tive aspects of the subject. The antecedents of "charac- 
ter and temperament" concern in the main the story 
of false and ambitious leads and venturesome solu- 
tions of the sources of human nature. However com- 
pletely discredited, they belong to the irrevocable 
stages of oiu* intellectual heritage, and show how un- 
certain has been the occupation of the psychological 
realm. The historical connection between the antece- 
dents and present-day views is irregular; the succession 
of opinion is largely by replacement and outgrowth. 
None the less the points of connection are frequent 
with the body of knowledge which we draw upon so 
readily for the satisfaction of our systematized and 
rationalized inquiries. 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 131 

The popular interest in human nature is itseK an 
expression thereof. Actions are largely regulated as 
well as interpreted by psychological considerations; 
and these turn attention to the nature of the mind. 
The feeling of strong impulse, the sense of conflict be- 
tween emotions as also between desire and sanctioned 
conduct, the search for motives, as well as the shrewd- 
ness of the battle of wits, and the reading of another's 
intentions shape psychological insight. "Know thy- 
self" is an ancient precept — at once a moral injunc- 
tion and an invitation to psychological study. The 
early contributions to the field to be surveyed came 
from the learning aptly called "the humanities" and 
reflected the insight of experience, directed by an 
unschooled but worldly wise analytical temper. Quite 
as science is glorified common sense, so is literature 
elevated common sentiment; either may fail to rise 
above a suggestive type of opinion or pleasing conjec- 
ture. The delineation of character springs from the 
impressionistic attitude towards the products of natm-e 
and the vicissitudes of fortune. It is animated by a 
fundamental interest in one's kind. It trains men to 
be practitioners, empirics in large measure, in the arts 
of human intercourse, and tends to establish man as 
the proper study of mankind. 

The distinctive service of Greek thought was to 
launch the permanently engaging intellectual problems; 
to this rule the problem of character is no exception. 
It presents the two tendencies — the impressionistic 
and the analytic — in characteristic form. Theophras- 
tus (370-288 B.C.) is the prototype of the impres- 
sionistic delineators, yet is not without an analytic 



132 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

strain. He sets forth his intentions thus: That although 
aU Greece is of one 

clime and temperature of air, and Grecians in general bred 
and trained up after one fashion, should notwithstanding, in 
manners and behavior be so different and unlike. I therefore, 
O Polycles, having a long time observed the divers dispo- 
sitions of men, having now lived ninety-nine (?) years, having 
conversed with all sorts of natures good and bad, and com- 
paring them together: I took it my part to set down in this 
discourse their several fashions and manners of life. For I 
am of the opinion, my Polycles, that our children will prove 
the honester and better citizens, if we shall leave them good 
precedents of imitation: that of good children they may 
prove better men. 

The "Characters" of Theophrastus form a group 
of sketches of human foibles, holding the mirror up to 
nature. They comprise the dissembler, the flatterer, the 
gossip, the toady, the fop, the miser, the superstitious, 
the mistrusting, the querulous, the bully, the coward, 
the stubborn, the pompous, the boor and the bore, 
the malaprop of either sex, the well-intentioned fool 
and the public-disregarding autocrat. This gallery of 
mental and moral shortcomings served as a model for 
distant ages. A group of delineations of character ap- 
peared in England in the seventeenth century; and 
the model was still suggestive when George Eliot chose 
the title for her "Impressions of Theophrastus Such." 
The modern delineations emphasize circumstance, the 
vocations and social stations, reflect a more varied, a 
more specialized, and a more complicated world. The 
"idle gallant," the "meer dull physician," the "up- 
start country knight," the "pot-poet," the "plodding 
student," the "down-right scholar," as well as the 
"seK-conceited man," the "vulgar-spirited man," the 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 133 

"too idly reserved man," and men of other dispositions 
are subjected to keen strictm-es in the "Microcosmog- 
raphy, or a Piece of the World Discovered in Essays 
and Characters," by John Earle (1628). Such portrai- 
tures of human peculiarities, gauged by their moral 
or social desirability as examples to be followed or 
avoided, form an attractive compendium for the in- 
terpretation of men and their ways. Their considera- 
tion, ranging from gossip to philosophy, supplies the 
common touch of nature that makes the world of every 
time and clime akin, and presents graphically for our 
psychological contemplation the outward issues of 
disposition as shaped by opportunity and circum- 
stance. 

II 

This vein of character-mining failed to yield the 
native ore of disposition. The more fundamental prob- 
lem was early recognized in the venerable doctrine 
of the temperaments as the alleged determinants of 
the original yet distinctive natures of men, and in the 
general notion that outward uncontrollable forces, such 
as climate, and directive ones, such as breeding and 
training, were responsible for the types of individuals 
and races — as duly indicated by Theophrastus. The 
doctrines of the school of Hippocrates (fifth century 
B.C.) formulated the Greek point of view. Its philo- 
sophical procedure followed that of Empedocles in the 
search for elements and in the explanation of manifold 
appearance as their variable combination. The ele- 
ments of creation were regarded as fourfold: air, fire, 
earth, and water. These are distinctive by virtue of 



134 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

elemental qualities: namely, dry and moist, hot and 
cold, hesLvy and light, which by combination yield the 
qualities of the elements: fire as hot, dry and light; 
water as cold, moist and heavy, and so on. The four- 
fold elements of the body are the humors or fluids : the 
blood, the (yellow) bile, the phlegm, and the black bile. 
Subjected to the play of analogy and correspondence 
in the speculative manner then employed, blood be- 
comes related to air, has the quality of being warm 
and moist; the season which it typifies is spring, and its 
temperament is the sanguine. Its direct opposite is 
earth, which is cold and dry, finds its bodily correspon- 
dent in the black bile and its season in the fall of the 
year; its temperament is the melancholic. Fire as warm 
and dry has special relations to summer, is represented 
in the body by the yellow bile, and produces the fiery 
or choleric temperament;, while water as cold and moist 
is allied to the phlegm, to the sluggish season of vnn- 
ter, and to the languid temperament which we still, in 
deference to Hippocrates, call phlegmatic. 

These views were held as much more than specula- 
tive possibilities; they were practically applied. Dis- 
eases were regarded as defects in the composition of 
the humors, to be counteracted by appropriate appli- 
cations of heat and cold, or of dry and moist, to restore 
a favorable equilibrium. Winter was held to be the 
dangerous season for a temperament lacking in fire; 
the body must not be too full of humors nor yet be too 
dry and sapless. The several ages of man, from child- 
hood to senility, reflected the natural sequence of domi- 
nance of the several humors. 

The doctrine of temperaments is historically impor- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 135 

tant quite beyond any illumination that it affords. 
It is obvious that the philosophers of the school of 
Hippocrates had no means of ascertaining that cheer- 
fulness was resident in the blood, laziness in the phlegm, 
testiness in the yellow bile, and low-spiritedness in the 
black bile; nor that any such fundamental vital basis 
was afforded by the "humors" thus distinguished. 
Their habits of mind inclined them to such an opinion; 
and their sense of plausibility was gratified (where we 
see only far-fetched and irrelevant analogy) by observ- 
ing the hot moist fluidity of blood and the damp 
cold sluggishness of phlegm. The originators of the 
doctrine of temperaments were empirical psychologists, 
who observed that differences of mental disposition, 
like cheerfulness and testiness, were common and con- 
spicuous traits of men. They were also medical prac- 
titioners with a fair knowledge of the body and its ills, 
and recognized that mental dispositions were inti- 
mately related to bodily condition. Their philosophi- 
cal temper found satisfaction in connecting these two 
varieties of information through the doctrine of the 
temperaments. 

This doctrine does not stand alone as such an at- 
tempt. The "spirit" theory of disease has a like basis 
and pm^pose; it reaches from primitive medicine to 
Christian exorcism and beyond. The reference' of 
epilepsy or other mental invasion to a foreign and 
malignant spirit is not unrelated to the notion of ani- 
mal spirits coursing through the body and finding a 
local habitation in the ventricles of the brain. Again, 
the doctrine of signatures, in accordance with which 
red flowers were considered efficacious in the treat- 



136 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ment of blood diseases and yellow ones in the treat- 
ment of jaundice, or "heart's-ease" was prescribed for 
heart trouble, and wahiuts for mental disorders (by vir- 
tue of the resemblance of their outer shell to the skull 
and of their convoluted kernels to the brain) illustrate 
the force of native analogy in cruder practices. 

When notions of this order, instead of being carried 
along as the folk-lore products of primitive thought, 
assume a systematic form, they become more fantas- 
tic in the analogies employed as well as more remote 
from a corrective common sense. Astrology is the most 
ambitious of such efforts both in design and scope 
of application. The three persistent motives in this 
world-wide and world-old expression — a composite of 
primitive culture, superstitious survivals, and pseudo- 
scientific elaboration — seem to be the ciu'e of disease, 
the reading of character, the fore-knowledge of the fu- 
ture; and. in all, the control of fate. The motives com- 
bine. Astrology aims to determine the character as 
well as the careers of men, to predict their liability 
to disease and its issues, and to prescribe the set of 
disposition — making one of jovial temperament if 
the hour of birth showed favorable relations to Jupiter, 
or gloomy (saturnine) if Saturn ruled the critical mo- 
ment. These and related notions and systems form 
a vast background of belief, continuously influencing 
the views of character and its soiu-ces. Whether the 
causes or the signs of dispositions were regarded as 
resident in the fluids of the body, or in the stars and 
planets, or in the detailed contours of the features 
of the face and head — as in the later physiognomy, 
itself a revival of classic and popular lore — or with 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 137 

more modern but no less fanciful elaboration, in the 
"bumps" of phrenology, or again in the creases of 
the hand upon which palmistry specializes, there ap- 
pears in all a common practical motive in the control 
of fate through insight or revelation, and a common 
quasi-logical attempt to establish its basis by read- 
ing the secret of its conditioning — the insignia of its 
dominion. The logic of the procedure, as judged by 
our standards, is of the feeblest; but these standards 
are the issue of many generations of experience, each 
critically testing the conclusions, revising and enlarging 
the data, of its predecessors. The stress of practice, 
we must bear in mind, is insistent. Men will apply 
what knowledge they have; they can not await its per- 
fection. Ideals and systems support the intercourse 
with reality, but they also express the progress attained 
in reading its meaning; the ideal "has always to grow 
in the real, and often to seek out its bed and board 
there in a very sorry way" (Carlyle). 

The ancient and honorable place of the doctrine of 
the temperaments in the evolution of psychological 
knowledge warrants its further consideration. Most 
influential were the contributions of Galen (a.d. 130- 
200), who developed the views of Hippocrates and 
whose authority dominated the medical world for cen- 
turies. The doctrine became a classical heritage through 
its incorporation in the Galenic system of medicine. 
Its survival in the transfer of Greco-Roman science 
and tradition across the desert of unprogressive ages, 
with their uncertain and irregular caravans of learning, 
was due largely to its association with the "humoral" 
theory of disease. This remained a central as well as a 



138 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

controversial issue in mediseval and Renaissance medi- 
cine, and was effectively retired only by the complete 
transformation of physiological conceptions inaugurated 
by Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood 
(1628). Along with this decisive reform in knowledge 
and method there was established the clinical tem- 
per of the practice of medicine, which was as largely 
set by Sydenham (1624-89), as were the experimental 
standards by Harvey, as similarly the anatomical pre- 
requisite had been supplied by Vesalius (1514-64). 
Cumulatively these advances served to cast off the 
spell of Galen and to install verification and observa- 
tion in place of authority. As a herald of the new 
learning, the philosopher John Locke, a friend of Syden- 
ham's, wrote: — 

You cannot imagine how a little observation, carefully 
made by a man not tied up to the four humors (Galen) or 
salt, sulphur, and mercury (Paracelsus), or to acid and alkali 
(Sylvius and Willis) which has of late prevailed, will carry a 
man in the curing of diseases, though very stubborn and 
dangerous; and that with very little and common things, and 
almost no medicine at all. 

These considerations show to what extent practices 
kept alive systems precariously supported by prin- 
ciples. Symptoms such as fevers and chills, parching 
and perspiration, substantiated the hot and cold, the 
dry and moist as clinical realities. Remedies were pre- 
scribed to counteract them; diets were arranged accord- 
ing to degree of dryness and moisture. Even when the 
classic doctrines were discarded, they were replaced by 
others developed in like manner.^ 

1 Medical theories and practices were reflected in popular lore. To 
recall the spirit of the ministrations it is sufficient to cite the vener- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 139 

It is fortunate that the older currents of thought, 
medical and otherwise, were summarized at the very 
period at which they were destined to retirement by 

able Chaucerian diagnosis made by Pertelote of Chanticlere's affright- 
ing dream. This was ascribed to 

"the grete superfluitie 
Of your reede colera, parde. 
Which causeth folk to dremen in her dremes 
Of arwes, and of fyre with reede leemes. 



Right as the humoiu* of malencolie 
Causeth ful many a man, in sleep, to crye. 
For fere of beres, or of boles blake. 
Or elles blake develes wole him take. 
Of othere humours couthe 1 telle also. 
That wirken many a man in slep ful woo; 
But I wol passe as lightly as I can. . . ." 

She then advises digestives and laxatives to purge him of "choler'* 
and of "melancolie," though she bids him remember that he is "full 
colerick of compleccioun" and should beware of the "sonne in his 
ascensioun." Among the artists, Albrecht Diirer reflected the cur- 
rent belief that temperament was responsible for the differences of 
men. He urged that artists should present the features and propor- 
tions suitable to the characters of their subjects. One of his ripest 
productions, commonly known as "The Four Apostles," also bore 
the title of " The Four Temperaments," St. John representing the 
melancholic, St. Peter the phlegmatic, St. Paul the choleric, and St. 
Mark the sanguine. 

The affiliation of "humors" and temperaments appears in the 
transferred use of the former term. The dramatic material of the age 
of Elizabeth, with its free emphasis of personality, was typically 
staged in Ben Jonson's (1574-1637) Every Man in His Humour and 
Every Man out of His Humour. The following is from the induction 
to the latter: — 

"To give these ignorant well-spoken days some taste of their abuse 
of this word humour," the argument proceeds: — 

"Why, humour as 't is ens, we thus define it. 
To be a quality of air, or water, 
And in itself holds these two properties. 
Moisture, and fluxure: as, for demonstration. 
Pom* water on this floor, 't will wet and run: 
Likewise the air, forced throujgh a horn, or trumpet. 



140 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Harvey's fundamental discovery. Burton's "Anat- 
omy of Melancholy " is a collection of all the mystic, 
fantastic, engaging, and (to our minds) incredible pro- 
cedures of an ambitious science, suggestive of the waste- 
products of the mind. Burton anatomizes the humors, 
recognizing the fom* primary juices 

without which no living creature can be sustained; which 
four, though they be comprehended in the mass of the blood, 
yet have their several affections. . . . Blood is a hot, sweet, 
temperate, red humour, prepared in the meseraic veins, and 
made of the most temperate parts of the chylus in the liver, 
whose office is to nourish the whole body, to give it strength 
and colour, being dispersed by the veins through every part 
of it. And from it spirits are first begotten in the heart, which 
afterwards by the arteries are communicated to the other 
parts; — 

and so on, with a like conjectural anatomy and acro- 
batic physiology for the other humors. Burton's appe- 
tite for the occult inevitably made him a believer in 
astrology. It is a fact that his horoscope is pictured on 
his tombstone, but it is presumably but a rumor that 
he assisted the fulfiUment of the prediction of the time 

Flows instantly away, and leaves behind 
A kind of dew; and hence, we do conclude. 
That whatsoe'er hath fluxure, and humidity. 
As wanting power to contain itself. 
Is humour. So in every human body. 
The choler, melancholy, phlegm, and blood. 
By reason that they flow continually 
In some one part, and are not continent. 
Receive the name of Humours. Now thus far 
It may, by metaphor, apply itself 
Unto the general disposition: 
As when some one peculiar quality 
Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw 
All his affects, his spirits and his powers. 
In their confluctions, all to run one way. 
This may be truly said to be a humour." 



CHAKACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 141 

of his death by hanging himself. Burton's work is sug- 
gestive in view of the career of the doctrines which 
superseded the "temperaments " as practical expo- 
nents of character. It indicates the ready temptation 
for views of this nature to degenerate into vain pseudo- 
science, and under a common enthusiasm and pre- 
possession to bring together in mutual tolerance diverse 
notions of like conjectural basis. Their common mo- 
tive is a strong leaning toward the occult. 

m 

The parent view, that mental traits are conditioned 
by bodily composition, affiliated with views of similar 
ancestry, holding that the traits were revealed in bodily 
signs. Such is the principle of physiognomy, a doc- 
trine as old as Aristotle, and older. There is the tradi- 
tional story that the physiognomist Zopyrus, in read- 
ing the character of Socrates, pronormced him full of 
passionate tendencies, thus showing in the opinion of 
the disciples of Socrates, the vanity of his art. But 
Socrates came to his defense and confessed the reality 
of the impulses, which, however, he was able to resist. 
Aristotle's advocacy of physiognomy was not pro- 
nounced; it may have been little more than an inclina- 
tion to recognize the reflection of emotion in feature, 
or the coordinate growth of body and mind. But the 
tractate on "Physiognomy" ascribed to him served 
as the text to the Renaissance adepts in occult lore. 
Thus restated, even more than in its original setting, 
it presents the characteristic dependence upon weak 
analogy in connecting specific bodily features with 
specific mental traits. Coarse hair, an erect body, a 



142 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

strong sturdy frame, broad shoulders, a robust neck, 
blue eyes and dark complexion, a sharp but not large 
brow, were together regarded as marks of the coura- 
geous man, while the timid man showed opposite charac- 
teristics. The doctrine was reinforced by such analo- 
gies as that timid animals, like the rabbit and the deer, 
had soft fine hair; while the courageous ones, like the 
lion and the wild boar, were coarse-haired. 

A mental trait may have at once a natural bodily 
cause and a manifest or covert sign. The "humorist" 
may also be a physiognomist, may both accoimt for 
and read human character, may prescribe for its ail- 
ments according to the one set of influences, and advise 
as to course and career according to the other. 

There is no more instructive instance to illustrate 
how the old learning was reinstated with slight altera- 
tion in precept and practice, than the career of Jerome 
Cardan (1501-76). Esteemed by his contemporaries, 
shrewd and able, he was urged in one direction by his 
taste for science and in another by his credulity. His 
autobiography reveals his analytic bent as well as his 
strong personality. It has been said of him that for 
all for which his contemporaries thought him wise, we 
should think him mad; and for what we think him wise, 
they would have thought him mad. So great was his 
reputation that he was invited and then inveigled to 
travel from Naples to Scotland to treat the Bishop of 
St. Andrews. The prelate's ailment had been described 
as a periodic asthma due to a distillation of the brain 
into the lungs, which left a "temperature and a con- 
dition too moist and too cold, and the flow of the 
humors coinciding with the conjunctions and opposi- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 143 

tions of the moon.*' With the characteristic prestige 
that results from finding others in the wrong, Cardan 
promptly fomid that the Archbishop's brain was too 
hot and too dry. He put his distinguished patient on a 
cold and humid diet to resist the attraction of the brain, 
yet had him sleep on a pillow of dry straw or seaweed, 
and had water dropped upon his shaven crown; in 
addition, however, he prescribed a regimen of simple 
food, much sleep, and cold showers. The improve- 
ment that resulted — naturally ascribed to the "hu- 
moral" procedures — added much to the glory of Car- 
dan's reputation and the profit of his purse. This 
physician, learned and wise for his day, was yet the 
very embodiment of all things superstitious. Every 
trivial occurrence was an omen or potent. He cast 
horoscopes, wrote on all manners of cosmic influences, 
and espoused the role of a physiognomist. His distinc- 
tive contribution was an astrological physiognomy, 
based upon the underlying notion that the furrows or 
lines of the forehead correspond to the seven dominant 
celestial bodies; and that the qualities which they de- 
noted were those connected with the powers and vir- 
tues conferred by Venus, or Jupiter, or Saturn, or Mer- 
cury, etc., in the current astrological system. Across 
the forehead he drew seven parallel lines, the spaces in 
succession dedicated to the moon and the six planets, 
and by the proportions and prominences of these lines 
he read the fortune of the subject, not hesitating in one 
case to predict from the grouping of these wrinkles 
that the owner thereof was doomed to die by hanging 
or drowning. 

In such manner the humoral doctrine served to de- 



144 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

termine the diagnosis of disposition and ailment, while 
from astrology and physiognomy were drawn fm*ther 
indications of personal character and probable fortmie. 
Hardly less significant for the logical temper of these 
pre-Harveian days were the contributions of Giovanni 
Baptista della Porta (1538-1615). He was impressed 
by the comparative physiognomy sketched in the Aris- 
totelian writings — a field in tm-n indicating the strong 
impression that the traits of animals make upon the 
thought-habits of primitive people; it appears in to- 
temic practices, as well as in animal fables from -^sop 
to Br'er Rabbit. The notion that stubborn persons 
carry the outward sign of their obstinacy by having 
features in common with the face of a mule, or that fool- 
ish ones show a like resemblance to a sheep, impresses 
the modern reader as a strange joke. The analogy will 
barely support a pleasantry or a metaphor. We are 
fully conscious of the metaphor of our epithets, when 
we call an obstinate person muHsh, or a shy one sheep- 
ish, or a man of sly ways an old fox, or speak of a social 
lion or a wise owl or a gay butterfly; it is significant 
that what was once serious logic is now playful figure 
of speech. It is also in accord with the principle of siu*- 
vivals in culture that the notions made current by 
generations of credulous "physiognomists" continue 
to be circulated in the popular manuals sold to simple 
folk to teach them the art of reading faces and futures.^ 

* Nothing less than a glance at the illustrations which the earlier 
physiognomists employed will convey an adequate impression of 
the vagaries of Porta and his kind. They show that what was once 
pictorial proof has become the artist's pastime. The material pre- 
sented for amusement in Lear's Nonsense Botany or Wood's Animal 
Analogues is hardly more remote than that which served Porta as a 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 145 

All this would be as irrelevant retrospectively as it 
is to our central purpose, were it not that it indicates 
the presence throughout the ages of a considerable 
body of popular lore and systematized doctrine — both 
saturated with flimsy analogy and engaging prepos- 
sessions — which was available for the ambitious re- 
naissance of the interest in character and its signs in 
the face, through its best known apostle, Johann Cas- 
par Lavater (1741-1801). The contrast between Lava- 
ter and such men as Cardan and Porta is as marked as 
that of the spirit and scope of the scientific study of 
their respective times. The vagaries of the sixteenth 
century may have stood measurably aloof from the 
real, if slow and uncertain, advances in the knowledge 
of mind and nature then maturing; but they were not 
wholly remote, not wholly tangential to its orbit. This 
was no longer true of the eighteenth century. Lava- 
ter, despite his reputation and associations and the 
imposing effect of his ambitious publications, failed to 
affect seriously or to divert the increasing stream of 
scientific discovery to which the early eighteenth cen- 
tury gave momentum. The scientific contemporaries 
of Lavater judged his views as critically, appreciated 
their wholly subjective basis in a personal predilection 

serious instrument of research. Thus, a portrait of Plato is printed 
side by side with that of a dog, and one of Vitellus Csesar is paral- 
leled by that of a stag; and in each case some of the most deserving 
qualities of the animal are regarded as typical of the human embodi- 
ment. Similarly distorted illustrations show human resemblances to 
a lion, or a bull, or a donkey, or a deer; while the picture of a girl is 
ungallantly made to approach the features of a pig. These and yet 
more capricious ventures in animal physiognomy were incorporated 
into later systems, often in complete ignorance of their source, j 



146 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and their lack of objective warrant quite as justly as 
we of to-day. The contrast of attitude appears equally 
in the all but complete desuetude of the old persistent 
pseudo-sciences, astrological and others. 

Lavater had nothing new to offer in principle or data 
or method. He was an impressionistic enthusiast, set- 
ting forth conclusions with a minimum of argument 
and convictions with a minimum of proof. His system 
was based upon subjective interpretation. His delinea- 
tion of character has a direct reading of detailed men- 
tal traits by an interpretation of their equivalents or 
representatives in features and expression. Lavater's 
activities were manifold. Preacher, orator, philan- 
thropist, political reformer, dramatist, writer of bal- 
lads, he was a conspicuous man of his times, highly 
regarded by his eminent contemporaries — among 
them Goethe, whose contribution to the "Fragments 
of Physiognomy" have been identified. He was quite 
without scientific bent or training. Yet his name was 
so commanding in the annals of physiognomy as to 
distract attention from the slightness of the founda- 
tions upon which his elaborate superstructure was 
raised. Indeed, the impressiveness of elaborate plates 
and luxurious editions, and the support of distinguished 
but uncritical patrons, were responsible for much of 
his fame. The reader who desires first-hand acquain- 
tance with Lavater must be prepared for tedious as- 
sertion, for generalities that do not even glitter, for 
persistent avoidance of real issues, for the futile con- 
tention and misunderstanding of a propagandist. Of 
method he had little, and for the most part translated 
directly and by use of a dictionary of fanciful etymolo- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 147 

gies, irom the language of a superficial anatomy into 
that of a wholly arbitrary psychology. He presented a 
popular, empirical grouping of feature-interpretation 
by virtue of a certain common-sense shrewdness, which 
he elevated to the dignity of a universal physiognom- 
ical sense — "those feelings which are produced at 
beholding certain countenances, and the conjectures 
concerning the qualities of the mind," which the fea- 
tures suggest. The extensive collection of portraits 
alone offset the tediiun of the text. Lavater was an 
expert draftsman, and a diligent collector of engravings, 
outline drawings, and the silhouettes then in vogue. 
To each picture he attached a character-reading, which 
reflected little more than his personal impression or 
knowledge of the subject, to which occasionally were 
added special correlations of such traits as prudence, 
cunning, industry, caution, determination or what not, 
with the forehead, the eye, the nose, the mouth, the 
chin. 

It was inevitable that the practical interest, lacking 
the compensations of Lavater's serious purpose, rap- 
idly turned physiognomy into vulgar quackery. The 
followers of Lavater developed a craving for handy 
recipes by which to interpret the meaning in terms of 
character, of chin, forehead, eyebrows, and of the sev- 
eral distinctive combinations of feature, by an arbi- 
trary or plausible system of signs. Physiognomy de- 
generated into a baseless and senseless empiricism. 
Oblique wrinkles in the forehead were held to indicate 
an oblique or suspicious mind; small eyebrows with 
long concave eyelashes were made the sign of phleg- 
matic melancholia; long high foreheads were advised 



148 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

not to contract friendships or marriages with spherical 
heads. Such was the detailed but arbitrary correlation 
oracularly set forth with no more analysis or under- 
standing of facial traits than of mental ones. 

Lavater's work ^ supplies a convincing and not too 
ancient example, if such be needed, of the Umitations 
of impressionism as a basis for the study of character 
and of its utter futility for the purposes of a soimd psy- 
chology; and that apart from the like disqualifications 
resulting from an ignorance of the significance of such 
somatic features as those which formed the basis of 
the system. It shows how readily an enthusiastic but 
imintelligent industry may build a monumental con- 
struction upon a hollow foundation. It illustrates as 
weU a specific psychological fallacy: that of exagger- 
ating the significance of traits in which we have an 
interest. It is the general human appeal of the face and 
its expression and its place in human intercourse that 
suppHes the interest so readily abused by popular 

^ A possible redeeming feature of Lavater's work is his recognition 
of facial expression as worthy of study; in this he followed the lead- 
ership of the artist LeBrun. Expression is much more generic and 
more readily interpreted than are peculiarities of featm-e. In such 
Biblical maxims as "though a wicked man constrain his countenance, 
the wise can distinctly discern his purpose," Lavater found a text for 
his exposition. Of the true meaning of expression, so far as it was 
possible before Darwin, he had slight understanding. His physiog- 
nomical sense conferred no physiological comprehension. Indeed, 
so far as he ventured into the biological territory, he reverted to the 
older notions, and made fish and fowl and even insects reveal their 
character by their effects upon the human impression. In an engrav- 
ing of the heads of snakes he pointed out the reprobate qualities dis- 
tinguishable in their form, the deceit of their colors, and the natural- 
ness with which we shrink from such a countenance. The logic of 
physiognomy, ancient or modem, learned or ignorant, is of one kin- 
ship; it is the family associations that in time and circumstance come 
to be less and less respectable. 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 149 

writers or commercial charlatans. It is just this realm 
of loose analogy and unchecked ambitious conclusions 
that attracts feeble minds with a taste for speculation 
and an inclination for the occult, the bizarre, the eso- 
teric; such a taste, as if to appease a neglected, logical 
conscience, usually finds refuge in a forced semblance 
of verification. It is this combination of interests that 
supports physiognomy or phrenology, palmistry or 
fortune-telling, and (with an altered complexion) Chris- 
tian Science or Theosophy, — in which latter exam- 
ples cures or miracles instead of readings supply the 
realistic support. 

V 

The next and last stage in the antecedents of the 
study of character presented a new r6le, or, it may be, 
an old one in a new and distinctive costume. In its 
practical effect and later career it resembles the system 
of Lavater, and invited still greater popular abuse. Its 
founder was Dr. Franz Joseph Gall (1757-1828); and 
it achieved popularity under the name of *^ Phrenol- 
ogy.*^ While Lavater stood beyond the pale of the 
scientific activity of his day, Gall was an influential 
part of it. Gall's scientific service must be acknowl- 
edged, even if he be held responsible for the extrava- 
gances of phrenology. The system was extended and 
popularized by Dr. Johann Caspar Spurzheim (1776- 
1832), Gall's associate, and his successor as leader of 
the movement. 

There are two distinct aspects to the work of Gall 
and Spurzheim; and it is not easy to understand or to 
set forth just how the connection stood in the minds 



150 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

of these contributors to the anatomy and physiology of 
the nervous system, and advocates of the locations of 
elaborate mental faculties by means of cranial promi- 
nences. The two orders of contributions are difficult 
to reconcile either in spirit or in method. The motive 
of "character-reading" was operative, though restricted 
by scientific considerations. It was forcibly made the 
consummation of a system quite irrelevant to the pur- 
pose. In the end, the practical temper prevailed; and 
phrenology allied with physiognomy, palmistry, or 
other character-reading pretenses, degenerated to the 
woeful state of a declasse pseudo-science. Its nearness 
to the illmninating truth served but to intensify the 
obscurity of its shadows. The contrast in the two 
spheres of the career of Gall and Spurzheim serves to 
explain why, as they traveled about Europe, they were 
by some called "a pair of vainglorious mountebanks," 
and by others placed with Newton and GaHleo as illus- 
trious contributors to science. Yet the fact that phre- 
nology called larger attention to the study of character 
than had any other movement, gives it an important 
place in a retrospective view. 

The impressionistic origin of his phrenological in- 
terests is thus recounted by Gall. When at school, he 
was struck by the fact that his schoolmates had fa- 
cilities independent of instruction; that one was 
musical, another artistically endowed, and that this 
innate ability rather than application was most deci- 
sive in determining progress. He seems to have been 
annoyed at being surpassed by schoolmates who had a 
capacity for memorizing; and in an inauspicious mo- 
ment he observed that these schoolmates all had promi- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 151 

nent eyes. At the university he directed his attention 
to students with prominent eyes, and persuaded him- 
self that in every case such men had exceptionally 
good verbal memories; and thus was the fatal correla- 
tion made. Not unlike Lavater, he trusted to his "phys- 
iognomical sense" to recognize the prominences which 
were to find a local habitation and a name upon the 
phrenological chart. At church he observed the most 
devout of the attendants, detected what portions of 
the skull were well-developed in them, and discovered 
the organs of veneration. He compared the heads of 
murderers and found an organ of murder, and similarly 
studied the heads of thieves and located the organ of 
theft. He had organs for the preeminent quality of each 
of the five senses; an organ of tune for the musical, and 
one of number for the mathematical. He thus accumu- 
lated a group of some twenty-four organs (which Spurz- 
heim enlarged to thirty-five or more), and in this con- 
tribution disclosed with strange unconcern at once his 
self-deception and the shallowness of his psychological 
notions. 

The common assumptions of physiognomy and 
phrenology (as we readily detect, though not thus ob- 
vious to the minds of their defenders) are these: (1) that 
there are distinct mental traits, qualities or capacities, 
which ordinary human intercourse and observation 
reveal; (2) that these are caused by (or correlated 
with) prominent developments of parts of the brain; 
(3) the critical assumption (presumably least explicit 
of all) that we may accept as established the relation 
whereby the one, the bodily feature, becomes the in- 
dex of the other, the mental trait. The assumed prin- 



152 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ciple of relation was plainly empirical, had no warrant 
in principle. The clue in all such systems was merely 
a sign or trade-mark displayed, in Lavater's theologi- 
cal view, by a beneficent Providence to indicate the 
virtues and vices of men. For phrenology the alleged 
principle was wholly different. It grew out of the sub- 
division of the fimctions of the brain. The evidence, 
it must be admitted, was sought by approved scien- 
tific methods. But the stupendous assumption was 
made that the presumption in favor of the existence 
of such specialized brain-areas included a knowledge of 
their termSy and that their nature was indicated by the 
specific differences in the observed traits of men; fur- 
ther, that such mental traits, giving rise to or condi- 
tioned by marked local development of brain-areas, 
could be detected in the corresponding prominences 
of the skull. So supremely unwarranted was this cumu- 
lative series of assumptions that the scientific knowl- 
edge and procedure associated with its alleged estab- 
lishment failed to confer upon phrenology any more 
respectable status or accredited position than was 
accorded to the far more extravagant assumptions of 
physiognomy. Clearly, if the assumptions of phrenol- 
ogy held — itseK an extravagant supposition — the 
study of character and temperament would be com- 
pletely shaped by its conclusions. Since they are nei- 
ther pertinent nor illmninating, physiological and psy- 
chological studies still have a message for the student 
of human nature. 

The chief warrant for a further consideration of the 
position of Gall and Spurzheim is that their views came 
into direct contact with the advances in the knowl- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 153 

edge of the nervous system, which — as will duly ap- 
pear — became the requisite for true psychological 
progress. The central question at issue was whether 
the brain functioned as a whole, or whether distinct 
functions could be assigned to its several parts. The 
former position was defended by Flourens (1794-1867), 
who maintained that the removal of a part of the brain 
of a pigeon weakened its general intelligence, but that 
the intact portion still exercised the complete range 
of brain-functions, though with diminished efficiency. 
Gall's position required a detailed and specialized divi- 
sion of function. He drew attention to the fact that 
the mutilated pigeon, while retaining physical sight 
and hearing, became mentally blind to the meaning of 
what it was clearly able to see, and mentally deaf to 
the meaning of sounds; he drew attention to the im- 
portant evidence supplied by the association of men- 
tal symptoms with injury or disease of different por- 
tions of the human brain, and noted that these were 
very different according to the region affected. His 
contentions proved to be correct in fact, in interpre- 
tation, and in method. In this controversy Gall ar- 
gued physiologically, not phrenologically. In another 
controversy the reverse was the case. Flourens re- 
stricted his conclusions of the unity of function to the 
cerebrum, and confirmed the experiments on pigeons 
which showed that the cerebellum regulated locomo- 
tion. Gall had made the cerebellum the organ of ama- 
tiveness; if it regulated the love-affairs, it could not 
regulate the gait. He replied first physiologically, that 
the experiment was defective, and the motor impair- 
ment due to concomitant injury of other parts of the 



154 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

brain; and then phrenologically, that if the cerebellum 
were the organ of locomotion, it would follow that 
persons with large cerebellmns should be acrobats, and 
asked whether women (who in Gall's view possessed 
a small cerebellum) "walked and danced with less 
regularity, less art, less grace than men." Controver- 
sies of this kind were futile in view of the wholly ir- 
reconcilable positions of the advocates. In the end, the 
phrenological position became an obsession. 

At one other point phrenology came in contact with 
the advances leading to modern psychology; this was in 
its aUiance with the study of hypnotism in the career 
of James Braid (1795-1860). The remarkable insight 
of this investigator enabled him to recognize under 
disadvantageous conditions the true nature of this 
mental state as a partial disqualification of the nerv- 
ous system; but it did not prevent his temporary 
subjection to the phrenological fallacy. He refuted the 
position that the hypnotic state was an histrionic de- 
ception; he demonstrated its reality, but imwittingly 
brought it within range of suggestion or self-deception. 
Later he reahzed the error of his earlier work; but his 
association with phrenology injured his reputation, 
and delayed the recognition of his pioneer work in a 
difficult field. The following suggests the course of the 
experiments : — 

I placed a cork endwise over the organ of veneration and 
bound it in this position by a bandage under the chin. The 
patient thus hypnotized at once assumed the attitude of 
adoration, arose from his seat and knelt down as if engaged 
in prayer. On moving the cork forward, active benevolence 
was manifested, and on its being pushed back veneration 
again manifested itself. 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 155 

This observation seems the very parody of science. It 
illustrates that prepossession, even in men of shrewd 
observation and ability, is disastrous to logical integ- 
rity; and further that not until the true nature of nerv- 
ous functioning was raised to a fundamental directive 
position in all psychological considerations, were false 
leads of this kind entirely discredited. 

VI 

In view of the fact that the vogue of phrenology in 
the middle of the nineteenth centm-y represents the 
largest collective interest in the study of character that 
ever gained a temporary foothold, it seems proper to 
consider the nature of its pretensions and their follow- 
ing. Propagandists have an enviable if perilous vigor 
and enthusiasm — an element of reckless abandon not 
unrelated to the extravagances of mania in the ex- 
aggeration and self-deception which it entails. Lavater 
had the simpler problem of collecting drawings and 
engravings in imposing array to enforce the principles 
of physiognomy. Gall collected skulls and casts, and 
induced persons with marked mental peculiarities to 
have their heads shaven so that their replicas in plaster 
might be at his service. He asked that "every kind 
of genius make me heir of his head. . . . Then indeed 
(I will answer for it with my own) we should see in ten 
years a splendid edifice for which at present I only col- 
lect materials." The critical peril of false theories lies 
in their application. Gall's interests seem to have 
remained for the most part scientific and objective; 
but in association with Spurzheim, whose direction of 
the phrenological movement largely determined its 



156 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

course, they took a more practical turn, and therein 
found their degradation. The extension of the phreno- 
logical principle to races and animals as a zoological 
problem appealed to Gall. He tells with ludicrous if 
pathetic simplicity of his baffling attempt to interpret 
the prominence of a part of the cranium which mon- 
keys and women have in conunon. Finally: — 

In a favorable disposition of mind, during the delivery of one 
of my lectures, I was struck with the extreme love that these 
animals have for their offspring. Impatient of comparing 
immediately the crania of male animals, in my collection, 
with all those of females, I requested my class to leave me, 
and I found, in truth, that the same difference exists between 
the male and female of all animals, as existed between man 
and woman. 

Thus was the cranial locaHzation of "love of offspring" 
discovered. 

Phrenology similarly offered the clue to racial differ- 
ences: — 

The foreheads of negroes are narrow, and their musical and 
mathematical talents are in general very limited. The Chin- 
ese are fond of colors, and have their eyebrows much vaulted. 
According to Blumenbach, the heads of the Calmucks are 
depressed from above, but very large laterally, about the 
organ which gives the inclination to acquire; and this na- 
tion's propensity to steal, etc., is admitted. 

It was seriously set forth that the dog, the ape, and 
the ox do not sing because the shape of their heads 
shows the absence of the faculties for music; that the 
thrush and the nightingale had heads with developed 
musical faculties, and the hawk and the owl lacked 
these parts; that in the male nightingale or mocking 
bird the head was square, angular, and more promi- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 157 

nent above the eyes, while in the female these parts 
were conical, thus endowing the male and not the fe- 
male with the gift of song. "Observe the narrow fore- 
head of the dog, the ape, the badger, the horse, in com- 
parison with the square forehead of man, and you will 
have the solution of the problem why these animals 
are neither musicians, nor painters, nor mathemati- 
cians/' Extravagant as this may appear to our scien- 
tifically minded generation, it yet represents the more 
sober conclusions of men conversant with the science 
of the day. In the hands of system-mongers and quacks 
the doctrines were carried to far more capricious con- 
clusions. 

It was the practical tendency to read character and 
predict capacity or even career that was responsible 
for the rapid deterioration of phrenology. This course 
was set by Spurzheim, under whose influence phreno- 
logical societies were founded in England and America, 
and the world deluged with books, pamphlets, man- 
uals, lessons, exhibitions, charts, plaster-casts, insti- 
tutes, parlor talks, and street demonstrations for the 
dissemination of character-reading by the bumps of 
the head — a movement the waves of which still beat 
feebly along the remote frontiers of intellectual ven- 
ture. An excursion into these disorderly bypaths — 
suggestive of the slums of psychology — would yield 
little profit;^ it would but indicate that slight devia- 

* The excursion would indeed serve to justify the general conclu- 
sion that the sporadic survival or revival of such systems as physiog- 
nomy, astrology, phrenology, palmistry, fortime-telling, dream-inter- 
pretation, etc., is due not to the appeal of their evidence, but to the 
persistence of the attraction of the occult as well as to the prom- 
ise of practical revelation. For it is characteristic that this class of 



158 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tions in principle lead to the widest divergence of re- 
sult. An intellectual degradation ensues as the move- 
ment descends to lower strata, an issue not unlike 
the social degradation of sections of cities where ques- 
tionable occupants inhabit the dwellings that sheltered 
the respectable citizens of other days. Though we can- 
not hold the founders responsible for this issue, it is yet 
true that they prepared the way for it by their own 
practices. Gall and Spurzheim conducted tours in 
prisons and asylums, reading from the shapes of the 
heads of the inmates the propensity for forgery, theft, 
violence, or lack of thrift which brought them to their 
fate. One prisoner showed the "organs of theft, mur- 
der, and benevolence all well developed, and, true to 
his organs, robbed an old woman and had the rope 
around her neck to strangle her, when his benevolence 
came to the surface," and prevented the fatahty. 

Such was the practical degeneration and such the 
fallacious principles by which phrenology attempted to 
oust physiology from its domain. At the time psy- 
chology was not sufficiently developed to assert its 
claim against the phrenological pretensions. Spurz- 
heim had a stronger psychological bent than Gall, and 
developed an arbitrary psychology to fit the scheme. 

latter-day compendium upon "character" through the reading of 
heads, faces, hands, etc., combines and resurrects with curious igno- 
rance of their source, with a strange insensitiveness to their mutually 
contradictory positions, all the varied bypaths of obscure and dis- 
credited lore which we have ciu-sorily surveyed. Aristotle, Porta, 
Cardan, Lavater, GaU, Spurzheim reappear in doctrines, without 
assignment of source, in support of "systems" purporting to reveal 
the secrets of human nature for the small consideration of the pur- 
chase of the volume. The occult — representing poverty if not mis- 
ery of mind — like misery, makes strange bedfellows. 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 159 

He distinguished between the emotional and the in- 
tellectual powers, dividing the former into propensi- 
tiesy which were direct impulses to action (like the 
desire to live, the tendency to fall in love, destructive- 
ness) and sentiments which were complex human powers 
(like seK-esteem, hope, mirthfulness, ideality); the 
latter were either perceptive (like size, tune, time), or 
reflective (like causality and comparison). This con- 
struction was distorted and confused, but yet not so 
strikingly divergent from other contributions as to 
arouse suspicion of its forced adjustment to the alleged 
findings. It was these latter, apparently substantiated 
by anatomical evidence, that kept the system alive. 
In the actual procedures of proof the simple psychol- 
ogy of self-deception was the dominant factor. Either 
the trait was marked and the phrenologist readily per- 
suaded himself that the prominence — at best slight 
and not clearly defined — was present; or in the pres- 
ence of a marked "bmnp," he was readily convinced 
that the required trait — as a rule a matter of uncer- 
tain and variable judgment — was conspicuous. As 
illustrating the temptation of allegiance to theory to en- 
list self-deception in the determination of fact, the retro- 
spective view of the subject has permanent value. Pre- 
possession, though unrecognized by the phrenologists, 
is likewise a quality of human nature, with an interest- 
ing psychology of its own.^ 

1 It is characteristic of the wavelike oscillations of movements of 
this kind that in periods after the desertion of the position by the 
scientific world, an occasional reaction appears and gains a consid- 
erable adherence. An Ethological Society, which publishes the 
Ethologicd Journal, was foimded in 1903 and attempts to rein- 
state the phrenological position, though in a wholly modified form 



160 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

VII 

At this juncture we turn from the antecedents to 
the more direct line of descent of modern psychology. 
The successive claimants to the domain of "charac- 
ter and temperament" may be said to have momen- 
tarily triumphed and passed away, without accredited 
issue. The new sovereignty represents a very differ- 
ent allegiance. It shares in the common heritage of 
modern science. The notable extension of knowledge 
through experiment is ever paralleled by a develop- 
ment of logical method and critical interpretation, as 
well as by an extension of technical resources. To this 
general movement psychology owes its present status, 
and shares in its benefits. It finds a concrete expres- 
sion in the psychological laboratory, and a yet more 
comprehensive one in the transformation of the entire 

and with an attempt at reconciliation with the established localiza- 
tion of function in the brain; the latter is in a legitimate sense the 
new and true phrenology. There is no reason, except the historical 
one (which, however, is adequate), for giving the term "phrenology" 
any less respectable status than that of "psychology" itself. It is 
clear that the doctrine of the localization of function in the cortex of 
the brain represents a chapter in the development of physiology which 
replaces the series of conjectural and extravagant views that belong 
to the antecedents of our subject. It should not be inferred that 
the Ethological Society is wholly devoted to this reinstatement of 
phrenology; it considers the entire range of topics bearing upon 
character and temperament, but presents a leaning toward the im- 
pressionistic and obscure interpretations. It may be added that so 
distinguished a contributor to the principles of modern evolution as 
Alfred Russel Wallace believed that the neglect of phrenology was one 
of the intellectual crimes of the nineteenth century, and maintained 
that this aspect of physiological and psychological research is cen- 
tral in its promise for the regulation of mental affairs in the future. 
The attempts to restate certain aspects of the phrenological position 
in modern form should be mentioned. They undertake a "Revival 
of Phrenology " and are represented by Hollander: The Mental Func- 
tions of the Brain (1901). 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 161 

range of accredited problems, and the introduction of 
new realms of inquiry. The technical advance in the 
knowledge and control of physical, biological, and 
psychological forces characterizes the modern world 
of science. These divisions of intellectual enterprise, 
though differently directed, are mutually corrobora- 
tive. They progress by the application of a common 
logic. Standards of evidence, extension of data, and the 
basis of interpretation develop together. Jointly they 
determine the spirit of modern science, from which 
psychology, along with the rest of the sciences, receives 
its directive bent and the temper of its pursuit. A 
coordinate factor is the dominance of an expanding 
practical philosophy — a worldly wisdom born of a 
larger experience in social, political, and economic rela- 
tions. It is expressed in the standards of intercoiurse 
and living, and more particularly in the cosmopolitan 
outlook, reflecting the insight into the determination 
of events and careers as of the qualities of men shaped 
by and shaping them. This influence extends to litera- 
ture, philosophy, and the arts of life; it provides the 
background against which the technical pursuits are 
projected, from which they emerge. 

The establishment of the principles and the body of 
knowledge determining the present study of charac- 
ter and temperament is the convergent product of a 
complex development; it forms an integral part of 
the general advance for which the nineteenth century 
is notable. Our purpose will be served by considering 
broadly the contributory branches of investigation to 
which psychology is particularly indebted. Among 
these the establishment of the relation between body 



162 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and mind is clearly central. Equally fundamental is 
the interpretation of the vital processes and provi- 
sions through a unifying and illuminating principle. 
This was supplied by the master-key of evolution, and 
at once rationalized and vitalized the conception of 
origins and transformations of natural processes and 
products — including the manifestations and endow- 
ments of the mental nature. Interpretation became 
possible in a convincing language — quieting the Babel 
of tongues. Both of these guiding principles — the 
latter particularly — were revolutionary in their in- 
fluence, not primarily by the new extension of knowl- 
edge and interest (which was in the main a consequence 
of the new insight), but by the introduction of a new 
interpretation. Familiar facts were given a distinc- 
tive and a richer meaning. The perspective of signifi- 
cance was notably altered. This momentous recon- 
struction of the biological realm indicates in a few 
words the decisive factors that made modern psychol- 
ogy possible. The brevity of the record should not 
diminish the appreciation of its vital importance. 

The development of the knowledge of nervous func- 
tion has a venerable history. The recognition of sen- 
sation and movement in relation to the nerves occurs 
sporadically and irregularly in Greek, Roman, and 
mediaeval medicine, at times with a shrewd interpre- 
tation of symptoms. It seems never to have been made 
a leading principle, but was held in detachment from 
the general notions in terms of which conclusions 
were stated. Hippocrates, Galen, and their followers 
occasionally record observations in which a limited loss 
of movement (paralysis) and loss of sensation (anses- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 163 

thesia) were referred to interference with the action 
of certain nerve-trunks. Such observations remained 
casual and incidental. The usual explanation of the 
bodily accompaniments of mental action were given 
in terms of the flow of the "vital" spirits, with the 
veins (supposed to contain air) as the true channels 
of the flow that determined sensation; while the ven- 
tricles (literally breathing-spaces — actually the chan- 
nels for the cerebro-spinal fluid) were assigned the 
central part in the vital service. Vesalius, foimder of 
modern anatomy, knew by experiment apparently, as 
well as through inference from observation, that sec- 
tion of the nerves abolished muscular control and that 
the loss of the medulla deprived an animal of sensation 
and movement. He contested the notion that facul- 
ties like memory could reside in such spaces as the 
ventricles of the brain. But such views were heretical 
to the scriptural authority of Galen and Hippocrates, 
and were timidly expressed and pursued. As a type of 
conception matured under philosophical pursuits cri- 
tically maintained and in relation to the science of the 
day, may be cited the view of Descartes. He looked 
upon the nervous system as a mechanical automaton 
— somewhat after the manner of an elaborate and 
fantastic "playing" fountain, whose ingenious streams 
turned windmills and started miniature water-spouts. 
The nerves were conceived as tubes for the flow of 
"animal spirits," or of some similar agency, with the 
pineal gland in the center of the system as a controll- 
ing valve directing the flow — the flow according to 
the course resulting in one kind or another of mental 
process. Even Willis, despite his insight into the struc- 



164 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ture and function of the brain and the complex provi- 
sions for its circulatory system, could speak of it as an 
instrument which the "soul inhabits and adorns with 
its presence." He conceived the blood as a vital flame, 
through which products of combustion arose and in 
turn gave rise to mental processes. Each variety of 
physical change which the physiologists and chemists 
discovered in the laboratory of the body — such as 
distillation and absorption, or fermentation and evap- 
oration, along with the older conception of animal 
spirits (the latter term used confusedly at once in a 
psychological and a chemical sense; hence "spirits" of 
ammonia, turpentine, etc.) — were in turn called upon 
to account for the transformations responsible for the 
elementary mental processes. 

There is nothing notably distinctive in the succes- 
sive formulations of "nervous" function from the days 
of Harvey, who gave the directive impetus to physio- 
logical conceptions, to those of Haller, who first apphed 
them with marked success to develop the conception 
of nervous responsiveness (irritabiHty) through spe- 
cific adaptation of the organism of the stimulus. Haller 
was not free from the speculative vagaries of his pred- 
ecessors; yet he thought of the problem of the phys- 
iological basis of mental processes consistently and 
clearly. His contributions so decidedly advanced the 
conception of nervous function that it was relatively 
easy to make the transition to the true interpretation 
given first by a group of physiologists in the early nine- 
teenth century (Marshall Hall, Charles Bell, Majendi) 
and culminating in the actual measiu-ement of the rate 
of nervous impulse by Helmholtz in 1850. The posi- 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 165 

tion of Haller is notable not only for the general cor- 
rectness of his conclusions and the experimental evi- 
dence upon which they were based, but equally because 
he separated so clearly what was conjectural from what 
was established. In a number of cases the task of his 
successors was merely to follow his lead and transform 
conjecture into proof. ^ 

This account of one strand in the network of data 
indispensable to the establishment of a psychological 
point of view is presumably typical of parallel move- 
ments. It indicates how recent are the steps of direct 
bearing upon present-day problems, and in so far jus- 
tifies the slight consideration (in the present connec- 
tion) of the remoter and more fragmentary historical 
antecedents. 1 The history makes it easy to understand 
how readily, in the absence of an accredited and es- 

* An admirable statement of the development of knowledge of the 
nervous system is found in Sir Michael Foster's Lectures on the His- 
tory of Physiology (1901), chap. X. G. Stanley Hall's " History of 
Reflex Action" {American Journal of Psychology, January, 1896) 
should also be consulted. Andrew D. White's History on the Warfare 
of Science and Theology (1896) provides an illuminating commentary 
upon the movement of thought through which the present subject 
reached its modern stage. Of the histories of psychology that of 
Dessoir (1912) contains the most distinctive appreciation of the 
"character and temperament" movement. Of the more recent 
studies the most noteworthy are: A. Levy, Psychologic du Caractere 
(1896); Malapert, Temperament et Caractere (1902), Les J^lSments du 
Caractere (1896); Alfred Fouille, TempSrament et Caractere, e^c.;PauI- 
han, Les Caracteres (1894); Th. Ribery, Essai de Classification Nat- 
urel des Caracteres (1902); L. Klages, Prinzipien der Charakterologie 
(1911); Sternberg, Charakterologie als Wissenschaft (1907); C. J. 
"^Tiitby, The Logic of Human Character. Of books of other purpose 
with important bearing upon the subject may be mentioned Mac- 
Dougall, Social Psychology (1908), and Wallas, The Great Society 
(1914). A notable volume is A. F. Shand, The Foundations of Char- 
acter (1914). My own volume. Character and Temperament (1916), 
attempts a comprehensive statement in terms of modern psychology. 



166 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tablished view of the bodily correlates of mental action, 
the ambitious innovations as well as the traditional 
sm*vivals of beliefs could gain a foothold. This is true 
in part of even so late a propaganda as that of Lava- 
ter — which in large measure was operative before the 
day of the most decisive discoveries — and to the careers 
of Gall and Spm^zheim, whose contributions in part 
came after them. The spirit of nineteenth-century 
science was not then sufficiently disseminated to make 
obvious the irrelevancy of such pretensions as phre- 
nology, nor indeed to offer a satisfactory considera- 
tion of the problems which that system professed to 
solve. 

VIII 

In the collateral ancestry of "character and tempera- 
ment" the anthropological attitude occupies an im- 
portant place, in a new sense making mankind the 
proper study of man. It forms part of the broadening 
outlook upon the constitution of nature in general and 
human nature in particular, that characterizes mod- 
em thinking. It doubtless has a relation to the closer 
study of the political struggles of nations and to eco- 
nomic expansion, though the relation is not intimate. 
It aims at a philosophical interpretation of the struc- 
ture and motive sources of human society and insti- 
tutions. The anthropological interest extends to the 
characteristics of the social groups, particularly of races 
and peoples in different stages of development and 
under the sway of distinctive cultures. The enlarge- 
ment of outlook is a result of the spirit of exploration 
and inquiry, which brought knowledge of peoples and 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 167 

habitations and other systems of culture, and in an- 
other direction extended the reconstruction of the past 
of man. A similar enterprise resurveyed the story of 
the intellectual past and traced the slow control of the 
forces of nature through invention, and the equally 
laborious attainment of a social control through the 
organizations of men. The larger intercom-se with 
varieties of mankind; the broader interpretation of the 
forces responsible for human development; the techni- 
cal scientific advances: these resulted from the spirit 
of exploration and inquiry, and brought with them a 
more thorough knowledge of the diversity of men and 
civilizations, and in the process traced the issues of 
the interplay of desires, capacities, and beliefs, by 
which to interpret one's own and (with allowance) for- 
eign natures. Culture acquired a more real and a 
richer meaning as a psychological product, and there- 
with conferred a new insight and a new obligation 
upon the psychologist. The diversity of men was 
thus related to their divergent solutions of the prob- 
lem of shaping their lives to satisfy needs, impulses, 
and desires; and the environment, so largely a psycho- 
logical one, acquired its full significance. The study of 
human nature embraced more than that of one time 
and region and status. The still more recent and in- 
dependent emphasis of the sociological aspects of life 
is in the larger view an issue of the anthropological 
interpretation, but is yet more characteristic of the 
attitude now dominant, and properly called modern. 
The psychology of the social relations is thereby made 
an integral part of the study of human character. 
Two further aspects of the qualities of which charac- 



168 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ter and temperament form the realistic composite, are 
the genetic aspect, and the abnormal — the patholog- 
ical aspect. The growth of traits is an essential part 
of their nature. It impHes a reference to the setting in 
which they operate, to which they are adapted, by 
which they have been shaped. It implies equally the 
reference to the vital course, the maturing unfoldment 
of native endowment, which makes the biological 
aspect of human nature the most comprehensive and 
the most elemental. Within this compass the deter- 
mination of hereditary forces and their mode of opera- 
tion assumes a special importance. The traits forming 
the composite of " character and temperament " are part 
of the biological inheritance, are the issues of forces 
whose fundamental significance is the biological one. 
Accordingly (despite or in addition to our more de- 
tailed interests in other aspects) they must reflect and 
conserve the allegiance to this underlying relation. 
More specifically, the genetic aspect differentiates the 
outlines of the stages of growth; in its terms are de- 
scribed the orbit of the psychological cycle. It yields 
the psychology of infancy, of adolescence, of maturity, 
of senescence, and presents the course of the included 
qualities in mutual illumination. The genetic argu- 
ment emphasizes a progressive environment and a pro- 
gressive purpose; it enlarges the scope of adaptation, 
and it interprets the impetus and goal of varying in- 
terests and endeavors. It was never absent from the 
accredited psychology of human nature, but in the 
modern view it assumes an explicitness and a direc- 
tive position that constitutes it a notable factor among 
the available resources. It has powerfully affected our 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 169 

entire view of human qualities, has extended our data, 
and enriched their interpretation. 

A parallel statement may be made of the argument 
from the decay, the faulty development, the inherent 
liability to perversion of natural qualities, which are 
responsible for the pathological, the abnormal, the 
divergent aspects thereof. Useful adaptation, due pro- 
portion, tempered blending, related emphasis of traits 
stand as the normal issue; the divergence or failure 
thereof becomes the abnormal. The abnormal in ex- 
cess or defect takes its place as an instrument of analy- 
sis and an enlargement of data. It is a distinctively 
modern resource, particularly in the refinement of its 
application.^ 

It remains to touch upon the collateral streams of 
interest which in modern times maintain the study in 
one or another aspect, thus bridging the gap between 
the old and the new learning. Among these is the at- 
tempt, never wholly absent in practical ages, to guide 
training, to indicate on the basis of an analysis of char- 

* It is in such general terms that the line of descent of the present 
psychological interpretation of human endowment proceeds. The 
more specific history of the attempts to formulate the resultant posi- 
tions is brief. The classic chapter (book vii, chap, v) "Of Ethology, 
or the Science of the Formation of Character," in John Stuart 
Mill's System of Logic (1843), though a programme rather than a con- 
tribution, still has significance. The project was undertaken by 
Alexander Bain in a volume bearing the title On the Study of Charac- 
ter (1861). Though Bain wrote at a time when psychology had made 
rapid advances and the vagaries of phrenology had been retired to 
their proper place, he devoted a considerable portion of his book to a 
refutation of the phrenological position. He thus conferred an un- 
deserved dignity upon these findings and gave his constructive views 
an imfortunate setting. The subject was independently pursued by 
a group of writers (mainly in France and Italy), whose contributions 
in part belong to the living literature of the subject. 



170 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONMCTIGN 

acter the promise of youth, and the direction of voca- 
tion — all in the spirit of a worldly wisdom. As an 
example of the earlier period, the work of the Spaniard, 
Huarte (1530-92), "The Trial of Wits," may be cited, 
since it seems to have attained a large circulation, was 
translated into several languages (the English edi- 
tion appearing in 1689), and the German by the great 
Lessing (1729-81) so late as 1752. There were other 
writings of similar import both before and after Huarte. 
It is difficult to estimate their precise influence in 
the current of thought destined to be redirected in a 
more scientific analytic interest. There is no hesita- 
tion, however, in recognizing in the works of Kant 
(1724-1804) a dominant influence in the rehabilita- 
tion of the subject. This appears not alone in his rec- 
ognition of the claims of the practical reason, but not- 
ably in his "Anthropology" (1798). Indeed, Kant's 
use of this term corresponds more closely to a study 
of the individual differences of men — which the prob- 
lems of character and temperament consider — than 
to the content of the science which now bears that 
name. Special attention should also be directed to his 
"Observations on the Sense of the Beautiful and Sub- 
lime," in which is given ia a modem vein a detailed 
analysis in the field of the emotions, with excursions 
into the comparative psychology of the sexes and of 
nations. It shows the shrewd analyst in an engaging 
light. Of the writers affected by the Kantian position, 
who realized that the study of character offered a great 
field for the applications at once of philosophy, of an- 
thropology, and of education, Julius Bahnsen is the 
most representative. His work on "Charakterologie" 



CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT 171 

(1867) both in method and scope represents the attempt 
to reach general and practical conclusions in the spirit 
of the early nineteenth centm'y. It does not incorpor- 
ate the views of the bases or sources of character which 
were even then available and which were represented 
by a group of German physiologists, such as Johannes 
Muller (1801-58), K. F. Burdach (1776-1847), and in 
a different temper Lotze and K. G. Carus. These, sym- 
pathetic with the life of the practitioner, brought to 
their philosophical generalizations the spirit of exact 
knowledge. 

The establishment of modern psychology is the cul- 
mination of many interests; in no aspect is this histori- 
cal development more significant than in regard to the 
sources of the view of the qualities of men as applied 
in modern life. The attempt to short-circuit the route 
from theory to practice, from understanding to appli- 
cation, has always ended disastrously. The correct- 
ness of the foimdations determines the strength of 
the edifice. The study of the nervous system and the 
recognition of the subjection of all human traits to 
an evolutionary process laid the foundations. The so- 
ciological expressions of human qualities were related 
to their biological significance. The competition of 
human qualities received a psychological interpreta- 
tion. Narrow views were avoided by considering the 
varieties of human culture and expression. Institu- 
tions, though dominantly an environmental product, 
became significant as embodiments of psychological 
needs and their satisfaction. Vocations became direc- 
tions of special endowments. National characteris- 
tics were similarly interpreted. Education was seen 



172 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

to be a transformation of original trends as well as a 
direct preparation for the situations of an artificial life. 
Human nature was at once the material upon which 
all desired ends had to build, while yet to be remodeled 
for such cherished purposes. A closer knowledge of 
the mode of working of the human endowment re- 
sulted from the experimental study of the imderlying 
processes of the mind. Language, art, science, customs, 
social institutions, political relations, reflected the 
spirit of a collective mind, though often articulate 
through the original contributions of favored individ- 
uals. With this combined equipment the psychologist 
of to-day proceeds to the interpretation of the traits 
of men summarized in the study of character and tem- 
perament. The antecedents of this view form a not- 
able chapter in the development of the human mind, 
in the story of the control of the psychic forces of which 
culture is a record. 



VI 

FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 

As an instance of a simple and clear-cut "case" in the 
study of conviction, the contrast of the facts and the 
fables in the intellectual powers ascribed to pet ani- 
mals leaves nothing to be desired. The question at 
issue is direct and distinct. Can a dog or a horse rea- 
son in the sense of calculating, reading, and making 
similar logical distinctions? When an alleged educated 
dog or an equine genius is exhibited with elaborate 
demonstrations on the public stage, what shall be our 
attitude of belief? Once again we have to draw the line 
between the probable and improbable, the possible 
and impossible in terms of a psychological issue.^ Yet, 
so preposterous is the assumption involved in the claim, 
that even an elementary analysis of the psychological 
contradictions which it tolerates, is adequate to dispel 
the delusion. The will to believe in the supernormal 
animal may have affliations with other "survivals" 
that continue to iniEuence popular thinking through 
the imperfect consistency of the easy-going popular 
mind. Yet even fairly critical persons "take stock 
in" animal geniuses. In such cases, as well as in the 
case of the exhibitors of such animals, there may be a 
measure of self-deception in the process. Simple and 
brief though the case is, it stands clearly as a contri- 
bution to the logical conditions to which a psychologi- 
cal inquiry is subject. 



174 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

I 

Man has ever been ready to show his esteem of animal 
ways, even to the veneration that in early times took 
the form of animal worship. The cunning and com*age 
of animals, their passions and endurance, their keen- 
ness of sense and mastery of instinct, appealed to the 
man of nature as enviable quaUties. The wolf that he 
feared, or the horse that he subdued, was equally to 
him a fellow-being. He was aware that the animal scent 
was truer, the animal sense of direction surer, than his 
own. Matching his wits against theirs, he knew that 
he might be outwitted by animal wile, might be over- 
come by animal daring. In his mythology he con- 
structed beings endowed with superhuman qualities 
by fantastic combinations of the animal and the hu- 
man form; and in his fables, from Msop to Br*er Rab- 
bit, he gave to his favorite animal the hero's part in 
his simple plots. He placed himseK under the protec- 
tion of some sacred animal as a totem, and held it as 
likely that the soul of an animal could be made to in- 
habit the body of a man, or that by some magic he 
could be transformed into their semblance. 

It is quite possible that some obscure and disguised 
variety of this same instinctive feeling may still affect 
our estimates of what animals do, and of how they feel 
and think. We know so intimately how our domestic 
pets enter into the routine of our lives, share our moods 
and occupations, that it seems plausible to suppose 
that only a lack of speech prevents them from ex- 
pressing a knowledge of our thoughts and sympathy 
with our feelings. But when we reflect upon the mat- 
ter more soberly, we realize that we must not allow our 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 175 

prejudices to affect our judgment of what their beha- 
vior justifies us in concluding in regard to their intelli- 
gence. In considering what kinds of minds they have 
and how they use them, we must never forget how dif- 
ferent are their needs from ours, how readily an action 
on their part may seem to be full of meaning to us (be- 
cause if performed by us it would be done for definite 
reasons and purposes), and yet may be for them a rather 
simple trick to gain our favor. This, indeed, is the diflS- 
culty of the whole problem. We can judge what ani- 
mals think only from what they do; yet what they 
really do may be wholly different from what they 
apparently do. It is we who unintentionally read into 
the action the meaning that it has for us. The way out 
of this diflSculty is not very simple nor very direct; 
and it is the psychologist's business to determine by 
all the various kinds of evidence and reasoning that 
he can bring to bear upon the data, just what kinds of 
thinking the most favored animal can and cannot mas- 
ter. The latter limitation, particularly, must be care- 
fully considered; yet, both for animal capacities and 
animal limitations, is it of prime importance to note 
that, like ourselves, animals learn only such things as 
enter profitably into the scheme of their lives. They 
will under ordinary natural circumstances acquire an 
intelligent appreciation of such of the goings-on in the 
world about them as they can put to use. Though we 
furnish our pets with decidedly different conditions of 
life and teach them much that they would have no 
occasion to learn for themselves, yet the manner of 
their learning still remains of the same order and re- 
quires the same combination of powers as governs their 



176 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

natural behavior. So, in the end, the question of how 
animals think is one that psychology may hopefully 
consider. The answer may not be complete; but there 
is no reason, so far as it goes, why it should not be 
sound and convincing — setting forth clearly and pre- 
cisely what types of intelligent action animals share 
with us, and how much greater a range of eyen our 
simple thinking and doing lies wholly outside of their 
interests and their capacities. 

Such reflections are brought home to the psycholo- 
gist whenever he observes how willing people are to 
be convinced that the multipHcation-table and read- 
ing and spelling fall as readily within the powers of the 
exceptional animal as they do within those of an ordi- 
nary child. Let us consider a group of performances 
that within recent years have been trimnphantly her- 
alded as proving the vast possibilities of animal edu- 
cation, and have been accepted by the vast majority 
of people for what they pretend to be. A wise horse, 
"Kluge Hans," has mystified Berlin audiences; and 
"Jim Key," another equine sage, has done the same 
for the American public, by going through a pro- 
granune that includes adding and subtracting, and 
multiplying and dividing, reading and spelling, telling 
time and the days of the week, indicating people's ages, 
or sorting their letters, revealing their professions and 
their peculiarities, knowing the value of coins and 
bills, or reasoning that a circle has no corners, and 
even pointing out passages from the Bible! In analyz- 
ing such performances, it is iadispensable to remain 
undistracted by what the exhibitor asserts or pretends 
that the animal does, and calmly to observe what 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 177 

really takes place; to decide not necessarily how the 
trick is done, but what kind of thinking is concerned 
in the steps that the animal goes through. Such an 
exhibition may offer as interesting a study of the psy- 
chology of the audience as of the performer — a study 
of what people are ready to believe and why they are 
so disposed. 

II 

It requires no deep psychological insight to reach the 
conviction that the calculating and spelling, time-tell- 
ing and letter-sorting horse would be as much of a mir- 
acle as a centaur, or a Pegasus, or a unicorn. All these 
creatures belong, and with equal obviousness, to the 
world of fable; and the one falls as far outside the realm 
of actual psychology as the other escapes the ken of 
the zoologist. If one is inclined to regard that so obvi- 
ous a proposition would at once command assent, he 
need only overhear the talk of those who come away 
from these "marvelous" performances to become con- 
vinced that in popular estimation the calculating horse 
and the unicorn are horses of very different colors. The 
latter is at once relegated to the world of myth; but 
the former, though not to be met with in every stable, 
is regarded as falling within the occasional possibilities 
of mundane horsedom. 

If we neglect for the moment that there is absolutely 
nothing in a horse's life that would supply the least 
occasion for developing so remarkable a talent as is 
needed for counting or spelling, we may bring om-selves 
to consider what kind of a miracle the calculating horse 
would really be. An extravagant admirer of the Berlin 



178 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

horse, in maintaining that " Hans's " education is about 
on a par with that of a boy (even a Berlin boy) of 
twelve years, has at least the coiu'age of his convic- 
tions; nothing less would suffice to fit such a genius 
of a horse to handle numbers and words and the ab- 
stract relation of things, as his friends allege. And if a 
Zulu or an Eskimo were, after an equally brief school- 
ing, to turn out a Newton or a Darwin, it would be 
rather less of a marvel. 

To gain a common-sense view of the matter, observe 
a bright child of three years of age: note how it gives 
a hundred evidences for every hour of its waking exis- 
tence, of a ceaselessly busy occupation with all sorts 
of ideas and little mental problems; how it sets up in 
its play one situation after another, sees new relations, 
devises a new use for an old toy, and creates a little 
world of its own imagining, for which it makes rules 
and breaks them, pretends that things are happening 
and gives reasons for their doing so; and so hour after 
hour proves itseK possessed of a very acute little mind 
to which ideas and relations and situations are very 
interesting and familiarly handled mental tools or play- 
things. It is very true that much of this we know only 
because the child keeps up a constant chatter in its 
play, and speaks for itself as well as its toys or dolls, 
reveals its intentions in words, and thus teUs the story, 
which without such explanation we, in our grown- 
up remoteness from such occupation, could but feebly 
understand. But the very possibility of learning all 
this language and of using it is itself a direct tribute 
to the intelligence that animates the little brain and 
reveals its finer quality, its greater possibilities. Lan- 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 179 

guage helps, most decidedly helps the mind to grow 
in scope and power; but it does not create the capacity 
which its use requires. We have, moreover, some very 
interesting accounts of the cleverness of young chil- 
dren, who from early infancy were both deaf and blind, 
and who from their dark and silent world into which 
language could but sparsely enter, gave equally con- 
vincing proof of how busy their brains were with much 
the same kind of thoughts and purposes and interests 
as make up the mental lives of their more fortu- 
nate playmates. Naturally their doings were decidedly 
hampered, and their thinkings decidedly limited, by 
the slightness of the bond; — the single highway of 
touch — that connected them with their fellow-beings. 
Such children, in almost as languageless a condition as 
a dog, and with far less chance of finding out what was 
going on in the world and of participating therein, 
develop into rational creatures of just that special 
kind of rationality that, even in its simplest terms, 
the brightest dog never achieves or approaches. 

And now consider what a slow and weary path a 
bright child, equipped with all its sense and senses, and 
at the expense of much patient teaching, must tread 
before it comprehends the message of the letters, and 
gets to look upon "twice two is four" as something 
more than a rather stupid bit of memory exercise, that, 
like virtue, if persisted in, brings its own reward. With 
an inconceivably greater start beyond the dog or the 
horse, with a tremendously greater aptitude for just 
this sort of mental acrobatics, the human child must 
await some years of ripening of its powers, and upon 
that favorable foundation expend some further years 



180 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

of initiation and schooling to exhibit a simple profi- 
ciency in getting meaning out of those crooked black 
marks on white paper, and in putting two and two 
together so as to comprehend the manner of its strange 
transformation into four. Surely, the accomplishment 
merits our profound admiration. To this understand- 
ing of how much is involved in bringing an apt mind 
to the point at which reading and calculating becomes 
a bare possibility, of how great a world is already con- 
quered when the three R's begin to play even the most 
modest of parts, let us add one point more: When the 
child begins to show (and not wholly by language) 
that the letters and numbers have some meaning, it 
shows the fact so variously, while yet imperfectly, that 
we have constant means of testing how real its knowl- 
edge may be. We gain a pretty fair idea, in each case, 
how far the accomplishment is a mere mechanical 
trick, or a reaUy comprehended operation. Everywhere 
the limitations are conspicuously obvious; and we 
know how gradually we must add to the complexity 
of the business, how readily, by only a slight change 
in the setting of the problem, we sink the struggling 
mind beyond its depth. All this is a very sound lesson 
in psychology to take with us, when we attend a 
"show" in which a horse or a dog is put through some 
steps, which are supposed to prove for the " star " per- 
former a real comprehension of the message of the let- 
ters and the operations of the multipKcation-table. 

ni 

With so much of preamble, let us look at the actual 
performance, first as it is presented on the show-bills. 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 181 

and then as it appears from behind the scenes. The 
programme advertising the learned performances of 
"Jim Key" includes among its dozen numbers such 
items as these: "Jim shows his proficiency in figuring, 
adding, multiplication, division, and subtraction for 
any number below thirty." "He spells any ordinary 
name asked him." "He reads and writes." "Gives 
quotations from the Bible where the horse is men- 
tioned, giving chapter and verse"; and in addition acts 
as a post-office clerk or handles a cash-register. When 
these problems are reduced to equine terms, they prove 
to be simple variations of a single theme. To aid the 
figuring, the numbers are placed in natural order on 
large frames, five in a row, and five rows; and the let- 
ters, in alphabetical order, are similarly displayed. The 
numbers to be added or subtracted are proposed by 
some one in the audience, and repeated by the show- 
man. The horse then proceeds to the card bearing the 
number that indicates the result, takes that card be- 
tween his teeth, and gives it to his master. The same 
is done for words composed of letters, each letter being 
selected in turn. 

This is absolutely the whole performance; and even 
when most generously interpreted bears a decidedly 
remote resemblance to what the posters describe. The 
interesting part of it all is that so many who witness 
this simple exhibition are quite ready to conclude that 
before "Jim Key" chooses his card, he goes through 
those mental processes which each one of the audience 
performs when he works out the answer to the problem 
as announced. This assumption is not alone wholly 
uncalled-for; it is actually preposterous. One of the 



182 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

elementary facts that students of mind — whether 
of human or of animal minds — clearly grasp, is that 
there are vastly different ways, in this complex world 
of ours, of doing the same thing. The same result is 
reached by wholly different means. To neglect this 
distinction would be to conclude that because a man 
— or, if you like, a horse or a squirrel — avoids a cer- 
tain mushroom on account of its unpleasant odor, 
while the botanist does so by recognizing it as a speci- 
men of Amanita muscaria, all have displayed the same 
kind of intelligence, have used the same reasoning, 
because in the end they reach the same result, the 
avoidance of the fungus. To the simple but compre- 
hensive statement that the horse gives not the slight- 
est indication of going through any of these processes 
in order to select his card, it need only be added that 
he gives decided indication of going through a very 
different kind of process. It is not at all necessary to 
know precisely what special sign the horse observes 
in guiding his selections, in order to determine (which 
is the important thing) that it is some kind of simple 
sign, an operation that falls within this general type. 
The type of "Jim Key's" operation is simply that of 
learning to go first to a certain one of five rows, that is 
either the middle, or the top, or the bottom, or the one 
between middle and top, or the one between middle 
and bottom; and then in turn to select one of five cards 
arranged horizontally offering a similar choice. Whether 
the cards bear numbers or letters or Chinese charac- 
ters or the Weather Bureau signals or any other mark- 
ings, and whether these markings have any meaning, 
is as wholly indifferent to the horse as it is unneces- 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 183 

sary for him to go through any reasoning process in 
order to select the card that he is to present as his an- 
swer. As to the precise association that an animal comes 
to establish between a certain sign and a certain ac- 
tion, and the number and complexity of such associa- 
tions that he can master, there is doubtless some varia- 
tion among animals, though again hardly as much as 
among men. It is also interesting to determine the 
nature of the signs, whether noted by the ear or the 
eye, that a dog or a horse most readily learns; but all 
these details do not at all modify the general nature 
of the operation, which mainly needs be considered. 
The actual indication or clue that "Jim Key" follows 
to reach first the right frame, and then the right row, 
and then the right letter, seems to be given by differ- 
ent positions of the master's whip. The ability to learn 
even this simple association is probably very limited, 
and in this case seems never to exceed five distinc- 
tions. Upon this slender basis of actual achievement 
does "Jim Key" attain his reputation as a learned 
thinker. 

The performances of "Kluge Hans," so far as they 
may be gathered from the printed descriptions, are of 
no more complex character. The method of response 
is simpler, and consists of nothing more than in pawing 
continuously one stroke after another, and of stopping 
when the number of strokes corresponds to the answer 
of the arithmetical problem that has been set. Alpha- 
bets and "yes" and "no" must also be reduced to num- 
bers before they fall within "Hans's" repertory. Here 
again, as announced, the programme is most versatile 
and startling. There is the same proficiency in mul- 



184 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tiplying and dividing and adding and spelling; and by 
an ingenious variation of the question, "Hans" will 
tell how many of the admiring company are over fifty 
years of age, or are members of a certain profession, 
and will paw "yes" or "no" in answer to any ques- 
tion to which his master knows the answer. The claims 
put forth on behalf of the Berlin horse — and that on 
the part of men otherwise versed in scientific matters 
— is indeed remarkable, positively astoimding; for 
one of these attributes to "Hans" a perfect acquain- 
tance with fractions, the ability to distinguish colors 
as well as playing-cards, to tell the coins of the realm, 
to differentiate geometrical figures, to give the time 
upon any watch-face, to name musical tones and tell 
which are discords. The method by which these an- 
swers are indicated is never more nor less than that of 
pawing until the correct number is reached. The more 
complicated replies are in the form of words; for this 
purpose the elementary sounds are reduced to forty- 
two — allowing for combinations of vowels and con- 
sonants. Accordingly, any one of these sounds is indi- 
cated by its position in seven places on one of six rows; 
thus for j, "Hans" stamps first three times and then 
four; and for St, ^stfive, then six. Under this system 
the horse is actually supposed to distinguish between 
the ordinary s and the long s at the end of the word, 
between du (with the Umlaut) and au without it, and 
so on. Such, at all events, is the claim set forth for 
"Hans's" miraculous intelligence. As a fact it is, of 
course, completely a matter of indifference to "Hans" 
what the questions may be; they could with equal suc- 
cess be put in Greek or Sanskrit, so long as he can 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 185 

catch the right signal and stop pawing at the right time. 
And so again the gap between fact and fable is world- 
wide; and the assumption is equally groundless that 
any measure of the human type of reasoning inter- 
venes to make possible the horse's replies. 

Surely there is nothing in either of these perform- 
ances, except the pretenses of the showman, that in 
the least suggests the use of any of the powers that the 
developing child must first acquire to gain an actual 
knowledge of numbers and letters. And, if we look, 
we shall find many indications of the quite different 
processes that are really concerned. The best of these 
lies in the nature of the mistakes that are likely to 
occur. For "Jim Key," these take the form of select- 
ing a neighboring letter — an x for a y — a kind of 
mistake which no mind that really was doing any spell- 
ing would be in the least tempted to commit; while 
"Hans's" mistake consists in not seeing the signal 
quickly enough, and in pawing once too often or in 
anticipating through noting the preparation for the 
signal, and stopping too soon — again a type of mis- 
take that has no relation to the actual operation of 
those who calculate and read. So also the scope of the 
questions that these marvelous animals at once attack 
without preliminary training shows how imrelated is 
the finding of the answer to the consideration of the 
problem. If we add considerably to the difficulty of 
the problem that we set to a calculating child, we must 
be prepared to accustom its powers gradually to the 
increased difficulty and to take small steps repeatedly, 
with much chance for mistake, in the newer processes. 
But these calculating horses jump at once into frac- 



186 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tions and square roots, into propositions in geometry, 
and equations in algebra, when some enterprising ques- 
tioner proposes them. This, at all events, is true for 
"Hans's" master, who easily prepares the result; though 
in "Jim Key's " case, one sometimes suspects that the 
calculating possibilities of the master are not immeas- 
urably in advance of those of the horse. 

And once more — it certainly seems strange that so 
exceptionally educated an animal should find no other 
occasion to exercise his remarkable powers, should not 
spontaneously exhibit some original evidences of his 
genius, which would distinguish him from the ordinary 
horse. We are even tempted to pity so talented an 
animal with no outlet for its vigorous mind, condemned 
to the monotonous round of oats and hay, varied only 
by the tit-bits of carrot and sugar; these, however, 
seem to be appreciated as rewards of learning by such 
educated animals quite as keenly as by their imtu- 
tored kind. It is also pertinent, though possibly un- 
necessary, to point out the inherent contradiction be- 
tween the operations that a successful reply is supposed 
to involve and the absurdity of the failures or wrong 
answers that occasionally occur. Thus, this most in- 
telligent Berlin horse, who is supposed to be acquainted 
with difficult mathematical relations, occasionally 
makes mistakes. Now, when a child makes a mistake, 
it is in regard to some operation just beyond its capac- 
ity, while the simpler additions and subtractions are 
readily accomplished. On the other hand, "Hans," 
immediately after giving an answer in square-root, fails 
to count the buttons on an officer's coat, and insists, 
until repeatedly corrected, that a man has three ears 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 187 

and not two; or again, after making the minute dis- 
tinctions of German orthography, puts h for j; and 
further, if this miraculous horse really distinguished 
the sounds and converted them into letters, why should 
he not be phonetically misled and occasionally sub- 
stitute, let us say, a ck for a h, which would mean all 
the difference between two pawings followed by one, 
and three followed by five. Yet such objections are, 
indeed, superfluous, or would be were they not so 
commonly disregarded by the prejudice in favor of 
taking such absurd pretenses at their face value. In 
brief, it is difficult seriously to investigate these limi- 
tations in any other spirit than that of pointing out 
how unmistakably they indicate on the part of the 
horse an xmreasoning, unrelated method of reaching 
the answer through some system of signs. 

This statement of the facts of the case does not at 
all imply that in this performance we have reached 
the limits of the horse's education. Very likely the 
intelligent horse may be taught to go very much farther 
than this in the direction of his natural ability to as- 
sociate signs with actions. It would, for example, be 
very interesting to know whether "Jim Key" could 
be taught, in selecting one after the other the letters 
that spell his name, to proceed of his own accord to 
the I after he has been led to the J, and then to the My 
and so on; that is, whether he could learn to perform 
a series of selections by associating each with the one 
following. This would still be a task of the same order, 
but a more complicated one; and in investigations of 
this kind, earnest students of animal intelligence have 
obtained important evidence as to the capacities and 



188 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

limitations of animal thinking. Such psychological 
questions are asked in a different temper from that 
which prompts the stage performances, and they lead 
to far more useful results. 

IV 

And so we reach the other side of our inquiry: why 
this kind of a performance is so generally accepted at 
its face value, why educated persons attribute to the 
horse (as they do to the Berlin horse), the insight 
to recognize that twenty-seven divided by seven gives 
three with a remainder of six, that one fourth must 
be added to make a unit out of three fourths, or that 
at 12.17 one must wait forty-three minutes for one 
o'clock! Indeed, so widespread were the misleading ac- 
counts of this learned animal, that a commission of 
inquiry was appointed to investigate the whole affair; 
and upon this commission sat a professor of psychol- 
ogy of the University of Berlin. Though the foregone 
conclusion was reached that the performance did not 
exhibit "a scintilla of anything that may be regarded 
as thought," it certainly seems incongruous that so 
serious an inquiry should have become desirable. Only 
one point of interest seems to have been ehcited, namely, 
that the horse's master or the bystanders may have 
frequently been honestly unaware of giving the sign 
which the keen senses of the horse caught as the indi- 
cation to stop pawing. Perhaps we need not too point- 
edly raise the question as to how far these exhibitions 
intentionally deceive their audiences. Wherever sys- 
tematic training enters, it follows that the trainer must 
reahze how wide is the gap between what is done and 



FACT AND FABLE IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY 189 

what is pretended. Self-deception on the part of the 
showman cannot be held accountable for more than 
a slight portion of this discrepancy. Yet still truer is 
it that if people were not ready to credit such remark- 
able powers to the horse or the dog, such exhibitions 
would find no favor. It is partly because animals can 
really do many things that are wonderful in themselves 
and, if performed by men, would require considerable 
rational powers, that we are inclined to credit them 
with capacities for learning similar to our own. This 
tendency can be held in check only by an appreciation 
of the complexity of even a simple piece of true rea- 
soning, of how essential it is to appraise an action in 
terms of the process that led to it, and how indirect 
is the revelation of process that comes from the knowl- 
edge of the result alone. When this simple lesson in 
psychology is clearly recognized as furnishing a sound 
basis for judgment, there will be less tendency to be- 
lieve that horses can take unto themselves brains with 
a capacity to multiply and read, as tp believe that a 
horse can suddenly sprout wings, even though such 
a Pegasus is pictured on the posters displayed in front 
of the exhibition hall. 

People would also less easily succumb to such de- 
ception if they stopped to consider that in regard to 
these animal performances they must earn the right to 
an opinion by some simple measure of initiation into 
the arrangements of what impresses the uninitiated 
as a remarkable exhibition. The first attitude is natu- 
rally that of wonder, and in lack of any detailed knowl- 
edge of what the trick may be, the tendency is strong 
to credit, at least in part, the explanations that are 



190 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

advanced. Once this attitude is overcome, and the 
kind of training that prepares for the performance is 
understood, the whole affair loses its marvelous aspect 
and becomes a mildly interesting demonstration of 
animal training. A brief glimpse of the mechanism be- 
hind the scenes is quite sufficient to balance the glare 
of the footlights and leave the spectator in possession 
ot his usual measure of human intelligence that enables 
him to appraise sympathetically but sanely the intelli- 
gent powers of animals. 



VII 

"MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM" 

This study of an individual case of delusion is justi- 
fied as a contribution to the psychology of conviction 
for the reason that it plays a part, and a strange one, 
in a modern cult numbering its adherents by the hun- 
dred thousands; for the further reason that the con- 
tent of the delusion and the mode of its manifestation 
reflect older beliefs, in part through common tradition, 
in part through personal channels; and for the yet 
additional reason that a delusional conviction is also 
a conviction in terms of a psychology broad enough 
to include normal and abnormal expressions. The 
course of the delusion furnishes an interesting narra- 
tive, however one may view the personality of its 
martyr and the restricted incorporation of the belief 
in a movement, that in some respects is the most re- 
markable religious innovation of modern days. 



The story proceeds in terms of three distinct strands 
of fact and argument. It may be helpful to summa- 
rize them at the outset. The first is the history of the 
delusion as a personal belief of Mrs. Eddy, the founder 
of Christian Science. The second is the historical 
source of the notions embodied in the belief. The third 
is the statement of the belief as transformed in Chris- 



192 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tian Science phraseology, with reference to the sup- 
porting theory. The strands intertwine in a compos- 
ite product that is certainly unique in the annals of 
the closing nineteenth century. 

"MaUcious animal magnetism" — at times referred 
to in the literature of Christian Science as "M.A.M." 
— is a modern variety of witchcraft. It assumes a 
mysterious mental influence which one mind may 
exercise upon another to the latter's undoing. In the 
extreme, it is the wishing of another's death by intense 
and evilly disposed mental concentration. 

In its anthropological kinship the belief is affiliated 
to the widespread superstition (particularly prevalent 
in the Orient and southern Europe) of the evil eye, 
by which is cast a spell on those upon whom it falls, 
when accompanied by malicious intent. "M.A.M.** 
is a mental form of evil eye. Still earlier is the belief 
that the same influence may be exercised by pronounc- 
ing incantations upon any personal belonging of the 
intended victim. By securing a lock of his hair or the 
parings of his nails or anything intimately connected 
with his person, the spell is made more certain and 
deadly. Hence the care taken that no such parts of 
one's person or belongings shall fall into the enemy's 
hands, and the custom of burning these to avoid this 
possibility. Connected with this notion is the special 
practice of choosing an object which shall represent 
the victim, and by piercing, burning, or otherwise in- 
juring the proxy, cause the same fate to befall the 
victim himseK. Hanging in effigy may be interpreted 
as a remote application of the same imderlying notions. 
In Hawaii the death-prayer is similarly pronounced, 



MALICIOUS ANIMAX MAGNETISM 193 

and the doomed one succumbs to the dire influence.* 
These instances, which may be readily extended, show 
the relations of the belief in "M.A.M." to widespread 
notions and practices of older and cruder cultures. 

In mediaeval belief there was recognized a white and 
a black magic. The necromancer used the latter to 
wreak revenge upon his enemies, and offered his serv- 
ices to others for this end. In Christian tradition the 
power was gained by compact with the Devil, always 
regarded as the source of illicit influence. The methods 
of acquiring the power for evil varies with the cult 
in which it is incorporated. Its most general formula- 
tion is in the belief in witchcraft, which has an event- 
ful history, spreading sporadically in successive epi- 
demics over several centuries. Thus, one phase of 
"M.A.M." and its central doctrine, reflects the hold 
of a world-wide superstition natural to primitive reli- 
gions, with interesting survivals among less enlightened 
communities of modern times. 

The term "animal magnetism" comes to Mrs. Eddy 
directly from Mesmer (1734-1815). The notion is 
much older than Mesmer and is derived by analogy 
from the mysterious attraction by which a magnet 
draws particles of iron to itseK. To the speculations 
of older times it did not seem remote to assume a simi- 
lar magnetism acting among the celestial bodies, and 
an allied force affecting animal and human creation. 
These realms are connected in systems of astrology 
and occult magic. Building upon a confused mixture 

* The theme is used in the modern drama of The Bird of Paradise. 
Here the forsaking of the ancient tribal gods is avenged by causing 
the apostate — a native maiden married to a foreigner — to offer 
herself as a sacrifice to the burning volcano to appease its anger. 



194 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

of such notions, Mesmer reached the conclusion that 
diseases could be cured by applying actual magnets 
to the bodies of patients, thereby evoking symptoms 
(after the manner of crises) and through this proce- 
dure inducing a cure. In a later stage of his career, he 
built a large tub or haquet after the manner of a great 
battery. The tub was filled with iron filings and 
other paraphernalia; from it emerged bent iron rods 
which the patients seized. The usual symptoms, sug- 
gestive of hysterical attacks, ensued. Still later Mes- 
mer claimed the power to magnetize water, or a tree; 
he claimed that the magnetic fluid flowed freely from 
his person, and thus introduced the notion of a pecu- 
liar force exercised by specially endowed persons, and 
capable of influencing others, particularly in the cure 
of disease. Still adhering to the older notions, he in- 
duced the "crisis" by making passes and strokings 
with his hands, from which the personal magnetism 
was supposed to flow. Even in Mesmer's day it was 
demonstrated that the "crises" and symptoms and 
cures proceeded as well without the "magnetic" appa- 
ratus as with it; for they were due to suggestion and 
mental susceptibility. At first by a few advanced stu- 
dents, and then more generally, the source of the phe- 
nomena was correctly referred to the nervous suscepti- 
biUty of the subject; the state was called "artificial 
somnambulism," in view of its close relation to the 
state of a sleep-walker. Still later (1840) James Braid 
correctly recognized the physiological basis of the con- 
dition and called it "hypnosis" — an induced sleep-like 
state. The older notions survived and were continued 
by the popularity of hypnotism as a stage perform- 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 195 

ance. The "hypnotizers" kept alive the pseudo-scien- 
tific belief in the personal power (or magnetism) of the 
performer; they demonstrated dramatically how com- 
pletely the subject's senses, movements, and ideas were 
controlled by the fiat of the hypnotist's word. 

The further history or analysis of hypnotism would 
lead too far afield.^ With the aid of this outline the 
place of "animal magnetism" in the history of Mrs. 
Eddy's delusion will be intelligible. 

n 

Next to be considered is the personal aspect of the 
delusion in relation to Mrs. Eddy's mental develop- 
ment and the incidents of her decidedly bourgeois life. 
Her early history is that of a nervous invalid. In search 
for health she came under the treatment of "Dr." P. 
P. Quimby, who may be said to have been the earliest 
American mental healer. In an original way he ab- 
sorbed the principles of treatment by mental sugges- 
tion, to which the successors of Mesmer were turning, 
and introduced into it a little philosophy and a good 
deal of religious faith. There can be no doubt that the 
basis of the Christian Science healing practices and of 
most of its theory is Quimbyism. 

In his earlier days Quimby hypnotized by passes 
after the Paris fashion, prescribed drugs, and at the 
same time gave suggestions, consolation, and advice. 
His matiu'e system was one of pure mental healing, 
directed to the removal of symptoms and anxiety. It 
was in contact with this changing atmosphere — from 

* It is considered in "Hypnotism and its Antecedents" in my Fact 
and Fable in Psychology. (1900.) 



196 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

mesmerism to suggestion — that Mrs. Eddy grew to 
a late matm-ity. By it her ideas were shaped. 

It was also at this time that hypnotism came to 
America from France. In part the older "mesmeric" 
notions were adhered to, but the newer ideas of an arti- 
ficial somnambuhsm and a directly mental influence 
were gaining groimd. The passes and strokings, that 
were thought at first to convey the magnetic fluid, were 
retained, but only to render the subject attentive and 
passive. M. Charles Poyen was the intermediary be- 
tween Mesmer and Mrs. Eddy, and may actually have 
looked upon the faces of both. He lectured in New 
England and gave stage exhibitions with hypnotized 
subjects at the time when Mrs. Eddy, in her search 
for health, was inclining to mind-cure. She must have 
seen these passes and strokings and rubbings, which 
put the subjects at the mercy of the mesmerizer. She 
must have seen the "mesmerized" subjects helplessly 
go through strange antics at the behest of the opera- 
tor, and may have been impressed with the possible 
abuse of such power. At all events, these manipula- 
tions remained with her as the embodiment of animal 
magnetism. As she grew away from everything mate- 
rial and held mind to be all, this earlier system be- 
came to her the symbol of error, of everything awful 
and malicious. 

Thus it came about, when Mrs. Eddy developed 
as the cardinal principle of Christian Science the 
denial of everything material, that the last survival 
of anything visible or tangible in the system which 
most had helped her, became the basis of her delu- 
sions of suspicion and persecution. Her pubhshed 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 197 

writings refer to the subject frequently. The following 
paragraphs express her attitude: — 

As named in Christian Science, animal magnetism or hyp- 
notism is specifically a term for error or mortal mind. . . . 
This belief has not one quality of Truth or Good. It is either 
ignorant or malicious. The malicious form of hypnotism 
ultimates in moral idiocy. 

When Christian Science and animal magnetism are both 
comprehended, as they will be at no distant date, it will be 
seen why the author ^of this book has been so unjustly per- 
secuted and belied by wolves in sheep's clothing. 

The author's own observations of the workings of animal 
magnetism convince her that it is not a remedial agent, and 
that its effects upon those who practice it and upon their sub- 
jects who do resist it, lead to moral and to physical death. 

The likely forms of animal magnetism are disappearing 
and its aggressive features are coming to the front. The looms 
of crime, hidden in the dark recesses of mortal thought, are 
every hour weaving webs more complicated and subtle. So 
secret are the present methods of animal magnetism that they 
ensnare the age into indolence and produce the very apathy 
on the subject which the criminal desires. 

Whatever may be the obscure meaning of these pas- 
sages, they indicate a strong desire to establish the com- 
plete originality of the Christian Science doctrine. They 
make animal magnetism the dangerous counterfeit and 
denounce the material aids in its practice not alone as 
useless, but as resorted to only with vicious intent. 

From here on, the story of "M.A.M." is the story 
of Mrs. Eddy's personal relations to the belief. It is 
closely bound up with the early history of Christian 
Science. It grew by deeds and doctrines, at first most 
slowly, and later with astonishing rapidity. The fame of 
the cures kept the movement alive; classes were formed 
and disciples trained; a religious doctrine was developed. 



198 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Mrs. Eddy's strength as a leader lay in teaching and 
expounding. She was much too nervous, too ill at ease, 
too self -centered, to minister to others. For the sym- 
pathetic treatment that should remove doubt, inspire 
hope, and counsel wisely, she depended upon more 
confident, better-poised natures. In her early, diffi- 
cult days, she foimd a young, able, and willing part- 
ner in Richard Kennedy. Kennedy was a practitioner 
interested in results and not over-impressed with the 
verbal statements of Mrs. Eddy. In his treatment he 
used rubbings of the head as well as suggestion and 
denial, as he was taught by Mrs. Eddy and through 
her by Quimby. Mrs. Eddy was a trying companion 
and leader, and a bad loser. The rupture came when 
she accused Kennedy of cheating at cards. He left her, 
established an independent practice, and became the 
first Christian Scientist accused of practicing "M.A.M.** 
Mrs. Eddy promptly laid the falling-off of her success, 
due to Kennedy's withdrawal, to his sending out ad- 
verse mental influences both against her and to pre- 
vent others from joining the movement. She accused 
him of using his powers on patients, not to cure, but 
to aggravate their sufferings. This she called "mental 
malpractice." It was all rather confused in her mind 
and in her language. One notion persisted: that this 
evil mental influence causes suffering to its victim. 
The mental thought, being the sole reality, causes the 
disease and disaster which mortal mind is somehow 
compelled to recognize. That is precisely the primi- 
tive notion that keeps superstitions alive, manufac- 
tures evil charms, and places them in the enemy's house. 
Mrs. Eddy's language is interesting: — 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 199 

Among our very first students was the mesmerist aforesaid, 
who has followed the cause of metaphysical healing as a 
hound follows his prey. . . . This malpractitioner tried his 
best to break down our health before we learned the cause 
of our sufferings. 

His mental malpractice has made him a moral leper that 
would be shunned as the most prolific cause of sickness and 
sin, did the sick understand the cause of their relapses and 
protracted treatment, the husband the loss of the wife, and 
the mother the death of her child. 

Filled with revenge and evil passions, the malpractitioner 
can only depend on manipulation, and rubs the heads of 
patients years together, first incorporating their minds 
through this process. . . . Through the control this gives the 
practitioner over patients, he readily reaches the mind of the 
community to injure another or promote himself, but none 
can track his foul course. 

Sooner suffer a doctor infected with smallpox * to be about 
you than come under the treatment of one who manipulates 
his patients' heads. 

The distance from ordinary medical practice to Christian 
Science is full many a league in the line of light; but to go in 
healing from the use of inanimate drugs to the misuse of 
human will power is to drop from the platform of common 
manhood into the very mire of iniquity. 

Thus early in her career "M.A.M." became to Mrs. 
Eddy her "black beast," as the French say, her "hoo- 
doo" in popular superstitious phrase. To her it was 
dead earnest and a real beast. It made her an invalid 
and crossed her moods. It made her affairs go wrong 
and kept her poor. It set people against her and 
thwarted her plans. Most of all, it was used by traitors 
and enemies — by those who deserted her and took 
to successful mental healing on their own account. 

* The admission that there is such a thing as smallpox infection is, 
of course, inconsistent with Mrs. Eddy's precepts, as with her many 
denials of its reality. 



200 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

As one leading disciple after another tired of her tyr- 
anny and her nerves, he was turned against and 
accused of "M.A.M." The delusion grew, fed by per- 
sonal grudge. It took on definite shape as she shaped 
her system, and was made part of it. 

Kennedy's successor was Daniel Spofford. The new 
form of treatment was now called "metaphysical heal- 
ing." Spofford did not manipulate, but practiced suc- 
cessfully by mental suggestion. In 1877 he, in turn, 
came imder the ban. He left Mrs. Eddy, who thus 
referred to him in the hurriedly prepared second edi- 
tion of "Science and Health": — 

Since "Science and Health" first went to press, we have 
observed the crimes of another mesmeric outlaw, in a variety 
of ways, who does not as a common thing manipulate, in 
cases where he suddenly attempted to avenge himself of cer- 
tain Ludividuals. . . . 

In 1878 Mrs. Eddy, or her supporters, so worked 
upon the mind of one of their patients — Miss Lucre- 
tia L. S. Brown — as to gain her consent to bring suit 
against Spofford as a mesmerist. In the case of Miss 
Brown, he was charged with causing "by said power 
and art great suffering of body and mind and severe 
spinal pains and neuralgia and a temporary suspen- 
sion of mind, and still continues to cause the plaintiff the 
same." 

Mr. Spofford, so far as known, is the last person 
tried for witchcraft in a court of law. With strange 
dramatic justice the court sat in Salem, the seat of 
the only American epidemic of witchcraft. The attorney 
for Miss Brown was Edward J. Arens, Spofford*s suc- 
cessor, and himself the next to be accused of "M.A.M." 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 201 

Witnesses testified to the reality of the malicious 
influence mentally administered; but the ridiculous 
charge was ruled out of court. 

It is said that Mrs. Eddy, at successive phases of 
her career, kept pictures of Kennedy and Spofford and 
a third foe, Arens, in her room, the two former marked 
with a black cross, the latter with a red cross, to aid 
her mental resistance. 

No less remarkable an incident is the controversy 
surrounding the death of Mr. Eddy. On June 5, 1882, 
Mrs. Eddy gave out this interview: — 

My husband's death was caused by malicious mesmerism. 
Dr. Rufus K. Noyes, late of the City Hospital, who held an 
autopsy over the body to-day, affirms that the corpse is free 
from all material poison although Dr. Eastman^ still holds 
to his original belief. I know that it was poison that killed 
him, not material poison, but mesmeric poison. 

Mrs. Eddy was confident that she could have saved 
her husband by counter-thought, if only she had not 
been so occupied with her work, and had realized the 
power of the mesmerists. She says: — 

Oh, is n't it terrible that this fiend of malpractice is in the 
land! After a certain amount of mesmeric poison has been 
administered, it cannot be averted. No power of mind can 
resist it. It must be met with resistive action of the mind at 
the start, which will counteract it. 

"The atmosphere of Mrs. Eddy's house derived its 
peculiar character from her belief in malicious mes- 

^ The Dr. Eastman in question was a quack. Mr. Eddy fell com- 
pletely under the sway of Mrs. Eddy's delusions. He shared in the 
suspicion of constant danger, and often ran to the shelter of a friendly 
door to avoid the mesmeric miasma. The notion of thus mentally 
absorbing poison seems to have been his contribution. 



202 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

merism, which exerted a sinister influence over every- 
one under her roof. Her students could never get away 
from it. Morning, noon, and night the thing had to 
be reckoned with, and the very domestic arrangements 
were ordered to elude or counteract the demoniacal 
power. If Mrs. Eddy had kept in her house a danger- 
ous maniac or some horrible physical monstrosity," ^ 
the situation could not have been worse. If the water- 
pipe froze, or the wash-boiler leaked, or her servants 
were negligent, or her dressmaker was awkward in fit- 
ting, it was all the work of her enemies, accomplished 
by mental projections. Her mail, certain letter-boxes, 
certain streets, became infected with mesmerism. At 
one time she was convinced that the telegraph office 
at Boston was in the hands of her enemies, and sent a 
message to Chicago from West Newton via Worcester. 
She wanted her students to remain in Boston on the 
Fourth of July, a day when "mortal mind was in ebul- 
lition," to help her oppose the evil. She beheved in 
a real "printer's devil," and attributed the delays in 
printing her "Science and Health" to mesmerism. She 
set her students to treating mentally the pressmen 
against delays, and when the sheets were ready, asked 
them to turn their thoughts from the press-room to 
the bindery. Her letters are full of it; and nothing 
seems to irritate her more than a slighting of this essen- 
tial dogma of her creed. 

in 

To consider the case of IVIrs. Eddy scientifically is 
to consider it objectively. The details are naturally 
^ 1 Miknine, The Life oj Mary Baker G. Eddy, p, 301. 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 203 

personal, but the interpretation proceeds by accred- 
ited psychological principles, as objectively applicable 
to this case as to any other. The fact that the patient 
was the founder of a prosperous sect, and the reverence 
of her followers for "Mother Eddy," are incidents with 
no special bearing upon the central interpretation. In 
the actual development of Christian Science the part 
to be assigned to Mrs. Eddy is also readily over-esti- 
mated; dependence upon others, passive acceptance 
of fate, fortunate circumstances in the management 
of her campaign, and the public state of mind, were 
also decisive in the movement, which after years of 
struggle brought her notoriety, wealth, and an amaz- 
ing following.^ 

The case of Mrs. Eddy is the case of a nervous in- 
valid with a highly irritable constitution becoming a 
chronic victim to delusions of persecution. The text- 
books on insanity give many cases of the remarkable 
persecutions to which such victims have regarded them- 
selves as subjected. They believe themselves poi- 
soned, drugged, threatened by voices through the walls 
or the telephone; they see secret enemies in visitors, 
and find hidden meanings in letters. A common form 

^ One phase of Mrs. Eddy's mentality suggests a Freudian inter- 
pretation. She was very aggressive on the matter of the originality 
of Christian Science as her creation or special revelation. In conse- 
quence she denied any obligation to Quimby and concealed the evi- 
dence of her dependence. She quarreled with those who had helped 
her and denounced them. This attitude implies the subconscious 
sense of her dependence, even of her inferiority; the insistence be- 
comes a form of compensation for her incapacity. It may be traced 
in her writings, in her relations to the Mother Church, in the inci- 
dents of her life. The delusion of "M.A.M." is clearly related to this 
cluster of beliefs; it expresses the "fear" aspect accompanying the 
self-assertion by way of consolation. 



204 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

of the delusion makes its source mystic. The evil comes 
by thought-waves, by telepathy, by brain-vibrations, 
and by magnetism. The evil designs are ascribed to 
definite personal enemies. The form of the persecu- 
tion and the selection of the enemies are shaped by 
circumstances. The personal history of Mrs. Eddy 
places her delusion of "M.A.M.'* plainly in the same 
order of cases. 

How the delusion might have developed had it re- 
mained purely personal and not attached to a system 
of belief, it is impossible to determine. It is clear that 
her system was shaped to admit and express the delu- 
sional symptoms. It is clearer still that the tyranny 
of the delusions affected the doctrines, yet affected 
still more Mrs. Eddy's attitude to her followers and all 
the personal details of her administration. Her feeling 
of helplessness and her dependence upon others were 
directed by this delusional fear. She always needed 
a buffer against "M.A.M." When she wished to write 
and found the writing slow and unprogressive, she 
appealed to her students: "Direct your thoughts and 
everybody else's that you can away from me; don't 
talk of me." "Those who call on me mentally in suffer- 
ing are in belief killing me." 

It is related that at the time of her indignation against 
Spofford, Mrs. Eddy induced twelve of her disciples to 
arrange a continuous mental session of twenty-four 
hours, each student holding his thought for two hours, 
willing the downfall of Spofford. Her son, Dr. Foster 
(whom she adopted when the latter was forty-one 
years old), served as a shield to offset the adverse 
treatment of the enemy; when he was dismissed, others 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 205 

served to conduct the evil forces away from Mrs. 
Eddy by vigorous counter-statements.^ 

It is plain that such actions and beliefs as were ex- 
hibited by Mrs. Eddy would be set down as those of 
an abnormal, neurotic, unbalanced person. The no- 
toriety of the patient should not in the least affect the 
diagnosis; though so conspicuous a career necessarily 
and deeply modified the evolution of the case as a whole. 
The reactions to a personal experience, as vitiated by 
an unfortunate temperament, constitute the most sig- 
nificant exhibit in the origin and status of "malicious 
animal magnetism." The "animal magnetism" is an 
accidental reference due to circumstance, and as a 
name is almost meaningless. It represents the formu- 
lation of her delusion. The "maliciousness" is a per- 
sonal reference, and is an essential trait in delusions 
of persecution. 

Just how far Mrs. Eddy's case can be more minutely 
diagnosed or classified is not altogether clear. The 
medical details are lacking; her early obscurity and 
the attempts to shroud her personality in mystery in- 
crease the diflficulty of arriving at a clear decision. 
There is, however, no hesitation in reaching a diagnosis 
of a mentally abnormal condition — an inherited neu^ 
rasthenic diathesis, in its later development tending 
toward a paranoiac state. Mrs. Eddy's case has been 
diagnosed as paranoia on the basis of the documents 
of the case. Paranoia is a polite Greek term for a 

* In 1908, when Mrs. Leonard, living with Mrs. Eddy, died, it was 
said that her death was due to "M.A.M." as exercised by a faction 
opposed to Mrs. Eddy, who willed her death by "statements." Thus, 
saving her patron by acting as a shield to receive the "M.A.M.," she 
lost her life. 



206 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

marked and limited or one-sided eccentricity and ir- 
responsibility. In slang phrase its equivalent may be 
rendered as "being a little off" or "cranky." Many 
paranoiacs are markedly and dangerously insane; quite 
as many suffer from harmless delusions. Still others 
are in the borderland, and except in certain relations 
may lead outwardly responsible Hves. The paranoiacs 
form the most elusive, the most individual, the true 
elite of the great borderland where dwell the eccentric 
and the ill-balanced. Mrs. Eddy's is the rare but not 
unique case of a rehgious paranoiac with a following. 
"Paranoiacs," writes one authority, "form the aristoc- 
racy of asylums; indeed, the majority of them have 
little diflSculty in avoiding confinement in them." Mrs. 
Eddy deserves a high place in this aristocracy.^ 

IV 

The fact that the doctrine of "M.A.M." is so largely 
a personal contribution appears in the trouble it has 
caused in the camp of the faithful. Many of the de- 
fections from the faith have been due to the resistance 
to Mrs. Eddy's pet doctrine. When, in 1888, she gave 
a coiu'se of six lectures on "obstetrics," five of which 
were taken up with "M.A.M.," the students, who had 
paid high fees for the privilege of attending them, nat- 
urally rebelled. It is known that the revisers of her 

* For the details of Mrs. Eddy's life and personality the reader 
must consult the Life of Mary Baker G. Eddy, by Miss Milmine. 

As contributory to the medical side of the case, the following detail 
may be cited: A significant paranoiac symptom is the use of words in 
strange and forced meanings, with a marked verbal obsession. A 
certain simple verbosity goes with it. In this case the medical analo- 
gies prevail. The use of such terms as "obstetrics," "malpractice," 
"mental poison," "metaphysical healing," illustrate the result. 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 207 

works have stricken much of the record of her pecu- 
liarities from Mrs. Eddy's oflBcial writings, and have 
been strenuous in withdrawing the rare earHer editions 
of "Science and Health," that disclose the personal 
hold of this strange doctrine; this applies particu- 
larly to the third edition, which contains a remark- 
able chapter on "Demonology," in itself a conclusive 
document proving her delusional state. The earlier 
issues of the "Christian Science Journal" mention 
cases of successful treatment against the invasion of 
"M.A.M." In the daily press of the period the dili- 
gent student may find mention of occasional protests, 
when patients die of recognizable diseases, while the 
family insist upon a diagnosis of "M.A.M."^ — quite 
in the manner of primitive times or the darker ages. 
It is, however, dijfficult to say that the doctrine was 
generally accepted by Christian Scientists; a tendency 
to ignore the matter as a regrettable incident was the 
more common attitude. 

Yet so late as 1909 a renewed outburst of the delu- 
sion appeared in sensational form. By this time fac- 
tions and dissensions had arisen, as is not unusual in 
a personally controlled church. Mrs. Eddy was an 
old and very feeble woman; and the question of the 
bestowal of the mantle of the prophet was variously 
discussed. The most influential and independent can- 
didate was Mrs. Augusta E. Stetson, leader of the 
movement in New York City, who was bitterly de- 
nounced by Mrs. Eddy. It was against Mrs. Stetson 
that a member of her church raised the accusation of 
"M.A.M." Here is a part of the victim's story: — 



208 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

At midnight, I was awakened by an icy blast sweeping 
through the open window from the direction of New York. 
My teeth chattered. My heart fluttered. Luminous waves 
rolled toward me, covered with the faces of the dead. I felt 
just like a man being electrocuted. It seemed, indeed, that 
my soul went from my body, that I saw through the walls of 
my house. And in the hour of agony I saw Mrs. Stetson's 
blue eyes all around the room. 

Like the afficted of old, she took to her Bible to 
overcome the unseen foe, but to no purpose. The chill 
continued; in despair she turned on the steaming water 
in the bathtub, but could feel no heat. The contest 
went on. 

Impersonal, Ever-present, Omnipotent Love bore me up 
beyond the reach of the would-be midnight assassin, the 
human hatred of truth, the mad ambition for the personal 
place and power. . . . Still shivering from that boiling bath, 
I groped about for the most elaborate piece of darning I could 
find, and sitting up in bed, pushed the needle to and fro while 
my parched lips muttered, "God is all; God is good; nothing 
can harm me." As I sat there, my husband staggered up the 
stairs and into my room. 

**My God!" he exclaimed, "what has happened to me? 
Coming out on the train I felt as if I were going to die. I am 
suffocating.** 

This is clearly the hysterical tale of a badly fright- 
ened woman, under the spell of a set of ideas imposed 
by her religious faith. But hot baths, darning, and 
prayers would not have been called upon if the victim 
had not seriously believed that Mrs. Stetson, by fix- 
ing her thoughts with malicious intent, was causing 
this midnight agony many miles away. 

The story, of which this incident is a part, is set in 
the usual commonplace conflict of money and ambi- 
tion and influence. Step by step Mrs. Stetson induced 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 209 

the convinced disciple to give far more largely to the 
support of the church than her means allowed. When 
a gift of fifteen thousand dollars for an organ was ar- 
ranged, the husband protested; the gift was withdrawn, 
and the money used to build two country houses. The 
withdrawal from her vows preyed upon the mind of 
the disciple, and then came the blighting of her ven- 
tiu*es and the "death-thought." "My baby was born 
soon after, but only lived several days. Every pet I 
had died. Every flower I touched withered. Ill-luck 
attended the building of my houses." In the end, the 
power of fear prevailed; one of the houses was sold, 
and the church shared in the proceeds. 

And this, so far as can readily be determined, is the 
last incident in the drama of "M.A.M." With Mrs. 
l^ddy's death in 1910 the delusion lost its personal 
vitality. Never eagerly accepted by the disciples, it 
naturally faded from view. 



The belief in "malicious animal magnetism" can 
readily be derived from the theory and practice of 
Christian Science by carrying them to the further con- 
clusion that what cures may kill. If denying ills anni- 
hilates them, why should not asserting ills create them? 
The existence of the force and its use for good or ill are 
distinct. If the doctrine that all reality is mind ac- 
counts for the benefits which the practices of Chris- 
tian Science confer when beneficently used, it equally 
supports the possibility of "malpractice" or the 
"death-thought." Both practices, benevolent and ma- 
levolent, are forms of "absent treatment"; the one is 



210 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

as consistent with the underlying principle as the other. 
In the Christian Science ritual the healer and his com- 
pany are thoroughly convinced that the deluded pa- 
tient has no disease. They deny the reality of disease; 
they intently wish that the patient should not believe 
in it. They make "statements" that pneumonia or 
rheumatism or typhoid fever or smallpox does not 
exist; that the patient will presently be released from 
the belief that he has it. They state the beneficence of 
God, the healing power of Christian Science, and by 
repeated and insistent declaration they demonstrate 
away the belief in disease. Change all this procedure 
•from a blessing to a curse, but retain the faith in the 
power of wishing and believing, of stating and aflSrm- 
ing, and of other verbal substitutes for reality, and 
you can inflict injury and make things go wrong, just 
as the reverse process makes them go right. That is 
all that is necessary to reach the notion of mental 
"malpractice." Intensify it all as you would in treat- 
ing a mortal enemy, and you have the "death-thought." 
The fact that "M.A.M." remained so largely a per- 
sonal conviction of Mrs. Eddy without ready accept- 
ance by her followers shows that irrationaUty in a 
modern environment has its set limitations. Mental 
epidemics find resistances in the educational accom- 
plishments of the American democracy. The spirit 
of the age, though demonstrably tolerant of such start- 
ling logical performances as the success of Christian 
Science attests, none the less sets up restraining influ- 
ences upon the extent to which that process may go, 
even in a system of thinking that in so many ways 
deserts the logic that makes the spirit possible. Irra- 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 211 

tionality as well as rationality has its limitations; and 
thus is the psychology of conviction complicated. It 
is hardly conceivable that such a delusion as a mali- 
cious mental influence would develop to a general men- 
tal contagion, however strongly incorporated in the 
doctrines of a sect, and however strongly these doc- 
trines repudiate the claims of reality and the logic of 
daily life. The loyal Christian Scientist may tolerate 
or cherish large reserved areas of belief in which an 
alien logic rules; he is, however, careful to draw the 
boundaries between these areas and the practical field 
of operation of his business affairs. He is hardly likely 
to treat in the same manner a Christian Science state-^ 
ment and a bank statement; nor will he assemble a 
company and ask their aid toward increasing his 
balance in the bank by throwing forth intense mental 
vibrations, or have a fear that his balance will be 
endangered by the malicious mental concentration of 
his rivals; he is not likely to believe that fluctuations 
of stocks can be brought about by "absent treat- 
ment" on the part of "metaphysical" bulls and bears. 
It is interesting to observe that the integrity of a 
practical reason resists the encroachment of inconsis- 
tency, even when reinforced by religious faith; and it 
is equally interesting to observe that in the actual 
experience a saving moral integrity does the same. 

The easy-going public is content to concede that if 
the conviction of the reality of mental waves, even 
if it implies the unreality of microbes, helps some per- 
sons in the recovery from ills that the denied flesh is 
yet somehow heir to, and if there is some real satisfac- 
tion in considering the troubles so treated not as dis- 



212 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

eases but as mental "errors of mortal mind," so let it 
be; democracy is tolerant intellectually as well as polit- 
ically. But if this force is used to inflict injury, even 
those convinced of the underlying doctrine hesitate or 
refuse to accept the conclusion consistent with their 
inconsistent logic, and certainly refuse to apply it. 
The psychology of conviction in such issues develops 
a logic of its own. When hard-pressed, consistency 
yields to morality; ethical notions and habits exercise 
their restraints upon thought as upon action; for this, 
too, is part of the general psychology under which 
convictions alike develop and become practically 
operative in conduct. Principles and practice are most 
complexly and flexibly connected and construed, and 
the influence of reserved areas of thinking makes itself 
felt. Moreover, the principle of satisfaction prevails. 
The converts to Christian Science are attracted to it 
not by its logic, but by the solace it offers; they find this 
solace in the one aspect of its doctrines — the denial of 
ills and the cure of so-called disease — and not in the 
other — the belief in a maUcious use of the same order 
of agency. 

In so far as the psychologist may undertake the 
guardianship of mental health, he is bound to regard 
the menace of unreason with comparable concern, alike 
when the false beliefs which it fosters are apparently 
innocuous and when they are palpably dangerous. For 
the difference in no smaU measure lies in the limita- 
tions placed by the restraints of sanity upon the de- 
gree to which the invasion of reason is carried in the 
direction of influencing conduct. The type of think- 
ing that leads to the acceptance of such Christian 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 213 

Science doctrines as that there is no difference in the 
manner in which smallpox spreads and that in which 
fear or the blush of shame spreads, is logically in line 
with such beliefs as the deadly power of a malicious 
mental force. A critical reviewer of recent "mental 
healing" movements charges Mrs. Eddy with "doing 
all she could to revive in our generation the panic fear 
which oppressed all Europe for centuries," and finds 
the temper of beUevers in "M.A.M." comparable to 
that which "tortured and put to flame thousands of 
friendless old women." The temper is unquestionably 
malignant, but is itself tempered by a saving common 
sense. Large collective delusions would have to make 
their way against all the bulwarks that science and 
humanity, experience and common sense, have built 
about sanity and sound judgment. Twentieth-century 
minds are too busy with realities, too saturated with 
wholesome and profitable ways of thinking, too grate- 
ful for the benefits derived from science and a sturdy 
practical sense, to desert approved standards, tried 
and true, at the call of any belief, however deep the 
loyalty that it claims. Yet outside its familiar inter- 
ests, the average mind is open to the lure of doctrines 
whose very obscurity silences reason and induces a 
feeling of plausibility, dulling the sense of incompati- 
bility with the logical standards of daily life and soimd 
science. The great procession of Mrs. Eddy's follow- 
ers does not mean that those who subscribe to her 
pseudo-philosophy are going to regulate their behavior 
or their business on the theory that nothing exists but 
mind. It means that on one side of their natures they 
are willing to yield to the persuasiveness of doctrines 



214 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

that would make the rest of their thinking and doing 
utterly nonsensical. In that kind of tolerance there is 
a real menace to rationality. The whole purpose of 
education is to make men reasonable, so that when 
necessary one may reason with them. Any tendency 
that promotes irrationality is a serious menace to men- 
tal health, even though it affects directly only a small 
part of the community, and affects them in but a de- 
tached portion of their attitudes and actions. 

If a movement can give shelter to so pernicious a 
doctrine as "malicious animal magnetism" and even 
in isolated cases lead to such procedures as those 
cited, it shows the menace to rationality inherent in 
a departure from straight thinking; for this type of 
departure is a reversion to the swaddling stages of in- 
telligence, favorable to superstition and the vain pseudo- 
sciences of an outgrown past. In this sense there really 
are mahgnant mental germs; and one can never tell 
where, despite modern precautions in mental hygiene, 
such germs may find a culture-bed suitable to their 
propagation. Even a limited contagion deserves the 
serious attention of the guardians of mental health. 

The type of argument concerned in this study suf- 
fers from the psychological influence that the belief 
affects the result; an apparent verification is in real- 
ity a prepossession. Unquestionably the successes of 
treatment by the ritual of Christian Science demon- 
strate the power of belief to aid and abet the recov- 
ery of patients, particularly those of marked nervous 
susceptibility. Judicious neglect is often the best 
prescription for troublesome symptoms aggravated by 
worry and morbid habits, and thus deprived of nature's 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 215 

healing powers. Over-attention to ailments, fear, anx- 
iety, distrust, hopelessness, react unfavorably upon the 
prospects for recovery. Poise and confidence, however 
acquired, relieve these obstacles to progress. The 
Christian Science attitude shares in these benefits; 
but to ascribe the benefits to the doctrine, or to see in 
them a proof of the doctrine, is an obvious or a subtle 
fallacy according to its setting in the minds of those 
misled by the argument. That similar benefits may be 
reached along the highways of reason quite as surely 
as along the byways of unreason, is equally true. If 
so reached there will be no tendency to extend the 
principle beyond its warrant; such extension is the 
supreme danger. The failure to distinguish between 
organic and functional disorders, the willingness to 
expose others to violently contagious diseases, the 
refusal to employ approved precautions and remedies, 
are all most unreasonable convictions. The fact that 
they may be derived from the fundamental proposition 
that there is no reality except mind, and once thus 
derived are put in practice, is far more menacing than 
a weak and unapplied belief in "malicious animal mag- 
netism." This statement is pertinent only in that it 
calls attention to the menace of reason inherent in 
the principles of "Eddy ism"; the examination of this 
strange doctrine, or of the truths regarding mental 
healing which it uses and abuses, is not germane to 
the present excursion into abnormal logic and abnor- 
mal psychology. 

A false and shallow view of the principles of mental 
action operates in the preparation of the soil for the 
spread of delusion; for this reason both aspects, true 



216 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and false, must be considered. The principle itself is 
well recognized. It operates in crude as well as in re- 
fined settings. Travelers among primitive peoples 
relate that the warriors ordinarily recover promptly 
from spear-wounds, but not if they believe the spear- 
heads to be poisoned. But to regard the mode of ac- 
tion of the belief the same as that of the poison is to 
ignore the distinction between the subjective and the 
objective, which is the criterion of sanity. Voltaire 
satirically remarked that he was fully persuaded that 
incantations together with a sufficient dose of arsenic 
would kill your neighbor's sheep. As a practical mat- 
ter, we live in a dual world. If we lived only in the world 
of matter, we might come upon arsenic and not upon 
incantations; and if we lived only in the world of mind, 
we might come upon incantations, but not upon arse- 
nic. But to conclude that because there are incanta- 
tions, therefore there is no arsenic — to say nothing of 
announcing this absurdity as a great discovery — is 
the height of imreason; and the attempt to apply it, 
either by reviving a fear of incantations or by remov- 
ing the poison-labels from bottles of arsenic is equally 
though differently dangerous. It is such an attitude 
favorable to unreason that the confusions fostered by 
Christian Science doctrines make possible; only on the 
basis of such a departm-e from a sound logic would it 
be possible to graft the delusion of "M.A.M." Such 
a conviction, despite its personal aspects as an indi- 
vidual delusion of suspicion and persecution, has a 
more general significance in the setting and develop- 
ment that accompany it, and thus contributes to its 
psychology. It takes the modern mind back vio- 



MALICIOUS ANIMAL MAGNETISM 217 

lently to the cruder thinking of an outgrown past, and 
indicates that the same mind, in spite of educational 
opportimities, may succumb to the same disturbing 
forces that make the history of conviction so in- 
structive, while yet at times so discouraging a psy- 
chological record. It illustrates also how gradual and 
uncertain is the transition from weak to perverse think- 
ing; that with the restraints and guidance of logic 
overturned, the issue readily turns from the illogical 
to the pathological. For the temptation to delusion 
proceeds upon the attraction of a conclusion to a dis- 
ordered mind. The psychology of conviction must be 
conceived broadly enough to include a study of devia- 
tions as well as of conformities; for both are of one 
genius. Sanity lies in the adjustment of psychological 
tendencies to logical restraints. The study of convic- 
tion derives its value jointly from both sources, often 
with unexpected illumination from the more irregular 
aspects, as shadows bring out the high lights and the 
entire picture in more vivid perspective. 



VIII 

THE DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF 
EDUCATION 

In the survey of "cases" of conviction the transition 
is now to be made to the active arena of controversial 
questions. As a part of their history all important 
beliefs have passed through controversial stages. In 
the process of establishment the newer candidate en- 
counters the accredited prestige of the older claimant. 
Dispossession in intellectual sovereignty is difficult; 
for it must overcome the conservative forces of adjust- 
ment and the adherence to systems and causes that 
have grown into the intellectual and emotional fiber 
of both popular and influential conservative minds. 
The raising of doubts disturbs an adjusted attitude; 
this is naturally an imwelcome procedure. When it 
meets the entrenched positions that have been long 
occupied and have developed cherished associations 
and warmly espoused loyalties, its reception is still 
more aggressively resisted. Heresy is the familiar 
charge that brings the issue to trial; persecutions for 
radical, dissenting, subversive convictions are fre- 
quent and far from creditable incidents in the his- 
tory of thought. When excommunication and social 
ostracism are superseded as incompatible with the 
accredited standards of tolerance, ridicule and sus- 
picion may take their place. The controversy that dis- 
placed the earth from its central position in the cosmic 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 219 

system, the displacement of miracles by the rigid mii- 
formity of natm-al law, the displacement of ** special 
creation" by evolution, — all fm-nish examples of the 
opposition which great convictions encounter, of the 
bitter controversies through which they emerge to 
their rightful place. Prestige, prejudice, convention, 
and the entire array of conservative social forces enter 
into the psychology of the conflict. This field, how- 
ever dominant its importance in the general history 
of science, is not the one to be selected for illustration 
of the psychology of controversial issues; for these, to 
be typical, must deal with living, shifting, present-day 
problems. The older controversies, though their les- 
sons are not remote, have no decisive bearing upon the 
attitudes that affect our convictions or with which 
we sympathize. The weapons employed in the intel- 
lectual campaigns of the past are obsolete in our 
twentieth-century equipment. In the progressive war- 
fares of the mind the armament changes as radically 
as in military operations. In both fields war motives 
are more endm*ing than the settings and the instru- 
ments of the conflicts. 

Displacements and replacements, reformations and 
renaissances, are inevitably gradual in their progress, 
however sharp and critical the attack and defense at 
the moment of the conflict. Certain orders of con- 
victions are markedly fluid in their establishment, are 
much like dissolving views in the manner of the wane 
of the old and the yielding to the new. The emphasis 
and the rendering change, rather than the theme. An 
altered manner and method of procedure, more con- 
genial to the spirit of the incoming age, characterize 



220 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

such movements; the waves of their progression form 
in contom-s of a gentle sweep. Such plastic convictions 
are determined less by newer orders of knowledge than 
by newer insights and interpretations. The contro- 
versy is real but never critical; gradually, without 
convulsion, the old order passes. Peace ensues with- 
out aggressive victory; an altered attitude, like the 
calm after a storm, settles upon the same scene, yet 
transforms its complexion. The changed status of 
women, the attitude toward war, the place yielded to 
indulgence in the social code, are but a few of the 
many examples. In their discussion the shift of em- 
phasis and of point of view bring other orders of 
consideration to the foreground, and retire the promi- 
nent features of yesterdays. A change of interest be- 
comes as significant as a change of conclusion. 

By a proper selection of "cases," controversial psy- 
chology may be portrayed in the making, with the 
intent to interpret its nature and to render its spirit. 
In such an essay a unifying interpretation is decisive; 
the features are given, but the expression must be 
brought out. Such portrayal is entirely compatible 
with an intent to incline conviction toward one posi- 
tion and away from others; there should be no prop- 
aganda, but there may properly be an array of the 
evidence toward a consistent exposition, by which the 
mind is won to a satisfying conclusion. The argument 
proceeds upon a psychological understanding of the 
complex forces that shape conviction as affected by 
temperaments and circumstances. Selected surveys of 
living controversial issues may prove rich in illustra- 
tive value and profitable in consideration. 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 221 

The theme introducing the controversial group — 
by way of overture, as it were — is of somewhat differ- 
ent status. The position of education in the system of 
acquiring social control is apparently uncontro verted; 
the opposition is apparently non-existent. But it is 
possible to summon the plaintiff and obtain a state- 
ment of the charge. Despite appearances, education is 
really placed upon the defensive, and in varied forms 
of expression has always been so. The suspicion of 
education is of ancient lineage, though no more ven- 
erable than the respect, even the awe or fear of learn- 
ing. In the history of the intellectual classes there is 
some justification for the distrust. In the beginnings 
of culture the priest medicine-man was the sole repre- 
sentative of the savant. Learning conferred a some- 
what mysterious power to influence fate; the possi- 
bility of using the knowledge-control to work ill, as 
well as the intangible nature of the gift, gave rise to 
awe and fear. Soothsayer, interpreter of omens and 
the signs of nature, magician and depositary of lore, 
the proof of his art was a practical test — the power, 
like that of Aaron, to do something beyond the ordi- 
nary capacity, to transcend common experience. When 
miracles were demanded, the temptation to resort to 
trickery was strong; and the play upon ignorance would 
readily convert even a modest accomplishment into a 
marvelous power. Thus set apart, the wise man may 
put his prestige to too severe a strain, or he may exercise 
his calling in an unpopular cause; also his pretenses 
may have been disclosed suflBiciently to arouse suspi- 
cion of his oflBce. Under a possible twofold application 
of the power conferred by knowledge — so long as the 



222 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

methods of securing intellectual control were feebly 
understood — there arose in mediaeval times the dis- 
tinction between white magic, exercised in approved 
ways, and black magic, which was evil and presum- 
ably conferred by compact with the Devil. The em- 
ployment of this Satanic aid was the theme of the 
drama of ** Friar Bacon" and of the "Faust" legend; 
and through these this aspect of the exhibition and the 
suspicion of learning was made familiar. In a measure 
the suspicion under which the wielders of the black art 
labored, extended vaguely and moderately to learning 
in general. 

In any modern setting the suspicion is differently 
exercised; its center is shifted. A vast amount of con- 
trol has come directly out of practical experience, quite 
detached apparently from the scholar's professional 
activity. Technical skill arising from direct doing and 
from a rigidly practical learning, acquires a standing 
in rivalry to the form of control conferred by the study 
of principles, which we know as science; for science is 
the accredited form of control succeeding the ambi- 
tious search for the essence of things, which captivated 
the mediaeval mind and gave its arts their magical 
aspect.^ Thus theory and practice, which in reality 
are inseparable and mutually dependent, came into 
a sharp and imfortunate rivalry. What really hap- 
pened was that principles once arduously gained by 
progressive and original scholars became so familiar 
that they were absorbed in common knowledge. Prac- 

* An aspect of the old-time search is considered in the "Modem 
Occult" in my Fact and Fable in Psychology (1900); see also pp. 238- 
275. 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION nS 

tice seemed able to dispense with them, but really- 
assumed them. Thus fortified, but ignoring the source 
of its equipment, practice proceeded, as well it might, 
to extend its domain and to claim its mighty conquests 
as exclusively its own. It grew proud of its power and 
naturally attracted the larger following. Practice is, 
indeed, quite capable of seK-direction so long as it 
remains fairly close to a well-trodden domain; but at 
the frontier, where the next step is uncertain and 
ventures into the imknown, theory holds the larger 
vision and the more capable direction. 

Once education has become a democratic birthright, 
it is inevitably Hmited for the vast majority to the 
point at which it fits one for performance of the sim- 
pler parts in the social economy. A livelihood must be 
gained, and learning comes to be appraised by the 
"paying" quality of its gifts. Such pragmatic test 
may be as rigidly applied to theory as to practice, but 
when applied to the study of principles has a more 
catholic criterion. The man of science appreciates how 
indirect may be the road from theory to practice and 
how vain are short-cuts as well as royal roads to learn- 
ing. The democratic temper is apt to be impatient of 
such precautions, and to ignore what is not patent on 
the surface, apt to insist upon immediate results and 
to become suspicious of broad foundations, when the 
details and specifications of the structure to be erected 
upon them cannot be supplied. 

But the peculiarly ominous feature of the democra- 
tic rule is that, with its freer distribution of opportuni- 
ties, "practical" men come into influential positions, 
and establish alike the standards of approved success 



224 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and the power to enforce them. PoHtical control and 
economic control set the patterns for control in gen- 
eral; and any claim for exemption on the part of edu- 
cation from the tests thus established is cavalierly 
dismissed as a specious mask for incompetence. While 
still regarded as indispensable, education finds its 
hands tied by an alien rule, which may be kindly but 
undiscriminating, but is quite as likely to be self-con- 
fident and intolerant. Thus transfigured, the demo- 
cratic suspicion of education is the strangely habited 
successor of the distrust of the learned arts. In some 
quarters disavowing the role, in others proud of it, 
the champions of the practical life become difficult 
opponents because of their entrenched positions and 
their dislike or disdain for argument when conclu- 
sions can be more simply determined by force. Stated 
with the pardonable brusqueness that results from a 
rough sketch, such is the controversial contention that 
is selected for consideration, because its very existence 
is so commonly ignored, either in complacent satis- 
faction with the status quo, or resignation to it, or in 
an imwillin^ess to agitate with uncertain profit, and 
face the possibility of arousing a more aggressive dis- 
trust. 

I 

Among the professed convictions of democracy none 
is more readily urged than the belief in education. All 
adherents, whatever their partisan political affiliations, 
eagerly espouse its cause, as similarly all nations 
profess the cause of peace. But the type of education 
and the conditions under which it shall proceed, like 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 225 

the conditions under which nations will keep the peace, 
are matters of serious contention. For education as 
for peace the critical issue is the placing of that con- 
trol; for education the actual conflict is between the 
several orders of interest contending for a share in the 
social control. 

Education is at once respected and suspected; for 
education protects the past, even as it secures or mort- 
gages the future. It faces the task of reconciling the 
older and the newer order, of making the transition 
from one to the other. In a brisk democratic climate, 
education, if it takes its clue too largely from prece- 
dent, becomes dull and forbidding to the sturdy pro- 
gressives; if it caters too eagerly to the ambitious haste 
of the young and untried, it loses poise and prestige. 
The situation, however, is not so simple, either in fact 
or in statement. 

The parties to the suspicion of education are not 
readily summoned. It is only occasionally, when the 
freedom of speech and action is at stake, that the issue 
comes to trial. The ancient form of the conflict was 
direct and militant, and promptly raised the cry of 
heresy. From charges of heresy to modern indulgent 
tolerance, the change of front is decided. In the old- 
time regime the professor was assumed to be safely 
orthodox. Any deviations from the prescribed path 
were sharply checked by a superior of his own guild. 
In the present order his calling approaches that of an 
accredited pathfinder; if his right of dispensation is 
questioned, it is he who reads the law of trespass upon 
academic freedom. Yet the two expressions are one 
in motive and akin in circumstance. The professor in 



226 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

the land of the free — if he remembers that it is also 
the home of the brave — may attain a democratic 
variety of liberty. If he is moderately vertebrate, de- 
cently considerate, and properly practical, he enjoys 
the freedom of the forum as well as of the academy. 
But restrictions, however themselves restrained, are 
at work; they may not gall, but they chafe. The man 
of ideas is not gagged or muzzled, but tethered. The 
stake is shifted to pastures new when the powers that 
be decide to extend the boundaries of what it is safe 
for the public to know. The restraint handicaps the 
profession as it limits its public service. It is not 
austere, dogmatic, or ceremonial, because these forms 
of expression are imcongenial to a modern platform. 
Yet the suspicion of education remains; the voice is 
Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau. 

In our up-to-date democracy it is not the dead hand 
of the past that stills the voice of the scholar or saps 
the vitality of his utterance, but the mailed fist of the 
present. The fear or the complaint is not that the 
learned tribe are going too fast in tearing up the old, 
but that they are presumptuously interfering with the 
new. The distrust is a pragmatic tribute to learning, in 
that it assumes that what is taught in the academy has 
its effect in the market-place. Suspicion is aroused only 
when real or cherished values are threatened; these vary 
with the changing rallying-points of worldly interests. 

The shifting lines of conservative protest are sug- 
gestive. The sciences and philosophies that deal with 
man — his origin, his nature, his obligations, his des- 
tiny — invite the suspicion of learning. What the peo- 
ple believe on these matters profoundly affects their 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 227 

conduct, and may disturb the established institutions 
that assert a control of such conduct. Beyond this 
range, feeling does not run high because interest is re- 
mote. We must go back a generation or two in time 
and a longer span in ideas, to find an heretical suspi- 
cion of geology, for example. To our retrospect it seems 
a crude loyalty to the Biblical prestige and an insen- 
sitiveness to the ethnological quality of the story of 
creation, that looked upon the geological account as 
a rival. The attitude toward inquiry that entertained 
the suspicion is substantially obsolete. In the ab- 
sence of any sanctified chemistry or physics — apart 
from certain aspects of miracles — these sciences es- 
caped the heretical implication; but they did not 
escape the oppressive, inhospitable, ghetto-like atmos- 
phere of suspicion in which all science had so long to 
live. Astronomy was less fortunate in that the earth 
was the human habitat, and the cosmic system the 
center of all speculation. Such considerations are sig- 
nificant. As a fact, it made no difference to the or- 
dinary citizen whether he believed in the Ptolemaic 
or the Copernican system, except as authority stepped 
in and saw to it that he should be let alone in the one 
case and suitably harassed in the other. But what 
always made a difference was whether the citizen was 
acquiescent and conforming or not, and from whom he 
took his orders — the crucial issue of the social control. 
To tolerate indiscriminate inquiry or condone skepti- 
cism is an invitation to anarchy; no one can tell where 
it will stop. 

It becomes apparent that the suspicion of education 
centers about the knowledge-sources of human control 



228 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and moves with the shifting center of the estabHshed 
institutional interests. In long cultural sweeps it shifts 
from Church to State; within the State from absolute 
authority to mobihzed partisanship, from politics to 
commerce, from one system of fused and composite 
interests to another. The democratic suspicion of edu- 
cation is the dominant one in American affairs. It 
grows out of the complications of theory and practice 
in a highly organized, industrialized community. The 
constructive instincts are bigger and older than the 
intellectual ones. The native human fitness is for do- 
ing things; changing the face of nature is the human 
specialty. The cult of the hand is more universal than 
the cult of the head. The practically occupied part of 
humanity is always the vast majority; the intelligence 
of the practical understanding sets the standards of 
intelligence in all respects and the perspective of in- 
terests yet more conclusively. 

I Biologically, it may be noted, man's only formidable 
weapons are his wits. In his early career he outwitted 
his animal competitors; and the game of life persists 
as a complicated endeavor to outwit one's human 
competitors. It is natural that beyond the point of 
immediate guidance of action, the pursuit of knowledge 
should seem a vanity or a luxury. To the many it is 
such; to the few, not. That ridge forms the great di- 
vide, and eventually estranges the few who live by 
thinking, in a world of ideas, from the many who live 
by doing, in a world of action. The public function 
of education is to reconcile the estrangement, to bring 
the two camps together. 

It is a sobering consideration that the carrying of 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 229 

thinking beyond the stress of the urgent or the immi- 
nent situation is in truth an unnatural process; but 
also that such is the inexorable demand of the artifi- 
cial life. The complimentary designation homo sapiens 
applies feebly to the race at large. To the unsophisti- 
cated mind, getting results by thinking seems a weird, 
uncanny process. Letters and formulae are charms, 
and the laboratory a witches' caldron. Necessity is the 
only accredited mother of invention; and, by the same 
token, laziness must be its father, since labor-saving 
devices are the common features of the progeny. 
Yet that incidental by-product of the problem-solv- 
ing impulse through which was distributed irregu- 
larly among men a liking of the thought-adventure 
and a joy in the mental quest, has proved to be the 
most momentous factor in human evolution. Little 
wonder that genius stands aloof and anomalous, com- 
manding awe and suspicion, and that a like suspicion 
attaches to all practitioners of the thinking arts, black 
and white, ancient and modern. 

With such an heredity the present-day suspicion 
of education becomes more intelligible. But present- 
day conditions seem peculiarly fitted to dispose of the 
suspicion finally. There is so much intermingled, com- 
plicated knowing and doing for so many of us, that 
the intercourse between them is busy and regulated. 
The portals of learning are thrown wide open. A imi- 
versity is democratically defined as an opportunity for 
anybody to learn anything. The cult of learning has 
no longer any hallowed secrets or mystic rites. The 
democratic shift of affairs, reflecting the widespread 
organization of industry and the bigness of it in the 



230 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

perspective of life, has swept the center of social con- 
trol into the stream of the industrial traffic, and es- 
tablished the stock-exchange as the solar plexus of 
communal sensibiUty. 

n 

When the universities, both leading and following 
the political and industrial movement, incorporated 
the newer humanities into the curriculum, the demo- 
cratic suspicion was inevitably concentrated upon these 
studies, as soon as they grew formidable enough to 
assert a direction of affairs. The big business of gov- 
ernment rapidly became hugely complex, and had to 
be organized as much after the manner of studies 
as of office routine or industrial management. The 
methods of investigation and research were alone ade- 
quate to confer insight. The man trained in the school 
of experience occupied one side of the desk, and the 
man trained in the school of organized learning, the 
other. The suspicion of education still hovered near 
and erected an intangible barrier. The question of 
directive control was certain to become a critical issue. 

The effect within the imiversities was marked. It 
weakened the waning hold of the older humanities, and 
in so far removed them from the zone of contention 
toward the neutral territory of the harmless and the 
useless; it also altered the trend and temper of inquiry 
throughout the institution. This movement proceeded 
with safety and sanity in the European universities 
by reason of the firm establishment of the rights and 
dignities of learning and the accredited share of trained 
thinking in the equipment for leadership. In the 



J 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 231 

American universities the parallel conservative ten- 
dencies were negligibly weak or had a different setting. 
In the older institutions of the Atlantic seaboard, en- 
dowed by the loyalties of private patrons and serving 
the interests of the spirit, somewhat locally interpreted, 
for several generations of homogeneous communities, 
the adjustment was gradual. In the receding frontiers 
where territorial and industrial expansion was rapid, 
governmental regulations provisional, situations urgent, 
different solutions of public interests had to be found. 
In that environment any desirable citizen, and many 
an imdesirable one, could be elected or appointed 
upon qualifications moderately unrelated to the func- 
tion to be served, and proceed in office after the man- 
ner of a man of action. The tradition of the respecta- 
bility and the steadying power of learning was not 
lost; each new State established its university almost 
as soon as its capital. The educational institutions 
accepted the conditions and such limited support as 
they made possible, and prospered in varying measure. 
The rest is a matter of rapid history. The distinctive 
and comprehensive fact is that the establishment 
after their manner — in itseK quite unprecedented — 
of the American State Universities presented to the 
interested, and at times amazed world, the reaction 
of thorough-going and untraditional democracy to the 
perplexing claims of learning. 

The primary effect of the contact was obvious. De- 
mocracy raised the criterion of utility, which was legiti- 
mate, and insisted upon prescribing the instruments 
of its attainment, which was questionable. The ban- 
ishment of the classical inutilities was simple; the Greeks 



232 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

had little to offer on facilities of transportation. The 
contentious question of the value of studies may b^ 
side-stepped; but the question of the value of trained 
thinking is vital. To the loyal steward of learning, 
whatever contributes to that end is precious. The 
democratic steam-roller is not a deUcate or a con- 
siderate leveling instrument. Education emerges from 
the operation maimed rather than rectified. The prac- 
tical criterion is derived too narrowly from a limited 
and insistent world of experience; its harsh and un- 
discriminating intrusion distorts the pursuits of learn- 
ing and disturbs its temper. Feebly supported by 
tradition, coerced into immediate responsiveness to 
local pressure, controlled by external and inevitably 
unintelligent authority, the State University is bound 
to compromise such aspirations and ideals as sur- 
vive. Toward the activities of the University the 
practical control dispensed with irregular bounty 
three policies: encouragement, indifference, suspicion. 
The immediately and aggressively practical was en- 
com-aged; the traditional and well-established main- 
stays of learning were tolerated, possibly damned with 
faint praise, possibly permitted to decline by inani- 
tion; the newer studies, with close bearing upon poli- 
tics and business, were pastured and watched. But 
back of all and most vital was the manner of regula- 
tion. Meanwhile the Universities grew, the catalogue 
swelled, the students flocked, the budget waxed apace. 

• 
ni 

The phenomenal and triumphant march of the 
higher education in the United States during the last 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 233 

half -century may be viewed as the visible embodiment 
of the democratic faith in education as the only 
adequate preparation for the modern life. The scale 
of the demonstration, and the measure and manner of 
conviction which it embodies, are apt to escape the 
attention of those to whom the phenomenon is famil- 
iar. It may appear if one considers that presumably 
for the first time in history has the control of the vital 
concerns of education fallen to the direction of the 
people at large. This is the result of the spread of 
democracy, which is one with the spread of education, 
and of the consequent interest in the educational pro- 
visions and the equally consequent desire (considering 
the dominant democratic political temper) to exer- 
cise control over it. Only when the mass of the peo- 
ple were in creditable measure educated — or at least 
the possibility of such education stood close to every- 
body's horizon — could such a situation develop. It 
has developed most typically in the United States by 
reason of the extensive opportunity and intensive 
assertion of the democratic regime; and it appears in 
the fullness of its implications in the growth and ex- 
pansion, as likewise in the manner of control, of the 
State University. The consideration applies to the en- 
tire educational system, but to the University pecu- 
liarly. For the student of the convictions underlying 
education as a great social institution, the manner in 
which the democratic genius has disposed of the distri- 
bution of control is of commanding interest. It is not a 
matter of limited professional concern, least of all is it 
an academic question in the uncomplimentary barren 
sense of discussion without issue; it is a vital issue in 



234 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

public policy. Though a democracy may treat education 
niggardly, and ignore the appalling fact that the cost of 
one battleship will pay for the building and equipment 
of a great university or endow a small college, the edu- 
cational budget and the educational activities form a 
conspicuous feature even in an ungenerous provision. 

Tm-ning to this most practical aspect, we note that 
in regard to the State University, the voting of the 
sinews of war is a legislative function, and thus def- 
initely places the control of education with the lay- 
man. On this matter there must be no illusion; the 
result is not inevitable, but merely actual; for the 
democratic position is decided. The notion that those 
who dance must pay the piper is imiversal; the notion 
that those who pay the piper shall say what and how 
he shall play is democratic. In such measure the box- 
receipts control the career of the drama and the ad- 
vertising columns the editorial pages, — all crude state- 
ments, but in this application not libelous. Next must 
be discarded the academic delusion that by adoption 
of policy one may put asunder what by institutional 
bond goes together. Boards of Trustees or Regents 
may solemnly record that educational questions rest 
with the Faculty and financial ones with the Board; 
but both are parties to self-deception if they believe 
that the resolution affects the facts. Under the actual 
government the real situation is that questions which 
the Board is willing to leave to the Faculty define the 
latter's province; and such decisions as the Legislature 
is willing to leave to the Board determine the orbit of 
its powers. The determination of control, within the 
college walls and without, is of one complexion. 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 235 

In the machinery for the regulation of the State 
Universities, the democratic suspicion of education 
has an unprecedented opportunity to reveal its exis- 
tence and its quality. Here the student of education, 
with a taste for diagnosis, finds the tale-telling symp- 
toms. Of the first order of significance is the transfer 
of the policy and spirit of the practical life to the aca- 
demic economy. The germ responsible for the most 
acute symptom is that insidious bacterial agency known 
as "efficiency." The expansion of business, including 
the business of government, has developed a technique 
of its own; through its mastery was to be secured the 
largest share of social control. The business technique, 
and still more disastrously the business attitude, comes 
into sharp and direct conflict with the scholarly tem- 
per and disinterested habit of mind of the inquirer. 
The one criterion is tangible and intelligible; the other, 
intangible, uncertain, and difficult. The practical man's 
control advances or implies or imposes the view that 
the same methods that bring success in business must 
apply and have like value in education. The Univer- 
sity "plant" must be weighed and surveyed, and if 
found wanting. Dr. Efficiency will prescribe. The rat- 
ing of the student-factory is to be judged by its out- 
put. Time-slips and unit-costs tell all the story that a 
busy man has time to consider. The professor fills out 
a tediously complete question-sheet, and a clerk tabu- 
lates just what he is worth. Those who have followed 
the situation know that this is not an exaggeration or 
a travesty, but in at least one instance an under-state- 
ment of the crude attempt under legislative warrant 
to apply an irrelevant appraisal to a great University's 



236 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION j 

activity. This may be paralleled in another instance by 
the wanton disregard of intellectual interests through the 
autocratic withholding of the University's appropria- 
tions by the Governor of the State. In the latter case 
the danger of power in unintelligent hands, as of the pos- 
sible fate of learning imder political handling, is drasti- 
cally illustrated; in the former case, the danger of car- 
rying a totally imsuitable method of appraisal to the 
extreme of an obsession. In both instances the motive 
force is the insistence upon a practical standard, with 
the consequent suspicion of sound learning not immedi- 
ately translatable into commercially negotiable terms. 
In both instances the most obvious and essential of 
practical policies, that of providing every worthy en- 
terprise with the conditions favorable to its finest 
possibilities, is grossly disregarded. When education 
is appraised by irrelevant standards, its cause, however 
attentively Hstened to, fails to get a hearing. The 
pleading and the defense come to assume the argu- 
ments acceptable to the business mind. The triumphs 
of science are quoted as increasing dividends obtained 
by conversion of the baser metal of inquiry into the 
gold of application. Under cover of such benefit, char- 
ity is solicited for the poor relations of the educa- 
tional household. Morganatic alliances of culture and 
agriculture are entered into to secure the interests of 
the future. Defend, excuse, condone, regret, bewail or 
censiu-e the situation as one's conscience or one's tem- 
perament decides; but let it not be ignored. Such are 
the controlling factors of the interests of education 
under democratic control. 

Perhaps the strangest manifestation of the demo- 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 237 

cratic suspicion of education is the complaint that the 
educational interests do not remain free from the taint 
of political influence which democracy has itself im- 
posed. Common and loud is the cry that the State 
University is "in politics." Forced by its constitution 
to be a political dependency, pricked into an alert re- 
sponsiveness to public pressure, unprotected by an 
adequate bill of rights or permanence of policy, ex- 
posed to inquisitive periodical digging-up of such roots 
as get a start in the meager soil, how shall it be other- 
wise? The educational present is no sooner liberated 
by favorable or complacent measures than the future 
becomes uncertain by a turn of political fortune. Poli- 
tics makes strange bedfellows, and the State Univer- 
sity is called to account for the character of its involun- 
tary associates. It is not only possible, but supremely 
easy, to free the State University of all undesirable 
political aflSliations. A single measure properly framed 
would secure adequate financial support and legal 
seciu-ity. But that would diminish the external con- 
trol and give the directive policy to those profes- 
sionally qualified to exercise it; and there's the rub, 
for the democratic suspicion of education will not have 
it so. 

To acquit the Universities of all accountability for 
the unfortunate situation would disclose an academic 
bias. For the most part the Universities have played 
the game with Httle or no protest at all. They have 
consented to make it a game. Many a worthy Uni- 
versity president has entered the office as a scholar and 
left it as a poHtician. Some have not the original 
handicap to overcome. Some entertain the imperial 



238 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ambition to leave in marble what they fomid in brick. 
Others give due consideration to the principle that a 
university is composed of men. And thus we reach 
the indiscreet question: Who is (or who are) the Uni- 
versity? On this issue one may be as neutral as the 
Sphinx and as politic as the University president, and 
yet recognize that for the suspicion of education, the 
University is the Faculty. No legal disfranchisement 
conceals the true relation. The professor in his im- 
protesting timidity may be dubbed the "third sex"; 
but the unerring test, with the truth of psychological 
revelation, leads to the actual source of influence. By 
following the trail of suspicion one reaches the knowl- 
edge of the scholar and discloses the fear of trained 
thinking. 

IV 

It is well to carry diagnosis a little farther and ob- 
serve how the men of knowledge and the men of action 
come to clash. Application needs no defense, and specu- 
lation to be profitable must be kept within bounds. 
The divorce of thinking from the vitality of fact and 
the experienced habit of mind leads to refined but 
inconsequential rumination. The scholastic sterility is 
the historical justification of the suspicion of educa- 
tion; but for the American situation it is as remote as 
the accusation of witchcraft. The lines of conflict are 
assembled about the standards by which utility is to 
be judged. The practical mind in this aspect of its 
operation is strangely blind or inconsistent. The charge 
may be made respectfully, for it is recognized that all 
men except fools have their irrational sides. The prac- 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 239 

tical mind appreciates the benefits of science, its re- 
cent gifts especially. The telegraph, telephone, elec- 
tric light, motors, and automobiles are indispensable 
to business. A vote of thanks is in order; but there the 
matter ends. Of the intellectual supports of science, 
the depths of its foundations, the immensity of its 
scope, of the world and the life which it expresses and 
the consecration which it imposes, there are but vague 
notions. The notion approaches definiteness in the 
suspicion that a demand for a favorable scientific at- 
mosphere is a clever but specious plea, whose real 
purpose is to extract uncontrolled appropriations 
and secure immunity from investigation. Deliver the 
goods, and to those who have shall be given. 

The practical emphasis is legitimate just so far as 
it is intelligent. But the source of insight is the hidden 
spring from which all blessings flow, and which, like 
all springs, will run dry unless constantly replenished. 
The effect of unintelligent democratic practicality is 
composite. It encourages the equalizing education, and 
makes a pet of university extension and all that may 
be spread widely and thinly. The recognition or cul- 
tivation of superior fitness is viewed with suspicion. 
Learning is necessary, even admirable, so long as it 
serves. Learn all there is to know, but bring the learn- 
ing to the practical man, and let him direct its employ- 
ment. Those who come with unprofitable accumu- 
lations or with empty hands have only themselves or 
the system of education to blame. The expert, like the 
laborer, is worthy of his hire and no more; and to be 
thus worthy, he must perform a desired and a pre- 
scribed service. The twentieth-century expansion of 



240 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

industry and government requires the services of 
trained thinking in systems of taxation and transpor- 
tation, in regulation of natural resources and public 
utihties. The employment of the trained thinker is 
one matter; his in vesture with authority quite an- 
other. As a clerk to a business-minded commissioner 
he is acceptable, but as a commissioner, questionable. 
The brimt of the suspicion goes back to the Univer- 
sity of which he is a product, and which sets his affilia- 
tions. To the politically minded, affiliation is always 
of a political cast. The scholar in public service be- 
longs to the University Party; and party pohtics is a 
ruthless struggle for social control. The State Uni- 
versity is urged by the practical turn of the democra- 
tic institution to apply its resom-ces to the problems of 
the day and the hour, and by the very thoroughness 
with which it accepts the obligation, it arouses the 
suspicion of its service. "Serve, but do not aspire to 
control,'* would be a suitable motto for its portals, if 
peace at any price were its policy. "Let thy knowl- 
edge be another's power," is a proper text for a bacca- 
lam-eate sermon that seeks democratic approval. 



The suspicion of education has another and a most 
significant aspect. Regulation and control are means; 
the satisfaction of needs is an end. Between the two, 
morality steps in and justifies or denounces means and 
ends. Conflict of policy is serious; conflict of motive 
even more so. The regulation of public good and pri- 
vate advantage is the oldest political problem, but not 
older than the moral principles by which it alone can 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 241 

be safely and sanely solved. The enduring tempta- 
tion is to use the political machinery for private in- 
terests. Lobbyists range from philanthropists to scoun- 
drels. The back-door channels of influence, secret 
understandings, bartering of measure for measure, ex- 
tend the mechanism of control deviously and dubi- 
ously. Despite distressful exceptions, the party of the 
larger knowledge has been the party of the firmer right- 
eousness. A sensitiveness to the intellectual values, if 
education is permitted to express its inherent quality, 
sensitizes to moral values as well. Times alter expres- 
sion; but the custody of learning does not lose its 
priestly function. Were this not so, a university might 
degenerate to a training-school for "crooks.''' The 
atmosphere of ideas and ideals is one. In it must flour- 
ish such measure of disinterested endeavor as is com- 
patible with a rigorous democratic climate. 

The political suspicion of education thus acquires 
an added motive. To interpret the implication crudely 
would be unjust; to ignore it is misleading. The sins 
of society grow with its complexity and rise with its 
level. The standards of propriety that divide men are 
delicate and involved. Compromises which one man 
sanctions and another condemns are not black but 
variously shaded. It is altogether too true that the 
standards congenial to the political habit of mind, 
with its short-sighted vision focused upon immediate 
advantage, leave convictions forlorn and principles 
**all tattered and torn." To make the worse appear 
the better cause is the ancient temptation of the battle 
of wits. Hypocrites, demagogues, "confidence men," 
artful dodgers and copious shufflers, all shades and 



242 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

grades of frauds, persist among men and prove the 
moral neutrality of heredity. These engaging quali- 
ties in their modern guise appear less as vices than as 
failings; they are toned down to the manners of re- 
spectability, but the disguise is often as crude as the 
underlying quality. You cannot wholly avoid them by 
joining University Clubs; and to their shame, the Uni- 
versity's graduates have not always proved its truest 
knight-defenders in the political jousts. An insensi- 
bility to intellectual values and to moral distinctions 
alike contribute to a suspicion of education. The up- 
holders of the broader learning, as of the finer integ- 
rity, will continue to love the cause of education for the 
enemies she makes. 

It should not be overlooked that in developing its 
position, the democratic suspicion of learning has im- 
provised an educational platform. The democratic 
view sets forth that as one man is as good as another, 
or at least no better, so is one study as fit as another. 
Education has no center and an accommodating pe- 
riphery. This convenient theory finds defenders within 
the University, possibly as a comforting echo of the 
sentiment without. If students find difficulties in en- 
trance requirements, whittle away the requirements, 
and graduate candidates upon terms which they can 
conveniently meet. The increasing nmnber of college 
graduates may always be pointed to to prove the grow- 
ing enhghtenment of the State. If a man is not equal 
to his task, adjust the task to the man, or accept what 
he can do. By eliminating quality the world is won- 
derfully simplified, the academic world especially. 
Consequences multiply. Those within the University 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 243 

who yield to the popular clamor attract the elective 
aflfinities of the student, and more and more set the 
standard of presentation and performance. Injection 
of the practical motive doubles the attendance of 
the complacent professor's courses; and, however re- 
sisted by the professors more loyal to ideals, by such 
returns is their academic status affected. Foundations 
are slighted, engaging but uncritical interpretations 
sponsored, half-baked theories advanced, and equally 
indigestible conclusions swallowed. The process has 
gone on long enough to affect the quality of the recruits 
to the learned career. The rewards of practice attract, 
and the disqualifications of the learned profession re- 
pel. The selection is lowered, and enough of the weaker 
sort enter the Faculties to give imwelcome support to 
the contention of the practical men that the profes- 
sional man is no better equipped for responsibility than 
any one else. Too frequently insecure in professional 
virility, the practical aspirant for preferment finds it 
easier to impress the layman than the judgment of his 
peers. The suspicion of education lowers the profes- 
sional standard alike of learning and of learners. 

Such is the true if unpopular story of the educational 
situation. The text and its elaboration may not be 
suitable for a congratulatory Commencement address. 
To the serious and sincere it induces reflection, per- 
haps dejection; but despondency is largely tempera- 
mental; hope and despair commonly enjoy the same 
outlook. There is no question that theory and prac- 
tice will continue in business together. The warrant 
for the decline of the fear of trained thinking lies in 
the fact that the political and the industrial expansion 



244 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

demand it; the larger experience will restore the truer 
perspective and the broader sympathy. The move- 
ment in that direction, by the inertia of the masses 
concerned, is slow and irregular. Under the banner 
of Efficiency men may proceed jauntily to brief and 
startling reform; under the same misleading ensign the 
reaction from its disappointments, sincere or feigned, 
will proceed to a stronger entrenchment of the practi- 
cal man and a withdrawal of such favor to the cause of 
new learning as new movements dispense. The effect 
seems to be the substitution of an indiscriminate for 
a partial suspicion of learning. 

Yet it would be neither fair nor wise to conclude with 
this despairing note. It is well to consider that matters 
might be worse. There are more menacing dangers to 
the cause of education than a democratic suspicion, 
there is an autocratic control. Of this the saddest ex- 
ample that the modern world has discovered to its 
dismay, is furnished by the educational system that 
American institutions have copied with greatest re- 
spect. The world war has revealed the extent to 
which the positions and preferments of professors in 
German Universities is determined by complacent 
agreement with governmental policies. Such conform- 
ity has gone to the extent of shaping doctrine to sup- 
port the policies of those in power and supplying them 
with the prostituted sanction of learning. Such a con- 
dition subjects the freedom of teaching, not to sus- 
picion or limitation, but to a perversion worse than 
any possible encroachment by unwise distribution of 
control. Under this startling revelation the cause of 
academic freedom has assumed an international im- 



DEMOCRATIC SUSPICION OF EDUCATION 245 

portance. It makes clearer to democratic institutions 
the sanctity of educational ideals and gives the intel- 
lectual interests a clearer share in the safeguarding of 
democracy. Learning must be free, not alone to di- 
rect practice wisely, but to perform its service for the 
commonwealth; such service consists in the command 
of scientific principles which is the warrant of the ex- 
pert, and the loyalty to moral principles which in 
considerable measure are likewise under the priestly 
custody of the disciples of learning. With the danger 
of an unwise control of educational interests thus dis- 
mally revealed, the truly practical man, the broadly 
practical man, will more readily appreciate the impor- 
tance of abandoning his suspicion and yielding to the 
professional guardians of learning a far larger and more 
authoritative control than is now exercised. No pro- 
fession can maintain itself or its ideals, can attract to 
its calling the finest minds, that does not control the 
standards of its guild and command the confidence of 
the public. The indispensable step toward such an 
issue in a democratic nation is to dismiss the suspicion 
of education as an obsolete heritage from an unenlight- 
ened past. Conviction must precede reform; a survey 
of the forces shaping such conviction may serve as an 
approach to a more fortunate imderstanding. 



IX 

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE: 
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO 

For presenting a controversial issue in which the voice 
of psychology may be heard, the question of indulgence, 
more particularly the "case" of alcohol and tobacco, 
presents many advantages as well as perplexities. It 
is a question upon which persons of comparable intel- 
lectual and social status, of like concern for matters 
of morality and of health, of similar outlook and edu- 
cation, hold divergent and even strenuously opposed 
convictions. The problem presents widely varying 
aspects in different countries, under different tradi- 
tions, which in turn are reflected in the mode of regu- 
lation of these indulgences, in the social customs sur- 
rounding their use, and particularly in the attitude 
assimaed toward them by the prevalent public opin- 
ion. These varieties and contrasts are the issue of the 
cumulative historical forces that always shape modes 
and standards of living. Other days, other ways; from 
one generation to another, under special stress of cir- 
cumstance and in response to an alert social conscience, 
views change moderately or decidedly. In addition, the 
scientific decision in regard to the effect of alcohol 
and tobacco turns upon technical investigations in 
physiology and medicine, involving difficult and in- 
tricate interpretation. Moreover, a definite stand in 
the matter is not easily avoided, alike in theory and 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 247 

in practice. The situation invites if it does not compel 
a positive attitude and decision. The question of the 
regulation of such indulgences is certain to become a 
public concern, and may become an acute political 
issue. Public sentiment and public opinion determine 
personal attitudes narrowly or liberally; very differ- 
ent atmospheres surround the indulgences, leaning to- 
ward approval, or tolerance, or indifference, or con- 
demnation, or uncompromising animosity. Politically 
these may assume a local, or a provincial, or a national 
importance. Such movements at times gain a favor- 
able and rapid headway, and again are treated com- 
placently or with slight concern. In a disinterested 
view the attempt in the United States to establish a 
political party on the question of regulating by pro- 
hibiting the traffic in alcohol, is an amazing anomaly. 
If party organizations were generally carried on in 
this spirit, there would arise as many parties as there 
are planks in a platform; and the problem of securing 
a democratic expression of opinion would become even 
more hopelessly complicated than it now is. Though 
it may be formulated politically, the liquor question 
is considered morally. It inspires violent harangue as 
well as sober condemnation. In some quarters it is 
presented as the most serious menace to civilization; 
and the thousands of wrecked lives and unhappy homes 
traceable to the liquor habit form the tragic and indis- 
putable evidence of the gravity of the problem. Though 
so nearly equally controlled by moral, hygienic, social, 
and practical considerations, it is in the main the moral 
aspects that shape the contours of the issue; in this 
respect legislation follows public sentiment or yields to 



248 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

it. The practical side is represented by the question 
of extravagance and the obstacle to thrift, and by the 
economic effect upon the efficiency and reliability of 
labor. Irregular living, diminished returns, enfeebled 
energies, stand as the charge when the "case" of alco- 
hol is called. 

For all these reasons the attitude toward the use of 
alcohol, and in lesser measure — thus serving as a 
helpful comparison — toward the use of tobacco, may 
profitably be considered as types of complex convic- 
tions. The larger bearings of the regulation of these 
indulgences are not here to be considered; our concern 
is only with the forces that shape convictions and atti- 
tudes. In this view alcohol and tobacco become "cases" 
of indulgence; for psychologically that is the larger 
aspect — not necessarily the more important aspect 
• — that includes them. Under these limitations the 
manner of formation, and in some measure the jus- 
tification of convictions, is made central and deter- 
mines what shall be included in and what omitted from 
the present survey. Obviously the pros and cons of 
statistical data, of technical investigation, and of politi- 
cal situations belong to other domains; as do also the 
policies to be reached and made effective after due 
consideration of all sides and interests. Of large bear- 
ing upon such decision, however reached or whatever 
its complexion, is the general principle that the prac- 
tical setting of the indulgence — which is a matter 
of the attitude toward it, and thus fundamentally 
psychological — itself determines the moral and man- 
nerly side of it, and through these the. measure and 
nature of the abuse and the consequent evils. As un- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 249 

questionably established as the evils of intemperance 
and the menace of .unwise indulgence (all with refer- 
ence to one's temperament and surroundings) is the 
psychological fact that the influences attaching to such 
indulgence can go far to reduce or to aggravate the 
dangers, to give the indulgence a favorable or unfav- 
orable setting. The American saloon and the manner 
in which liquor is used, and the occasions and associa- 
tions of the drink-habit, may have more to do with 
the evils of alcohol than its intrinsic and inherent men- 
ace. The environment of the potation may be more 
decisive than the alcoholic ingredient. And this means 
that the problem must be considered discriminatingly; 
the discrimination must extend to details and circum- 
stances, alike physiological, psychological, and more 
generally social. Even the percentage of alcohol, which 
represents the strength of the craving, — whether for 
brief, strong, violent stimulation, or for leisurely, con- 
vivial, moderate easement, — may be the determin- 
ing factor that directs the indulgence to restraint and 
an innocent sociability, or degrades it to abandon and 
irresponsibility. For tobacco the parallel alternative 
may be between using the weed for solace and the sym- 
bol of leisure, or for excitation and relief of tension 
during intensive work. In all this apparent detach- 
ment there is no intention to ignore other and practi- 
cally more important aspects of the "case" of alcohol 
and tobacco. The set limitations of the essay imply a 
familiarity with such other bearings, in order to make 
way for a treatment on a larger scale, of the special 
psychological considerations that are so easily over- 
looked. The psychologist, like every other specialist, 



250 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

finds in a common problem the material for his special 
interests and interpretation. In so far as he sets himr 
seK the troubled task of illustrating in terms of the 
psychology of indulgence, the general manner in which 
controversial attitudes are shaped, he must face the 
consequences of his venture. He may be content if he 
carries the conviction of the pertinence of his approach, 
whether there is acceptance or rejection of his conclu- 
sions. 



It is conceded that, by and large, the affairs of the 
body affect the business of the mind, that substan- 
tially every physiological adjustment involves a psy- 
chological one. When the effect is carried primarily 
through the nervous system, the relation may be af- 
firmed unreservedly. Such direction of the joint affairs 
of body and mind regularly assumes a moral aspect, 
readily makes demand for economic regulation, and 
may appear militantly in political policies, or give rise 
to a complex social problem in a problem-conscious 
age. In the hue and cry against the use of tobacco and 
alcohol — in excess a serious social evil — are raised 
many voices of denimciation. The clamor is loud but 
confused; for the cause, like other causes, makes strange 
bedfellows. Extravagant tirade, a noisy campaign cry 
of extermination, high-pitched moral concern, lusty 
prejudice, sanctimonious preachment, sober judg- 
ment, political hubbub, contribute to the Babel of 
tongues. In such an issue where passions, though of 
milder partisan temper, are engaged, a broad rea- 
sonableness of view makes for poise and sanity and 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 251 

tolerance alike. The present essay presents the con- 
viction that a consideration of the psychology of in- 
dulgence may promote a helpful attitude toward an 
admittedly controversial issue. 

A college student, after a patient trial of the some- 
what strange menu of a "health" restaurant, came to 
the reasonable conclusion that there was no substitute 
for food. To this we may agree, and agree as well that 
it behooves us to exercise discretion in regard to what 
shall pass the lips and sustain our being. Such is the 
dispensation of nature that links in close sympathy 
digestion and disposition. It is, however, not alto- 
gether a simple matter to distinguish between foods 
and stimulants, and aids to digestion; for these are 
of many varieties and in their effect encounter a 
complex physiology, are subject to the individual 
susceptibility that proverbially makes one man's meat 
another's poison. When the chemistry of nutrition 
and the physiology of digestion have had their say 
and have been duly heeded, the food problem is not 
disposed of, at least not in the case of the more com- 
plexly organized members of the species, to whom 
consideration may be directed. It begins as the 
relatively simple problem of feeding, and presently 
assumes the composite complexion of dining; and the 
diner, with no exemption from the primitive satisfac- 
tion of universal needs, is none the less a social, sesthe- 
tic, moral, and intellectual being capable and desirous 
of a generous round of as worthy (or, at least, as inno- 
cent) gratij&cations as his endowments, tastes, and cir- 
cumstances may afford. He wishes to participate in 
the enjoyments of good, and likewise of sound living. 



252 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

That the pleasures of the table play some proper part 
in the art of living, and contribute effectively if mod- 
estly to the formation of standards and levels of cul- 
ture, is abundantly attested by the tried and approved 
customs of many sorts and conditions of society. Hos- 
pitality is an ancient virtue and an abiding one. Good- 
fellowship, the widening of sympathies and outlooks, 
the stimulations of intercourse and temperate dis- 
cussion of the affairs of state or philosophy are pro- 
moted by the companionship of the table. A German 
saying, by a play of words, sets forth that a man is what 
he eats ; it would be truer to say that how a man eats 
is a clue to his nature. At all events, the ceremonies 
of the repast and table-manners come to serve as a 
critical index of refinement. Psychologically, the trans- 
formation from feeding to dining is a convincing ex- 
ample of the evolution by which the exercise of a 
natural function acquires a worthy social status by 
surrounding it with the several embellishments avail- 
able to an sesthetic natm-e. Released from the grosser 
claims of urgent hunger and absorption in the cruder 
sensory stimulations, we add to physiological appe- 
tite — ever the best because the natiu-al sauce — sup- 
plementary allurements of spice, garnishing, flavor, 
setting, and such arts of gastronomy as we conunand. 
In thus elevating a necessity to a function, we are ever 
appealing to the more delicate, and are subordinating 
the grosser satisfactions. Nor need we become heed- 
less of the superior injunction of plain living and high 
thinking enjoined by our moral nature, that in turn 
subordinates the dinner to the diners. The quality of 
the former can never atone for any notable defections 



■J 



/ 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 253 

in the qualities of the latter. Yet to attain the repu- 
tation of a welcome dinner guest and to participate 
worthily in the communion that ministers to daily- 
needs is an attainment not to be slighted. The culti- 
vation of the zests of life, of the alleviations of the 
day's sterner occupations, presents a claim that cannot 
be denied without losing something of the fullness of 
living. It is true with more than one reference that 
man does not live by bread alone. 

The appreciation thus defended, itself makes for 
moderation. It sets forth the service of the seasonings 
and garnishings, and by that token does not mistake 
them for the solid ingredients of the courses them- 
selves. It allies itself with the amenities, the luxuries, 
the leisure, and the surplusage of life, from which many 
choice blossoms emanate; it contributes the order of 
gratification that tends to advance the standards of 
living. It does not depreciate abuse nor become un- 
mindful of temptation; the very presence of tempered 
restraint is part of the flavor. Such appreciation may 
properly point with disfavor to the neglect of that 
which it cherishes, to bemoan the scant place accorded 
to its interests in a recklessly busy occupation, snatch- 
ing hasty bites at "quick-lunch" counters, tolerant 
of bad cooking, insensible to the unsavoriness of a 
rushing or a mussy existence. If the cultivation of 
standards of good living be our aim, it seems reason- 
able to enlist in the cause all the various aids of high 
and low degree, that may contribute to the common 
end; nor need we fear, if we have any confidence in 
the stability of our individual, social, or national 
character, that the presence of restrained indulgence 



254 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

will mar the perspective and detract from the higher, 
by attention to the lower satisfactions, or by exposm'e 
to temptation endanger the power of resistance. Man- 
liness is to be and often must be trusted as well as 
sheltered; and by the very confidence that we express 
in self-control, we pay tribute to its worth. Ideals 
need not suffer in their pragmatic contact with the 
convincing realities of our many-sided nature, respon- 
sive to the versatile appeals of a many-sided world. 
It is rather in om* skill in making the conventions of 
society the instruments of worthy purposes that we 
show our quality and attain the full stature of a privi- 
leged humanity. 

II 

All this may seem an ambitious, even an irrelevant 
prelude to quite too slight a theme to sustain it. Yet 
the argument is of one nature; the keynote is that 
of the psychology of indulgence. Men will look very 
differently upon the place that may properly be pro- 
vided or sanctioned for such indulgences as alcohol 
and tobacco, according to their views of indulgence 
in general, of the legitimate demand to be conceded to 
cravings that stand close to vital needs, and by such in- 
timacy incur the danger of disturbing the general econ- 
omy. Men will be judged by the direction of choice 
and desire — guided by morals, manners, and ideals 
— among the varieties of indulgence afforded by the 
democracy of common opportunity or the aristocracy 
of special privilege. That the glass of wine at the table 
and the cigar after it have come to take their part in 
the scheme of indulgent gratification that promotes 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE ^55 

fellowship, and in such social service, under the usual 
sanctions and restrictions of convention, have served 
their purpose well, may be advanced with quite as 
much warmth and pertinence as has inspired the fierce 
and imdiscriminating denunciations that recognize 
only the serious evils of intoxication and an intem- 
perate tobacco habit. It will ever remain the case that 
for this or that individual or group, in consideration 
of the dangers to which the use of alcohol and tobacco 
is undeniably open, the only safe and the only wise 
policy is that of abstinence; but if we are prepared to 
guide policy by knowledge and reason, it is but fair 
that the several aspects of the problem, alike for prin- 
ciple and for practice, be considered together and with- 
out prejudice. 

A comprehensive antipathy to alcohol and tobacco 
is expressed in the verdict that places them in the in- 
dex exprn-gatorium of drugs, and speaks of the indul- 
gence in their use, however moderate or occasional, 
as a drug-habit. It allies them with cocaine, morphine, 
opium, and similar psychic poisons, and once reach- 
ing the term "poison" has seemingly proved its case. 
This is certainly a striking example of the danger in- 
herent in assuming an intolerant attitude toward a 
practice admittedly open to serious danger in its 
abuse; it also illustrates that such danger is not theo- 
retical but woefully real in the American situation and 
temperament. In this aspect it is akin to the similarly 
expressed extreme antagonism to the use of drugs in 
any form, for any purpose. The exponents of drug- 
less healing illustrate the menace of conviction when 
it is undiscriminating in its premises and uncomprom- 



256 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

ising in its conclusions. It is wrong — the argument 
goes — to administer drugs; for drugs are unnatural, 
and many of them are poisons. Cults, such as Chris- 
tian Science and Dowie's Zionism, are inspired by such 
argument; and the appeal is ever to the obvious ex- 
amples of excess, the victims of drug-habits that ob- 
sess and possess them to their undoing. Let children 
die through neglect of available treatment; let the 
pangs of disease and the tortures of injured tissues 
bring suffering to the full; let pestilence spread; but 
let us abjure drugs at whatever cost! It is entirely 
fair to adduce this amazing example of inhuman- 
ity fostered and advocated on the basis of just such 
type of undiscriminating prejudice as is often directed 
against other practices — admittedly, as in the case 
of tobacco or alcohol, with very different charges and 
quite different defense. It is fair, because only thus 
can one make plain the danger inherent in such atti- 
tudes, however worthy the motives or the causes in 
which they are enlisted. They make directly for un- 
reason that is ever potentially vicious and dangerous. 
Whenever a campaign is inspired by the spirit of prej- 
udice and unreason, the interests of sanity and sane 
regulation are jeopardized; every movement that con- 
ducts its enterprises by means of such appeals assails 
the rationality of the commimity and paves the way 
for fanaticism. It is reasonableness in all crises, as in 
lesser occasions of moment, that is the fundamental 
resource of wholesome judgment and policy, alike in 
hygiene, in morals, in politics, and the many con- 
troversial issues of public weKare. 
One is tempted to go farther afield to illustrate the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 257 

menace of unreason as applied to problems concern- 
ing hygienic and moral measures that affect the rights 
of the individual and of society. Upon the basis of a 
similarly inspired opposition — and one quite as un- 
intelligent — we have the anti-vaccinationists; and 
reaching to higher circles where prejudices, like other 
beliefs, acquire a more moralized statement, the anti- 
vivisectionists. It is gratifying to record that Ameri- 
can conditions up to the present have not been as fav- 
orably disposed toward this propaganda of unreason 
as to others; ^ yet it is possible to cite the well-known 
fact that a popular periodical, which ministers to the 
relaxations of life and stands for that sanity of view 
which a sense of humor so notably confers, which cir- 
culates among the more cultivated classes of society, 
incessantly preaches an ignorant and false crusade, 

^ Since these words were written, the occasion for recalling them 
has arisen. The "Red Cross" has been sued by the anti-vivisection- 
ists to prevent the use of one hundred thousand dollars appropriated 
by the War Council for medical research to relieve suffering and 
diminish the death-rate among war casualties of our own soldiers. 
A more amazing instance of the menace of intentional ignorance and 
obstinate prejudice is hardly imaginable. To insist upon a senti- 
mental objection against experiments upon animals at such a critical 
time in the history of the nation, in brutal disregard of the facts and 
in impertinent opposition to the expert conviction of medical proof, 
is as preposterous as it is inhumane. To state that vivisection has 
brought no benefit to mankind in face of the overpowering evidence 
to the contrary, shows the utter blindness to evidence of a convinced 
sentimental prejudice; to urge that prejudice at this time and thus 
to cripple the humanitarian efforts that redeem the awful calamities 
of war, shows the complete disregard of humane considerations to 
which unreason may lead. In the face of this instance of bigoted 
opinion, the strictures above applied to it seem criminally lenient. 
Like the delusions of the insane — to which such fanaticism is allied 
— the distinction between innocent and dangerous beliefs is most 
treacherous. Society cannot afford an attitude of tolerance; the men- 
ace of extreme conviction is too serious. 



258 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

brutally misrepresents the noble army of experts who 
are carrying the triumphs of science into the field of 
deepest concern to humane interests, criticizes with- 
out authority and ignores the open records of achieve- 
ment; while in the main stultifying its own position, 
it unquestionably fosters the cause of prejudice. With 
such a flagrant example of a campaign of unreason 
circulating among those most favored in condition 
and education, it is well to proceed cautiously in all 
issues prone to arouse prejudice. It is, indeed, pertinent 
to observe that vivisection, vaccination, and the use 
of stimulants are essentially medical questions. This 
does not mean that physicians alone have the right 
to an opinion on the matter; it does mean that the same 
methods of scientific study must be applied to them as 
to all other problems in which the popular judgment 
must defer to the expert. Of the three, the vaccina- 
tion question is clearly the most technical, the one in 
which a positive lay conviction in opposition to an 
established medical conclusion is most impertinent. 
Yet in this issue the method of prejudice loses none 
of its violence, is no more considerate of fact, than in 
more legitimately controversial matters, in which the 
nice adjustment of individual liberty and social wel- 
fare require a fair hearing of all interests. 

All such issues revolve about the claims of senti- 
ment as against reason. The proper appraisal of sen- 
timent must be tactfully as well as charitably reached. 
The opposition to vivisection is more intelligible than 
that which inspires the anti- vaccinationists.^ It rests 

* It is familiar that the sentiment against dissection of the human 
body, reinforced by the authority of the Church, delayed for cen- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 259 

upon a sentiment that is cordially approved, but not 
as a principle to be followed at any price. In the view 
of humane men of science, vivisection is amply jus- 
tified by the benefits which it confers upon the human 
race; to abandon it or even unduly restrict it would 
be a costly sacrifice to sentiment. The use of alcohol 
is obviously a more debatable matter, essentially a 
different order of issue, and reaches to the field of per- 
sonal and social even more than of medical regulation. 
It is well, however, to consider related issues in order 
to appreciate the common psychology of their setting; 
to appreciate that the formation of conviction upon 
such issues is in each case affected by a decidedly simi- 
lar play of forces. The perspective of consideration in 
all of them shows comparable factors; the wise deci- 
sion of each proceeds by the same methods. In all, 
tolerance of divergent attitudes and the avoidance of 
fanatic convictions are indispensable. No one of these 
questions can be solved wisely, viewed sanely, regu- 
lated wholesomely, unless it is brought and kept well 
within the sphere of discussion dominated by a judicial 
temper, and subject, when pertinent, to expert, scien- 
tific judgment. That the same danger threatens the 
attitude toward the use of alcohol and tobacco appears 
in the legislation that requires textbooks for boys and 
girls to recite — often with a misleading emphasis and 
always with an unwholesome one — the shocking 
physiological consequences of over-indulgence in alco- 

turies the advance of the basal medical sciences, even after these 
interests had been scientifically established. Although the force of 
proscription was more powerfully exercised in those days, and the ob- 
jectors had a different sentimental background, it is clearly akin to 
that now operative in more restricted measure. 



260 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

hoi and tobacco, as a part of an elementary introduc- 
tion to the principles of physiology. Such legislation 
is inspired by a propaganda conducted with mistaken 
zeal and persisted in despite the emphatic protest of 
experts in physiology and hygiene, as well as of the 
lay sponsors of sound teaching and sane views. 

Ill 

In the present sirrvey it is not possible to consider 
in any adequate manner the findings of those who 
have calmly and scientifically investigated the effects 
of alcohol or tobacco, or to interpret their sober con- 
clusions upon which alone a wise decision as to their 
mode of use or regulation can be based; or, again, to 
consider the economic regulation that the extensive 
traffic in these commodities demands. On these issues 
let those speak who speak with authority; and may 
they find a reasonable public to listen to their verdicts. 
The present concern is with the psychological influ- 
ences that affect convictions in regard to the use of 
these indulgences, and determine the attitudes toward 
them, including the attitude of unremitting antago- 
nism and uncompromising opposition. 

It may be well to refer briefly to the judicial type 
of opposition, which is more likely to be met in the 
case of tobacco, because its use is looked upon more 
indulgently. Yet in sober statements we may read 
that the use of tobacco roughens or toughens the moral 
fiber, that smokers disregard the rights of others, that 
the habit is disgusting and will appear so if one thinks 
about it in the right way. The first type of statement 
will carry only when it is conceded that only the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 261 

wrong kind of people smoke; for it stands, not by proof 
of observation, but of prejudice quite as justifiable, 
doubtless as a predilection in favor of smoking and a 
preference for the custom and its associations. The 
sesthetic argument is sound; but it is interesting to 
observe to what uses it may be put. The same order 
of reflection that might induce one to give up smok- 
ing may also direct one's contemplation to the inher- 
ent unsesthetic character, the slimy nastiness, of a 
soft-boiled egg, so that ever after it will be a loathsome 
object. One might also bring to bear humanitarian 
considerations, and decide that it is wrong to inter- 
fere with natural embryological development and 
destroy life at its tenderest stage. It is perhaps easier 
to attain a yet more energetic sentiment against swal- 
lowing a raw oyster; but by thus breaking one's self 
of the habit of eating eggs or oysters by conjuring up 
an aesthetic prejudice against them, one has not dem- 
onstrated that the purpose was worthy or that eggs 
or oysters are unfit for food. The aesthetic argument 
is too uncertain; other people of respectable standing 
eat and relish such queer things. "Food" tabooes, as 
we know familiarly from the Mosaic dispensation, ac- 
quire a sanctity which in turn creates a violent disgust 
in presence of their violation. The same parent dis- 
pensation, the same historical stream of custom in 
which our attitudes have been developed, is quite as 
direct and strong in praise of the blessings of wine, 
though not silent in admonishing against its abuse. 
Through the ages an abundant sentiment has played 
about the service of wine, given it a place in the sacra- 
ment, and an earlier function in the ceremonial liba- 



262 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tion, has made it the symbol of tribute and good feel- 
ing. It seems likely that healths will continue to be 
drunk as of old; and toasts celebrated in cold water, 
however crystal pure, fail to carry the flavor of the 
hallowed rite. 

Moral denunciation and aesthetic objection are legit- 
imate arguments, but uncertain ones. They revolve 
in part about sensibiUties, and these go back to the 
personal and the temperamental basis. If it be true 
that those who look indulgently upon a glass of wine 
and a cigar, or a mug of ale and a pipe, in the average 
run belong to the less sensitive and considerate mem- 
bers of the community, as compared with others of 
like social status who have not succumbed to these 
temptations, the argument would begin to assume 
moderate weight. Similarly on the side of health: if 
physicians, whatever they prescribe for others, in their 
own practice for themselves are as Ukely as not to 
take an indulgent attitude toward alcohol and tobacco, 
they express as pertinent a verdict by example as by 
precept. The same applies to editors who present one 
attitude for their readers and another for themselves; 
while the reference to ministers in this respect may be 
discreetly avoided. 

The other aspect of the matter is more definitely 
sentimental. Such sentiment, in assuming an indul- 
gent attitude toward the indulgence, is admittedly a 
favoring predilection; but the fact that it has become 
attached to this form of indulgence is not without sig- 
nificance. It argues for the congeniahty of the indul- 
gence to the ensemble of the traits that make for an 
appreciation of the values of fife. In view thereof, the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 263 

intolerance displayed by those to whom all this type 
of sentiment makes no appeal, seems sadly out of per- 
spective. The story of a famous writer who pictured 
the hero as partaking of the cup that cheers, and was 
advised by the editor that in deference to the pub- 
lic the incident might acceptably be deprived of its 
alcoholic flavor, is not too improbable to be true, and 
is in a line with the protest upon the part of ardent 
prohibitionists against the ceremonial breaking of a 
bottle of champagne at the launching of a government 
vessel. All this is indicative of the temper of convic- 
tions that claim a superior sanction and glory in un- 
yielding tenacity — an unwillingness amounting to a 
horror of adjusting attitude or conduct to the judicial 
perspective. 

The spirit of Puritanism may be viewed sympa- 
thetically in its historical setting. If followed too liter- 
ally, it would banish the drama, and because of the 
allurements and immoral temptations of the stage — 
all real enough and a constant menace — offer no other 
solution than their abolition. Cards become the Devil's 
counters and dancing his enticement; both are to be 
shimned. GambKng may readily become a serious evil 
demanding vigilant regulation, and dance-halls are the 
undoing of many. Even "bridge whist " may lose its 
legitimate service as relaxation and destroy the sane 
perspective of the values of life. The moral argument 
is thus set off against the sentimental one. This is 
legitimate within judicial limits, but in any liberal dem- 
ocratic regime must be referred to the field in which 
each must exercise those virtues of judgment and re- 
straint that neither paternalism nor prohibition nor 



264 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

intolerant prejudice can or should regulate. One will 
hardly go far in reasonable adjustment by setting up 
false antagonisms of this type. Let each draw his 
distinctions of licet and non licet according to his lights, 
and respect all others who draw them differently, with 
no less integrity of conscience. 

No claim is made for indulgence in its own right, nor 
for any relaxation of the eternal vigilance that alone is 
the price of moral safety. It is urged that the moral 
aspects of the issues be not too obtrusive; for, though 
legitimate, they are subject to a large plasticity of in- 
fluence. Reason, usage, propriety, breeding, circum- 
stance, all play upon them and make their truer ad- 
justment a matter of a sense of value — a One art and 
not a crude proscription. Other moralized sentiments 
show the same relations. Even so commonplace a 
sentiment as shame may serve as an example. Mo- 
rality requires a sensitive sense of shame; but the situa- 
tions to which it shall be applied are most variable and 
complex. Just what we shaU and shall not be ashamed 
of cannot be scheduled in however liberal a system 
of commandments. Honi soil qui mal y pense. It may 
even be the case that the same qualities or actions of 
which one man is ashamed, another is proud. A weak 
sense of shame is certainly a fault, and shamelessness 
a vice; but the like is true of prudery, in that both in- 
terfere with a more desirable disposition of the play 
of modesty in thought and deed. The reference is also 
pertinent because shame enters into the attitude to- 
ward indulgence in alcohol and even tobacco. If the 
community sentiment is such that these indulgences 
cannot be freely acknowledged, they acquire a Httle of 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE ^5 

the tarnish of a secret vice. In view of this psycholo- 
gical factor, it has been wisely urged that if the screens 
and opaque doors were removed from saloons, the 
American bar would lose some of its unfortunate fea- 
tures; though it would take far more than this to re- 
deem it wholly. We are all aware how different is the 
attitude toward these indulgences, how completely 
different is their use and regulation in other communi- 
ties, which may lay claim to as proper consideration 
for morals and manners and health as those that look 
with suspicion or horror upon these practices. The 
individual is inevitably controlled by public opinion. 
It is because such opinion is readily thrown out of its 
judicial perspective by a violent sentiment, that its 
care is a proper charge upon the leaders of opinion. 
In this service the psychologist may properly ask to 
be recognized. He participates in the shaping of stand- 
ards and attitudes; and these make the controversial 
situations — make them or mar them. 

It is to the congenial and sympathetic court of in- 
dulgence that the "case" of alcohol and the "case" 
of tobacco may safely be referred for trial. Nor is the 
plea that of "guilty with mitigating circumstances"; 
the point is rather that the entire procedure of crimi- 
nal or even of civil hearing is unsuited to the case. May 
it not be that Justice is represented blindfolded not 
merely to confine attention to the cause, with no fav- 
oritism to the suitors, but as well to symbolize that 
there are other jurisdictions remote or excluded from 
her austere domain? 



^66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

IV 

The psychology of indulgence, to whatever field 
applied, is subject to a common interpretation. It may 
be developed positively with reference to the principle 
of the urgent expression of impulses and needs, of low 
and high degree. Specifically, the human machine is 
so complex in construction that it seeks moments of 
expansion, vents of emotion, releases of tension, and 
quite as distinctively yearns for enhancements of 
experience that come to the fore in the minor charms 
and greater thrills of the emotional life. It may be 
developed negatively with reference to the principle 
of unwise suppression; for there is a set normal limit 
to salutary discipline and reserve as ministrants to 
self-culture. Carried beyond such Hmit, undue re- 
straint may lead to insidious invasion of efficiency. 
Insistent denial of impulse, tolerance of secretive aver- 
sion, may in abnormal cases induce an undermining of 
stability, the cause of which is commonly unsuspected. 
Speaking to these aspects, the statement of principle 
may be brief and confident. The art of apphcation, 
like all art, is long, and not teachable by any less ex- 
perience than that of life itself. The primitive stress 
of impulse is urgent; the exercise of function in the 
simpler orders of expression is amply provided for by 
natural outlet and common occasion. The optimistic 
joy of action and expression as a satisfaction of needs 
is duly recognized as the cry of red-blooded life: Let 
life be Kved to the full! 

To complex adults the simple life is a delusion; so- 
phistication makes it so; cultivation strives to make 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 267 

it more so. The satisfaction of needs moves upward 
with the levels of their attainment. Hence, the sug- 
gestion that milk is for babes and stronger potations 
for men. Let it be conceded that richness and expan- 
sion of life involves a fullness of expression as of appre- 
ciation; quite as it involves an acquired restraint, a 
poised self-control. Maturity is achieved by successive 
and cumulative exercise of restraints, reserves, repres- 
sions, and denials, by which the primitive cast of our 
nature gives way to the disciplined ideals of our 
nurture; the most comprehensive of these are imposed 
by social relations. The more complex social regula- 
tions require more complex types and occasions of 
relaxation. 

To provide for the psychology of indulgence under 
the conditions of twentieth-century life cannot be a 
simple matter. Racial and national preferences, 
strengths and weaknesses aUke, are shown in these 
provisions and their sanction in sentiment and cus- 
tom. The contrast of North and South, of Anglo- 
Saxon and Latin, of sunny and gray skies, reappears 
in the psychological contrast of stolid reserve of the 
one, and freedom of gestural and facial expression of 
the other; in staid or ready sympathies, and also no 
less in the effects sought and found in beer or wine: 
likewise in the mode of succumbing to intemperance. 
But all this is complex; the prevalence of intoxication 
is not revealed in the statistics of the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. Manner and measure and occasion 
and the kinds of beverages all participate in the result. 
In so far as these are unconsidered, statistics ignore 
psychology. Different peoples require different types 



268 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

of relaxation and indulgence; moreover, the social 
"case '* of alcohol must not be considered by itself. It 
stands along with other indulgences, and with them 
frames a scheme of life, involving profit and loss. If it 
be decided deliberately and reasonably that the dan- 
ger exceeds the zest, let the use of alcohol be abandoned 
by those thus convinced, but without animus against 
those who reach the opposite conclusion in the exer- 
cise of the same reasonable judgment and reasonable 
temper. Also let those voting "no'* stop a moment 
to count the cost, for there is a cost — an equally legit- 
imate cost as that recognized by those voting "aye "; 
both relate to the cost of excess. Excessive restraint, 
or even too constant frowning upon indulgence, may 
lead to a narrow, austere, sunless perspective of life, 
or yet more mildly throw a shadow where indulgence 
sheds a beam of sunHght. Blue laws are archaic, but 
their temper survives and in no apphcation more 
characteristically than in the singling out of alcohol 
as the special offender, with tobacco as the minor ac- 
compUce. It is because these indulgences have had to 
bear the brunt of the charge that it is worth while to 
plead the case of indulgence in their behalf. 

Let us face the question of excess. As war indicates 
the momentary failure of the peaceful adjustments of 
conflict, so intoxication indicates a serious fault in the 
normal adjustments of relaxation. A temperate peo- 
ple stands higher than an intemperate one. A peace- 
ful nation is not by virtue of that fact in any measure 
cowardly, weak, or soft. Its unwarHke spirit may be 
thus determined, but even more probably it may not. 
It may have found vents and occasions in other enter- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 269 

prises for the exercise of the virile quaHties which war 
unquestionably develops. A temperate people, made 
so by imposed abstinence, reaches the end by less 
worthy means. It does not solve its problems, but 
abandons the solution by substituting for it a proscrip- 
tion. It may well be that under certain situations 
the dangers involved are too serious to take the risk 
of any other type of regulation. The regulations ac- 
cepted thus become a clue to the collective psychology 
of the community. Stated the other way about, the 
yielding to drunkenness becomes an index of racial or 
national weakness. The fact that so large a portion 
of alcoholic indulgence in the United States takes place 
in coarse and even degrading surroundings is a legiti- 
mate arraignment, either of our people or of our social 
regulations, or of both. If we cannot take our alcohol 
and our tobacco soberly, we must assume a large part 
of the blame and place it where it belongs, and not 
invidiously upon alcohol and tobacco. These minis- 
ter to the satisfaction of certain cravings, admittedly 
in the field of indulgence; if we cannot take our indul- 
gences wisely, the unwisdom is ours. And if we reach 
the conclusion that our social psychology is so unfor- 
tunately established that we cannot change it, or can- 
not take the risks incidental to such a reform, let us 
face that situation frankly and penitently. To this end 
we may find aid by contemplating the happier solu- 
tion of other peoples in other lands. To array ourselves 
as plaintiffs and make alcohol the defendant, is to 
falsify the true relation. With this attitude of social 
responsibility we have become familiar in other rela- 
tions. We ask ourselves how far our treatment of crimi- 



270 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

nals and crime is responsible for the prevalence of crime 
and delinquency. Yet we know that however wisely 
we regulate such tendencies, we shall always have 
crime and drunkenness, just as we shall always have 
poverty. All these we constantly try to reduce to a 
minimum, and are constantly examining how far we 
can exercise a salutary social control. It is the same 
type of endeavor, exercised in the same temper, that 
is demanded for the case of alcohol. 

Viewed more individually, the psychology of indul- 
gence takes account of the hohday mood, the constant 
small and occasional large enhancements and high 
lights of experience; it sets store by the breaks in rou- 
tine and by the minor easements of existence, and con- 
siders a life bare and cold that lacks the generous econ- 
omy which indulgences serve to relieve, as well as a 
life dissipated that by excess disturbs or wrecks it. It 
finds a place for indulgence in the habits that make up 
the stream of daily occupation, and by their more 
common presence — as against the occasional hohday 
— are cumulatively more important. It emphasizes as 
well that it is the mental attitude that makes the zest 
and forms the tonic, while yet it reahzes that zest must 
be afi&liated with and developed from needs set in the 
heritage of a common appetite. Good cheer aids di- 
gestion; but digestion may crave and in like spirit wel- 
come a physiological stimulant. If body and mind are 
closely allied, the recognition of the kinship should be 
mutual. Feeding, hke working or thinking, or any 
aspect of routine living, must find its relief in indul- 
gence. We indulge in idling and playing, in vaudeville 
and dime-novels, in amusement-parks and motion-pic- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 271 

tures — all more or less wisely and more or less riskily. 
But we have no intention of doing away with all these 
types of indulgences. There is indulgence in eating, 
but this, like drinking, in addition to moral and hy- 
gienic consequences, raises the issue of extravagance, 
which for the moment should not be emphasized. The 
fact remains that releases from routine are thus de- 
manded and enjoyed; and life takes its stamp from 
the manner and measure of their recognition. Wisdom 
lies in temperance in all these types of indulgence; ex- 
cess everywhere lurks as a danger. A motion-picture 
jag, or a dime-novel jag, or a bridge-whist jag, is in 
principle as open to danger as an alcohol jag; its con- 
sequences are different, but that does not entail a dif- 
ferent psychological appraisal of their legitimacy. 

Eating furnishes the nearest analogy for drinking; 
and there we find the same variation in terms of nec- 
essity and luxury, of food-value and zest-value, from 
soKd nutriment to fruits and flavors and condiments 
and relishes and desserts, and no differently in the sol- 
vent and mood of wine. Variety of food and a mixed 
diet confer a psychological benefit; occasional banquets 
maintain the zest. Roast beef is a feast to the peasant 
indulging in meat on Sundays only; it loses that qual- 
ity in a monotonous hotel diet. One may accept or 
prefer the same breakfast day by day, but by that very 
token demand a different dinner. In the composition 
of the meal as of the courses, the same variety that 
is the spice of life is insisted upon, the same demand 
made that some of the ingredients shall stand for the 
zest and flavoring, that some shall be valued more as 
stimulants than as food. The principle holds for the 



272 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

larger features as for the details of life, and of its phys- 
iological as of its psychological ordering. 

Selection and regulation is ever an art, and as such, 
of however lowly a degree, may ask the same freedom 
from hampering restrictions or prejudicial tabooes that 
are approvingly granted to arts of loftier concern. 
Moreover, there is a sanctioned scale of indulgence; 
and it is but a question of drawing lines according to 
our preferences, ideals, or customs, which differ no 
more than the views and diversities of our philosophies. 
Tea and coffee are indulgences; a rating of their value 
or injury cannot be obtained from the admonishing 
advertisements of substitutes for them, or of the opin- 
ions of those who find them unnecessary, unsuited, or 
harmful. If some prefer on occasion a dash of brandy 
in coffee or of rum in tea, the indulgence has not wholly 
changed its status. The laborious proofs that alcohol 
and tobacco are, strictly considered, unnecessary, are 
likewise themselves unnecessary. There is no conten- 
tion that these represent the only indulgences of their 
kind; merely that when viewed with the spirit of in- 
dulgence, they have found a place in societies that are 
mindful of the sterner duties of life, as of the dangers 
of excess in what in temperate measure relieves voca- 
tional strain. 

Leisure, luxury, relief, indulgence partake in this 
respect something of the parallel excitements of sport. 
The shooting of corralled game comes near to butchery; 
and if one is so worried by the sense of danger that the 
chase is a torture, the enjoyment is gone; between the 
two lies the zest of good sport, of the enhancement of 
experience through the thrill of uncertainty, or even 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 273 

of danger. Here, too, humanitarian and other con- 
siderations enter; and we cannot expect agreement as 
to the legitimacy of shooting and hunting, though we 
may rather envy the exhilaration and enthusiasm that 
a devotee gets from gun or rod. We realize that all this 
is debatable ground and a controversial issue. If we 
observe that individuals and societies, respectful of 
the serious duties of life and considerate in the regu- 
lation of their relaxations as well as mindful of the 
dangers attaching to indulgences, find a proper and re- 
strained place for alcohol and tobacco, we must be pre- 
pared to accord them the right and privilege attaching 
to such sanction; for that is the type of adjustment 
that prevails in controversial issues. 



The psychology of suppression is equally to be con- 
sidered. The adherents of the Freudian school of psy- 
chology look upon saving rather than spending as the 
root of mental evil. The miser rather than the spend- 
thrift becomes the shocking example; the sour-faced 
ascetic and disappointed spinster, rather than the 
cheery epicure and the contented mater or paterfamilias, 
happy despite the high cost of living. Certainly the 
most charitable view of the miser is to regard him as 
abnormal, as lacking, by inherent defect or acquired 
perversion, wholesome impulses and channels of ex- 
pression of desires and their satisfaction. However 
conditioned and however exercised, miserliness, like 
all greeds, makes a vice of repression out of the virtue 
of moderation; it makes of thrift an obsession. The 
abnormal — as is true of so many phases of conduct. 



274 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

so also of indulgence — has a lesson for normal psy- 
chology. Suppression is not so innocent as it appears, 
though unrestraint, which stands so close to indul- 
gence, loses none of its dangers. Both sides of the case 
offer warnings. There are cases in which despondency 
of mood, paralysis of desire, hesitations, broodings, 
obstacles — all thwarting action and throwing the 
mental equilibrium seriously out of balance — are 
traceable to persistent and long-standing suppressions 
and repressions of impulses and desires which nature 
has implanted deeply in the fiber of oiu* being. To find 
the source of the emotional obstruction that dams the 
freedom of flow, often by the very release of conscious 
confession, restores tranquillity. The mental abscess has 
been lanced, and relief follows. Preventively at earlier 
stages, the provision and enjoyment of slighter normal 
indulgences might have averted catastrophe, by in- 
ducing a freer habit of expression. The mechanism of 
suppression is subconscious and by that token is insi- 
dious in its invasion, unsuspected in its onset. Such 
is the reinforcement of the principle of indulgence de- 
rived from the lessons of mental disaster inherent in 
over-suppression. So, on the one hand, over-indul- 
gence — which includes constant indulgence of trivial 
degree, even more than occasional debauches — leads 
to a mental habit of willfulness and unrestraint, quite 
apart from the actual injury of the indulgence; and on 
the other hand, constant suppression and denial dams 
the emotional current with quite comparable dis- 
aster. The choice and mode of indulgence is a separate 
matter, but like the degree and manner of indulgence, 
is largely a temperamental reaction, an individual 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 275 

adjustment. Such adjustment, like all economy, be- 
comes a matter of a budget; and the legitimacy of- ex- 
penditures is determined by the same complexity of 
judgment that must ever be called upon in making up 
the accounts of living. Economies may be wise or fool- 
ish; far-sighted or near-sighted. Indulgence, the policy 
of generosity, seems to find support in the psychology 
of our emotional nature — the emotions themselves, 
as in the play of the imagination, supplying the in- 
dispensable relaxations as well as inspirations for the 
rigors of duty and the obhgations of reason. To ex-, 
elude alcohol and tobacco from the privileges of such 
consideration is psychologically unwarranted. 

There is no intention in the application of this argu- 
ment to imply that the authority of psychology may 
be cited in behalf of smoking or drinking. The path 
from principle to policy may be clear; but the inter- 
pretation of policy as applied to specific practices must 
be uncertain. It is possible to state conclusions in the 
indicative and the conditional moods; but the cate- 
gorical statement must be cautiously appealed to. 
Ideals, however well estabHshed, are ever in the mak- 
ing; and the psychologist, like any other specialist or 
layman, brings to the transition from theory to prac- 
tice the trend of his personal bias. He may do this 
quite frankly, while presenting the bearing of his find- 
ings as his professional insight sees them. The message 
of the psychology of indulgence is authentic and vital; 
whether the interpretation is sound and the appHca- 
tion wise must be left to the same sanity of judgment 
to which the regulation of the physiological and psy- 
chological economy is approvingly referred. 



276 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

As to the special psychology of the alcoholic indul- 
gence, a shghter consideration will suffice. There are 
some who claim that the moments of exaltation are 
in miniature moments of ecstasy, of getting out of 
ourselves — in lesser measure and more commonly — 
of dropping the handicaps of repression, the thralls 
of convention, and thus attaining geniaUty if not in- 
spiration. Alcohol unbends, releases by banishing re- 
straint, sets free the truer self. By all means a steady 
fire for the heat of the work of the day, but the occa- 
sional spark for the illumination of insight. Moreover, 
it is urged, the general habit of susceptibility to such 
appeal raises the quahty of endeavor, supports the 
mechanism of elaboration, makes for originality and 
the higher gifts of service of the mental life. Clearly 
alcohol confers no gifts, educates no facility; "Der 
Wein erfindet nichts; ef schwdtzt nur aus." The admis- 
sion gives the clue to the opposition: inspiration thus 
induced is often babbHng; the exhilaration an illusion, 
the stimulation artificial, the dependence upon it an 
uncertain crutch; the plight of the lame and the halt 
who counted upon its support, an adequate sermon. 
The alternative does not exclude the middle ground 
of temperate indulgence. 

Such tolerance is more readily gained for tobacco, 
in that its effects present no such drastic issues. The 
evil effects of tobacco are less comprehensive; the in- 
temperate habit is less easily formed, and in formation 
more readily restrained. But, more importantly, the 
associations of the indulgence are more easily assimi- 
lated in the prevalent social customs. All this is ad- 
mittedly a matter of convention, and the present plea 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 277 

urges that it may wisely be left to the forces that, 
under discriminating oversight, build convention into 
a sanction. An apt illustration is furnished by the ob- 
jection to women's smoking. The fact that the stand- 
ards of indulgence as well as the forms of indulgence 
are different for the sexes, is again a complicated issue 
of the many composite forces that have been passed in 
review. That women have the same right as men to 
claim the privileges of the psychology of indulgence, 
can hardly be questioned; that the status of the in- 
dulgence in their hands will be determined by the per- 
sonalities of those who practice it and the setting which 
they give it, is equally clear. For the attitude toward 
a habit and its setting go far to determine its status. 
The important consideration in the use of alcohol 
and tobacco, as of any other indulgence, is to surround 
them with those influences and associations that make 
their use, as far as may be, a fine habit and not a coarse 
one. 

* How far the problem of alcohol is the problem of the 
craving for stimulant, or the convivial drink-habit, or 
the low saloon, is the decisive issue that determines 
the remedy to be sought. The problem will yield to 
solution under unprejudiced scientific investigation 
at the hands of physicians, social workers, physiolo- 
gists, psychologists, and practical moralists. Let these 
interests study, consider, and recommend. None the 
less, indulgence brings a legitimate if minor plea. Pub- 
lic hygiene, moral health, and economics may well ac- 
knowledge the plea of the psychology of indulgence, 
while yet they maintain the supremacy of their own 
interests. Condition and circumstance must be dis- 



278 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

criminatingly considered. Sweeping regulations are 
always simpler to propose and enact than discriminat- 
ing ones. If the American temperament and American 
conditions are so misuited to the favorable assimila- 
tion of this type of indulgence, so disposed to exhibit 
its dangers in the most extreme form; if experience 
proves the hopelessness of any reforms which shall 
surround indulgence with respectability, it may be 
wise to admit defeat and surrender. To repeat: Pro- 
hibition is not a solution, but the abandonment of a 
solution. While the regulation by statute of the use 
of tobacco has hardly been attempted, one phase of it 
has brought about the same undiscriminating legisla- 
tion that is to be feared. To find a group of States in 
which a cigarette is contraband seems a strange anom- 
aly in a democracy that balks at so many wise forms 
of paternalism. That some of these States have 
repealed such drastic laws shows that reason may be 
reinstated. The complete prohibition of cigarettes is 
a double confession of failure; an admission that laws 
regulating the sale of cigarettes to minors will not be 
enforced, and an admission that legislatures can be 
influenced to abandon principles and enact paternal- 
istic laws which they would not tolerate in other fields, 
and do so under the influence of prejudice which has 
not even the merit of sincerity. 

It is as yet an open question whether, if all the in- 
terests in favor of respectability were to direct their 
energies to the elevation of the conditions surrounding 
the use of alcohol, more could not be accomplished. 
It still remains true that the wholesale denunciation 
and the exaggerated emphasis of one phase of the evil 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDULGENCE 279 

disturbs the diagnosis and makes for unreason. It is 
but necessary to transfer the situation to other coun- 
tries with other customs to justify the plea for discrimi- 
nation in diagnosis, treatment, and prevention ahke. 
AmeHoration of social evils has usually yielded to judi- 
cious treatment rather than to narrow-minded or un- 
discriminating propaganda. It is with such a policy 
that the psychology of indulgence establishes a ready 
sympathy and support. 



X 

THE FEMININE MIND 

" We can bring no more to living 
Than the powers we bring to life." 

Kipling. 

Among issues characteristically modern, the contro- 
versy as to the true nature of woman and her place in 
the social order is peculiarly rich in complexity of ar- 
gument and variabiHty of conclusion. With the varied 
status of women in different lands, with their achieve- 
ments in older days and in the near and nearest gen- 
erations fairly famiUar, with the intimate knowledge 
of womanly ways and doings which is the common 
experience and the common tradition, the data for 
judgment as to the psychological endowmeut respon- 
sible for these products seem adequate and accessible. 
And yet the fact that the problem exists in a sense in 
which there is no man question is often accepted with 
no curiosity and little concern. Much of this is due 
to the adjustment of tradition. In every situation the 
woman question is practically solved, yet resists an 
enduring solution. The restless dissatisfaction with 
the status quo leads to question and reform. The con- 
trasts of national solutions remain interesting, and no 
less so when shifted to the narrower contrasts with- 
in an accepted range. Modern technique brings to 
the question a different approach, generally biological 
and specifically psychological. In an analytic spirit 



THE FEMININE MIND 281 

it detaches circumstance from nature, and measures as 
it explores. 

The present survey attempts to bring to bear upon 
the psychological phase of the problem the combined 
evidence of theory and practice, of science and tradi- 
tion, of experience and test. The question at issue is 
whether and how the feminine differs from the mas- 
culine mind; how far the observable differences of 
achievement and response are the result of tradition 
and education, or of original nature doubtless rein- 
forced by artificial direction. Application stands close 
to interpretation and demands a hearing. The issue 
comes forward in questions of the day: whether women 
should vote, should enter this or that profession, should 
enjoy this or that privilege or right. Decisions are 
difficult and discussion constant. Prejudice and con- 
vention exert a powerful influence on conclusions, and 
logic is often ignored or retired to a subsidiary issue. 
Facts and their interpretation are confused, or more 
commonly their significance distorted. The issue ex- 
tends to all spheres of living and the spiritual supports 
of life; to industry and commerce, to education and 
profession, to art and science, to family life and public 
concerns, to religion, to ethics, to all the massed in- 
fluences that constitute the social ideals and the social 
control. Institutions embody the prevalent views and 
customs reflect them. Psychology claims a special 
place in the hearing; for it is predominantly the nature 
of the mental endowment of woman that is decisive. 
Her fitness and capacity determine, under the admitted 
deviations of opportunity and custom, the types of 
her career. 



282 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

A survey of such broad scope should not be hurried 
in procedure, as it should not be hasty in conclusion. 
Its purpose is at once to throw light upon the com- 
posite forces affecting the actual decisions reached by 
all sorts and conditions of men and women, and yet 
more particularly upon the significance to be at- 
tached to the several orders of evidence and consid- 
eration. This double purpose affords the clue to the 
presentation. Such a judicial survey is consistent 
with a definite view of the favored conclusions, once 
the principles of interpretation are reached. The issue 
is one of a considerable group in which a scientific- 
minded approach is possible, though a rigid scientific 
procedure is not. The common bias and prejudice of 
convention and usage may be overcome; yet the di- 
vergence of opinion remains, by reason of the variable 
emphasis attached to one or other order of evidence. 
The rapprochement of method is important, even 
though the differences of opinion remain; for a modus 
Vivendi and a practical cooperation in the actual issues 
of the day, in so far as they depend upon an enhghtened 
view of the feminine mind, are thus rendered possible. 
The same forces are responsible for the changing status 
of woman that is recognizably moving in a definite 
direction to the great benefit of social progress. 



The nature of the feminine endowment is primarily 
an affair of biology; biology divides the responsibility 
by referring the question to physiology, to psychology, 
and to sociology. These speak with the voice of au- 
thority; and to them the public listens with its custom- 



THE FEMININE MIND 283 

ary deference, tinged with suspicion. For every man 
presumes to know and every woman knows feminine 
behavior and character intimately; so the personal 
verdict dominates, undisturbed by what science has to 
say. Moreover, on so engaging a topic the average 
mind is as Httle disposed to be critical as it is to be 
objective. Hence, the popular and the scientific ver- 
sions of the "eternal feminine" diverge; likewise the 
ancient and modern ones, and those of class and mass. 
From the academy and the laboratory come learned 
treatises and essays, some ambitious and comprehen- 
sive, others modest and restrained. In its view of the 
"eternal feminine" the pubHc follows a tradition that 
reflects the experiences as well as the prejudices and 
impressions of a preoccupied, slightly reflective, largely 
sentimental, and frequently confused, democratic order 
of wisdom. The men of science report: "Here is our 
analysis, and such is the nature of woman." History, 
the formal spokesman of experience, replies: "Here is 
the career of woman; in the story read the nature of 
her parts." More informally the idea and ideal of 
the feminine appear in the drama, the novel, the story 
of the day. These several renderings offer contrasts 
rather than conflicts; they present varieties of per- 
spective. Throughout the question appears and re- 
appears: Which is the truly, intrinsically feminine, and 
which the favored or enforced manner of feminine ex- 
pression? Society changes its forms; evolution proceeds, 
and takes the feminine with it; what in all this change 
is the inherent, eternal feminine? "Thus natured, 
woman could not be other than she is," says the posi- 
tive scientist. "Responsive to condition, the woman 



284 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

of each age and stage of culture becomes what her 
world makes of her," concludes the cautious historian, 
remembering his varium et mutahile semper. The ver- 
satile past, the responsible present, and the glorious 
future of womanhood each finds its special pleaders 
in the variegated Hterature of the feminist movement. 
To rescue the problem from confusion and sentimen- 
tal distortion is in these tolerant days a possible if not 
a grateful task. Despite an occasional editor or legis- 
lator or other worldly cloistered soul, men are about 
ready to admit that women are people; also that the 
nature of femininity may become a definite and dis- 
interested inquiry, as well as a worthy one. "We have 
comprehensive monographs on silkworms, beetles, and 
cats, but none on women," says an Itahan anthropolo- 
gist, who attempts gallantly to supply the lack. 

n 

Such a monograph might well begin with the ob- 
vious but significant statement that men and women 
are obviously and overwhelmingly alike. They are 
alike by reason of a common nature, which means a 
like evolution through the remoter ages; and yet more 
alike by reason of the common schooHng of experience 
through the nearer generations. They are still more 
conspicuously ahke in that the social tradition moulds 
them to a common pattern. Yet to all these influences 
the sexes react differently. The actual status and 
achievement of any section of the human race is in- 
telligible only as a vast transformation of original 
nature, which affects similarly the present nature of 
both sexes. The racial heredity and the racial history 



THE FEMININE MIND 285 

prevail. What the sexes have in common still domi- 
nates even in the present complexities and artificialities 
of human nature. Under one interest or another we 
may push this community into the background; with- 
out it the foreground would be unintelligible. 

And so we return to first principles: the significance 
of sex remains. Nature's intention is as plain as her 
execution. "The powers that we bring to Hfe" are 
already specialized by decree of nature. "Male and 
female created He them." If the principle of a phys- 
iological psychology is sound, Hke minds in unKke 
bodies are a contradiction. Along with their commu- 
nity men and women differ broadly and deeply. 

There is no need to review the established differences 
in structure and function, in skeleton and organs, in 
metabolism, in development, in liabihty to disease, in 
every minute detail of bodily economy; it is necessary 
only to observe the pattern of closely woven connec- 
tion thus set by nature. Such differences of bodily 
structure and function obtain over and above the 
direct functions of sex; they constitute an array of 
secondary or associated traits. Some stand close to 
and support the complex interests of sex; others are 
derivative and remote, radiating to the minutest bio- 
logical details. Such differences express specialization 
and the issues of specialization. "A man is a man even 
to his thumbs, and a woman is a woman down to her 
Httle toes." Anatomy, physiology, and pathology tell 
a concordant story. What reason is there to expect 
psychology to enter a dissenting opinion? 

Nature makes differentiation significant to the drama 
of sex. In human psychology each sex becomes addi- 



286 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tionally attractive to the other by a variegated 
unlikeness in appearance and expression. Sex is a bi- 
ological emphasis. It carries with it a diminishing per- 
spective of derivative traits. Some of these traits are 
of major and others of minor import; some stand close 
to the center of the powers that we bring to life, and 
others are more or less remote. Heredity carries for- 
ward the entire composite of ancestral traits. In the 
long rmi fathers and mothers contribute equally though 
differently to the endowment of men as well as of 
women, and both are more interesting and richer in 
possibility by virtue of their dual heredity. Yet every 
heredity is subject to the supreme emphasis of one 
sex alone, which brings it about that there are no 
human beings — only men and women. Sex remains 
the eternal motive of Nature's organic design. 

The differentiation of men and women is thorough, 
comprehensive, and estabhshed; its existence is beyond 
question; its limitations and consequences offer a 
meaty bone of contention. Woman, whether by nature 
controversial or not, is to-day a controversy. Conclu- 
sions, though they differ widely, are held confidently. 
Like many another opinion, that concerning the nature 
of woman is formed by precipitating an interpretation 
in the solution of facts. The interpretations are more 
largely responsible for the divergent opinions than any 
disagreement upon the facts. The facts are gathered 
by observation, extensive or limited, crude or refined, 
and presumably objective and unprejudiced; interpre- 
tation enters and proceeds upon a system of values. 
In terms of fact, no one is tempted to question that 
when Nature has her way, men have beards and women 



THE FEMININE MIND 287 

have none. But by way of interpretation, to deter- 
mine what use or advantage a beard is to a man re- 
quires a standard of values. To consider a bearded sex 
as superior or inferior to an unbearded one is a vain 
assumption. For, once more: sex-traits are more or 
less central, or more or less peripheral, fairly vital or 
fairly trivial; or they are significant in one aspect, 
and differently so in another. In Nature's scheme — 
which must be accepted, though decidedly modified 
by human purposes — beardedness is an incorporated 
masculine trait. For adequate reasons, however ob- 
scure or to our thinking irrelevant or perverse. Nature 
conserves the beard. The Mohammedan may accept 
it and swear by the beard of his prophet; the twen- 
tieth-century American citizen may accept it more pro- 
fanely by an irksome obligation of a daily shave; but 
even a Christian Scientist cannot successfully deny 
its stubbly reality. 

Human interests lie in values rather than in facts. 
Civilizations have arisen and have assumed their vari- 
ous complexions by virtue of this preference and the 
manner of its expression. The important type of value 
is social value — value for human living as it is or- 
ganized in the environment of the age and the com- 
munity, as it is shaped by the traditions and in- 
stitutions in which the individual is embedded. The 
individual's habits are saturated with the mental inheri- 
tance and the imposed schooling of his tribe. Great 
streams of influence, ancient and recent, general and 
local, massive and dehcate, pour down upon him, de- 
termining the set of his beliefs and attitudes, for bet- 
ter or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in his lifelong 



288 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

alliance with the social conditions of his habitat. All 
this makes him or her the particular kind of a human 
being that he or she is. 

What is true of conditions is also true of opinions. 
Opinions, scientific as well as impressionistic, expert 
and popular, proceed upon an accepted set of values. 
Facts in the abstract are naked and neutral; their very 
selection clothes them with a partisan tint. Thus 
clothed, they are fashioned into opinions. The busi- 
ness of natural science is to interpret the facts in terms 
of natural values, yet human values enter. For many 
purposes that is legitimate, as it is inevitable. Science 
aims, however, to render unto Csesar the things that 
are Caesar's. At best, science is a bold restoration of 
the torso of our partial knowledge. As such it is the 
work of the critical and skilled imagination. Leg and 
arm, trunk and head, are alike indispensable, but not 
equally a clue to the meaning of the whole, and to the 
spirit of the composition. Proportion and perspective 
determine the impression even more completely than 
content. Facts in themselves are mute; they await 
a unified interpretation. Hience, the difficulties in 
reaching a right conception of the feminine as differ- 
entiated from the masculine nature; hence, also, the 
justification of this logical approach. 

Ill 

Sex is as ancient as it is significant. The human dis- 
position of sex forms part of the interesting record. 
In the natural environment, before the distxu'bing 
intervention of historical change, the powers of Hfe 
adequately determined the powers of living, for men 



THE FEMININE MIND 289 

and women in common and distinctively. Primitive 
living was a foray and a combat for food and wives, 
and for the protection of a cave or shelter for the cubs. 
The powers brought to life and matured by living were 
directly concerned with food and family. These con- 
cerns and the qualities to meet them remain primal, 
elemental, inexorable. They shape existence for the 
twentieth-century tenants in steam-heated sky-scrap- 
ers no differently than for the original cliff-dwellers. 
The powers that we bring to life are essentially un- 
changed — so the anthropologists assure us — and 
only the living profoundly altered. What this means 
is that the powers of the human brain — the limiting 
instrument of all power — were fixed by and adapted 
to the needs of primitive Uving. The oldest, deepest 
instincts in human psychology are those of the cave- 
man and the cave-woman. Living was for long cen- 
turies of this simple order, and in comparison has been 
of the civilized order only for brief years. What saved 
and expanded the powers of life were the large play- 
fulness and long helplessness of the human cub. Ma- 
turing is gradual, and is in process an instinctive and 
irregular trial and error, joy and sorrow, in attempt 
and growing success and enlarging enterprise. Play 
is deep-rooted, and once tasted is never absent from 
the game of living, and becomes its redemption from 
ferocity. Play enters into occupation as well as re- 
laxation; the satisfactions that make doing things fun 
take their place beside food and family to make life 
livable. The powers that we bring to life may be 
measured in relation to their ministry to the con- 
cerns of food, family, and fun; such is their service 



290 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

in their near-to-nature perspective, and such they re- 
main. 

The original woman question is accordingly this: 
How far do the specialized functions assigned by Na- 
ture carry with them other ranges of power, of fit- 
ness and Umitation, of advantage and handicap? In 
quite the same spirit of neutrahty, the assets and Ka- 
bilities of the mascuhne economy require examination. 
To over-tailored minds there is something derogatory 
in the notion that quahties of high esteem and remote 
employment should acknowledge so lowly an ances- 
try. Such prejudices are irrelevant and disturbing. It is 
the attempt to rise above them that characterizes the 
scientific temper. 

In the achievements written in the conquest of Na- 
ture and of human nature, He the honor and the glory. 
The ancient traits remain, but are transmuted in the 
crucible of civihzation. It is a long road from mar- 
riage by capture or by purchase to chivalry, romance, 
devotion, sacrifice, and the art-embeUished enhance- 
ments of courtship; yet they all belong to the same 
psychological tale, saturated and thrilled with the 
love-song of sex-attraction. Without these life seems 
aknost unthiokable and Uving impoverished and bare. 
Strong virtues and strong vices are rooted here — the 
strength derived from a common source of the powers 
of life. The roles of men and those of women in this 
drama are different; the difference runs the gamut of 
human nature and iu no rendering is more sustained 
than LQ the psychic one. The part played by food in 
the drama of Hving may be no less comprehensive than 
that of sex, and no less momentous; its moments may 



THE FEMININE MIND 291 

be less tense, but are more constant, differently for- 
mative. Both pursuits with their associated energies 
go forward to the extended, transformed struggle for 
richer living, in the complex will to prevail, that im- 
poses its urgency — though with difference of empha- 
sis — upon both sexes. 

In the beginning and continuously the sex-ardor and 
food-aggressiveness of the male sets his qualities in 
the mould of mastery. Might was and is the theme of 
his being; it vibrates in his mind as in his muscles. The 
bully shows it crudely in a small setting; the despot 
wields it grandly in a larger one. To judge by sleeping- 
car etiquette the propitious address for the American 
male is "boss," as it is likewise the less complimentary 
title of political influence. Muscular prowess was first 
in the field and remains in possession. In institutions 
ostensibly devoted to learning, brass bands greet the 
returning football heroes; but the initiates of Phi 
Beta Kappa remain unserenaded. The discovery of the 
North Pole is more thrilling than the discovery of 
evolution. It is aggressive exploration on a popular 
plane, nearer to Nature's patterns, and thus intelli- 
gible and appealing. It establishes a record which the 
grand-stand can appreciate and applaud. 

Mental aggressiveness combines with physical aggres- 
siveness or replaces it. Initiative and enterprise wait 
upon strength, as mind no less than muscle demands 
exercise. To explore and venture and possess — and in 
the first instance by direct physical prowess — confers 
the satisfaction craved by the masterful temperament. 
It orders the coming and the seeing and the conquer- 
ing of the Caesar in every man. The mad ambition of 



292 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

the male, if unchecked, becomes the serious menace 
to humanity, a threat to other cherished values, un- 
less restrained by other potent forces of living, rooted 
and made strong in other powers of life. Masculine 
performance and interest tend to a high-tension ac- 
tivity; in so far they follow the primitive pattern of 
the chase, involving active endurance, keen pursuit, 
hot rivalry, stirring climax, and the quarry or foe over- 
come. Big game and big business and the "big stick" 
appeal to the eternal masculine. Properly combined 
with a lion rampant and a fox couchant, these trophies 
would compose an appropriate male escutcheon. The 
strengths and the weaknesses of masculine psychology, 
no less than the fitness of the masculine powers of life 
to the forms of living at present cherished and estab- 
lished, or to the life and ideals of other days and ways, 
are to be considered with reference to one origin, as 
rooted in a common quality of the male. The problem 
of civihzation — if we are prepared to interpret its 
mission pacifically — is to let the ape and the tiger 
die, without killing the man, without maiming the 
potential superman. 

There is a further psychological principle that nur- 
ture reinforces nature and finds its motives there. 
Thus encouraged, masculinity becomes increasingly 
masculine. Primitive social organization shows the 
simple life at its simplest, and the strenuous life with- 
out complication. Those hold who have the power and 
those take who can. When, however, a man commands 
other men, however despotically, personal strength 
is replaced by social authority. The transformation is 
possible only by a psychological process; it endures 



THE FEMININE MIND 293 

only as the psychic bond holds. The captain remains 
a captain so long as his crew does not mutiny. Organi- 
zation follows the clue of individual rule. Its early 
form is military; for manly men soldiering is the oldest 
of professions. But the qualities of the soldier's profes- 
sion, like every other, change as ideals and conditions 
change. What a man fights for, and with, and how, and 
the restraints he exercises, come to be far more signifi- 
cant than his original pugnacity. The soldier may be 
enlisted as a crusader, or as a member of the Salvation 
Army, or as an individualistic soldier of fortune, or as a 
philanthropic knight-errant of reform. The " conduct " 
and "satisfaction" pattern of fighting, like most of 
nature's patterns, is complex, woven of many strands. 
The psychological satisfactions of fighting may depart 
slightly or widely from the original type; they reap- 
pear in the employments of vocation and relaxation. 
Venture, pursuit, overcoming, rivalry, possession, 
authority, the rewards of shrewdness, and the plau- 
dits of the crowd are all satisfying. They were in part 
established through fighting; they continue in the psy- 
chology of all manners of mastery. Sport enlists them 
so thoroughly that it remains typically a masculine out- 
let. But sport may enlist other patterns of satisfaction 
that encroach upon the "food" or livelihood interests. 
When the interests in the stake exceed that in the 
game, the player becomes a gambler or a pot-hunter. 
Our approval is for the authentic amateur, for sport 
for sport's sake. The word "amateur" (Hterally, 
"lover ") implies another fundamental pursuit. A lover 
fights and likes to win, though marriage by capture is 
fairly obsolete. In all its expressions masculine ardor 



294 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

is of one source, however variously expressed, variously 
composed. We deny as we cite that all is fair in love 
and war; but the association remains. 

Such is masculine nature; and by consequence the 
imposed niu-ture insists upon injecting into all man- 
controlled pursuits a fair measure of the same qual- 
ities. Men so organize their enterprises as to make 
business a game, a competition, a fight, often a ruth- 
less one; also they speculate and take chances. But as 
they gamble they use their wits; they plan the cam- 
paign, they measure and circumvent opposition, they 
seek the thrill of success. Not indifferent to other 
values, they yet excuse evasions or sharp practices 
by the dictum that business is business, which means 
that men will be men. The same intelligence has dis- 
covered that war is war, and that love is love. Yet 
thanks to the like penetration of the feminine mind, 
a warlike or businessUke lover is rarely acceptable; 
so the^masculine endowment escapes too rigid Hmita- 
tions. To repeat: The masculine tendency is to make 
a fighting game of all pursuits, to bring to them the 
flavor of the typical male satisfactions. If permitted, 
men make poHtics a game, not too clean a one, and 
having stained it, advise sensitive souls — women and 
scholars — to keep out. 

Equally important is the transformation of the mas- 
culine satisfaction as it extends its range, transfers its 
allegiance. The foray and chase stimulate the zest of 
experience, the spread of ciu'iosity, the experimental 
inclination. The hunter becomes the trapper, the fighter 
becomes the strategist. Invention is started on its 
momentous career, and with it as the social counter- 



THE FEMININE MIND 295 

part, the organization of man-power as well as of ox- 
power and horse-power. Power and conquest still en- 
thrall men; but the instrument is no longer a simple 
pugnacity or blood-thirst, but conquest of nature, 
extension of mental dominion, forearming by fore- 
thinking, controlling by understanding. The mental 
quest brings its minor satisfactions as well as its tan- 
gible results; it brings them most generally in some 
form near to the primitive pattern; nor in complex 
undertakings are the earlier types forsaken. In such 
manner the whole man is transformed, but not wholly. 
Once society has incorporated and organized these 
derivative activities, boys turn as naturally into me- 
chanics and engineers, or captains of industry and 
business men, as into soldiers. At an unsophisticated 
age they are enthralled by railway trains as readily as 
by fisticuff encounters. Girls are not debarred from 
these indulgences by a tyrannical male ukase, but by 
a decree of their nature; they are not devoid of either 
pugnacity, curiosity, inventiveness, or a love of sen- 
sation; but the formulae of satisfaction which they nat- 
urally follow is sufficiently different to make the segre- 
gation that occurs in the College of Engineering as 
expressive of what women dislike as of what men like. 
There is more than one lesson in the illustration: In 
the first instance, that the derivative and remote con- 
trasts in what men and women do better than the 
other, differently than the other, with more decided 
preference than the other, follows consistently, though 
not rigidly, from consistent and rigid original endow- 
ment, indissolubly associated with sex. These differ- 
ences may be man-encouraged, man-exaggerated, but 



296 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

they are not man-made. A second consequence is that 
these very differences are not only of degree, but of 
limited degree; what the social system does is either 
decidedly to increase the divergence, or decidedly to 
diminish it, to encourage it, or to discourage it. 
In times of war women engage and acquit themselves 
acceptably in occupations which for a variety of rea- 
sons they avoid in times of peace. The peace stand- 
ard, though not infallible, is presumably more legit- 
imate than the war standard. A further consequence 
is that types of modem emplojonents may be so remote 
from these original differences that the fitness of men 
and of women for them may be substantially equal, 
though this equality may conceal the fact that the 
male superiorities and inferiorities are of one order, 
and the female of another. Still further: It should 
never be forgotten that there are some sorts of em- 
ployments in which small differences are highly signifi- 
cant, and others in which they are not so. One may as 
readily be deceived as enlightened by statistics and the 
bare outUnes of facts; for, like words, they may con- 
ceal as much as they revealJ 

IV 

Leaving the masculine psychology with its forbid- 
ding logical flavor, we turn to an equally sketchy out- 
line of the feminine nature as Nature has ordained it. 
The evidence is strong that the feminine endowment 
is even more heavily sex-determined than the mascu- 
line. Reducing pages to phrases, one may read, with 
abundant citation of chapter and verse, that women 
are truer to type than men, nearer to the race-norm 



THE FEMININE MIND 297 

and the child-nature, more conservative and less vari- 
able. Prominent is the larger affectability of woman, 
which in turn is the nearer-to-nature reaction, and is 
indispensable to the race-preserving, mothering minis- 
trations. The potential mother in every woman com- 
mands a larger range of her endowment, penetrates 
deeper into the roots of her being, radiates more inti- 
mately to the finer modes of her expressions, than is 
true of any sex-determined section of masculine psy- 
chology. The race-preserving qualities are in their 
feminine expression more absorbing, more sustained, 
more vital. The female of the species is more deadly 
in earnest for the species; her marginal activities re- 
flect more warmly, more pervasively the focal con- 
cerns. She bears the sterling hall-mark of her na- 
ture more conspicuously and more responsibly. It has 
been well said that the Romans appropriated everything 
from the Greeks except their background; a fortunate 
son might inherit as largely his mother's qualities, but 
would always lack her background. 

In her secondary trait a woman follows a double 
allegiance: the one set by courtship, the other by the 
care of the young. This duality — which under stress 
may approach duplicity — enlarges and complicates 
a woman's qualities; it gives her a versatility more ex- 
acting than is needed to make a man at once a good 
lover and a good provider. The belle and the matron 
are both present in the woman's dower; and those by 
dower competent to judge detect in some women the 
dominance of the belle inadequately under-studied 
by the matron, and in others the matron rather negli- 
gent of the other half. If the interests of the one, in 



298 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Hausfrau parlance, are children, churcli, and chim- 
ney-corner, the interests of the other may be disre- 
spectfully rendered as charms, chaps, and chiffons, 
with chatter as a frivolous, and charity as a sobering 
ballast. The eternal feminine is as truly the belle as 
the matron. Historically, the role accorded to women 
has varied from slave to siren, to solace. At all times 
women have had to charm for their station, even for 
their Uving; and the technique of charm and its asso- 
ciated arts, which are many and of good standing, — 
and of not so good, — are hers by bent of nature and 
the inclination of nurture. 

In both pursuits there is a large demand upon emo- 
tional endowment, upon sympathy and a tempera- 
mental insight into the play of intimate motives, of 
affective give and take — all intensely personahzed. 
"Man has been compelled to face external Nature. 
Woman must face humanity." The personal passion- 
ateness of the mother standardizes much of feminine 
emotion; and in so far as the mental life is supported 
and colored by the emotional nature, — and that, Uke 
beauty or the love of it, is not skin-deep, but goes to 
the bone, — the feminine mind is bound to reflect 
originally, and in all its moods and tenses, the abound- 
ing sources of its inspiration. The larger possibilities 
lie here, the truer devotion to causes espoused, the more 
righteous appraisal of what things are vital and worth 
while, and an abundant following of minor qualifica- 
tions, slighter superiorities, more congenial fitnesses 
for types of occupation, which shape female (and also 
feminist) psychology. 

The larger limitations are of the same conditioning. 



THE FEMININE MIND 299 

Certain profound transformations of the human mind 
must be accompHshed before civilization can proceed 
completely, consonantly, successfully, and happily. 
Some of the qualifications for entering into the prom- 
ised land — the promise that of inspired vision and 
the fulfillment directed by cherished ideals of the larger 
minds of both sexes — will be more difficult for women, 
and others for men. In so far as the transformation 
runs counter to deeply ingrained masculine traits, — 
strengths and weaknesses alike — men will have a longer 
and a harder road to travel to incorporate them into 
their being. In so far as the transformation opposes 
the feminine bent, — its frailties and foibles as well 
as its potencies, — the greater trial will fall to the lot 
of women. The civilizing process requires a reorgani- 
zation of the psychic nature; if one sex has a readier 
facility for such readjustment, that facility will be- 
come a general advantage. For civilization, education, 
domestication, — call the process by whatever name, 
— is nothing else than the expression of the seK-trans- 
forming power of the human mind, aided or hindered 
by the institutional establishments which that same 
intelligence establishes for the process. A dominantly 
masculine civilization will differ from a dominantly 
feminine one; either implies the capacity to control 
above the other. Every civilization reflects the parts 
assumed by the two. 

The psychic changes that civihzation demands of 
human nature, and the mascuUne and feminine way 
of meeting that demand, are decisive. They shape the 
conditions of living, and they determine the field of 
operation of the feminine along with and as contrasted 



300 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

with the masculine mind. The generally human way 
of meeting that demand — as likewise, the way of this 
nation and of that — comes forward in the differences 
of ideals that make the large issues of our Uving. Na- 
tions go to war for such ideals; people travel and study 
to understand them and absorb them; missionaries 
devote their Uves to extend them; commerce brings 
them with her cargoes. And always these ideals are 
differently absorbed and refracted as they pass through 
a psychic prism that behaves after the manner of a 
masculine or of a feminine medium of transmission. 
That complex refractive and reflective aspect of the 
feminine mind is the consideration eventually to be 
reached, but is present in our minds from the outset; 
it is, indeed, largely responsible for our entire under- 
taking. For the moment the important thing is to 
note that the transformations, large and small, come 
into being by a grafting process; the success of the 
graft depends upon the nearness of kin of the trans- 
formed to the original trait. Such transformations as 
stand close to feminine quaUties will be better and more 
readily accomplished by women; those that sprout 
more congenially upon a masculine stem will blossom 
more abundantly in the transfonned psychology of 
the male; still others may flourish as richly imder the 
one culture as under the other, and yet show differ- 
ences of growth. 

That phase of the conclusion has been reached. The 
other side of the same conclusion requires statement. 
It is that the mode of the response reveals sex as char- 
acteristically as the success of the response. Mode, 
method, manner, technique carry the stamp of sex as 



/ 



THE FEMININE MIND 301 

strongly, possibly more revealingly than the action or 
the interest. In so far as women qualify for the trans- 
formations demanded by this or that order of living, 
they qualify not only by virtue of womanly traits, but 
in a womanly manner. Sacrifice is inherent in a moth- 
er's nature; by virtue thereof the womanly nature i^ 
emotionally more richly responsive; that trait will 
spread itself over the entire range of feminine respon- 
siveness. Women will share the profit and the loss of 
such generous affectability in all their reactions to 
life's situations, alike where it proves to be a benefit 
and where it does not. They may be disposed to 
approach and to solve problems emotionally by the 
technique of sacrifice (or it may be by the technique of 
charm), which require for their adequate solution, the 
technique of invention and mastery. They may be in- 
clined to substitute feeling for initiative. By the same 
token they may have a tendency to over personalize 
situations, which is another consequence of a more 
susceptible and generous affectability. And a weak 
sense for the objective (which is a characteristic atti- 
tude demanded by science and made strong in its 
practice) may handicap them seriously in playing this 
part or that, for which, so far as all the other essential 
or supporting qualities go, they may be as well fitted 
as men. They may not take ideas so seriously as feel- 
ings, and may prefer good will to good sense. Grafted 
upon one and the same stem are the qualities that make 
women more sacrificing, more conscientious, more 
patient alike of drudgery and disaster, more senti- 
mental, and less tolerant of personal differences, less 
impressed by far-flung systems of control, and more 



302 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

inclined to yield devotion than to supply the direction 
of its energy. More bluntly put: the following of her 
natural bent may lead a representative woman to 
martyrdom, more or less futile, or more or less noble 
(witness the hunger strikes of imprisoned suffragettes), 
or to nagging more or less venial (witness Xantippe 
and her clan). Let the concluding emphasis fall upon 
this principle that manner maketh the man and the 
woman also. 



But what is the bearing of all this upon the feminine 
mivd f The mind is the instrument of reasoning, and 
logic does not deal with gender. In Mme. de Stael's 
words: "Xe5 ames rCont pas de sexes." The explana- 
tion of this gifted feminist's view that minds are with- 
out sex, is astonishingly simple: she was simply wrong. 
And there are psychologists differently mistaken by 
way of the other extreme, who hold that minds reflect 
Uttle else than sex. A truer mean is expressed by Mr. 
Havelock Ellis: "A man is a man throughout, a woman 
is a woman throughout, and that difference is mani- 
fest in all the energies of body and soul." The truth 
is that the rational element in the mind's procedures 
dominates only in the few, and reaches so far as a 
moderately responsible control of conduct in the many, 
yet by no means in the vast majority of the average 
nm of men and women. Of thinking pure and simple 
there is much that is simple enough, but not so much 
that is pure. Thinking colored by emotional inclina- 
tion is the rule, even among the more intellectually 
inclined; and thinking warped by desire and emotional 



THE FEMININE MIND 303 

bias is the even more common rule for the far more 
numerous non-intellectual classes. Considered more 
practically: if conclusions affecting human relations 
could be expressed in logarithms, minds would truly 
have no more sex than adding-machines; and diaries 
would be no more interesting than time-tables or bank- 
books. Thinking would stand free of emotional, and 
consequently also of sex-bias. Thinking, as it actually 
goes on (when charitably interpreted), includes the 
gross aggregate of mental processes that intervene 
between the appearance of a problem and the line of 
action decided upon for its solution — between vague 
impressions and definite convictions. Making up one's 
mind, like our display of an American flag when we 
travel abroad, is in many instances a superfluous pro- 
cedure. \The average mind is already in a state of pre- 
paredness; it may be caught in deshahilley but promptly 
assumes its formal and conventional habit. To un- 
welcome calls it is conveniently as well as convention- 
ally not at home. I 

One must not be misled or cajoled by a word. The 
mind is the logical phase of the psychological nature. 
The mind as the instrument of perception and judg- 
ment must on occasion be distinguished from the com- 
posite personality that also attends to feeling and 
willing — the character. But neither minds nor charac- 
ters exist in detachment. The only reality is the indi- 
vidual, at once mind and character, both set in a com- 
mon nature. Young men and young women go to col- 
lege to develop their minds, but in no sense leave their 
characters — or however they designate their none too 
logical selves — at home. They bring their total per- 



304 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

sonalities, sex and all, to learning as to all other call- 
ings. And so distinct are the problems arising from 
this circumstance (which many even oflficially con- 
cerned with it take pleasure or pride in ignoring) that 
coeducational colleges appoint women Deans of Women 
to direct women students, despite the presence of 
fairly competent men on the Faculty. Recognizing 
this practical condition, psychology studies the femi- 
nine nature, mental nature, emotional nature, willing 
nature, conduct nature, — aU in one, and one in all, 
— composite and sexed. 

This consideration is important in its own right, and 
is additionally so because the perceiving and judging 
fimctions, which are favored in the ordinary meaning 
of mind, are likewise not detached. The mind as the 
logical instrument depends upon supporting qualities. 
These supporting qualities lie partly in the same field 
as the logical operations; such are keenness of percep- 
tion, capacity for detail, sustained attention, ready 
imagination, range of association, a sense of perti- 
nence, value, propriety, effectiveness. Quite as largely 
they are in the field of feeling and will, or encroach 
upon them; such are conscience, persistence, endur- 
ance, self-control, and that composite attitude that 
makes the professional temper. When these supports 
are considered in their actual relations to success and 
manner of undertaking, to the capacities, preferences, 
strengths of interest, inclinations to occupations, and 
all manner of fitnesses that make up the quahty of the 
work of the mind in its daily rounds, it becomes clear 
how arbitrary it would be to view them as merely in- 
tellectual facilities, as detached in any manner from 



THE FEMININE MIND S05 

the man or woman — body, mind and character — 
who directs them. The pragmatic differences in the 
feminine mind and the mascuHne mind, when both are 
set to work upon the same order of task, result from 
the infusion of the feehng and wiUing factor, quite as 
much as from any difference in logical power or method. 
The difference makes manner and quality as well as 
eflSciency. The range, degree, and manner of one's 
interests are as much a part of one's feeling as of 
one's thinking; the complex play of interests as sup- 
ports to mind are intelligible only when considered in 
terms of the total psychological nature. 

In summary: The minds of men and the minds of 
women may differ less (both in general and in particu- 
lar cases) than their supporting qualities. What men 
and women choose to attempt and manage to accom- 
plish with their minds may depend more upon the 
supporting qualities they bring to bear upon the effort 
than upon any strong differences in mental capacity. 
Psychology recognizes such original and decisive dif- 
ferences, while yet it emphasizes that they are of de- 
gree only; but it considers them in their practical em- 
ployment as aided by their supporting qualities. If 
this interpretation is sound, it is natural that isolated 
tests designed with slight reference to the supporting 
qualities (which play such a large part in the actual 
relations of a real world) should show slight contrast 
of the masculine and the feminine performance. Tests 
like facts, which they are, require the illumination of 
their place in the setting that gives them meaning. 



306 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

VI 

It is only in a Kmited sense that the mental aptitudes 
of men and women are subject to test. The test of the 
schooboom is pertinent so far as it goes; the psycho- 
logical laboratory contributes similar and more meas- 
urable comparisons. The experiences of trades and 
occupations add to the impression. The combined edu- 
cational, psychological, and industrial records show, on 
the whole, a small range of differences — some favor- 
able to men, others to women. This conclusion applies 
to tests involving the working of the senses, the direc- 
tion of skilled movements, as well as tests in the field 
of memory, imagination, and the associative and judg- 
ing processes. The most marked superiority is that of 
men in muscular strength and qualities of action re- 
lated to this factor. A consistent feminine superiority 
is in the field of memory and the allied supporting, 
somewhat detailed and minute, secretarial or hand- 
maid qualities that keep the mental affairs in order. 
Yet equally convincing of fair equality are the records 
of Phi Beta Kappa in coeducational institutions. These 
summarize the most complex array of mental apti- 
tudes that may readily be compared in parallel colunms 
of figures. Speaking broadly, and thus shallowly, so 
far as aptitude for study goes, the academic record 
divides the prizes — for there is more than one — and 
some go to boys and some to girls, though often with 
conspicuous exceptions and uncertain distribution. 
When projected in averages, the curves of such men- 
tal aptitudes decidedly overlap and present similar 
outlines. 



THE FEMININE MIND 807 

When it comes to interpretation, the trouble begins. 
The pertinent question, if our principles are sound, re- 
lates to the place of the aptitudes tested in college, in 
a biological scale. Thus considered, they are obviously 
highly special applications of highly derivative powers 
to the third and fourth degree. The bare fact that 
young men and young women do so nearly equally 
well (by the tests of rank in studies) may have so un- 
expected a meaning as that they do equally badly. And 
this is not a sliu", but the recognition of a fact; namely, 
that the specialization of the mental powers demanded 
by college coiu'ses, though not very rigid, is rigid enough 
to make the test Umited and uncertain. It would be 
more so if one proposed to test the intelligence of the 
sexes by their skill at chess, — in which, from a profes- 
sional point of view, most men and most women would 
do equally badly. The test is good so far as it goes; 
and clearly it does not go nearly so far as a " college 
course " test. Both tests would show that the stand- 
ards of proficiency (in chess or in studies) set by a 
democratic requirement, or the modest qualifications 
necessary to keep one in college, represent but a part 
and a tangential part of the individual's total qualifi- 
cation for living. Men and women do equally well (or 
equally badly) in college, because their doing well or 
not depends on qualities too irregularly related with 
their most significant strengths and weaknesses. The 
records of what intellectually specialized men and in- 
tellectually specialized women do with their minds, 
when released from academic discipline, is a far more 
significant criterion. In professional pursuits, the sup- 
porting, congenially masculine qualities, combining with 



308 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

the special intellectual grasp, may account largely for 
the overwhelming prominence of men's names in gen- 
eral biographical dictionaries and in those of the spe- 
cialties. 

It should be noted that in such comparisons the 
standards are shifting. In the selection of those fit for 
college from the total candidates (neglecting the large 
and distiu-bing factor of opportunity) the intellectual 
facihty may prove to be about equal in the sexes. In 
the early days when few women went to college, those 
who went were doubtless of higher intellectual status 
than the average of men, or the average of women in 
college to-day; selection must be considered. The pro- 
portion fit for encouragement for the doctor's degree 
may show a decided contrast of sex; and successful 
candidates for important professorships may reveal still 
more pronounced differentiation of sex (after due allow- 
ance for artificial sex-disqualification is made). This 
specialized order of intellectual test, though in part 
legitimate, is indeed remote from the central function 
of the intellect to direct conduct rationally under the 
ordinary conditions of life. It may be gliding over 
rather than resting upon the significant sex-differences; 
it may be concealing rather than revealing the sex- 
differences on which a comparable amateur score is 
made. The professional standard may be needed to 
show sex-differences of so highly specialized a type. 

High-grade intellectual logical quality lies so remote 
from the central and common utilities of a decently 
rational control of conduct, that it is almost the last 
place where one should look for pronounced and au- 
thentic sex-differences. And if it should be the fact 



THE FEMININE MIND 309 

that some one quality in this domain dominates, and 
if that quality happens to have a stronger and more 
congenial hold on the psychology of one sex than on 
that of the other, such superiority may have a tremen- 
dous influence upon the achievements and occupa- 
tions of the sexes. The tests, be it noted, are set by 
complex careers under highly civilized and specialized 
social conditions. Such a quality is originality; not 
originality alone, but supported by an aggressive per- 
sistence, an exploring curiosity, a directive manage- 
ment, and much else of like nature. 

For no lifelong pursuit flourishes upon one quality 
alone; the combination which it demands widens the 
chance for finding a greater fitness in masculine or in 
feminine psychology. When a similar achievement is 
fairly equally accomplished by men and by women, 
it may still be that the qualities contributing to the 
comparable success themselves vary moderately or 
decidedly in the two sexes. And quite as significantly, 
men and women will not only carry to the same occu- 
pation differently contributing factors, but show a like 
difference of manner in expression. Even when no such 
complexity exists, the sex-difference may be signifi- 
cant. In general, women are doubtless as musically 
gifted as men, probably more so; the proportion of 
musical composers among men-musicians remains a 
significant fact, and the contrast of a masculine and 
feminine musical rendition equally so. Though such 
statements must be made with proper reservations, 
their significance remains. They direct the interpre- 
tation without which the bare facts are as likely to 
mislead as to enlighten. Once the right clue to inter- 



310 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

pretation is found, the controversial issues may be led 
to a surer understanding and a more profitable appK- 
cation. The indispensable condition to following the 
right scent is the avoidance of the false ones. Among 
these the statistical fallacy is especially to be avoided; 
this claims for facts because they accurately represent 
what they represent, an authority over conclusions 
which the intrinsic value of the facts entirely fails to 
justify. 

Statistics tell the truth, but not the whole truth; 
they are false only when falsely interpreted. There 
are professional psychologists who conclude, on the 
basis of the experimental and similar data, that women 
have proved themselves as well fitted as men for all 
vocations, that their intellectual equipment is com- 
parable, that the exclusion of women from any calling 
is mere prejudice. That conclusion involves a double 
fallacy: it assumes that the intellectual test is ade- 
quate and is adequately tested by the given tests; and 
also that all kinds of differences are equally significant. 
It likewise ignores an important fact: that specialized 
quahties mature by the support which they find in the 
generic, more primary, more vital quahties, nearer to 
Nature's perspective. In addition, it overlooks that 
small differences may count, and count heavily, just 
in that proportion in which society fiinds a use (an im- 
natiu-al use, it may be) for highly speciahzed qualities. 
If one will reflect upon the small place provided for 
a mathematical gift (that is, for that general type of 
aptitude upon which a proficiency in mathematics may 
be built) in a fairly primitive and natural condition of 
society, and will reflect upon the extremely modest 



THE FEMININE MIND SU 

mathematical capacity fomid in the average person in 
school or behind the counter, — all of whom make 
desirable voting or should-be voting citizens, de- 
cently competent in all the complex relations of mod- 
ern life, — one begins to realize how remote a part in 
a natural distribution of general and special aptitudes 
this mathematical proficiency plays. The fact that 
we honor one who has such unusual powers by making 
a professor of mathematics of him, and by supporting 
him in such affluence that it requires all his mathemat- 
ical ingenuity to make both ends meet, demonstrates 
that our complex needs require in a highly selected few 
an extreme development of powers fairly remote from 
the ordinary range upon which a livelihood is gained 
and a life lived. So far may the powers that we bring 
to living travel from the powers that we bring to life. 

The general relation of women to learning should 
not be dismissed without recognizing, indeed, empha- 
sizing, that by sheer force of tradition society may 
impose a disqualification upon a sex, which, if not least 
aptly, at least inaptly, expresses a significant differ- 
ence. In days well within the modern perspective, 
an educated woman was regarded as an unwomanly 
one; and a taste for blue in stockings (though in long- 
skirted days more readily concealed) ostracized the 
feminine precursor of the "high-brow" from the privi- 
leges of her sex. Books are no more formidable weap- 
ons for women than for men; and the pen which some 
men have found mightier than the sword may also by 
some women be found mightier than the broom. The 
ignorance of women in many lands must not be cited 
to indicate an aptitude or a taste for that form of bliss. 



312 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Similarly the fact that the group who hold that a 
college education unfits for the activities of life is 
composed of impenetrable meuy may give that senti- 
ment a mascuhne air without making it typical of the 
male. 

The restridtions which a masculine rule have placed 
upon feminine expression and the extent to which such 
limitations have fettered or effectively discouraged 
the development of womanly capacities, can be judged 
only by the result of emancipation. For it is not 
merely the feet of women — as in China — but the 
minds of women that have been bound, by both proc- 
esses limiting their excursions. The effect of restric- 
tion appears in social, political, and vocaticmal fields 
and spreads over the entire career of women; histori- 
cally it is doubtless the largest single influence that 
determines what women have done, even when the 
largest allowance is made for the extent to which their 
occupations express their nature. This apphed field 
will presently be considered; for the moment we note 
that the intellectual qualities of women are of intens- 
ive interest because minds count in modern life and 
are going to count more and more. Without inclina- 
tion to the educating process and capacity for it, the 
competence necessary for the civilized life cannot be 
attained. The world is going to be more and more in- 
terested in the feminine mind, as the tendency spreads 
to give minds (and feminine minds) a fairer and a 
larger field. The world will not thereby lose its interest 
in feminine personahties. 

In brief: the intellectual test is valuable, but does 
not stand alone; deeper and more comprehensive are 



THE FEMINmE MIND 313 

the allied and supporting processes which give the 
cutting edge to the instrument, and determine the 
temper of the mind, the manner and spirit of its use. 
Women possess a distinctive type of mentality and 
express the mentality which they share with men with 
distinctive differences of manner and composition and 
effect; and all this, by reason of the different composite 
of their supporting qualities and their setting in the 
total feminine nature. To neglect these differences, 
and rely for one's convictions as to the nature of the 
feminine mind upon the detached mental tests, is un- 
warranted. It over-emphasizes the tendency to look 
upon intellectual sex-differences as the results of im- 
posed restraints; its leads to the hasty conclusion of 
a comparable equality in all capacities from a demon- 
strated comparability in a limited and selected group 
of specialized proficiencies. The generic tests of life 
are more authentic than the selected tests of the lab- 
oratory; they alone supply a field of operation broad 
enough and natural enough to be adequate, however 
themselves artificial. Specific tests of isolated psychic 
capacities are valuable; but their true value appears 
only when they are appraised in relation to the total 
psychology in which they live and move. On the one 
hand, the results suppHed by the artificial reaction of 
women under the attitude of a test are readily stated; 
their meaning is seriously in dispute. On the other 
hand, the evidence of what women can do is uncertainly 
reflected in the history of what women have done, 
because of geuerations of traditional restrictions of 
women's careers and expressions. For these reasons, 
though not for these alone, the measures of the powers 



314 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

of women as recorded upon a mascuKne or a neutral 
yardstick leave the powers of women a problem, and 
the desirable status of woman a controversy. 

vn 

Once again a long bit of rough logical road has had 
to be traveled to gain the easier highway upon which 
one may proceed more smoothly the rest of the way. 
The concerns of life in which men hold the common 
stock and women the preferred, and those in which 
the reverse distribution holds, must be sought in those 
close, intimate, social, democratic relations that affect 
directly the modes of living that count in convictions 
as well as in occupations and satisfactions. This is 
the habitat of deep psychology, where traits are at 
once subtle and profound. Here the feminine mind, 
as all minds in their speciaHzed aspects, becomes most 
revealing, most characteristic in the actual and com- 
plex encounter with the play of general cultural and 
special social forces, with life in all its complexity of 
tradition and circumstance, as it is warmly and richly 
lived. Under such complications, the relative simplic- 
ity of the "woman question " assumes the sophisti- 
cated intricacy of the "feminist movement." Here 
the psychological forces shaping the attitude toward 
women and of women meet the practical forces that 
shape the common situation, the common world, in 
which all sorts of people and all sorts of men and women 
must find a way of adjusting their differences of opin- 
ion and of nature in a psychological as well as a prac- 
tical modus Vivendi, 

Feminism is itself a telltale manifestation of the 



THE FEMININE MIND 315 

feminine mind. But the tale that it tells is not merely 
of the aggressive sex-consciousness with which men 
can afford to dispense or express without need of de- 
fense, but of the reasons why there is little occasion 
for a masculinism. The world has for many ages been 
a man-made world. It may be a crude affair, but 
there are some provisions in it for a masculine type of 
interest and happiness, some cozy corners of reckless 
abandon, some invitations to masculine zest. Here and 
there are a few sheltered tables labeled: "Reserved for 
women and children." One of the overlooked reasons 
why the woman's place is in the home is that man has 
decided that his place is outside of it — in the great 
man-made world without. In a more systematic sur- 
vey there would be much to say, in the past tense and 
in the present, of the subjection of women, of the un- 
suitability of any established forms of social regula- 
tion, as of education, to the inherent psychology of the 
feminine mind. It is the undefined status of women 
and the inner attitude toward the accredited sphere 
of womanly expression, rather than the approved or 
tolerated treatment of women, that tells the tale. So 
far as respect and privilege go, we of the New World 
— in which we have retained a sense of its making — 
readily accept the judgment of a people and its in- 
stitutions by the position accorded to women. Indeed, 
our visitors from beyond the sea comment upon our 
attitudes sometimes with intelligent amazement, and 
sometimes with unintelligent despair.^ 

* It remained for a scholar of the Teutonic persuasion to recog- 
nize in the "Cult of Womanhood" the supreme American danger. His 
explanation exposes the trap which knowledge sets for learned minds: 
the cult is traceable, he thinks, to the matriarchal system of the Amer- 



316 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Feminism is the expression of a growing conscious- 
ness of the misuitabiUty of traditional restrictions to 
modern conditions. Like many a movement it is sub- 
ject to extreme expressions, and, more imfortunately, 
is apt to be judged by them. Its progress has been 
hampered and its motives distorted by a sort of radi- 
cal iconoclasm which selects as the idol to be shattered 
the presumption of the male. Nothing is to be gained 
and much of great value is to be lost by fostering 
in any measure a sex-antagonism. Sex-differences may 
be interpreted by way of compensation for specializa- 
tion; and the assumption or discussion of superiority 
is futile. No sex can show the other its place and keep 
its own. What the world is interested in are the dis- 
tinctively masculine qualities and the distinctively 
feminine ones, and the values attaching to these in the 
perspective of ideas and ideals of the day. 

Sex-differences, Uke all authentic differences, are val- 
uable. Such differences prevent a Sahara-like stand- 
ardization from sweeping over the world. Feminism 
and masculinism should be encouraged to their fullest 
and freest expression. A neuter mind is not desirable, 
if possible; and a denatured mind of either sex would, 
like some of the artificially grafted fruits, sacrifice 
flavor for something less choice. What the world owes 
to the feminine mind is a native and authentic em- 
phasis among the common human traits, which is re- 
sponsible for some of the deepest trends in civiUzation. 

ican Indians, combined with the practice of co-education. By the 
same logic one may conclude that as women in cruder times were 
accustomed to accept dictation at the hands of men, they now nat- 
urally become stenographers; this conclusion, however, appeared in 
its proper place, not in a professedly learned volume, but in a frivo- 
lous column of jokes. 



THE FEMININE MIND 317 

The compensations which it has made strong enough 
to offset the perils of a too aggressive mascuUnity have 
estabUshed sympathy, esteem, affection, charm, grace, 
and the amenities and gentihties that enrich the art 
of Hving. They compensate for the insistent utiHties 
and the coarser brutahties of an unredeemed nature. 
By reason of the investiture of the dominant social 
control in the hands of men, the manner of incorpora- 
tion of feminine quaUties in the cultural products, and 
the value set upon them, becomes a test of the cultural 
level of attainment. In so far as civilization is domesti- 
cation, the domestic inclination of women is an asset. 
Its scope is broad, but its focus lies in the intimate 
personal relations and constant social contacts of the 
daily round. In so far as civilization is transformation 
under exploration, invention, inquiry, and mastery, 
the constructive inclination of men is an asset. The 
bypaths of invitation associated with these divergent, 
though not exclusive traits lead to minor contrasts and 
remoter consequences. Social institutions and regu- 
lations, and the prizes and approvals which they estab- 
lish, provide congenial avenues of expression for such 
traits, and likewise set up limitations and restrictions. 
Such cultural products are normally cherished and 
embraced, and only with an awakening consciousness 
of their limitations are they endured, then tolerated 
in rebellion, and finally displaced by more congenial 
forms. The attitudes shift imperceptibly under the 
slower processes of adjustment; they alter rapidly 
under the deliberate stimulation of a growing mal- 
adjustment. In such a setting, feminism has an intel- 
Hgent origin, while the form that it assumes reflects 



318 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

the temperamental reactions of racial and national as 
well as of individual temperaments. 

To sense the spirit of such reactions and to gain an 
insight into their justification, one may observe se- 
lected areas of human interest. The occupational field 
contributes a suggestive illumination; and a gUmpse 
backward to primitive conditions is interesting. "A 
man himts, spears fish, fights, and sits about," said a 
primitive Austrahan, with the plain impUcation that 
the rest is woman's work. Apart from the sitting 
about — which is a perennial masculine proficiency — 
the work of men has decidedly changed, far more so 
than that of women. The larger reorganization has 
fallen to men, and in that lies some excuse for their 
failures and lapses. Viewed occupationally, there is 
in these and the nearer generations so little distinctively 
masculine work available — that is, for the vast ma- 
jority of men — that men have been compelled to take 
the more interesting portions of women's work away 
from them; for the industries were originally predomi- 
nantly feminine. Out of them men have made manu- 
facture and commerce and trade and business, and 
have injected into these pursuits masculine orders of 
satisfaction. Without this masculinization of indus- 
try, the modern world could not have arisen. It is not 
to be inferred that all business activities are pecul- 
iarly mascuhne. What ha? happened in recent days 
is only that the business man has come to be regarded 
as the typical male, to whose interests and habits of 
mind all others must give way. In the confidence of 
his self-approval and the consciousness of his economic 
power, he may presume to regard a University as a 



THE FEMININE MIND 319 

knowledge-plant, of which the significant side is the 
time-table and the cost pe^: student-hour. For his 
tired (though not overstrained) mind, the drama in 
the hands of business-minded managers must be re- 
duced to vapidity, horse-play, and the display of the 
feminine without suggestion of mind or eternity. The 
glamour of business hangs over every masculine ac- 
tivity, however questionable in service or practice, 
that is accredited to this absorbing pursuit. Most of 
it is admittedly necessary, though its necessity is un- 
intelligently considered; yet much of it is by no war- 
rant a manly calling. To select an unimportant in- 
stance: the stately personality that bears so unworthy 
a title as "floor- walker" or "hotel-clerk" fails to im- 
press the reflective mind with the inherent virility of 
that calling. Appearances are deceptive; we must look 
below the surface to determine how far what men 
do and what women do is theirs by inherent fitness, 
or by tradition and convention. This consideration is 
pertinent because so many attitudes toward the fem- 
inist question are rendered superficial and irrelevant by 
lack of psychological discrimination. 

In further illustration both of convictions and of 
human relations, one turns naturally and without 
apology to the business of politics. The reasons as- 
signed privately and publicly why women should not 
vote, make a self-respecting psychologist hesitate to ex- 
ercise that uncertain privilege. The hypothetical dan- 
ger of entrusting the ballot to many women is the same 
as the demonstrated danger of entrusting it to quite 
as many men. We rejoice in the removal of the me- 
diseval disability of women in regard to education. 



320 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

having found them unexpectedly educable. True it is 
that most women and most men have an effective and 
a different resistance to the process; yet it remains to 
show any distinction in gender between one unedu- 
cated vote and another. What is really feared is not 
quite clear: Is it the effect of women on pohtics, or the 
effect of pohtics on women? Replying to the former; 
It is true that men have made pohtics a game and a 
fight. If we wish to keep it so, it is well to leave mat- 
ters as they are. If we beheve in mimicipal housekeep- 
ing, it might be well to recognize the housekeeping part 
of the community. And more seriously: If we beheve 
that the interests that are entrusted by Nature to 
women may also, at least under masculine guidance, 
be entrusted by men to them; and if we believe that 
as the world is apparently arranged for occupation by 
both sexes, so may institutions recognize that fact, 
we shall at least be prepared to consider the question 
on its merits. Doubtless there is a hazard in any rapid 
and violent reconstruction; and what seems to be feared 
is a sudden introduction into social regulation of a soft 
sentimentahsm and a one-sided emphasis. Even Mr. 
Ellis, who is generously fair to feminism, considers 
that "nice, pretty, virtuous Uttle laws, complete in 
every detail, seem to appeal irresistibly to the feminine 
mind." But he promptly atones in a parenthesis, that 
is fairly incandescent in its illumination: "(And of 
course, many men have feminine minds.)" 

If we accept the political test, we must recognize 
how far we have made politics a masculine privilege, 
and how far it is naturally so. Judged by appearances, 
the legislative function is sustained by cuspidoric liba- 



THE FEMININE MIND 821 

tions; and if one were to argue that the salivary inca- 
pacity of the weaker sex unfits them for a place in the 
halls of state, it would be a grotesque but not an 
unfair caricature of many an argument oratorically 
uttered in those halls. The effect of politics on women 
is a graver matter. It resolves itself into a matter of 
proportion, and a matter of a fundamental faith in 
human nature and in the institutions and ideas estab- 
lished for its direction. The psychologist can afford 
to believe that in the career ordained by Nature, sex 
has been too long tried, is by this time too well-poised, 
to suffer any serious disarrangement by the exercise 
of a modest democratic function. Conviction is, in- 
deed, tinged with faith, with confidence in the inher- 
ent rectitude of sex-endowment, in the authenticity of 
the feminine mind. The question also intrudes whether 
objectifying their social interests may not prove for 
women a desirable corrective for feminine failings and 
cloisterings; it may well be so. The feeling that one is 
exercising an obligation as well as a right is more con- 
genial to a sense of responsibility than the uncertain 
enjoyment of privilege. Unquestionably women will 
bring to all their activities a feminine technique and 
a feminine attitude, which will prove disturbing to 
vested masculine ways, confident with "the confi- 
dence of their insensibilities." The justification of 
equal suffrage will depend upon the ability of women 
to dispossess themselves of their failings, in behalf of 
the public interest, as well as men can dispossess them- 
selves of theirs. Upon this referendum the polls are 
open. 

The political application is important in its own 



S22 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

right, and is furthermore pragmatic and direct. Votes 
bring a certain range of issues to decision, or place them 
for trial in partial and progressive fulfillment. They 
stimulate reflection and reveal the inconsistencies and 
bias of estabUshed institutions. This is their educational 
service; apart from this, poUtics by no means supply 
the significant avenue for the contributions of femi- 
nism, desirable and undesirable. The great highways 
of ideas that direct social attitudes, mental disciphne, 
aesthetic taste, the sense for the human superiorities, 
are far more comprehensive, far more momentous. In 
this light the feminization of the absorbent minds of the 
young by a too large preponderance of women among 
school-teachers is a serious weakness of the school-sys- 
tem. The opinion seems to prevail that if only there 
are a sufficient niunber of unspecialized and axe-grind- 
ing committeemen on the school-board to introduce 
the masculine element of domination, it matters little 
who does the teaching. The feminization of Hterature, 
aided by the paradoxical situation that women have 
more time or inclination to read, the increasing differ- 
entiation of women's magazines and women's pages, 
is also a step in the wrong direction. The aggressive 
phases of a "woman's rights" movement are unwhole- 
some. They agitate sex-antagonism. These protago- 
nists resist any measure of segregation in education, 
ignoring the fact that the real segregation takes place 
spontaneously in the elections of men and women; they 
insist that women shall be exposed to the same mis- 
takes as men, holding that so long as the two sit side 
by side in rigid consciousness of equal opportunity for 
instruction that is not quite suited to either, all is well. 



THE FEMININE MIND 323 

And in the larger aspects of these questions informing 
us "Why Women Are So," or, "What Eight MiUion 
Women Want," there is the same tendency. It is ag- 
gravated by a feministic version of the past, pre- 
senting the history of the sexes as a continuous and 
maHcious domineering of women by men. These rhe- 
torical triumphs over men are misguided; they have 
given rise to a brand of feminists who hold that men 
and women are substantially ahke, only that men are 
peculiar. They lead nowhere and lead away from a 
discriminating and helpful view of the theories and the 
conditions that confront us. They serve to prove the 
disUke of impartial analysis, which is one of the serious 
charges that the masculine ventures to advance against 
the feminine mind. 

The essential desirable effort is to shape the social 
order to the needs and capacities of both sexes, and 
especially to encourage in that order those influences 
that promote the higher types of satisfaction in which 
both sexes have a parallel interest. For these are what 
make life most worth living, make the significant dis- 
tinction, not between men and women, but between 
low-grade and high-grade men or women; and in that 
gradation, between the many shades and grades, the 
sorts and conditions, that bridge the contrast. To 
make the world safe for the higher values of life may 
appear too pretentious a formula; but something of 
this order, more modestly framed, is what is aimed 
at in the right disposition of the specialized quahties 
of men and women, and the equally right disposition 
of their common nature, common interests, common 
strivings, common capacities, common failings. All 



S24 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

this must be recognized in terms of the several insti- 
tutions — occupational, educational, religious, and, in 
the highest sense, social — which are the recognized in- 
striunents of human progress. What is wanted is not 
a melting-pot of human quality in which laboriously 
developed products shall lose their distinctive form, 
but an alembic of such psychological potency that all 
the baser quahties shall be transmuted into gold. In 
such a consummation the elemental masculine and 
the elemental feminine will not disappear, but be de- 
veloped to their choicest expression. 

The supreme issue of feminism, and that which 
gives it a timeliness beyond aU other phases of its in- 
terest, Ues in its pacific contribution. Women, like all 
the morally responsible nations in the vanguard of 
civiHzation, are irrevocably bound to the settlement 
of controversies by peaceful measures. Women may 
be more affected by the unspeakable horrors of war; 
men may be more affected by its irrationality. Join- 
ing forces they reinforce the greatest campaign that 
the world has ever witnessed, — the war for the ex- 
termination of war. Here Hes the largest mascuHne 
responsibiUty — the imperfect reorganization of the 
male to suit the conditions of modem thought, the 
unbalanced development of the male, strengthening 
ingenuity and the mighty forces of control of Nature, 
with imperfect control of the moral forces that alone 
can wisely direct them. Again citing Mr. ElUs: "We 
must reahze that there can be no sure guide to fine 
living save that which comes from within, and is sup- 
ported by the firmly cultivated sense of personal re- 
sponsibiUty. Our prayer must still be the simple, old- 



THE FEMININE MIND 325 

fashioned prayer of the Psalmist : * Create in me a clean 
heart, O God ! ' — and to hell with your laws ! " Women 
will forgive the masculine expletive for the sake of the 
feminine sentiment. The charge remains that men, 
called upon to spend their largest energies in subjugat- 
ing Nature, have continued the habit of subjugation 
by subjugating women and other men, and not them- 
selves. To-day the unrestrained cry of the male re- 
sounds clamorously if yet sensitively in the Nietzsches, 
stridently in the Treitschkes, diabolically in the Bern- 
hardis, shamelessly in Teutonic representatives of press 
and pulpit and academy, with fanatic insanity in the 
ruthless sword-bearers of Germany, and ruinously to 
all the values of life and living in those who listen to 
their sacrileges of humanity, defended with a perversity 
that by comparison makes Mephistopheles a scrupu- 
lous saint. If there was from the beginning of time an 
ordained hour when the cry of the male should listen 
humbly and devoutly to the cry of the female, that 
hour has now rung. "Nature," says Mr. Ellis in a 
happy summary, "has done her best to make women 
healthy and glad, and has on the whole been content 
to let men run somewhat wild." Manlike, men have 
taken advantage of their privileges and abused them. 
The more innocent abuses may be tolerantly accepted; 
the menace of the larger ones has never before been 
realized. In the councils of peace that shall sit in high 
conclave, determining in Olympian parliament the 
fate of humanity, there will, in all likelihood, be no 
woman delegate. But invisible, yet responsible, a coun- 
sellor will be present in the spirit of the feminine mind. 



XI 

MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 

The controversy of militarism versus pacifism is large 
in extent, far-reaching in root and branch. It com- 
mands the tensest thought of the day and the anxious 
vista of to-morrow. It is here to be reviewed in argu- 
ment and circumstance as it affects the alert modern 
mind. What affects that mind may have a variable 
logical value and a shifting psychological pertinence; 
standards of judgment must be correspondingly elas- 
tic. Arguments derive their momentum, their "con- 
vincing " energy, from the spirit and genius of the atti- 
tudes of their champions. The concrete points of view 
of miUtarists and pacifists determine the course of the 
controversy. The appeal of ideas becomes more signifi- 
cant than the push and pull of events; as "always the 
thought is prior to the fact." The controversy is Janus- 
faced, looking backward to wars and their provocations, 
forward to measures that will make war remote. Prec- 
edents count heavily when they accumulate rapidly 
and pertinently. This cannot be the case for the wars 
of great nations and the rapid modernization of ideas 
and conditions to which ahke the nations and the wars 
are responsive. For foresight as well as insight "fifty 
years of Europe " is immeasurably "better than a cycle 
of Cathay." The psychological perspective must be 
maintained; to its composition the contemporary, the 
national, the personal allegiances contribute. 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 327 

It is the taking thought, in times of war, of the ori- 
gins of war and peace that becomes the proper study 
of mankind. In the presence of the world-war, projects 
of hand or mind unrelated to war-aims seem remote. 
Yet the student of conviction owes a logical as well as 
a personal loyalty; must recognize the one without re- 
linquishing the other. The overwhelming movements 
of war decentralize reason; they disturb the legitimate 
influence of principles upon attitudes and practice; 
they move policies away from theories and toward 
conditions. Yet the obligation to inquire into causes 
and to set the mental household in order is strengthened 
in serious moments. A right view of militarism is as 
important as a right view of this war; the principles 
underlying peace are as important as any concrete 
peace-terms. 

By such consideration war and peace cease to be 
incidents or issues however momentous, and become 
still more momentous as general conditions of the exis- 
tence and welfare of peoples. The values at stake be- 
come the essential and eternal values of life and the 
enhancement of living, that we call civilization. Of 
such values, material, intellectual, aesthetic, social, po- 
litical, and moral, the moral ones assume the central 
place; the right protection of human rights becomes 
the paramount issue. That historically the rights of 
men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness have 
been strengthened by the issues of war is as clear as 
that they have been assailed by such organized na- 
tional force. That the inclination so to defend them 
is an integral part of human nature is as clear as that 
the same impulses may be summoned to ignore and 



S28 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

override them. If justice lies predominantly with one 
warring faction or nation, it as clearly does not lie 
with the other; and there have been as many unjust 
as just wars. War as a means to determine justice or 
to enforce it must be measured against other means to 
the same end. But the compKcation of social forces, 
though always referable to human motives, modifies 
without impugning such clear-cut issues. For issues 
must become part of the conscious struggle; and the 
dramatic and compelling crises of war may be the most 
direct, if not under the circumstances the only way 
of incorporating them into the social consciousness. 
Such incorporation carries with it not only the tense 
emotional and romantically sentimental values at- 
taching to great heroic enterprises, but also the height- 
ened sacrificial attitudes and warm cohesive sense of 
patriotism, which in other contacts and interests may 
be as authentic, but fail to attain the same pitch, to 
enlist the same popular appeal, to arouse the same 
sociaHzed sense of a cause embraced and won. The 
irrationahty of war may be demonstrable and yet leave 
substantially intact the persistent thrill of its triumphs, 
moods, and employments. 

But aU this makes war enthusiasm inteUigible rather 
than the military pohcy justifiable. To discover and 
analyze the psychological attractions of war is one 
matter; to sit in judgment upon the logical defenses 
of war is quite another. Both procedures affect the 
course of controversy; together they constitute the 
rationaUzed psychology of mihtarism and pacifism. 
How far the complex and variable adherence to either 
cause is psychologically, and how far logically deter- 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 329 

mined, is a nice question for the individual examiner of 
his own convictions as well as for the critic of typical 
positions. Pacifism and militarism are alike played 
upon by abundant sentiment. A passionate devotion 
to peace is as mighty a motive for spiritual endeavor 
as the comparable and more conspicuously heroic de- 
votion to war. Much as we value the rich thrills of 
intense living, those of us responsive to the logical re- 
sponsibihties of conduct feel the strong undercurrent 
of reason, the driving force of a consistent world-policy 
that must be enthroned as the arbiter of human des- 
tiny. We cannot await the die of fate, but must pro- 
ject a course and do our bit in exercising a rational 
control — a control of impulses, of interests, of affairs. 
We thus feel the obligation to review the pacific forces 
and the militaristic ones in our common nature, in the 
institutions that we support, in the ordering of the 
mind's allegiances. It is this obligation intensified by 
the spectacle of the embattled nations, in which none 
are spectators but all combatants, that determines the 
controversy which is here to be presented as a psycho- 
logical confiict of forces. The tragic moments of the 
impressive and frightful drama recede; but in their 
place the momentous consequences of right thinking 
appear no less tremendous in the far-flung measures of 
national and humanitarian policy. 



In the perspective of the day the conflict between 
militarism and pacifism occupies the commanding 
position. The world-war makes it the supreme con- 
troversy of our generation. Yet the champions of the 



330 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

opposed positions are not inclined to show their colors 
unmistakably. The hesitation has a one-sided source. 
In profession all or nearly all are pacifists; nobody 
wants war, few defend it unreservedly as an institu- 
tion; many regard it as inherent in human nature, and 
the preparation for it a prudent national insurance 
against disaster; there is a further fear that its removal 
as a contingency would weaken the social structure and 
tradition, and relax the virile energies of men. The pa- 
cifists who come in overwhelming numbers to enlist in 
the cause of peace show a divergence of principle and 
measures that divides them as sharply as those who 
hesitate to join their ranks. The articles of faith to 
which the two parties respectively subscribe are at 
times much the same, and as often quite incompatible. 
A liberal pacifist may be a close and not uncongenial 
neighbor to a mild mihtarist. The extreme militarist 
regards the extreme pacifist as an obstinate and mis- 
guided enemy to the nation and the nation's cause; and 
the unlovely estimate of the tendency of the opposed 
view is cordially reciprocated. There would appear to 
be a radical divergence and a sharp controversy. Yet 
when summoned to debate the two parties are com- 
monly bent upon conciliation, upon a middle road of 
moderation and compromise leading to a common goal. 
Specific positions as held by specific persons would in 
one interpretation be assigned to the militarist and in 
another to the pacifist camp. So involved a situation 
requires illumination; the removal of misunderstand- 
ing is the first step. 

A certain measure of clarification is readily attained; 
positively by definition, negatively by avoiding a nar- 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 331 

row and unfair usage of the two terms. In no sense is 
the controversy a verbal one; with a decent regard for 
logic and a fair treatment of honest opinions, the essen- 
tial features remain distinct. Ignorance and prejudice 
are chief among the gross sponsors of misunderstand- 
ing. To use either term as a sneer or an accusation or 
an execration is not an argument, but at best a dis- 
guised billingsgate. The temptation to express an opin- 
ion by the simple use of a classification, with the word 
"damn" as a convenient adjective, may be a relief to 
one*s feelings, but it is not an aid to thought. The emo- 
tion that inspires the condemnation may make it more 
or less venial; the existence of the temptation is a sign 
of weakness, not of strength. Such extreme defection 
from logical standards may be ignored in the present 
survey. 

Next in order of unpardonable sin is the assimilation 
of either position, as ordinarily championed, with an 
extreme or absolute adherence, — thus making the 
uncompromising partisan in either camp the typical 
supporter of the doctrine. The type of the ultimate 
extreme, the unbalanced, monomaniac extreme, is the 
fanatic. There are undoubtedly fanatical militarists, 
and fanatical pacifists; neither group contributes to 
the sanity or the comfort or the progress of the world, 
though the one order of fanatic may be more innocent, 
and present more redeeming quahties than the other. 
The absolute, imcompromising types of partisans in 
this world-wide controversy that engages as does no 
other the vast and deep resources of our emotional 
nature, must be recognized, so far as they remain well 
within a liberal interpretation of sanity. But the over- 



332 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

whelming majority of militarists are not absolute mili- 
tarists; and the overwhelming majority of pacifists are 
not absolute pacifists. To imply in any degree, without 
ample evidence and justification, that an avowed mili- 
tarist is an absolute militarist is an insult and an in- 
jury, — an accusation logically unsound and morally 
unfair; to associate pacifism with the extreme position 
of the small minority of absolute pacifists is worse, be- 
cause the implication is more imcaUed for and more 
apt to lead to further and more seriously imfair impli- 
cations. 

Pacifism presents the more pertinent instance of the 
fallacy and the injustice of making the extreme the 
measure of the mean, in that it is the actual, almost 
(within recent days) the common practice. For this 
reason a digressive step in exposition is necessary. The 
tendency to pose the ordinary orthodox pacifist as an 
absolute pacifist is presumably more a matter of stu- 
pidity than of malice; it could not proceed far without 
an element of both. 

If we were not at war, the factors of the controversy 
between mihtarism and pacifism would easily appear 
in their right relations. War disturbs the judicial atti- 
tude in two ways; it interprets arguments narrowly 
for their bearing upon immediate issues, and these in 
turn for their strengthening (or weakening) of a pohcy 
already embraced, and embraced with all the concen- 
trated determination of loyalty and interest and the 
defense of cherished values that are threatened. It 
thus, secondly, sets the argmnents in a seething mass of 
tense emotions; it plays upon them a stream of senti- 
ment carefully fostered by the social ideals. As indi- 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 333 

viduals, we are naturally and rightly approved if we 
respond to this mass influence; we are naturally and 
rightly regarded with suspicion if we remain indifferent 
or hostile to it. In such tremendously potent issues, 
the emotions remain central; in the one direction they 
reach for the support of reason; in the other they ex- 
tend to the confirmation of action. War makes it of 
vital consequence that we should act, and act with 
promptness, enthusiasm, and determination. Argur 
ments, above all logical refinements, seem irrelevant. 
War is a trial of faith by deeds. War imposes restric- 
tions of speech and influence; it curtails desirable lib- 
erties at every point. A state of war indicates that the 
accredited system of national and international control 
has temporarily broken down; its guarantees are threat- 
ened, in part impaired. Under the danger to the com- 
monwealth the rights and privileges which are ordi- 
narily secure must likewise yield. Everything is affected 
by reason of the solidarity of political and economic 
and broadly social and particularly moral and individ- 
ual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- 
ness. There cannot be and there should not be busi- 
ness as usu'al, or pleasure as usual, or occupation as 
usual, or insistence upon privilege as usual. The entire 
social system, especially in a democratic country, is 
conceived and adjusted for peace; it is inevitably vio- 
lently disarranged in times of war. There is no reason 
to ask for exemption from this concession on the part 
of convictions and the accustomed manner of their ex- 
pression and advocacy. But like all restrictions and 
concessions, the test of their value lies in the wisdom 
of their exercise. These considerations suggest the 



334 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

unique place of convictions in war-time. Convictions, 
true or false, worthy or unworthy, make war possible, 
and under stress actual. Convictions maintain the 
combatants in action, sustain their morale, support 
sacrifice, and keep loyalty alive. Convictions that fall 
in with war aims are approved; those that oppose or 
lessen the belief in the cause are disapproved; if seri- 
ous and permitted to influence action or attitude against 
the national interest, they constitute treason. 

Yet if the stern actuahty of war were permitted to 
obliterate or override all other values, Ufe would soon 
be reduced to chaos, and civilization would disappear. 
Nothing is clearer than that in war-time the system 
of values which in one respect we call justice or fair 
play, in another honor, in another morahty, in yet 
another religion, is carried along with the banner under 
which the citizen-soldier is enhsted. Without the in- 
fluence of these values upon the spirit of war, upon the 
cause of war, upon the conduct of war, and upon the 
discussion of war, there would be no distinction between 
a just and an unjust war, between a righteous and a 
diabohcal war. War may and must modify the appli- 
cations of justice, honor, morahty, rehgion, and is liable 
to distort them; but it cannot ignore them. Speaking 
as Americans, convinced that the forces of liberty, jus- 
tice, and right shall ever determine action, we insist 
upon their recognition, and are fighting for them. We 
are convinced that they must prevail. That convic- 
tion is an integral part of the moral capital of om* war. 
We do not unreservedly and without consideration set 
loyalty to a legally declared war above all other obK- 
gations; that is not done by responsible governments 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 335 

attaching value to convictions reached in the spirit of 
liberty, or to the cherished interests of civilization. 
For this reason we can conscientiously aid the Ger- 
man people to rebel against the violations of the laws 
of nations and morality which the German Govern- 
ment directs and defends. In so doing we are asking 
them to desert one type of national loyalty, not in dis- 
loyalty, but in the spirit of a truer loyalty, no less 
national but respectful of other loyalties. For the 
German, as for the German sympathizer, it is a tragic 
choice between treason to country and treason to law 
and morality; but the choice must be made. The re- 
demption of the proper choice lies in the elevation of 
the loyalty to a finer quality and a sturdier conviction. 
These considerations must remain in the background 
of judgment, if the issues between militarism and paci- 
fism are to be rightly judged. 

But war is not only a national uprising for a great 
purpose; it is a particular manner of uprising. Its 
methods are determined, ruthlessly determined. There 
arises the deadliest kind of antagonism, that of means 
and end; there may be in some minds the stanchest 
belief in the end, and the strongest opposition to the 
means. Under the stress of war, positions in regard to 
the merits of pacifism and militarism are shaken; the 
issues become complicated and confused. Such an 
internal antagonism may occur in other controversies, 
but when it occurs has by no means the same practi- 
cal bearing. Before 1914 the most militant operations 
reported in the daily press were those of a group of 
women claiming equal suffrage. On other occasions 
advocates of the rights of labor have resorted to mill- 



336 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

taristic methods. Many believers in the rights of women 
and in the rights of labor approved the cause and dis- 
approved the means. Their positions commanded re- 
spect; for ends and means in these conflicts might be 
separately considered. With the declaration of war 
there is no choice of means; it is itself a decision that 
the ends cannot be otherwise secm*ed, though, obvi- 
ously and importantly, it does not follow that in war 
mihtary methods alone should be exclusively rehed 
upon, and all others abandoned. The evidence that 
other means have been patiently and conscientiously 
attempted, serves to justify the declaration of war. 
Pubhc opinion and pohtical policy continue to operate 
despite the break in diplomatic relations and the in- 
dustrial blockade. Points of view permeate even in the 
trenches and prepare the minds of men for the nego- 
tiations of the future. 

By virtue of these circumstances, the controversy 
between pacifism and militarism is bound to be pro- 
foundly altered by a state of war. This result may not 
be logical; it is merely psychological and inevitable. 
To an absolutely detached intelligence, it might appear 
merely and solely as a disclosure of human frailty. 
Every practical mind acknowledges it, though without 
succumbing to it wholly. The attempt to analyze the 
merits of the controversy between militarism and paci- 
fism is even a more binding obhgation in times of war 
than in times of peace. The obhgation imposed is that 
of rising as far as we can above the two temptations — 
the one that of too immediate and narrow an appHca- 
tion of principles, the other that of too complete a sur- 
render to an emotional impulse. By such resistance 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 337 

we show a loyalty to reason — a loyalty with which no 
cause can so ill afford to dispense as that of a just war. 
Reason assures us that we may acknowledge our in- 
stincts without worshiping them. It is as futile as it 
would be pointless to consider the issues of militarism 
and pacifism in any other bearing than upon the pres- 
ent world-war, which has diverted not only the re- 
sources but the thoughts of men as has no other event 
of history. It would be equally irrelevant to approach 
the discussion from any other point of view than that 
of the unquestioned righteousness of the Allied cause, 
from the point of view of the convinced faith in the 
moral values which the Allies support, and which the 
German position denounces in principle and violates 
in action when speciously protesting an adherence. It 
would be well in our considerations to dispense with 
the hot emotional indignation against the monstrous 
crimes for which a German militaristic policy is re- 
sponsible, though we have no intention to dispense 
with this invaluable moral capitalization of our ener- 
gies in the actual task before us. For in controversial 
issues there is a hierarchy of value, and an inner shrine 
where desecration is too serious to be contemplated 
with calm abstraction. There are values which cannot 
be questioned, without ceding the conditions indis- 
pensable to right thinking and right living. Here there 
can be no compromise, no abatement. To a detached 
intelligence such an attitude may appear as prejudice, 
or it may appear as faith; to the practical intelligence 
that is here addressed, it is the acknowledgment of the 
position from which alone a profitable taking thought 
is possible. 



338 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

Thus limited and thus inspired, the survey of the con- 
tentions of miUtarism and pacifism for a share of the 
regulation of our thinking that shall determine in times 
of war as in times of peace our ways of life, our atti- 
tudes, our perspective of values, our employments of 
mind and hand, may contribute to the understanding 
of the genesis of our convictions and their psychological 
sanction. 

II 

Resuming the direct exposition, we face the peculiar, 
indeed the paradoxical situation that the actuality of 
the war has distorted the interpretation of the pacifist 
position to a caricature that would be grotesque were 
it not so tragic in its consequences. The resulting in- 
version may be stated as that of prejudging action by 
profession, or even — far less legitimately — by the 
name of a profession. When an avowed pacifist enlists 
in the army, the unreflecting comment holds that he 
is inconsistent or has abandoned his pacifism. The 
more logical conclusion is that imder proper circum- 
stances a pacifist may become a soldier as consistently 
as any one else. The more completely logical conclu- 
sion is that the adherence to principles which make him 
a pacifist and the decision to enlist are derived from 
separate though not unrelated reservoirs of his stores 
of conviction. The distinction involved, though seem- 
ingly refined, is actually simple and is of the order com- 
monly made by the average mind. Even more, the 
average mind is decidedly prone to reason by the prag- 
matic method of "from action to principle '* and not 
the reverse. That "actions speak louder than words " 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 339 

is the common rule, but is in this case strangely re- 
versed; that is the paradox. The actions are ignored, 
hushed, or misinterpreted, because of the banner under 
which they proceed; the bystanders look at the banner, 
and not at the procession. 

Such paradox is, however, itself not uncommon. It 
is one of the phases of conviction that must constantly 
be considered; for it is nothing more or less than a 
variety of prejudice. It is not the simplest variety of 
prejudice, such as results from either plain dislike or a 
hasty conviction that runs ahead of the evidence or 
disregards it. Its genesis is somewhat more complex. 
In its simplest and crudest form, the argument may 
be outlined thus: A pacifist believes in peace; the nation 
is at war; consequently, a pacifist is opposed to the 
national position. And in further consequence (as- 
suming a still duller wit, a greater ineptitude for the 
process of argument), the pacifist, if consistent and un- 
resisted, would obstruct the government, and weaken 
the national cause through his obstinate adherence to 
the principles of peace. If it be objected that in an 
essay dealing with pacifism and militarism as a proper 
controversial issue addressed to an intelligent reader, 
such elementary and palpable fallacies have no place, 
the only reply is a frank apology. Unquestionably, 
except under the mental distortions of war, no reason- 
able being would be tempted to argue in this childish 
fashion. But the effect of war, as of any great sweep- 
ing emotion, is to lower decidedly the critical level of 
reasoning; and we may as well meet the fact in this 
connection as elsewhere. 

It is an interesting reflection that this twentieth-cen- 



340 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tury war may be the first that has had to face in any real 
strength the position of pacifism as an essential part of 
the mental and moral equipment of thinking men. It is 
more than likely that former wars were generally ac- 
cepted and supported with little conscious resistance; 
we know that some wars were welcomed. Opposition 
was confined to the justification of this or that quarrel 
as a proper basis for war. The growth of the resistance 
to war as war is of course the direct work of pacifism. 
Every citizen, whatever his share in the conflict of to- 
day or whatever the reflections that led to his decision 
to enter into the conflict, has been decidedly affected 
by the principles of pacifism. He was and is under the 
influence of pacifistic hesitations, reservations, over- 
coming of resistances, that are strong or weak accord- 
ing to his nature, his reflections, his outlook upon the 
values of life. These vary in status from the very strong 
to the very weak; every one is more or less of a pacifist 
in the sense of feeling the resistances to war that moral, 
economic, and other considerations have estabHshed. 
Just how strong such resistances must be to make it 
proper for one to call himself a pacifist is an idle ques- 
tion, certainly not a significant one. The pacifist justi- 
fies these resistances, rationalizes them, and upon them 
rears a political philosophy that shall incorporate them. 
To gain a sense of how principle and practice may 
react upon one another we may consider the analogous 
conviction that might make one a vegetarian outright, 
or leave an aversion to coarse fleshy cuts and joints, or 
a constant if moderate repugnance actuaUy overcome 
when meat is eaten. But vegetarianism is substantially 
only a practical matter — a practice following from a 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 341 

certain philosophy of food. It is free from large bearings 
iipon the constitution and spirit of the social order. We 
can practice vegetarianism individually, but hot so 
militarism; and pacifism equally has its importance in 
its collective social bearing. When such is the case, the 
essence of the position lies in its scope, with an elastic, 
complex, and at times uncertain application to the prin- 
ciples and their practice. In vegetarianism not alone do 
actions speak louder than words, but there is substan- 
tially only action; though one may be led to adopt the 
practice for somewhat varied reasons. The arguments of 
a "health " vegetarian are different from those of a 
"moral scruple " vegetarian; their relations remain 
cordial. Thus identity of practice may follow from di- 
versity of principle, and close similarity of principle lead 
to moderate diversity of practice with comparable con- 
sistency. 

To return to the argument: thte difficulty is not only 
to put it plausibly, but to be assured that it is put 
naturally, as it actually lies in the minds of those in- 
fluenced by it. Doubtless the practical phase, as in all 
popular arguments, is prominent in consciousness. Now 
the "action " side of pacifism in ordinary times of peace 
hardly appears, or at best negatively as a refraining in- 
fluence, possibly on obscure occasions in turning the 
other cheek to the smiter. In war-time, however, the ac- 
tion appears in the position, however sporadic, of the 
conscientious objector or the active obstructionist. The 
popular mind seizes upon this as the pacifist position in 
action, and by the usual fallacy identifies pacifism as 
the principle which inevitably or at least consistently 
leads to such practical action. The fact that the op- 



S42 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

position to the war may be due (is notoriously so in far, 
far more numerous cases) to economic, political, or other 
reasons, is for the most part ignored or obscured. Paci- 
fism is brought into the group of movements antagonis- 
tic to war propaganda and even receives the brunt of the 
opprobrium. To pause for an analogy: In the Boer War 
there was in England a very considerable opposition to 
the war, but the pro-Boers were not seriously accused 
of disloyalty. Their defection from the cause did not 
endanger the national position; and there was no temp- 
tation to call them pacifists. The absurdity of the con- 
clusion would have been apparent. The absurd be- 
comes plaiisible by reason of the changed conditions, 
predominantly because of the huge emotional factor 
and the vital menace that obtain in this world cam- 
paign. It may be a comphment to the strength of paci- 
fism that it should be singled out as the center of attack; 
but the compliment is as undeserved as it is unwelcome. 
The fallacy or the confusion is of course a limited one. 
Nobody argues that because some of the opposition to 
this war is, or is believed to be due to pacifism, there- 
fore all of it is. Fallacies are not of this blank, staring, 
obvious quahty. The pro-German feehng is clearly 
imrelated to the pacifist feeling; a sufficiently strong 
pro-German sympathizer might have welcomed Amer- 
ica's entry into the war on the German side, while re- 
garding it as unjustifiable on the Allied side. A still 
larger mass of feeling and opinion results from the con- 
viction that the true poHcy for America* was that of 
neutrality; it points to the two and a half years of the 
actual maintenance of this policy as a defense of its 
claims. So capricious is popular phraseology that this 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 343 

phase of conviction, unquestionably the largest of the 
group that fails to support the national position or does 
so reluctantly or with reservations, has received no 
name. In addition, there is a group whose opposition 
to the war is based upon the method of its declaration, 
the fact that it was not done by the express vote of the 
people. If then we enumerate (1) the pro-German 
objection to this war, (2) the neutralist objection to 
this war, (3) the social-democratic objection to this war, 
(4) the pacifist objection to this war, we may not be 
accurate in the designations, but they make it plain 
that a fair or large similarity of conclusion may have 
its origin in very different philosophies. But the im- 
portant, the overlooked, the critical point is that while 
the position of the first three orders of objectors is not 
only clear but undeniably applies to them as a class, 
that is far from being true for the fourth group with 
which alone we are concerned. 

Since the pacifist objection is to war as war, the ques- 
tion whether the objection extends to this war and how 
far it does so is altogether undetermined. Only an 
actual census of opinion can decide. To any one con- 
versant with the American situation, it is unmistak- 
able that the proportion of pacifists who carry their 
protest against war as war to opposition to this war 
is very small indeed. The proportion depends, as we 
saw, upon the denominator: that is, upon the answer to 
the questions. Who are pacifists? How strong must be 
one's belief in the validity of the pacifist arguments 
to be so denominated? One estimate may be as good as 
another. In a liberal sense it may be that of the ten or 
fifteen or twenty million persons in the United States 



344 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

who have thought enough of the matter to have an 
opinion, ninety per cent are pacifists.^ If the meaning 
of the term is Hmited to a more outspoken adherence, 
a less reserved allegiance, a lesser hesitation to carry 
the pacifist principles far along toward the influence 
of conduct, the percentage would fall decidedly, but 
may still be regarded as a majority. If one has in mind 
only the members of pacifist societies and persons un- 
enrolled of like opinion, the percentage would of com-se 
be much lower. Clearly the argument has slight bear- 
ing until we reach the last class, the thoroughly con- 
vinced, enthusiastic pacifists. From all the evidence 
available the percentage of these who oppose America's 
entry into this war is very, very small indeed. It may 
be as high as one in ten, it may be as low as one in a 
hundred. The odium that has been aroused against 

* This conclusion may perhaps be more acceptably put, if stated 
in the converse terms. By just as good logic as that by which the paci- 
fist is condemned, it follows that one who is not a pacifist is a mili- 
tarist; and it follows with like logic (or the lack of it) that a militarist 
is one who believes in and approves the position which the German 
militarists have taken, and which is responsible for the present up- 
heaval with aU its terrible crimes and consequences. To say that 
there are not ten in a hundred of Americans who would enroU them- 
selves in this group, in any sense, is certainly not an exaggeration. 
Very well then; if not in this group, they are in the other, and thus 
are pacifists. The reasoning in the abstract is sound; the fact that it 
is not adjusted to the situation is precisely the same objection that 
obtains in regard to the pacifists. Indeed, in a rough adjustment, 
there is no tenable objection to the statement that ninety per cent 
at least of Americans are far more pacifists than they are militarists, 
and that independently of whether they find it more to their liking 
to call themselves militarists than pacifists; or whether — and this is 
perhaps nearer to the actual situation — they object more to being 
called pacifists than to being called militarists. They feel more con- 
fident that their positions will not be misunderstood if they are 
called militarists than if they are called pacifists. But their actual 
position is the same whatever the name that they accept or refuse to 
accept. 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 345 

pacifism is not based upon the practical positions actu- 
ally taken by its adherents. It has no bearing whatever 
on the positions of ninety per cent of the avowed, miH- 
tant pacifists, carrying the banner of their cause in 
war-time as in times of peace. If the meaning of the 
term be extended to include milder pacifist sympathiz- 
ers, it has no bearing upon ninety-nine per cent so 
denominated. For the step from an opposition to war 
as war to an opposition to this war or any particular 
war is, of course and obviously, an extremely variable 
conclusion, and subject to just that uncertainty and 
complexity of circumstance which constitutes the in- 
terest and the difficulty of all controversies.^ The para- 

* Whatever the facts as to the proportion of war-pacifists among 
the total body of pacifists, this argument certainly deals leniently 
with the logic of those who regard pacifism and opposition to this war 
as synonymous. Pacifists — this regrettably common judgment 
seems to hold — must oppose every war, must oppose America's 
entry into the war, must be opposed to conscription, and presumably 
are looking for safe ways to oppose their government and give aid 
and comfort to the enemy, despite the fact that this enemy is above 
all their enemy — an enemy which is the most violently militaristic, 
the most anti-pacifistic force that has ever been established. Surely 
if any one thus holding ever stopped to think, he would see as plainly 
as daylight that the consistent, the convinced pacifist must be far 
more determinedly, far more violently opposed to the position of a 
militaristic Germany than any one can be who has thought less 
deeply, cared less warmly for the values of peace. But the obstinate 
anti-pacifist is so convinced of his opposition to the pacifist, that he 
is sure that whatever he himself stands for must be the opposite of 
what the pacifist stands for. He is so impatiently sure of his conclu- 
sion that he does not care to inquire whether pacifists hold the posi- 
tions he ascribes to them or not. This common judgment not only 
prejudges the facts, but declines to consider the relation between 
principles and their application. Emulating the modernity of wire- 
less communication the anti-pacifist takes a logic-less flight from 
prejudiced premises to prejudiced conclusion. There is no ready way 
to bring this judgment within the scope of logic. It may come about 
gradually by observing the many persons of respected judgment who 
hold a very different view of pacifism. 



346 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

dox remains: the vast army of patriotic pacifists is 
ignored; the insignificant exceptions are alone con- 
sidered. Such are the tragic possibilities of a strong 
prejudice and a weak sense of logic. 

Ill 

With the removal of this gross and unfortunate mis- 
conception of the spirit and the practice of pacifism, 
the controversy may be restored to the clearer vision 
that would obtain were we not at war, were our minds 
less troubled, less overpowered by the ominous situa- 
tion reveahng clearly and drastically, that unless we 
defend by the force of arms the cause of reason and 
sanity and law and order and right and morality, the 
values of life are notably menaced. The writing on the 
wall is so incandescent that we sometimes forget that 
the warning is pointedly directed to war itself, that the 
instrument of our fight and the enemy that we are 
fighting are one and the same. 

"We needs mHst combat might with might, 
Or might would rule alone." 

The philosophy of miUtarism has its advocates. 
They should be attentively if protestingly heard. 
Their fatherland is Germany. Professor Woodbridge 
Riley thus presents their position. The movement be- 
gins with an ambitious triumvirate. Hegel, "the pope 
of speculation," hails in Germany the synthesis of the 
thought of Greece and the action of Rome. His philos- 
opher's stone is the absolute, the one uniting prin- 
ciple that reconciles opposites and harmonizes con- 
tradictions. Hegel's grandiose generahzations, his 
lordly sweeping aside of troublesome, inferior realities. 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 347 

his metaphysical autocracy, left their toxic impress on 
German thought, inclined it to the self-delusion that 
finds a Freudian satisfaction in vaunting phrases to 
smother ugly or unwelcome shortcomings or remon- 
strances. The doctrine and the mood become articu- 
late in Nietzsche, himself an embodiment of irrecon- 
cilable contradictions — an invalid body and a mind 
of heroic intentions. Serving in the ambulance corps 
in the Franco-Prussian War, at the close of a busy day 
with the wounded, he heard a sudden thunder and saw 
the dash of a cavalry regiment in full charge. "Then,** 
he writes to his sister, " I felt for the first time that the 
strongest and highest Will to Life does not find expres- 
sion in the miserable struggle for existence, but in a 
Will to War, a Will to Power, a Will to Overcome.** 
Thus, "the soul has skill to pluck out of battle, sweet 
and glorious truths.*' Nietzsche's is not so much a phi- 
losophy of militarism as a militaristic philosophy. With 
power glorified and might supreme, war is life at its 
fullest, its truest expression; and he who embodies the 
martial qualities is on the way to becoming a super- 
man. The forces of so-called civilization tending away 
from this ideal — which also reflects the actual rise of 
man through combat from primitive club-rule to the 
modern embattled nations — are to be despised. The 
morality of Christians is a morality of slaves; and dem- 
ocracy is the refuge of weaklings. In worth the individ- 
ual superman outweighs, as he scorns, the claims of 
the masses. He suffers no obstacles to his Will to Power; 
he stands, not lawless, but above the law, beyond the 
realm where obtains for lesser mortals the distinction 
of good and evil. 



348 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

While the Nietzschean conceptions are developed 
for the most part in a lofty, remote, intellectual strain, 
at times with an aesthetic absorption in the imagina- 
tive creation, they approach the confines of apphca- 
tion temptingly. They are readily used in justification 
of positions sustained by cruder, coarser motives, 
prompted by harsh, relentless instincts. The pragmatic 
intent of Nietzsche's philosophy may be uncertain; 
its actual influence is not. Its finer abstract features, 
modeled, it may be, for an ideal composition, were 
interpreted as the portrait lines of the figure of Ger- 
mania. Possibly not as a prime motive, but no less 
with constant sympathy, and occasional direct appli- 
cation to the case of Germany, Nietzsche gave the aid 
and comfort of a definite programme and a dramatic 
venture to the ambitious war-lords of his country. Like 
himself, his countrymen were susceptible to high- 
reaching formulae, accepting them as a philosophic con- 
firmation of poHtical desires. He became the prophetic 
force in German mihtarism — the pen in the service 
of the might of the sword. 

The policy of mihtarism received its historical sanc- 
tion in the person of Treitschke. Germany is boldly 
acclaimed as the superman among nations, and the 
State exalted to an Hegehan synthesis absorbing and 
overriding the individual wills. Deutschland must pre- 
vail uber alles within and without; its superiority im- 
poses a God-derived duty, makes it a God-chosen nation, 
bound by no laws but those of its own success. Actions 
which in others would be crimes are expiated and moral- 
ized when committed by the chosen instrument of hu- 
man destiny. "War is both justifiable and moral . . • 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 349 

the ideal of perpetual peace is not only impossible 
but immoral as well.** "War is a drastic medicine for 
mankind diseased.*' The State is built for war and 
the military power is the only force to be recognized. 
Stone-deaf from childhood, Treitschke is absolutely 
unresponsive to any claims of pity or justice. He be- 
comes the apostle of what we now recognize grimly as 
ruthlessness and unscrupulousness. The moral defect, 
paralleling the physical one, sets his mind negatively 
to ignore consideration of means, which are ever to the 
exclusively political-minded justified by the end. The 
voice is still the strident Nietzschean voice, but the 
hands are the coarse hands of Treitschke. 

The only possible super-climax to this relentless phil- 
osophic structure would be the direct military appli- 
cation of its principles. Of this the spokesman is Bern- 
hardi. He translates the philosophy into the terms of 
military practice. Might is the supreme right; treach- 
ery and strategy are one; war is biologically noble and 
necessary; brutality is negligible; peace is unworthy; 
treaties are scraps of paper; small nations are parasitic; 
Germany is the heroic savior of mankind; other peo- 
ples are contemptible and will remain so until Teuton- 
ized; such is Kultur, Bernhardi's world is an abso- 
lutely militarized world; in it there are no values but 
those established and cherished for military ends. 

There would be little purpose in adding examples of 
the complete sway of this set of doctrines over the 
minds of eminent professors, statesmen, publicists, 
men of letters and of science, men of the cloth and of 
the bench, since Germany by an act of war converted 
principles into practice. The world at large stands 



350 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

aghast at the issue, is stupefied by the collective epi- 
demic of mind and morals. The convincing depositions 
are those made without the excuse of loyalty to a 
cause espoused; the responsible utterances are those 
dehberately leading the German mind to its undoing, 
and the German people to the abyss of national dis- 
aster. If such be militarism in action, argument is 
sacrilege; the twentieth-century will have none of it.^ 

IV 

It would be a logic cabined, cribbed, confined, that 
would conclude that such is the inevitable issue of the 

1 This detailed consideration of Prussian militarism may seem 
disproportionate, for the reason that such a militarism is not a gen- 
eral but a specific position. If all the other great nations of the world 
announced an adherence to their supremacy above the rest of man- 
kind, their contempt of other nations, their superiority to all laws of 
morality and a covenanted international code, and consequently pro- 
ceeded to enforce these imperial pretensions by the force of arms, the 
entire industries of the world would be absorbed in mihtary prepara- 
tions, and civilization would cease. The irrationality of a Prussian 
type of militarism would seem to exclude it from a rational contro- 
versy. But here again, pragmatic considerations enter. Prussian 
militarism may be considered as the extreme of a position which in 
restrained application plays an actual part in continuing the mili- 
tary poUcies of nations, and in shaping the convictions of those who 
support such measures. At the same time it proves for all time that 
militarism unrestrained, militarism as a philosophy of the State, is 
doomed as definitely as the Germany that has provoked its destruc- 
tion. A demonstration on so monstrous a scale excludes any counter- 
argument. Had Germany refrained from such suicidal demonstra- 
tion, it would have been far more difficult to convince men that such 
a possibility was inherent in the principles of a relentlessly consistent 
militarism, if once it secured a hold upon a national imagination, and 
had prepared the way for its realization by the studied destruction 
of the forces that make for sanity, justice, and liberty. It is for these 
reasons that an account of Prussian miUtarism as a philosophic con- 
struction plays its part in shaping present-day convictions, even 
though these convictions are coucerned with measures conceived in 
a wholly different temper. 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 351 

principle of militarism — a logic parallel to that iden- 
tifying pacifism with a supine non-resistance. The 
actual claim of militarism in a complicated world is far 
more tempered. The appeal is to history, to political 
constitution and economic rivalry, to moral quality, 
to a frank facing of reality and a prudent security. 
The historical claim is uncontested. "History is a 
bath of blood." The early and in part persistent mo- 
tives of war are direct. Conquest is the nobler term, 
piracy the franker one; slaves and wealth in more prim- 
itive days, empire and colonies in later ones, are the 
spoils of the victor. Ambition among the rival victors 
makes war a challenge; in the verdict lies the national 
fate, as well as the progressive struggle of humanity 
through the dominance of the superior race. The mili- 
tary technique, the military ideal, the military profes- 
sion, enlists the ability and the valor of strong men; 
the venture of war makes the unity of the nation. The 
modern mind raises the question of the cost, and reads 
the answer also in the course of historical evolution 
which spreads equally over peace and war and takes its 
set from the conquests of mind. Modern invention, born 
of the arts of peace, has so vastly increased the dead- 
liness of war as to multiply beyond the grasp of the 
imagination the cost of war. Before 1914 the militarist 
argument maintaining that the result was worth the 
price, also that some nationally vital kinds of social 
values and human qualities cannot be otherwise se- 
cured, had a plausible sanction; now the past and the 
future belong to different worlds. Before 1914 wars 
were confined to local issues; now an issue big enough 
to precipitate a war seems destined to take on the 



352 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

proportions of a world- war. The increased cost of war in 
lives, money, suffering, and ruin of so much of what 
men hold dear, as presented in the ledger of the world- 
upheaval of 1914, makes a radical revision of judg- 
ment inevitable, and sets conviction definitely in the 
pacifist's favor. The historical argument, by sheer over- 
weight of the parallel forces of evolution, has worn itself 
out. 

The traditional political and economic grounds of 
militarism are less and less likely to determine the con- 
victions of men in future considerations. They illumi- 
nate the past and constitute the difficulty of the adjust- 
ment of tradition and the status quo to the beliefs of the 
present. They are offset by the growing forces of in- 
ternationalism which are set strongly in the opposite 
direction, and are certain to revise the machinery of 
political and economic policies. The political-economic 
grounds as sources of friction may still incline men to 
believe in war as the inevitable, certainly the constant 
menace, while wholly convinced that war is neither de- 
sirable nor serviceable in the very solutions in which 
it is enlisted. Statesmen convinced of the paramount 
influence of economic factors in shaping political policy 
are laboring to minimize the tendency to use armed 
force, even though they continue to think in terms of 
armaments. The view that prevails, prevails in all 
camps with increasing majorities, is against the fatal- 
istic conception of the function of war in modern polit- 
ical and economic adjustments. The recognition is 
clear and well-nigh universal that war as an enterprise, 
equally with war as an ordeal, or war as the inevitable 
court of last resort, is essentially subject to the same 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 353 

motives and evolutionary conditions that have civil- 
ized all other social-political relations. As the institu- 
tion of war becomes more and more incongruous to the 
spirit of that evolutionary process, and as warfare by 
its deadliness destroys so large a range of organized 
interests, the national policies, reflecting the convic- 
tions of men, will refuse to support it, eventually re- 
fuse to consider it. Yet equally must we recognize that 
the masses of men and a considerable share of the lead- 
ers of men will continue to think of the causes of war 
and the possibility of war in traditional terms, and re- 
gard as Utopian the efforts of those who are as strongly 
convinced as they are determined that these efforts 
shall succeed. What needs to be emphasized is that con- 
viction without determination lacks courage; that what 
makes the project Utopian is thinking it so. And if 
it be so, the pacifist adds, the alternative is between 
Utopia and Hell. 

Let it be remembered that even though war is a real 
contingency, there never is war, but only this or that 
war, with this or that aggressor and this or that de- 
fender, and a specific casus belli. The particular war 
arises because the friction that represents its "cause" 
is pushed by ambition, or hope of prompt and large 
advantage, or the domination of a military policy, or 
the growing impatience with a tangled situation, to a 
declaration of war. Under a differently directed set of 
motives the war could as easily, far more easily, have 
been averted, and some other form of settlement 
reached. The friction, however strong, depends for 
its ripening into war-motive upon the support of a mili- 
taristic trend, itself based upon the ambition or the 



354 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

philosophy or the psychology of a people and its mode 
of rule. The futihty of war as a solution of the diflS- 
culties which are supposed to "cause" it, has been 
abundantly demonstrated by Mr. Norman Angell. 
Even when Hberal allowance is made for the consid- 
erable exaggeration of the inability of the issues of war, 
which are not all "spoils," to accomplish their avowed 
purpose — of which Mr. Angell is guilty — and with 
like allowance for the stretching of the militaristic 
argument beyond its legitimate implication (which 
renders it easy to demolish — a common fault in the 
pacifist arguments), enough remains to warrant the 
title of Mr. Angell's book: "The Great Illusion." 

As the problems which an actual war is supposed to 
settle become greater, involving the greater interests 
of the greater nations, the illusion and the menace be» 
come greater. With equal truth, William James tells 
us that "war becomes absurd and impossible from its 
own monstrosity," and Mr. Angell, that it becomes so 
from its own futility. The twentieth-century convic- 
tion so strongly favors a non-militaristic form of settling 
national disputes that the poUtical-economic defense 
of the war-function is reduced in bearing, is removed 
in pertinence for future policy to a point at which the 
student of conviction may leave it to its natural and 
inevitable decline. Historically it remains an argu- 
ment in the service of militarism so long as men's minds 
are engrossed by precedents with a feeble grasp of the 
vulnerabiUty of precedents under altered situations, 
particularly under altered conceptions of human aims. 
A more critical historical sense, a keener interpretation 
of the economic-political organization of the modem 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 355 

State, retires it to a diminishing as well as an illusory 
importance. 

More pragmatic considerations in defense of war 
are those urged by the moderate and responsible mili- 
tarists, who, in addition to massing the fatalistic, the 
economic, the political, the disciplinary, and the moral 
arguments, place a well-considered philosophy of force 
at the base of their structure. Of this position Cap- 
tain Mahan is a fair exponent. The initial considera- 
tion is that the affairs of men, the national affairs par- 
ticularly, cannot be managed without the use of force, 
and of force nationally organized. This the new type 
of constructive pacifist concedes and takes his place 
— though possibly not unreservedly — with Captain 
Mahan. The more orthodox non-resistant, older type 
of pacifist rejects the view, and relies upon the perfec- 
tion of international law and the removal of war as a 
national provision to bring about the social order that 
will secure peace, and exclude force in the military 
sense. The militarist concedes that force is best exer- 
cised through law when laws are adequate, yet holds 
that the appeal to force as a possible resort strengthens 
the law, vitalizes diplomacy, supports the progres- 
sive measures of civilization. The position which Wil- 
liam James, as a pacifist, takes from the moral side: 
"Let the general possibility of war be left open, in 
Heaven's name, for the imagination to dally with. Let 
the soldier dream of killing, as the old maids dream 
of marrying," — the militarist supports as a political 
stabilizer. The removal of war as a possibility, he 
argues, would weaken the political structiu-e and leave 
it open to serious impairment from many sides; it 



356 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

would withdraw the backbone from the poHtical frame- 
work. At the same time it would depreciate the strong, 
virile qualities indispensable to a worthy race; it would 
undermine the sense of nationality; it would profoundly 
alter the sovereignty of the State. These arguments 
are real and serious in that they raise the question 
whether under present conditions the abohtion of war 
might not be open to loss and danger, not alone the 
danger of too radical a reconstruction, but of less prompt 
and just settlements of international disputes than have 
resulted in the past from war, and particularly from the 
bloodless conflicts in which the threat of war proved 
decisive. The reply concedes the point so far as urging 
provisions for bringing to bear the same intercession of 
force exercised in a modified temper, free from the com- 
plications of national jealousies. Pacifism accepts the 
obligation to preserve the efficient machinery of inter- 
national relations; it accepts the obligation to trans- 
form international regulation as a whole, not crudely 
to operate by simple removal of an overgrowth. 

The militaristic argument naturally and properly 
addresses itself to the proposed substitutes for war, 
particularly to arbitration. It has no difficulty in in- 
dicating the falhbihty and limitations of the judi- 
cial procedure. The militarist must not assume that 
arbitration proposes to dispense with diplomacy; he 
must fairly face the question whether diplomacy under 
a pacifistic predisposition (which favors open public 
discussion) will not prove to be as serviceable as dip- 
lomacy under the assumptions of a militaristic even- 
tuality (which is favorable to secret agreement). The 
antithesis of arbitration and armament, or of law and 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 357 

war, is false as well as partial. A constructive pacifism 
is not so limited in resources; arbitration is far more 
significant as an elastic principle than as a set device. 
It is essential that constructions of such momentous 
bearings be considered as totals of consistent archi- 
tectural plan, with the details framed in sympathy 
with the underlying conception. To inject details or 
apply criticisms derived from a foreign source is to 
violate the logic of the scheme. The militaristic con- 
ception of the protection of the social order relies upon 
the balance of power as its constructive device; the 
pacifistic conception is set toward an international 
control, a league of nations. Yet a strong case could 
be urged for a "balance of power" construction to in- 
clude the essential protective demands of the pacifist 
statesman, while retaining the values on which the 
militarist sets store; and the powers of the "league of 
nations" could be so determined as to remove the chief 
(though not all) objections which the militarist urges 
against the project. All of which shows that when prin- 
ciples approach application in a proposed project, — 
as yet untried, — a certain measure of concession is 
possible. The coherence and promise of the scheme 
depends so largely upon the spirit of its administra- 
tion — and that spirit is now so strongly imbued with 
pacifist trends — that the future is indefinitely more 
secure from the menace of war on either basis than was 
the past. The liberal militarist will insist, not upon 
organization for war, but only upon the benefits and 
protection that such organization secures, upon retain- 
ing the strong national unity, the essential sovereignty, 
of each nation; the pacifist will make every concession 



358 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

that does not weaken the sohdarity of the forces that, 
once made mstitutionally strong, will of themselves 
make war so anomalous in principle, so hopeless in 
practice, that it will make little difference whether it 
is abrogated by decree or not. For both militarist and 
pacifist (always excepting the relentless Prussianized 
protagonists) are agreed that unjust and needless wars 
— war-upheavals under imperial plots against weaker 
nations — shall be made impossible at whatever cost. 

So much of apphcation seems necessary to give the 
issue of miHtarism and pacifism the realistic setting 
that the present crisis and the considerations of its ulti- 
mate settlement demand. As a rule the sources of con- 
viction, which is the matter in hand, are not notably 
illuminated by a discussion of the adjustments which 
the opponents might agree upon in a spirit of compro- 
mise in court or out of it. But when, as in this contro- 
versy, the actuahties of war or peace so overshadow 
the formulae of militarism and pacifism, this compel- 
ling circumstance may well be enlisted to vitahze the 
logical and psychological discussion. For indirectly, if 
not directly, the turning-point in the practical deci- 
sions of thoughtful men will center about their mental 
responses to arguments. The forces now at work are 
making pacifists or mihtarists as never before. Even 
in the thick of war men realize that miHtarism deter- 
mines war more than war establishes miHtarism; and 
that a permanent peace is dependent upon an enduring 
pacifism. Yet here also there is a temperamental as 
well as a logical contrast. In the light of the world-war 
the militarist will conclude that despite our advanced 
culture, no nation is safe without adequate military 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 359 

preparedness; the pacifist will conclude that other and 
more adequate guarantees must be provided, and thus 
further reduce and make it safe to reduce the signifi- 
cance of armaments and the military spirit. Logic and 
psychology seem destined to maintain their rival claims 
until the psychology of human nature has more deeply 
absorbed the logical impulses, or until nations agree 
by effective provisions that the interests which they 
regard as supreme shall no longer be at the mercy of 
unrestrained ambition or the precarious balance of 
threat and protection. 

V 

The moral benefits of war play a large part in the 
militaristic arguments. In them war represents the 
disciplined life, the strong life, the sacrificial life, the 
stern, sharp decision and the bold venture of fate and 
fortune. War brings forward the deep, ancient trends 
that have supported the race in its great enterprises. 
It makes a direct appeal to sentiment and romance; 
it consolidates the interests, arouses the national sense, 
quickens the loyalties of men. It moulds the conscious- 
ness and shapes the traditions of a people. The quali- 
ties that it enlists are the more keenly needed as their 
occasion recedes from the ordinary employments, es- 
pecially from the dull industrialism of the latter-day 
world. Hence the need for a "moral substitute for 
war " which James urged prophetically upon a compla- 
cent age. In so urging he concedes, though a pacifist, 
that war is "human nature at its highest dynamic." 
"Its horrors are a cheap price to pay for rescue 
from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks 



360 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

and teachers, of co-education and zo-ophily, of 'con- 
sumers' leagues' and 'associated charities/ of indus- 
triahsm unHmited and feminism unabashed. No scorn, 
no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a 
cattle-yard of a planet!" One further concession must 
be made: that these moral benefits of consecration to a 
cause belong not to the army alone, but to the people 
at large, who share in the sacrifice, the loyalty, the com- 
mon possession and the massive emotional stirring. 

The other side of the shield bears a message equally 
significant. The moral losses of war make as formidable 
a footing. The cruelty, the brutality, the excesses of 
war make it a life as strong in vice and temptation as 
in the possibilities of heroism. "Single men in bar- 
racks don't grow into plaster saints. " Over-drilled 
discipline may weaken initiative, and make men unfit 
for other service; authority may brutalize; military- 
mindedness may lead to scorn of qualities indispensable 
to manhood. War is not made up of supreme mo- 
ments; it enforces much from which the moral sense 
recoils or suffers permanent injury. Were it not for 
the resistances made strong in the moralization of 
peace, which the citizen-soldiery offers to these temp- 
tations, their effect would be far more disastrous. 
Tough-mindedness has its evils no less than tender- 
mindedness its compensations. 

On the social side of collective benefits, we do not 
abandon the hope that causes otherwise defended may 
come to enlist the same devotion, the same consecra- 
tion; and even though they lack notably in their ap- 
peal, they entail no loss, suffer no impairment of the 
very qualities which are offered in defense of war. Yet 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 361 

the arguments thus too formally marshaled are de- 
tached from their source, and the accounting is by that 
reason false. It must be borne in mind how much of the 
redemption of war is due to the issues of peace. The 
modern mind thinks at once of the Hague tribunals and 
the international agreements which have moulded the 
moral spirit of the martial life, by limiting the very 
violations inherent in the conflicts of war. Men's moral 
impulses and restraints move as a whole, as a part of 
the evolutionary push that receives its impetus domi- 
nantly from the moral gains of the peaceful life. The 
martial virtues and the military character reflect the 
moralized social order under which men's minds move 
to action in whatever cause. The soldier carries the 
qualities of the American, the Briton, the Frenchman 
with him; and these qualities of his tradition and train- 
ing must be credited in fair measure not alone with the 
mitigations of warfare but with the valor and nobility 
of his conduct as a soldier. The sense of fair play and 
justice and chivalry and honor are fashioned in the 
daily intercourses of men, in the adjusted relations of 
peaceful callings. The moral revival, though realized 
in the hard experience of war, derives its strength from 
the spiritual resources made strong in the pursuits of 
peace. 

The conclusion is reinforced from many sides. We 
observe once more that the reaction to the appeal of 
war takes its quality compositely from the character of 
those who respond. If we credit these to war, we must 
credit to it also the utter degradation of the German 
army in all ranks, even more responsibly in those who 
give than in those who carry out the fiendish commands. 



862 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

The spectacle is no less revolting in the civil and dip- 
lomatic authorities than in the military ones. It is 
common to lay this moral bankruptcy to the militari- 
zation of the German mind in all its operations; to such 
moral depths can a people descend through a mili- 
tarism unredeemed. Clearly the manner in which a 
people responds to the military conscription, the mili- 
tary transformation of the standards and employments 
of mind and hand, is a crucial test of its moral quality 

— raising to heroic stature virtues well wrought in the 
fiber of a free and healthy-minded citizenry, or debas- 
ing to servile shamelessness those vitiated by a "might 
is right" discipline, betrayed by a deliberate demoral- 
izing policy conceived in the interests of defense of 
militarism. 

These terrible lapses are not looked upon as the in- 
evitable consequences of war; by no means. Properly 
moralized nations, when driven to war or electing war 
as the lesser evil, are as competent as they are deter- 
mined to demonstrate that such is not the case. But 
as temptations and liabilities they may properly be 
reckoned in balance to the assets of war. Likewise in 
appraising the assets, the pacifist is justified in em- 
phasizing how much of the intensive uplift finds its 
source in the moral rebellion against the injustice, the 
oppression, the cruel wrongs of the aggressor. It is not 
the bare fact of being at war that summons Americans 
to a patriotic enthusiasm (the Spanish war aroused 
a very different psychological response), but the in- 
herent appeal of the cause for which they are fighting, 

— the indignation against the vicious tyranny that 
they are determined shall perish from the earth. For 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 363 

such to be the case, one of the belligerents must have 
contributed as positively to the attack upon the cher- 
ished values of civilization as the others contribute to 
their defense. The moral accounting of war has a 
double entry. Clearly the inherent iniquity of war 
leaves so large a balance on that side, that its redemp- 
tion by qualities of merit or its past service is hopeless. 
The moral benefits of war cannot save it, though they 
may well lead to the conviction that they shall be saved, 
so far as may be, in the service, the conscripted service, 
if need be, of peace. It is idle to maintain that we can 
assent to war in the interest of the heroic qualities or 
the national solidarity which it admittedly favors. 
The point is not — as one pacifist argues — that we 
should not consider setting houses on fire for the sake 
of the possible heroism of firemen, which is a false 
analogy; but that admitting the inherent (though lim- 
ited and dangerous) moral redemption associated with 
war, we cannot admit that these offset in the moral 
field or beyond it the equally inherent losses and its 
common degradations. War remains iniquitous de- 
spite its redemption by fine qualities, its thrilling ro- 
mance, its active quickening of the loyalties of men. 
For these values we must look elsewhere; their day is 
done in the older setting; the national structure of the 
future must provide for them otherwise or submit to 
their partial loss. National loyalty will survive, though 
reinterpreted in the international loyalty that finds its 
strongest claim in the removal of the menace of war. 

The "pentecost of disaster" remains; the war moves 
to its fierce and uncertain conclusion. From it we may 
derive not "sweet and glorious" but bitter and chas- 



364 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

tening truths. We witness and share in the unreserved 
sacrifice in effort, in money, in hardship, in blood and 
anguish. We accept the demonstration and resolve 
that these mighty powers shall be trained to the devo- 
tions of peace: that the hero-worship of the soldier shall 
remain enshrined, yet share that shrine with the heroes 
of humanity in the same cause of honor, justice, and 
liberty. The justification of war Hes in the removal 
of wrongs which it accomplishes. Wars of liberation, 
whether from bondage of man to man, of protest to 
tyranny, of the emancipation of the spirit — and only 
these — take their place with the great achievements 
of great men and great peoples in the progress of civili- 
zation. The resolve is strengthened that these shall 
come to men not with less sacrifice or effort, but with 
less cruelty and crime. Surely there is enough injus- 
tice, enough needless suffering, enough mean ambi- 
tion, enough brutal ignorance and crass bullying in all 
phases of the social stucture to enlist the fighting 
instincts and the martial enthusiasms of men. Truly 
valor will change the form of its expression but not its 
value or its service. Such transformation is precisely 
the force by which man has risen from his low estate 
and changed the face of the earth. He gains material 
control and social control by the exercise of compar- 
able qualities differently applied. The control of his 
own nature is the goal set by pacifism. 

VI 

In the conduct of argument the pacifist has faced a 
difficult task. He has had to prepare the minds of men 
for a mode of looking at the evolution of the past and 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 365 

the constitution of the present order, that runs counter 
to the usual habit. War as a possibiUty has been woven 
into the fabric of national coherence; its elimination 
threatened to leave not a gap, but a weakening of all 
the strands. If followed to its logical conclusion paci- 
fism would require a reconstruction of the concept of 
nationality, would re-interpret the rights and privi- 
leges and the mode of intercourse of a nation among 
the nations. To make pacifism actual would imply a 
radical reformation of institutions as well as of concep- 
tions, but by no means a revolution. The step would 
be but the confirmation and convergence of forces well 
under way. The earlier arguments were bent upon in- 
tensifying the sentiment against the cruelties, injus- 
tices, and irrationalities of war; next in order came the 
emphasis upon the futilities of war, the economic futil- 
ity, the political futility, the biological futility: that 
most, if not all of the alleged profits of war were illu- 
sory; that it settled boundaries and racial questions 
unwisely and temporarily, often with increasing aggra- 
vation; that its burdens fell most heavily upon the 
fittest and eliminated them from survival. The later 
stages of the argument became constructive — a pro- 
posal of measures by which the problems inclining to a 
military solution could be otherwise and more fitly and 
enduringly solved. Throughout, the growing incon- 
gruity of war with the spirit of the modern social order, 
the growing impossibility of war by reason of its cost 
and the interdependence of nations, directed considera- 
tion to the constructive measures of pacifism. 

In this evolution it was natural that the pacifist 
should for a time assume the negative role of the anti- 



366 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

militarist. The justification is clear: that peace estab- 
lishes its own defense. Peace is the acknowledged pre- 
condition for the weKare of art and science, of industry 
and the pursuit of happiness. Its interruption is a dis- 
aster; war is the institution that needs defense. If 
reason could decide, all that is needed is to show the 
monstrous folly of war and the futility and cruelty and 
human waste of war, and the argument for pacifism is 
won. So far we may agree that tiie burden of proof is 
rightly assigned : that it would be pointless to set forth 
the benefits of peace in a survey of pacifism. They 
will be granted in full measure in the assumptions of 
every discussion. If war is inevitable, peace is much 
more so. What the pacifist is called upon to set forth 
is the defense of peace against the militaristic attacks, 
and his own constructive poHcy for the future; like- 
wise his interpretation of the past and of the social, 
political, and intellectual forces now operative. 

The arguments confronting the pacifist are naturally 
the converse of those that he goes boldly to find in the 
enemy camp and seeks to put to rout; but when thus 
converted, they present a somewhat different front. 
The moral argument appears as the corruption in- 
herent in an enduring peace freed from the stiffening 
discipline of war. "The certainty of peace " — not the 
actual state of peace — " would, before the expiration 
of half a century, engender a state of corruption 
and decadence more destructive of men than the worst 
wars." It appears also in the inability of the peace rou- 
tine to summon the highest virtues u^on a large scale. 
"In peace man belongs to himseK. He knows no other 
law than his personal interest. He no longer has any 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 367 

other occupation than to seek his own good. The great- 
est virtue is self-abnegation, the spirit of self-sacri- 
fice, and it is in armies during war that that virtue is 
practiced. It is not only the individual whom war en- 
nobles, but also the entire nation." "War regenerates 
corrupted peoples, it awakens dormant nations, it 
rouses self-forgetful, self-abandoned races from their 
mortal languor. In all times war has been an essential 
factor in civilization. It has exercised a happy influ- 
ence upon customs, arts, and sciences." "Unless . . . 
war is the divinely appointed means by which the en- 
vironment may be adjusted until ethically ' fittest ' and 
*best * become synonymous, the outlook for the human 
race is too pitiable for words." "Yet unless human 
nature shall have been radically modified in the course 
of evolution, unless it shall have attained a moral 
strength and stature unknown at present, it appears 
certain that the attainment of this much desired uni- 
versal peace will be as the signal for the beginning of 
universal decay." ^ 

Arguments of this order are as diflScult to refute as 
to establish. In terms of evidence, incidents and prece- 
dents are far from comparable and may be selected as 
readily on one side as on the other: virile nations that 
are peaceful, and warring nations not notably virile, 
are as readily cited; for such instances are question- 

* The first two citations are from German, the last two from Eng- 
lish writers. In specific arguments the militarists of the two countries 
are often in close accord. But the setting of such citations in the Ger- 
man writers, even in the more responsible ones, shows a more uncom- 
promising position than obtains among the English. Arguments of 
moral and national benefit are more incidental to the German pre- 
sentation, in which the "might is right" doctrine dominates, while 
they are frequently central in English considerations. 



368 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

able by reason of the uncertainty of terms and the 
classification under these terms of the complications 
of human qualities. Precedents and parallels are usu- 
ally set with a backward reference and a one-sided 
emphasis; presumably they add little to conviction, 
but serve to reinforce prepossession. The fact is that 
historically war has always entered into the scheme of 
human affairs, as circumstances to be endured, cher- 
ished, or embraced. Men have always thought in terms 
of possible wars; they have expected them or dreaded 
them; plotted for them or boldly entered upon them. 
The charge that wars have been provoked to distract 
from internal dissensions and as a deliberate means of 
arousing enthusiasm for a cause is frequently made, 
and doubtless in some instances is true. To construct a 
warless history of mankind would be a speculative in- 
dulgence. If from all this one gathers that human 
nature, as well as man-made institutions, has had a 
gory nurse, and that human qualities have been tried 
and selected by the ordeals of battles, the conclusion 
is sound, but offers slight guidance for present-day 
conviction. The argument is too detached, too abstract, 
too»unadjusted to conditions and the changing forces 
of human progress to carry any definiteness of appli- 
cation. In the nature of things there can be no con- 
vincing parallel history free from the incidents of war; 
and causes settled without war seem inconclusive evi- 
dence on the other side, since the nations exercising 
them have also shared in the war-tradition. What the 
modern mind emphasizes is that history can never re- 
peat itself. Each apparent repetition is part of a newer 
cycle, on a different level of advance. Even a parallel 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 369 

evolution of a race of men accomplishing a parallel 
civilization entirely without warfare in some pacific 
Utopia (which the militarist would despise), such as 
might occur upon the planet bearing so inappropriate 
a name as Mars, would be of no avail. The rejoinder 
would be ready that conditions and human nature 
must be very different among Martians than on this 
distressful planet of ours. Obviously we do not go far 
on this route. 

If we turn to analogous phases in the actual historical 
evolution, we can obtain a more instructive parallel 
by observing the kinds of issues for which wars have 
been fought. Historians who write history in terms of 
the advances of the human mind, like Lecky and White, 
furnish the proper evidence and its interpretation. 
They point out that religious differences were at one 
time fertile causes of war; that differences of dogma 
were real enough to make men fight for them or wage 
war on heretics. That kind of war is now unthinkable 
among civilized peoples, though in this world-war it 
has still played a part under provocation in the fanati- 
cal Near-East. Wars for sheer piratical conquest by 
unprovoked invasion would not be tolerated; and ^Jie 
question as to what virtues might be furthered by such 
enterprises would not be permitted to arise. The only 
remaining motive for war is the patriotic one; and Lecky 
observes that the irrationality of the religious senti- 
ment on the one hand and of the patriotic sentiment 
on the other, and their interaction, constitute the core 
of the moral history of mankind. If the sentiment of 
patriotism could be similarly rationalized, similarly 
liberalized, the attitude toward war for this cause would 



370 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

approach the feeUng that now obtains toward a reli- 
gious war. The parallel is not complete, cannot be so, 
and leaves untouched the question of the ultimate de- 
fense of the soil and the home. Yet it is a true argu- 
ment in that it sets forth how the gradual ehmination 
of the accredited causes of war would render all other 
considerations of minor importance. 

Similarly, if we take up one by one the pacifist ver- 
sion of the arguments for war, we should be arguing 
that war does not select the strong and best; rather 
it weeds them out by destruction and leaves the 
weaker members to be the progenitors of the coming 
generations. We should be arguing that wars for de- 
fense cannot occur without an aggressor; so that the 
aims of the pacifist to make aggression increasingly 
diflScult and futile is the complete answer to that de- 
fense. We should be arguing that the natural combat- 
iveness of men under the prevailing order is less and 
less responsible for the outbreak of war, though it may 
be rehed upon to summon recruits when by other 
measures war has been provoked. We should be argu- 
ing that armaments prevent wars only when the re- 
course to war as a threat is itself a menace. We should 
be arguing that the internal differences that arouse a 
people to desperate measures, or again the just up- 
rising of a people in open and armed rebellion, are the 
very conditions which a proper social policy would 
prevent, once the energies of men were enlisted in a 
convinced pacific determination. We should be argu- 
ing that the alleged superiority of a nation inviting it 
to convert that excellence into a might must be aban- 
doned for a live-and-let-live poUcy, indeed for the pro- 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 371 

tection by the greater nations of the smaller ones, if the 
world is to go on at all ; and that such policy is already 
incorporated into the platform of all civilized peoples. 
We should be arguing that if adequate protection is to 
remain adequate, each nation anxious for an increas- 
ing margin of safety and never completely certain of 
its allies in the uncertainty of what is a defensive and 
what an offensive war, can only command perfect se- 
curity by making itself a little stronger than the other, 
in an impossible progression.^ And we should be con- 

1 There is a phase of the "defense" argument for war that pre- 
sents a paradox in the argument and an inconsistency in its adher- 
ents. It invites a like danger in its refutal. That for every defense 
there must bean aggression is clear. Novicow puts it thus: A man's 
first duty is not to defend his country; his first duty is not to attack 
the country of another. But this evades the issue, in that one cannot 
control the other man's country nor in private quarrels the other man; 
so that the question of preparing for such an event remains. Mr. 
Angell accuses his "wise" critics of committing themselves to some 
such statement as this: "The nations of Europe will shortly be en- 
gaged valiantly defending their homes against the armed hosts who 
resolutely refuse to attack them. This Armageddon will be particu- 
larly murderous and the battles particularly appalling because each 
army has for years been training itself to leave its neighbor alone. 
They will all defend themselves heroically to the last man against 
the attacks which nobody will consent to make." And again he re- 
plies to the charge of the militarist that "the peace of the world de- 
pends upon the armed forces of the nations " by interpreting this to 
mean that " if the nations had no armies, the wars between them would 
be appalling." As a satire upon the one-sidedness of some of the argu- 
ments for war, this is fair and to the point. But it does not reach the 
core of the actual situation or the actual policies and convictions. Un- 
til the entire question of attack and defense is placed upon a differ- 
ent footing of probability, the measure of defense is likely to be rated 
by the estimated probability of failure to persuade the potential 
aggressor to desist. That the same preparation is available for attack 
as for defense means that in playing one game, we are really playing 
two; and the diflBculty in holding to the original intention may be a 
valid argument for providing for that intention in a less dangerous 
manner. It is true that one cannot so shoot as to miss the mark if 
it is a cow and hit it if it is a deer; but that does not prove that a 



372 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

stantly pointing to parallels in which police force has 
replaced military force to the enduring benefit of all 
concerned. We should be pointing out that in all the 
parallel sources of human friction, involving the same 
pugnacious impulses, war has been gradually elimi- 
nated as a form of arbitrament, from duels and feuds, 
from local and partisan struggle; that when recourse is 
taken to the power of might (apart from the exercise 
of a personal police force of self-defense), we look upon 
it as a regrettable lapse from the established order, 
whether it occurs in lynchings or riots, in strikes or 
incipient revolutions. The elaborations of these refu- 
tals make up a considerable body of the literature of 
pacifism. They are accessible to all and have played 
an important part in its growing influence. Yet their 

gun is useless. The pacifist must be careful not to commit in refutal 
the same order of plausible fallacy as the militarist succumbs to in 
defense. On the other hand, Mr. Angell is quite right in accusing the 
rather aggressive militarists who are always insisting that their pri- 
mary aim is peace, of a glaring inconsistency when they throw the 
weight of their influence unreservedly in favor of military protection, 
and decline to consider with like seriousness other measures in the 
interest of the cause of peace. 

Mr. Angell uses the analogy of religious wars to refute another com- 
mon militarist misconception. One might argue that the Huguenots 
were glorious in that they brought out the noble qualities of martyrs, 
also their fighting qualities. To the alleged implication that the paci- 
fist would not have advised them to fight, Mr. Angell replies: "Of 
com-se no one means that they should not have fought, but we all 
mean that they should not have been compelled to fight. It is a noble 
thing to see a man go to the stake for his faith, but it is a vile thing 
that he should be compelled to do so. The resistance to the Inquisi- 
tion was magnificent; the fact of the Inquisition was an abomination." 
The argument that the Greeks displayed the qualities necessary to 
resist the Persians cannot overlook the fact that the Persians had the 
qualities inclining them to destroy the culture of Greece. Attack 
and defense are everywhere two-sided; which means that they must 
be considered together. Their treatment under a militaristic and 
under a pacifistic conception are separate constructions. 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 373 

power to carry conviction, as indeed the willingness to 
expose one's mind to their appeal, remains subject to 
the temperamental inclination that disposes one con- 
genially toward pacifism or keeps one immune to its 
doctrines. 

Argument can do little more to produce conviction; 
the spreading of the campaign as a proselyting force 
must do the rest. If the impression already made is 
limited in proportion to its inherent strength, the cause 
must be found in the logic of long-established institu- 
tions, vested interests, and the mental inertia which 
they cherish, not in a spirit of worship of tradition, but 
of a conservative prudence. As the abolitionists, or 
the "equal suffragists," had a long career of unpopu- 
larity, an uphill campaign against thick prejudice to 
overcome, before their cause became serious, respected, 
and at length dominant; and as long before a decision 
was reached by conflict of arms or opinions or ballots, 
the causes were first and firmly established in the minds 
of men, and only later in their practical policies and 
decisions, so must pacifism pass through the same 
evolution. Events may hasten or they may retard the 
issue. The essential step in their hastening that argu- 
ment can perform to strengthen the psychology of 
conviction, is to face the logic of reality and by plau- 
sible construction induce reflective minds to enter upon 
the venture. 

VII 

The culminating aspect of militarism and pacifism 
is reached when these principles and their establish- 
ment are considered with reference to the systems of 



374 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

government with whicli they congenially assimilate. 
What is the nature of the institutional forces and what 
the underlying principle of political rule which readily 
incorporate and are moulded by the policies of mili- 
tarism, and what is the nature of the forces favorable 
to pacifism? Answering in terms of tendencies, and 
neglecting unessential qualifications, mihtarism is con- 
sistently enlisted in the support and structure of abso- 
lutism; pacifism is the natural ally of democracy. Shall 
the will of the dynastic ruler or the will of the people 
prevail? The case of Germany is the extreme but 
the significant extreme instance. Admittedly Germany 
represents the militarized form of absolutism. In the 
Teutonic conception the State absorbs the individual, 
subordinates all personal to State interests. It makes 
for paternaHsm, wise and unwise, for petty officialdom 
and domineering bureaucracy, for pedantry and arro- 
gance, no less than for mihtary dominance and its 
counterpart — a servile docility. The central factor 
in the institution is the dynastic supremacy, which 
when exercised in the temper of a fanatical Kaiser, self- 
appointed as the vicar of Providence, overshadows the 
pohtical as well as all other phases of the system. With 
this conception thus circumstanced, the imperial am- 
bition and ruthless aggressiveness follow inevitably; 
and the army becomes the autocratic embodiment of 
the will of the State. The existence of such a system 
implies a complete subordination of the citizens, a sup- 
pression of liberty of thought and action in other 
temper, a thorough indoctrination of the people in the 
dynastic prerogative. That type of absolutism can be 
maintained only by a rigorous military rule. 



, MILITAEISM AND PACIFISM 375 

It does not follow that militarism leads to absolu- 
tism, or absolutism to militarism unreservedly. The 
absolutist form of government freed from an ambitious 
imperialism might confine the military rule to internal 
regulations. Yet historically and actually such a sup- 
position is improbable; the interdependence as well as 
the rivalry of the nations of the modern world makes 
it so. The absolutist system and the militaristic rule 
develop congenially and consistently. The decline of 
absolutism is the indispensable condition for the reduc- 
tion of militarism. Upon this conclusion the humanely 
reflective nations of the world are agreed. Absolutism 
is the chief defender of the most dangerous form of 
militarism. Its danger is the more menacing for the 
reason that any one nation, if powerful and unre- 
stricted in its preparations, can precipitate a war, 
while it requires the concert of all to maintain peace. 

Beyond this sanctioned premise, conclusions are 
complex. Yet a further conclusion appears : that armies 
and the policy of their support form an international 
interest, and must eventually yield to an international 
regulation. Under the present order the existence of a 
large and efficient army is compatible with a moderate, 
a liberal, even a skeptical attitude toward militarism. 
A democratic government pacifically inclined, might 
welcome a relief from an excessive military burden; yet 
may find it necessary to maintain a powerful military 
establishment, for the very reason that it cannot be 
assured of the same temper in its neighbors and has 
no adequate means of controlling them. Moreover such 
a nation will have liberalized its military organization 
and have made it an expression of the same civilizing 



376 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

principles which have brought about its pohtical democ- 
racy and its protection of individual liberty. Such a 
nation will have developed a high regard for the mili- 
tary profession, and have assigned honorable place 
to the protective function of the State. The army as 
an instrument, along with others, of the freely deter- 
mined will of the State is a vastly different matter from 
an army as tyrant and master. The essential attitude 
toward militarism cannot be inferred from the size of 
the national army or the measures for maintaining it, 
but from the spirit of its organization and its accredited 
place in the political structure. Militarism makes large 
armies; but large armies may be an uncertain evidence 
of a militaristic conviction. The distinction between a 
police force and an army is familiar. Independently of 
size, equipment or organization, the two may have a 
common purpose so long as they are protective and 
defensive. The very conception of a police force is the 
existence of a common, well-understood will. The ac- 
credited uses to which a police force will be put are 
likewise understood. In the case of an unusual upris- 
ing when the civilian police force is inadequate, the 
military force may be called upon without changing the 
nature of the proceeding. An army exists primarily to 
repel an invading foreign force; it is prepared to resist 
aggression from without. But just there lies the dan- 
gerous distinction between defense and offense; it is 
the uncertainty of the temper in which that distinc- 
tion will be made that arouses the suspicion of the en- 
tire military system, as at present conceived. In such a 
country as Germany the very scale and thoroughness 
of the preparations argue against a merely defensive 



MILITAEISM AND PACIFISM 377 

intention. So aggressive is the very organization, so 
complete the hold upon the popular mind, that a vast 
army organized for action becomes restless under in- 
activity, and at length eagerly looks to the day — ^'der 
Tag"" — when it can try its strength. That charge 
would not apply to all large armies; as ever, the temper 
of the organization decides. 

But the temptation to use force when force is there 
to be used, together with the awful magnitude of its 
power, remain sources of temptation. In pioneer days 
when everybody carried a "gun," shooting was fre- 
quent; going unarmed may at times be inconvenient, 
but an unarmed community is safer than an armed 
community. The comparison cannot be applied with- 
out large qualifications, to national situations; but the 
principle holds. The conclusion is conceded that in 
many a situation the use of force is indispensable, but 
the limitation of its use even more so. A constructive 
pacifism not only agrees to this, but urges the neces- 
sity of a police force to restrain combative and lawless 
impulses, to provide for emergencies which no system 
is adequate to prevent. Pacifism in its practical tem- 
per, far from assuming a universal pacific disposition 
or the readiness of all nations to come under its sway, 
insists that this ugly quarrelsomeness and natural 
pugnacity shall be brought under adequate institu- 
tionalized authority; only thus can they be counter- 
acted, if need be, nullified by force. Hence the demand 
for an international police-force to keep the peace 
between nations; such force shall act in the national 
sphere — different as it is — in the same interests as 
the law upholds in the quarrels of groups and individ- 



878 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

uals. The pacifism of to-day is intensely practical- 
minded and is made increasingly so by tlie stress of the 
war and the issues awaiting immediate settlement. 
Its supreme purpose is to incorporate into that settle- 
ment some distinct and adequate pacific guarantee, 
framed not in the older temper of give and take — so 
prone to degenerate to shrewd barter and secret con- 
nivance — but in the spirit of an international convic- 
tion definitely opposed to settlement by war. That 
same practical-mindedness focuses its attack upon the 
aggressive menace of war (since the cry of "forced upon 
us " must as often be the hollow excuse of a hypocritical 
lie, as it is an approach to the truth), and consequently 
places the limitation of armaments as a measure of 
prime importance in its programme. In brief the day 
of the pacifist statesman is at hand; not the least sig- 
nificant mission of pacifism is the redemption of states- 
manship.^ 

If, then, the world is so nearly agreed that the most 
ominous incitations to war shall be intercepted, the 
most serious aggravations reduced, the principles of 
democracy and the self-determination of peoples se- 

* The discussion of pacifism in the sphere of practical politics is 
obviously the next stage, already heralded. It cannot be included 
here. Yet mention should be made of a punitive weapon to be used 
in the prevention of war, which pacifism*supports: the economic boy- 
cott. The object is to make clear to any recalcitrant nation tending 
to an aggressive war, the economic failure that will result; it offers 
the alternative of swords or ploughshares. It takes advantage of 
the modern interdependence of nations, and offers an economic sub- 
stitute for war as a part of the policy of a practical pacifism. It gives 
a new tone to Weltpolitik and will doubtless enter into the platform of 
a league of nations. For economic profit, while not the cause of war, 
is apt to be the stake for which war is played. Withdrawal of the 
stake seconds the withdrawal of armament. 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 379 

cured, armaments limited, a league of nations or some 
equally strong guarantee devised, small countries pro- 
tected and great ones freed from temptation or means 
to use their strength unjustly, the arguments for mili- 
tarism and pacifism seem needless, and only retrospec- 
tively significant. For a more fortunate generation that 
may come to be the case; at present it is far from being 
so. It is precisely when principles are moving prom- 
isingly toward practice that a controversy attains its 
truest pertinence, and the examination of positions is 
most needed. 

The unprincipled action of Germany in the first in- 
stance by making war, in the second instance by the 
German conduct of war, in the third instance by the 
German mode of defense of its war and its lawlessness, 
and in many more instances by the shocking demon- 
stration not alone of the horrors of warfare thus spon- 
sored, but still more convincingly of the complete sub- 
version of every moral interest of civilization, — by 
such drastic logic has the chief protagonist of militarism 
made the case of pacifism versus miHtarism incandes- 
cently clear, brutally obvious. From this extreme 
assault the cause of militarism will never recover; the 
association of militarism with Prussianism will long 
reflect the stigma of the one back upon the other. By 
demonstrating the terrible consequences of militarism 
carried to its ruthless extreme, Germany has given the 
death-blow to the cause that she espoused. Without 
the unspeakable infamy of that desecration, the world 
might but slowly have realized, indeed, have flatly re- 
fused to consider that the principles of any system of 
government, even in the chaos of war, could have such 



380 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONVICTION 

an issue. Any argument setting forth such a menace 
as a possibility seriously to be considered would have 
been dismissed as the ghastly dream of a febrile misan- 
thrope. And yet when we recover, as best we may, 
from the staggering blow to our faith in a partially 
redeemed humanity, we become responsibly aware 
that the practical problem facing the thinkers of all 
nations cannot take its complexion from this, any 
more than from any other extreme position. We must 
learn once again, even as we resolve upon its extinc- 
tion, to think of militarism in more temperate mood, 
in a fairer consideration of the place of force nationally 
and internationally organized, in an imperfectly ad- 
justed politically-minded world. For by adjusting our 
convictions to the clear reality of fact we prove the 
practical worth of reason, — our loyalty to intelligence 
as the sane control of the highest interests of mankind. 
Thus reflecting we become responsibly aware of the 
folly of trusting to any set of principles unadjusted to 
the situation to which they are to be applied; we be- 
come responsibly aware that we do not compromise an 
end by applying ourselves conscientiously to the con- 
struction of the safest means, nor forsake a goal by 
scrupulous attention to the wisest route. We become 
responsibly convinced that if pacifism is limited to a 
conviction that at all hazards war must instantly cease 
and our own swords be turned to ploughshares, whether 
the swords of the enemy be sheathed or sharpened, such 
narrowness of vision makes any approximation to peace 
indefinitely remote. We become responsibly content 
to move slowly and wisely, if assured that each step 
secures the direction of our progress. Yet we are still 



MILITARISM AND PACIFISM 381 

more responsibly alert to the critical need of a critical 
hour, and are prepared to break with the past in a bold 
venture for the future. Indeed, the supreme need is for 
men of large vision, determined to establish a war-freed 
world. Pacifism calls for its heroes in no uncertain tones, 
calls for them in the thunder of war to enlist in the army 
of the embattled nations resolved to win the war that 
shall end war. 

This battle-cry of a distressed world appeals with a 
special claim to the convinced pacifist; it demands a 
higher than national patriotism. Not forsaking the 
one, but infusing it with a quality of sympathy for all 
nationally patriotic endeavor, it proceeds upon the 
multiplied security of pledged allies to demand the 
sacrifice of the unlimited sovereignty of one's own na- 
tion for the cause of the unlimited sovereignty of hu- 
manity. The nations that lead in such a movement, 
heralding the day of the international-mindedness of 
all responsible peoples, will prove their devotion to the 
inspiration of pacifism. Darkened as that conviction 
may well be by the increasing menace that the victory 
may prove inconclusive, even that the forces of might 
by the very treachery and frightfulness that is their 
strength, may extend their power over a world unpre- 
pared to resist such a diabolical attack, that convic- 
tion may yet find hope in the settled determination 
which the world-war has scarred upon the agonized 
hearts of men. The responsible idea of democracy re- 
mains : to make the world safe for pacifism. 



INDEX 



As this index is necessarily confined to topics of general character 
for which accepted terms vary, the analytical table of contents should 
be constantly consulted in connection with the index. 



Absent treatment. See Christian 
Science. 

Absolutism, 375 ff. 

^sop, 144. 

Esthetic, 6, 7. 

Alchemy, 14. 

Allies, the, 337. 

America, 50. 

Angell, Norman, 354, 371 (note), 
372 (note). ^ 

Animal intelligence, actual per- 
formance, 180-88; alleged per- 
formance, 180-88; compared 
with child intelligence, 175-77, 
177-80; nature of, 174-76, 188- 
90. 

Animal magnetism. See Magnet- 
ism, animal. 

Anthropology, and character, 166- 
72. 

Anti-vaccination, 257-60. 

Anti-vivisection, xii, 257-60. 

Arbitration. See War and sub- 
stitutes. 

Arens, Edward J., 200, 201. 

Aristotle, 42, 141, 158 (note). 

Astarte, 57. 

Astrology, 14, 136, 143, 144. 

Babylon, 37. 

Bacon, 55 (note). 

Bacon, Friar. See Friar Bacon. 

Bahnsen, Julius, 170. 

Bain, Alexander, cited, 169 (note). 

Balfour, Arthur James, cited, 70 
(note). 

Belief, and congeniality, 43; and 
the social impulse, 42; and tra- 
dition, 43; and verification, 44; 
fixation of, 40 ff. See also Con- 
viction. 



Bell, Charles, 164. 

Beringer, 12. 

Berkeley, Bishop, 55 (note). 

Bernhardi, General von, 349. 

Black Art, 228-30. 

Blavatsky, Mme., 56. 

Boer War, 342. 

Bonaparte, Prince Roland, 115. 

Braid, James, 145. 

Br'er Rabbit, 144. 

Brown, Lucretia L. S., 200. 

Buckle, cited, Q5. 

Burdach, K. F., 170. 

Burton, cited, 140, 141. 

Butler, Bishop, 75, 77. 

Cagliostro, 56. 

Cardan, Jerome, 142, 143, 145, 

158 (note). 
Carlyle, cited, 137. 
Carrington, Hereward, 104, 114. 
Carus, K. G., 171. 
"Case" method, the, ix, 9 ff., 220: 

of alcohol, 246 ff.; of indulgence, 

21, 246 ff.; of militarism and 

pacifism, 21 ; of Paladino, 101 ff. ; 

of the feminine mind, 21; of 

tobacco, 246 ff. 
Charleston, 57. 
Chiaia, Professor, 103. 
Christian Science, 33, 192, 197 ff.: 

and absent treatment, 209 ff.; 

menace of, 213-17; theory of. 



Clarke, F. W., cited, 64 (note). 
Clifford, W. K., cited, 70. 
Compromise, 241. See Practice. 
Conduct. See Conviction and 

conduct. 
Consistency. See Conviction and 

consistency. 



384 



INDEX 



Controversy, and knowledge, 22; 
and predilection, 22; logical 
basis of, 20 ff . ; practical aspects 
of, 246-50; psychological basis 
of, 20 ff. See also Conviction 
and controversy. 

Convention. See Conviction and 
convention. 

Conviction, aesthetic factor in, 82; 
and conduct, 7-9; and conform- 
ity, 3; see also Convention; and 
consistency, 30 ff., 85 ff., 91 ff.; 
and convention, viii, 2-4; and 
controversy, 20 ff., 218-24, 
246-50; and emotion, x, 1; and 
fanaticism, 84; and logical 
prestige, 77 ff . ; and motives, 27; 
and objective behef, 10; and the 
occidt, 31 ff.; and practice, 39 ff., 
64 ff.; and prepossession, 118; 
see also Will to Believe; and 
reserved areas, 17, 88 ff.; and 
satisfaction, 5 ff., 9, 84; and sen- 
timent, 25, 26, 264 ff.; and the 
subconscious, 26, 27; and the 
subjective attitude, 10, 121, 
129 ; andsympathy, 48 ff ., 70, 71 ; 
Freudian view of, 26-30; growth 
of, 34, 35, 40 ff., 49, 130; general 
psychology of, 1 ff., 15 ff.; logic 
of, vii, 79 ff., 87, 95 ff., 113-16, 
122, 129, 161, 342 ff.; personal 
aspects of, 24 ff.; psychology 
of, 80 ff., 84 ff., 97-100, 101- 
03, 124 ff.; service of, 78; sup- 
ports of, 6, 7. 

Copan, 38. 

Credulity, antidote of, 73; as to 
fact, 53-56, 64 ff., 71 ff.; as to 
theory, 51, 64 ff., 71 ff., 94 ff.; 
background of, 63 ff.; dramatic 
types of, 52 ff . See also Fallacy 
and false beliefs. 

Crusaders, 12, 52 (note). 

Darieux, Dr., 115. 
Darwin, Charles, 128, 148 (note). 
Death prayer, 192, 193 (note). 
Deception, 54; cases of, 56 ff., 

106 ff.; psychology of, 110 ff. 
De Fontenay, M., 104 (note). 
De Morgan, cited, 50 (note), 64. 



De Rochas, Colonel, 104 (note). 

Descartes, 163. 

Dessoir, Dr. Max, 110, 165 (note). 

Digby, Sir Kenehn, 65 (note). 

Dowie, John A., 256. 

Diirer, Albrecht, 139 (note). 

Earle, John, cited, 133. 

Eastman, Dr., 201. 

Eddy, Mrs. Mary Baker Glover, 

33, 191, 195-207, 209, 210, 213; 

personal delusions of, 191, 199- 

206. 
Education, and democracy, 221 ff.; 

control of, 224 ff. 
Effigy, hanging in, 192. 
Egypt, 37. 
Ehot, George, 132. 
EHis, Havelock, cited, 302, 320, 

325. 
"fimile," 59. 
Emotion. See Conviction and 

emotion. 
Empedocles, 133. 
Ethological Journal, 159 (note). 
Ethological Society, 159 (note). 
Evans, E. P., cited, 58 (note). 
Evil eye, 192. 

Fallacy and false beliefs, 9 ff., 14. 
See also Credulity. 

Faust, 222. 

Feminine, endowment, 282, 284; 
and disqualification, 312, 315; 
and feminism, 316 ff.; and poli- 
tics, 320 ff.; and sex specializa- 
tion, 285-88; mind, 302 ff.; sup- 
porting qualities of, 302, 304. 

Flammarion, Professor, 104 
(note) . 

Flourens, 153. 

Food, avoidances, 255; and aesthet- 
ics, 252-54, 261; and drugs, 
256 ff.; and indulgence, 254; 
and physiology, 251, 271; and 
poison, 255; and sentiment, 261. 

Fossils, "case" of, 11-13. 

Foster, Dr., 204. 

Foster, Sir Michael, cited, 165 
(note). 

Fouille, Alfred, cited, 165 (note). 

Franco-Prussian War, 347. 



INDEX 



385 



Frederick the Great, 64. 
Freud, Dr. Sigmund, 26. 27. 
Freudian, 26-32. 
Friar Bacon, 222. 

Galen, 137, 138, 162, 163. 

Galileo, 42, 150. 

Gall, Dr. Franz Joseph, 149, 150, 

152-56, 158, 166. 
German, x, 335, 337, 342, 344, 

(note), 350. 
Germany, 345 (note), 346, 348, 

349, 350 (note), 374, 376, 379. 
Goethe, 146. 
Greeks, 297, 372 (note). 

Hall, G. Stanley, cited, 165 (note). 

Hall, Marshall, 164. 

Haller, 164, 165. 

Harvey, 14, 138, 140, 164. 

Hauser, Kaspar, 59, 60. 

Hawaii, 192. 

Hegel, 346. 

Hellenes, 44. 

Hehnholtz, 164. 

Heresy, 225-28. 

Hippocrates, 14, 128, 133, 134, 

137,162,163. 
Hodgson, Dr. Richard, cited, 160 

(note). 
Holmes, Dr., 49 (note), 54, 55 

(note). 
Holy Land, 12. 
Homoeopathy, 83. 
Huarte, cited, 170. 
Huguenots, 372 (note). 
"Humors," 134, 135. 
Huxley, 53, 55. 
Hypnotism, 196. 

He Roubaud, 104. 

Index Expurgatorius, 42. 

Indulgence, and the environment, 
265 ff., 277-79; and excess, 268; 
and suppression, 273 ff.; and 
temperance, 269-72; psychol- 
ogy of, 246 ff . 

Inquisition, 42. 

Intolerance. See Tolerance. 

James, William, cited, 70, 78, 354, 
355, 359. 



Jeanne d'Arc, 58. 
"Jim Key," 176, 181-83, 187. 
Jogand-Paves, Gabriel, 56. 
Jonson, Ben, cited, 139 (note). 

Kant, Immanuel, 170. 

Keller, Helen, 67. 

Kennedy, Richard, 198, 200, 201. 

Kipling, Rudyard, cited, 280. 

Klages, L., cited, 165 (note). 

"KlugeHans," 176, 178, 183, 184. 

Lavater, Johann Caspar, 129, 145- 
49, 151, 152, 158 (note), 166. 

Le Bon, Professor, 112, 115, 116, 
123. 

Le Brun, 148 (note). 

Lecky, 349, 369. 

Leo XIII, 56. 

Leonard, Mrs., 205 (note). 

Lessing, 170. 

Leuba, Professor, cited, 105 (note). 

Levy, A., cited, 165 (note). 

Locke, John, 138. 

Lodge, Sir Oliver, cited, 104, 112. 

Logic, evolution of, 10, 15, 34, 35, 
38 ff.; unperfect, 10 ff.; of con- 
viction, see Conviction, logic of; 
distinctions, 6, 7; sense, 8, 39. 

Lombroso, Professor, 103, 104. 

Lotze, Hermann, 171. 

Lowell, J. R., cited, 44, 74. 

Lucian, 74. 

Lucifer, 57. 

MacDougal, Professor, cited, 165 
(note). 

Magnetism, animal, 191-217. 

Mahan, Captain, 355. 

Majendi, 164. 

Malapert, cited, 165 (note). 

Manipulations, 196-99. 

Masonic Sisters, 57. 

Maxwell, Dr. J., 104 (note). 

Medicine, and the temperaments, 
137 ff. 

Mental malpractice, 201-03. See 
Christian Science. 

Mesmer and mesmerism, 193-96. 

Militarism, 326 ff.; and concep- 
tion" of the State, 373 ff.; as po- 
litical stabilizer, 355-57; at- 



386 



INDEX 



tack upon, 352-55; German ex- 
pressions of, 346-50; tempered 
defense of, 350 ff . See also Paci- 
fism. 

Mill, John Stuart, cited, 169 (note) . 

Miller, Professor, cited, 119. 

Milmine, Miss, cited, 202 (note), 
206 (note). 

Mind-cure, 15. 

Moll, Dr. A., cited, 110, 111. 

Moral, 6, 7. 

Morley, Lord, cited, 46, 49. 

Morselli, Professor, 104 (note). 

Mtiller, Johannes, 170. 

Myers, F. W. H., cited, 104, 111. 

Nervous system, 162 ff. 
Newton, 150. 
Nietzsche, 347, 348. 
Novicow, cited, 371 (note). 
Noyes, Dr. Rufus K., 201. 
Nuremberg, 59, 60. 

Ohio, serpent mound of, 38. 

Pacificism, 326 ff.; and conception 
of the State, 373 ff.; as means 
and end, 336; as reservation, 
^341; constructive aspects of, 
378; defense of, 364 ff.; different 
orders of, 330, 341-46; distorted 
views of, 338 ff.; fanatic types 
of, 331; triumph of, 380. See 
also Militarism. 

Paladino, Eusapia, 18, 31, 102- 
12, 116-21, 123, 124. 

Palmistry, 14. 

Paracelsus, 138. 

Paulhan, cited, 165 (note). 

Peace, contributions of, 364 ff. 
See also Pacifism. 

Peirce, C. S., cited, 39, 41, 45. 

Perkins, 55 (note). 

Persians, 372 (note). 

Pertelote, 139 (note). 

Phi Beta Kappa, 306. 

Phrenology, 14, 81, 82, 137, 149- 
55; and hypnotism, 154; practi- 
cal applications of, 155-59. 

Physiognomy, 14, 136, 141 ff., 
145-49. 

Pius IX, 56. 



Pompeii, 38. 

Porta, Giovanni Baptista della, 
144, 145, 158 (note). 

Poyen, Charles, 196. 

Practice, 39 ff .-47; and expediency, 
70 ff . ; and theory, 67 ff ., 222-24, 
238-40. See also Conviction 
and practice. 

Prepossession, see Will to believe. 
See also Conviction and prepos- 
session. 

Prestige, 125, 126. 

Pseudo-science, 136, 142 ff., 155- 
59, 213-17. 

Psychical research, 16. 

Psychology, and temperament, 
117 ff. See also Conviction, per- 
sonal aspects of. 

Puritanism, 263. 

Quimby, "Dr." P. P., 195, 198, 

203 (note). 

Reason. See Sensibility. 
Reserved areas. See Conviction 

and reserved areas. 
Ribery, Th., cited, 165 (note). 
Richet, Professor, 103, 104, 110. 
Riley, Professor Woodbridge, 346. 
Romans, 297. 

St. Andrews, Bishop of, 142. 

Salem, 200. 

Satisfaction. See Conviction and 
satisfaction. 

Schiaparelli, 57. 

Scriptures, 42. 

Sensibility, and reason, 6. 

Sex, traits, 288 ff.; and civiliza- 
tion, 299-302; derivative, 289; 
feminine, 296-99; interpreta- 
tion of, 313, 314 ff.; masculine, 
291-96; tests of, 306 ff.; trans- 
ferred, 290, 292-96, 299-301. 

Shand, A. F., cited, 165 (note). 

Sidgwick, Professor, cited. 111. 

Singapore, 57. 

Society for Psychical Research, 
105 (note). See Psychical Re- 
search. 

Socrates, 67, 141, 

Speech, freedom of, xii, 225 ff. 



INDEX 



387 



"Spirit" theory of disease, 135. 

Spotford, Daniel, 200, 201, 204. 

Spurzheim, Dr. Johann Caspar, 
149, 150-52, 155, 157, 158, 160. 

Stael, Mme. de, 302. 

Stanhope, Earl of, 59. 

Sternberg, cited, 165 (note). 

Stetson, Mrs. Augusta E., 207, 
208. 

Supernatural powers, 31, 75 ff.; 
belief in personal, 16-19; in ani- 
mals, 19-20, 173 ff.; physical 
cases, 18, 89, 90, 107, ff. 

Supporting qualities. See Femi- 
nine mind, supporting qualities 
of. 

Suppression. See Indulgence and 
suppression. 

Survivals, 16 ff., 49. 

Swedenborgians, 94. 

Sydenham, 138. 

Sylvius, 138. 

Taboo, 3. 

Taxil, Leo, 5Q, 57, 58. 

Temperaments, 13, 14, 133 ff.; 
literary expressions of, 139, 140. 

Theophrastus, 131, 132, 133. 

Theory. See Practice and theory. 

Tolerance, xi, 33, 88, 93, 276. See 
also Consistency. 

Tradition. See Convention; Be- 
lief. 



Treitschke, 348, 349. 
Trent, 58. 

Universities, 230-32, 234-37. 

Vatican, 56. 

Vaughan, Diana, 57, 58. 
Vaughan, Thomas, 57. 
Vesalius, 138, 163. 
Voltaire, 12 . 

Wallace, Alfred Russel, 160 (note). 

Wallas, Graham, cited, 165 (note). 

War, and moral values, 334; and 
substitutes, 356-59; and the 
judicial attitude, 332; causes of, 
369-72; moral defense of, 359 ff . ; 
moral causes of, 360-64; objec- 
tions to, 343 ff. See also Mili- 
tarism. 

Wells, H. G., 1. 

Whately, cited, 69. 

Whitby, C. J , cited, 165 (note). 

White, Andrew D., cited, 12 
(note), 46, 165 (note), 369. 

Will to believe, 75 ff. See also 
Conviction and prepossession; 
Supernatural powers. 

Willis, 138, 163. 

Xantippe, 302. 
Young, Brigham, 93. 
Zopyrus, 141. 



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